LibreChat/api/server/services/MCP.js
Danny Avila 250aca375a
🔗 fix: Resolve MCP Tool-Key Boundary Against Configured Server Names (#14448)
* fix: resolve MCP tool-name delimiter collision at invocation time

MCP tool keys are identified internally as `${rawToolName}${mcp_delimiter}${serverName}`
(delimiter `_mcp_`). Several call sites parsed this back apart with a naive
`toolKey.split(Constants.mcp_delimiter)`, assuming the delimiter occurs exactly once.

When the raw upstream tool name itself contains the delimiter substring - which
happens whenever it's exposed through a gateway that prefixes aggregated tool names by
server (e.g. a gateway's own "gitlab-get_mcp_server_version" for GitLab's
"get_mcp_server_version" tool) - the combined key has the delimiter more than once.
`.split()` then produces more than two segments, and destructuring
`[toolName, serverName]` silently keeps only the first two, yielding a bogus server
name that matches no configured server. Tool listing still worked (a different code
path builds keys directly without re-splitting), but invocation failed with
`Tool {name} not found`, and `filterAuthorizedTools` rejected such keys outright as
malformed.

Add `splitMCPToolKey`, which splits on the *last* occurrence of the delimiter instead:
the server-name half is always LibreChat's own normalized suffix (guaranteed not to
contain the delimiter), while the raw tool-name half is untrusted and may legitimately
contain it. This matches `.split()`'s result whenever the delimiter occurs once, and
correctly resolves the collision case. Update the four call sites that parsed this
manually (`handleTools.js`, `MCP.js`, `mcp.js` controller, `filterAuthorizedTools` in
`v1.js`) plus one in the client (`useVisibleTools.ts`) to use it.

Fixes #14440

* fix: resolve MCP tool-key boundary against configured server names

splitMCPToolKey moves to librechat-data-provider so the client and backend
share one parser, and takes the configured server names when the caller has
them: the longest name the key actually ends with wins, which is exact.

Position alone cannot identify the boundary because both halves may contain
the delimiter. lastIndexOf alone fixes gateway-prefixed tool names but
regresses servers whose own name contains it, which ToolService.spec.js
already covered; the last-delimiter path now only serves as the fallback for
callers with no configured set.

Also converts the remaining first-occurrence parsers that the delimiter fix
missed - mcp/auth.ts (custom user vars silently unresolved), mcp/oauth/events.ts,
agents/initialize.ts, and the three client parsers that labelled tool calls
with the wrong server.

* fix: keep client tool-call labels on first-delimiter parsing

The three client parsers had deliberate, tested first-delimiter semantics
(ToolCall.test.tsx asserts the full server name for 'foo_mcp_bar' and the
synthetic 'oauth_mcp_server' call), and the client has no configured server
list in scope to resolve the boundary exactly, so they are left as they were.

Threads the configured names into the event-driven definition loader so it
resolves the same boundary as the authorization filter that admits the key,
and documents the one case that stays undecidable without provenance.

* fix: resolve tool-key boundary against all configured servers

resolveConfigServers only returns lazily-initialized config overrides -
ensureConfigServers skips unmodified YAML servers - so on a stock deployment
the known-name list was empty and suffix resolution never engaged. Adds
resolveMcpServerNames, which keeps every configured server in the normalized
form tool keys carry, and uses it at the loading, auth-map and definition
sites.

Background-tool eligibility now resolves against all configured names before
testing ephemeral membership, so a non-ephemeral server whose name ends in an
ephemeral one is no longer misclassified, and useVisibleTools resolves against
the server map it already receives.

* fix: use resolved server provenance and one app-config read

createMCPTool now uses the serverName loadTools already resolved for the key
and only parses as a fallback, so an unmodified YAML server whose name
contains the delimiter no longer resolves to the wrong server for auth,
reconnection and callTool.

resolveMcpServerContext derives config servers and all configured names from
a single getAppConfigForRequest, replacing two independent lookups on the
chat startup path, and degrades to empty like resolveConfigServers instead of
aborting tool loading when the config lookup fails.

* chore: drop unused resolveConfigServers import

* fix: forward server provenance on the all-tools path and read config once

createMCPTools builds each toolKey from the server name it already has but did
not forward it, so the sys__all__sys path re-derived it by parsing and bound
an unmodified YAML server whose name contains the delimiter to the wrong auth
and invocation context.

loadAgentTools now resolves the MCP server context once and threads it into
loadTools, replacing the second app-config read it had introduced on the
non-event-driven chat startup path.

