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Security recommendations
github-actions[bot] edited this page 2026-08-26 08:54:16 +00:00
3proxy Security Considerations
- Never install 3proxy suid. If you need it to run suid, write a wrapper with a fixed configuration file.
- Make the configuration file accessible only to the account 3proxy starts with.
- Under Windows, if 3proxy is used as a service, create a new unprivileged local account without "logon locally" rights. Assign this account to the 3proxy service.
- Under Unix, use chroot to jail 3proxy (make sure files included in the configuration file after the 'chroot' command, if any, are available from within the jail).
- Under Unix, either start 3proxy with an unprivileged account or, if you need some privileged ports to be used by 3proxy, use setgid/setuid commands inside 3proxy.cfg immediately after the last occurrence of a service bound to a privileged port in the configuration file (setgid must precede setuid).
- Always use full paths in the configuration file.
- Try to avoid 'strong' authentication, because only cleartext authentication is currently available.
- Always specify internal and external interfaces.
- Always limit connections to the internal network and localhost (to 127.0.0.1 and all interfaces) with ACLs. Be careful, because the BIND command in SOCKS requires the BIND method with the external interface IP address to be allowed.
- Services resolve IPv4 only unless told otherwise ('-4' is the default). Enabling IPv6 with '-6', '-46' or '-64' makes every ACL written in IPv4 incomplete, because the same host can be asked for in another way. A proxy that denies 127.0.0.1 but has IPv6 enabled still reaches that host as '::ffff:127.0.0.1', and reaches the machine again as '::1', which is a different address the IPv4 rule never mentioned. When IPv6 is enabled, deny the mapped form '::ffff:0:0/96' as well unless it is needed, and deny the IPv6 addresses that correspond to whatever the IPv4 rules protect: '::1' and '::' for the local machine, 'fe80::/10' for link-local and 'fc00::/7' for unique local addresses. Denying the IPv4 spelling alone is not enough.
- With '-46' or '-64' a name resolves to either family, so a target ACL that names only one of a host's addresses does not limit that host. Names are resolved into separate caches, and a name that resolves to an IPv6 address is only cached when 'nscache6' is configured.
- The 'admin' service hands out counters, the list of running services and a way to trigger a configuration reload. Bind it to an internal interface, and put authentication and an ACL in front of it. The '-s' option limits what the pages offer but is not authentication.
- The 'echo' and 'data' operations of the 'http' command exist for testing. 'data' returns a response of whatever size the request asks for, so a listener offering it to anyone is a traffic amplifier. Do not configure them on a public service.
- 'ssl_server_ca_key' is the private key of a certificate authority that clients have been told to trust. Anyone who obtains it can impersonate any site to those clients, so protect it as a signing key and use a CA created for this purpose only, never one that is trusted for anything else. Restrict the 'ssl_certcache' directory as well: it holds the certificates generated from that key.
- Interception ('ssl_mitm') ends the guarantee the client believes it has. The full URL of every request inside the tunnel, query string included, becomes visible to the proxy and reaches the log, where a plain CONNECT would have shown only a host and a port. Treat those logs accordingly.
- Certificates generated for interception by a build against wolfSSL carry no key identifiers, because that library cannot generate certificate extensions, and a client verifying strictly (OpenSSL 'x509_strict', which recent Python enables by default) rejects them. Builds against OpenSSL generate them. Where they are missing, turning verification off in the client removes the protection interception was supposed to preserve; use an OpenSSL build instead.
- Regular expression rules ('pcre', 'pcre_rewrite') are matched without authentication and do not replace ACLs. A rewrite that would change the method or the destination of a request is ignored, because the destination was already authorized; do not rely on one to redirect traffic.
- Before 3proxy 0.8, always use nserver and nscache under Unix; otherwise, a DoS attack is possible with an unreachable DNS server (because gethostbyname will block other threads).
- Keep logs in a secure location, because some confidential information from user requests can be logged.
- Use -xyz+A character filtering sequences for 'logformat', especially with ODBC logging, to prevent SQL and log record injections.
- With the 'cacheacl' authentication type the ACL result is cached and is not re-evaluated on a cache hit, so every field the ACL limits must be a part of the 'authcache' key. Any field the ACL limits but the key does not contain makes the cached result apply to a request it was not computed for, and that limitation is not enforced. Use 'user' and 'pass' for the userlist, 'ip' for the sourcelist, 'dstaddr' and 'dsthost' for the targetlist, 'dstport' for the targetportlist and 'dstoper' for the operationlist. Use plain 'cache' instead of 'cacheacl' if ACLs may change during the cache lifetime; cache entries are not invalidated by a configuration reload.
- 'cacheacl' must not be used together with parent proxies. The ACL is not walked on a cache hit, so no redirection is applied and the request is sent directly instead of through the 'parent' proxy of the matching ACL entry, without any error. If the parent proxy is the only sanctioned path to the network, this silently bypasses it. Use 'cache' instead. 'parent ... extip' is the only redirection which survives, and only if 'ext' is a part of the 'authcache' key.
- The destination of every datagram of a SOCKSv5 UDP association is authorized, but only with the default '-U3' (or '-U2') of the 'socks' service. With '-U0' or '-U1' only the first destination of an association is authorized, so ACLs limiting the destination do not restrict the rest of the association.
- Immediately report all service crashes to the developers.
- Participate in code audit :)