* fix: carry resolved MCP server name through tool classification

definitions.ts resolves the server for each key and then dropped it when
building loadedTools, so buildToolClassification re-derived it with a
last-segment split and recorded 'Workspace' for a server configured as
'Google_mcp_Workspace'. The resolved name now rides along on the tool
instance and classification prefers it over re-parsing.

* fix: consume carried server name when extracting MCP servers

extractMCPServers re-derived the name with a last-segment split, so a server
configured as Google_mcp_Workspace resolved to Workspace and its instructions
were silently omitted. Prefers the name carried on the tool definition
instance, falling back to the split.

* fix: fail closed on ambiguous MCP keys when persisting server names

Persisted mcpServerNames grant agent-scoped access to a DB server by name
(ServerConfigsDB.getAccessibleServers), so a wrong guess exposes an unrelated
server to everyone who can view the agent. The last-segment split turned
search_mcp_Google_mcp_workspace into 'workspace'; such keys were previously
rejected outright at agent save, so admitting them opened this path.

Derives a name only from unambiguous single-delimiter keys. This is #12250's
guard moved to the boundary it was actually protecting, instead of blocking
tool admission.

* fix: keep DB server access for multi-delimiter tool keys

The fail-closed guard was wrong for the case this PR exists to fix. This index
only grants DB-backed servers, and DB names are slugs that cannot contain the
delimiter (generateServerNameFromTitle strips underscores), so the trailing
segment is always the real server for them - dropping it cost every consumer
of a gateway-prefixed tool their shared-agent access.

Also gates the MCP server-context lookup on the filtered MCP set, so an agent
with no MCP tools no longer pays an app-config read on startup.

* fix: resolve tool-call display names without breaking OAuth calls

The display parsers could not use the shared boundary parser because their
tested behavior depends on first-delimiter semantics. That constraint only
applies to synthetic MCP OAuth calls, whose tool half is always exactly
'oauth', so everything after the first delimiter is the server even when the
server name carries one.

splitToolCallName special-cases that form and defers to splitMCPToolKey for
real tool keys, so a gateway-prefixed tool now renders its own name and
server while oauth_mcp_foo_mcp_bar still resolves to foo_mcp_bar.

* fix: persist resolved MCP server provenance on agents

Deriving mcpServerNames from the tool key cannot tell a config server's
trailing segment from a real DB server name, so a config server named
a_mcp_b indexed an unrelated DB server b and shared the agent's viewers into
it. Neither string rule works: the suffix guess exposes, and failing closed
drops legitimate DB access for gateway-prefixed tools.

filterAuthorizedTools already resolves each tool's server against the merged
registry config, so it now collects those names and create, update and
duplicate persist them. No extra registry queries: the update path unions the
newly resolved names with what the agent already had, and duplicate replaces
the copied list rather than inheriting the source's servers.

Display parsing also takes the configured names, so a real tool call on a
delimiter-bearing server renders the right server and icon.

* test: teach MCP hook mocks about useMCPServerNames

Three specs mock ~/hooks/MCP with a hand-listed factory, so adding the hook
to ToolCall made useMCPServerNames undefined under test and every render
threw. Returns a stable array so the mock cannot perturb render counts.

* fix: rebuild agent MCP server index from surviving tools

Unioning the prior names kept a server indexed after its last tool was
detached, so viewers of a shared agent retained agent-scoped access to it.
The index is now rebuilt from the tools that survive the edit: a prior name
carries forward only while some retained tool still resolves to it, using the
agent's own persisted names as the candidate set, and the rebuild runs on any
tool change rather than only when a new MCP tool is added.

* fix: keep duplicate indexes on registry fallback and harden the oauth split

Duplication blanked mcpServerNames when the registry was unavailable, because
filterAuthorizedTools grandfathers the source's tools without resolving them -
the copy kept tools it could no longer resolve. Source names now carry forward
for the tools that still point at them.

splitToolCallName also treated any oauth_mcp_ prefix as a synthetic OAuth
call, so a genuine upstream tool by that name resolved to the wrong server. A
configured server name now decides when one matches, since a real key always
ends in its server, and the prefix only breaks ties for unconfigured servers.

* fix: thread configured server names through display parsing

parseToolName and getMCPServerName resolved context-free, so a configured
server whose name contains the delimiter showed the wrong server in grouped
tool summaries and subagent tool labels, and stacked icons missed its entry in
the icon map. Both take the configured names now, supplied by the components
that render them.

Adds the hook to SubagentCall's mock factory: the spec renders the real
component, so an unmocked useMCPServerNames would reach the query with no
provider.

* test: cover the auth-map boundary, server provenance and context fallback

Adds regression coverage for three behaviors this PR changed that no test
exercised: customUserVars resolving under the right plugin key for a
gateway-prefixed tool name (the failure that made these tools loadable but
unusable), the resolved server name reaching createMCPTool instead of being
re-parsed, and resolveMcpServerContext degrading to empty rather than
aborting tool loading when the config lookup fails.

Each was checked against a mutated source to confirm it fails when the
behavior is broken.

* fix: normalize server-name candidates and cover the boundary guard

Tool keys embed normalizeServerName's output while the config is keyed by the
raw name, so callers passing raw keys never matched a server whose name needs
normalizing and silently fell back to the last delimiter. filterAuthorizedTools
now maps normalized names back to their config key, and createMCPTool
normalizes its candidates.

Adds the cases an audit found surviving mutation: a configured name that is a
bare but not delimiter-aligned suffix must not match, an empty candidate list
behaves as no list, and splitToolCallName still falls back to the oauth prefix
when a list is supplied but nothing in it matches.

* fix: keep resolved server names when a non-owner retains MCP tools

The shared-agent path keeps an agent's existing MCP tools verbatim but supplied
no mcpServerNames, so persistence re-derived them and reduced a configured
server like Google_mcp_Workspace to Workspace - which ServerConfigsDB then
treats as a DB server, granting the agent's viewers access to an unrelated one.
Carries the existing resolved names across instead, and clears the index on the
owner path where every MCP tool is removed.

* fix: preserve resolved MCP names for every tools update

extractMCPServerNames was reachable from any caller that writes tools without
mcpServerNames - the Action edit path does exactly that - so a configured
Google_mcp_Workspace was reindexed as Workspace and ServerConfigsDB granted
shared-agent viewers an unrelated DB server by that name.

updateAgent now rebuilds the index from the agent's own resolved names: one
carries forward while a retained tool still resolves to it, and only keys
matching none of them fall back to derivation. Callers are safe by default
rather than by remembering to pass the set.

normalizeServerName moves to librechat-data-provider so the client can match
its candidates against tool keys, which embed the normalized form; the icon map
is keyed the same way since it is looked up with a parsed server name.

* refactor: move MCP context resolution into packages/api

New backend logic belongs in the TypeScript workspace per CLAUDE.md, with /api
kept to a thin wrapper. resolveMCPServerContext now lives in
packages/api/src/mcp/context.ts and takes ensureConfigServers by injection,
since the registry accessor is still legacy-only; the /api function is reduced
to loading the request app config and translating failures into the empty
degrade it already promised.

* test: teach the MCP service mock about resolveMCPServerContext

The spec mocks @librechat/api with a hand-listed factory, so moving the
resolver into that package left it undefined and the wrapper degraded into its
own catch, returning empty config servers. The stub mirrors the real resolver
so these tests still cover what the wrapper owns - loading the request config
and degrading on failure - while the resolution logic is unit-tested in
packages/api.

* fix: only persist an authoritative MCP server index on update

Assigning the resolved set unconditionally pinned the index to [] whenever
nothing authoritative was available - a legacy agent holding MCP tools with no
stored mcpServerNames - which suppressed updateAgent's derivation and stripped
agent-scoped access to its DB-backed server.

The field is now supplied only when the result is authoritative: names were
resolved, or no MCP tool survives so the index genuinely is empty. The
retained-tools branch likewise leaves it unset when the agent has none stored.

---------

Co-authored-by: Jens Schumann <schumajs@gmail.com>
2026-07-27 14:45:38 -04:00

1163 lines
39 KiB
JavaScript

const { tool } = require('@librechat/agents/langchain/tools');
const { logger, getTenantId } = require('@librechat/data-schemas');
const { Providers, Constants: AgentConstants } = require('@librechat/agents');
const {
sendEvent,
PENDING_STALE_MS,
MCPOAuthHandler,
isMCPDomainAllowed,
splitMCPToolKey,
normalizeServerName,
resolveMCPServerContext,
normalizeJsonSchema,
GenerationJobManager,
resolveJsonSchemaRefs,
sanitizeGeminiSchema,
buildMCPAuthStepId,
buildMCPAuthToolCall,
processMCPEnv,
buildMCPAuthRunStepEvent,
buildMCPAuthRunStepDeltaEvent,
buildMCPAuthRunStepEndDeltaEvent,
isUserSourced,
checkAccessWithRequestCache,
requiresEphemeralUserConnection,
containsGraphTokenPlaceholder,
} = require('@librechat/api');
const {
Time,
CacheKeys,
Constants,
Permissions,
PermissionTypes,
isAssistantsEndpoint,
} = require('librechat-data-provider');
const {
getOAuthReconnectionManager,
getMCPServersRegistry,
getFlowStateManager,
getMCPManager,
} = require('~/config');
const db = require('~/models');
const { findToken, createToken, updateToken, deleteTokens } = db;
const { getGraphApiToken } = require('./GraphTokenService');
const { exchangeOboToken } = require('./OboTokenService');
const { createOboTrustChecker } = require('./OboPolicyService');
const { reinitMCPServer } = require('./Tools/mcp');
const { getAppConfig } = require('./Config');
const { getLogStores } = require('~/cache');
const MAX_CACHE_SIZE = 1000;
const lastReconnectAttempts = new Map();
const RECONNECT_THROTTLE_MS = 10_000;
const missingToolCache = new Map();
const MISSING_TOOL_TTL_MS = 10_000;
async function userCanUseMCPServers(user, req) {
if (!user?.id || !user?.role) {
return false;
}
try {
return await checkAccessWithRequestCache({
req,
user,
permissionType: PermissionTypes.MCP_SERVERS,
permissions: [Permissions.USE],
getRoleByName: db.getRoleByName,
});
} catch (error) {
logger.error(`[MCP][User: ${user.id}] Failed MCP permission check`, error);
return false;
}
}
function createMCPPermissionContext(req) {
return {
canUseServers: (user = req?.user) => userCanUseMCPServers(user, req),
};
}
function evictStale(map, ttl) {
if (map.size <= MAX_CACHE_SIZE) {
return;
}
const now = Date.now();
for (const [key, timestamp] of map) {
if (now - timestamp >= ttl) {
map.delete(key);
}
if (map.size <= MAX_CACHE_SIZE) {
return;
}
}
}
const unavailableMsg =
"This tool's MCP server is temporarily unavailable. Please try again shortly.";
function getOAuthFlowId(userId, serverName, tenantId = getTenantId()) {
if (!tenantId) {
return MCPOAuthHandler.generateFlowId(userId, serverName);
}
return MCPOAuthHandler.generateFlowId(userId, serverName, tenantId);
}
async function getAppConfigForRequest(req) {
const user = req?.user;
return await getAppConfigForUser(user?.id, user);
}
async function getAppConfigForUser(userId, user) {
return await getAppConfig({ role: user?.role, tenantId: getTenantId(), userId });
}
/**
* Resolves config-source MCP servers from admin Config overrides for the current
* request context. Returns the parsed configs keyed by server name.
* @param {import('express').Request} req - Express request with user context
* @returns {Promise<Record<string, import('@librechat/api').ParsedServerConfig>>}
*/
async function resolveConfigServers(req) {
try {
const registry = getMCPServersRegistry();
const appConfig = await getAppConfigForRequest(req);
return await registry.ensureConfigServers(appConfig?.mcpConfig || {});
} catch (error) {
logger.warn(
'[resolveConfigServers] Failed to resolve config servers, degrading to empty:',
error,
);
return {};
}
}
/**
* Resolves operator-managed MCP server names from admin Config overrides for the current request.
* Returns a request-time snapshot for DB server creation, not a cross-process lock.
* @throws Propagates app config lookup errors to keep DB server creation fail-closed.
* @param {import('express').Request} req - Express request with user context
* @returns {Promise<string[]>}
*/
async function resolveMcpConfigNames(req) {
const appConfig = await getAppConfigForRequest(req);
return Object.keys(appConfig?.mcpConfig || {});
}
/**
* All configured server names in the normalized form tool keys are built with.
* Unlike `resolveConfigServers`, this keeps unmodified YAML servers, which
* `ensureConfigServers` skips - those are exactly the ones that must still
* resolve the tool-key boundary.
* @param {import('express').Request} req
* @returns {Promise<string[]>}
*/
async function resolveMcpServerNames(req) {
try {
const names = await resolveMcpConfigNames(req);
return names.map(normalizeServerName);
} catch (error) {
logger.warn(
'[resolveMcpServerNames] Failed to resolve server names, degrading to empty:',
error,
);
return [];
}
}
/**
* Config-source servers and all configured names from a single app-config read,
* so the tool-loading path does not pay two lookups for the same principal.
* Degrades to empty like `resolveConfigServers` rather than aborting tool loading.
* @param {import('express').Request} req
* @returns {Promise<{ configServers: Record<string, import('@librechat/api').ParsedServerConfig>, serverNames: string[] }>}
*/
async function resolveMcpServerContext(req) {
try {
const appConfig = await getAppConfigForRequest(req);
return await resolveMCPServerContext({
mcpConfig: appConfig?.mcpConfig || {},
ensureConfigServers: (mcpConfig) => getMCPServersRegistry().ensureConfigServers(mcpConfig),
});
} catch (error) {
logger.warn(
'[resolveMcpServerContext] Failed to resolve MCP servers, degrading to empty:',
error,
);
return { configServers: {}, serverNames: [] };
}
}
/**
* Resolves config-source servers and merges all server configs (YAML + config + user DB)
* for the given user context. Shared helper for controllers needing the full merged config.
* @param {string} userId
* @param {{ id?: string, role?: string }} [user]
* @returns {Promise<Record<string, import('@librechat/api').ParsedServerConfig>>}
*/
async function resolveAllMcpConfigs(userId, user) {
const registry = getMCPServersRegistry();
const appConfig = await getAppConfigForUser(userId, user);
let configServers = {};
try {
configServers = await registry.ensureConfigServers(appConfig?.mcpConfig || {});
} catch (error) {
logger.warn(
'[resolveAllMcpConfigs] Config server resolution failed, continuing without:',
error,
);
}
if (user?.role) {
return await registry.getAllServerConfigs(userId, configServers, user.role);
}
return await registry.getAllServerConfigs(userId, configServers);
}
function getServerCustomUserVars(userMCPAuthMap, serverName) {
return userMCPAuthMap?.[`${Constants.mcp_prefix}${serverName}`];
}
/**
* Best-effort early gate; the authoritative check is
* `assertResolvedRuntimeConfigAllowed` in `@librechat/api`, whose resolution
* this must mirror. Graph placeholders resolve later (async), so a URL still
* carrying one defers to the authoritative check instead of rejecting here.
*/
async function isEarlyDomainAllowed({
serverConfig,
user,
requestBody,
userMCPAuthMap,
serverName,
allowedDomains,
allowedAddresses,
}) {
const validationConfig = processMCPEnv({
user,
body: requestBody,
dbSourced: isUserSourced(serverConfig),
options: serverConfig,
customUserVars: getServerCustomUserVars(userMCPAuthMap, serverName),
});
if (
typeof validationConfig?.url === 'string' &&
containsGraphTokenPlaceholder(validationConfig.url)
) {
return true;
}
return await isMCPDomainAllowed(validationConfig, allowedDomains, allowedAddresses);
}
/**
* @param {string} toolName
* @param {string} serverName
*/
function createUnavailableToolStub(toolName, serverName) {
const normalizedToolKey = `${toolName}${Constants.mcp_delimiter}${normalizeServerName(serverName)}`;
const _call = async () => [unavailableMsg, null];
const toolInstance = tool(_call, {
schema: {
type: 'object',
properties: {
input: { type: 'string', description: 'Input for the tool' },
},
required: [],
},
name: normalizedToolKey,
description: unavailableMsg,
responseFormat: AgentConstants.CONTENT_AND_ARTIFACT,
});
toolInstance.mcp = true;
toolInstance.mcpRawServerName = serverName;
return toolInstance;
}
function isEmptyObjectSchema(jsonSchema) {
return (
jsonSchema != null &&
typeof jsonSchema === 'object' &&
jsonSchema.type === 'object' &&
(jsonSchema.properties == null || Object.keys(jsonSchema.properties).length === 0) &&
!jsonSchema.additionalProperties
);
}
/**
* @param {object} params
* @param {ServerResponse} params.res - The Express response object for sending events.
* @param {string} params.stepId - The ID of the step in the flow.
* @param {ToolCallChunk} params.toolCall - The tool call object containing tool information.
* @param {string | null} [params.streamId] - The stream ID for resumable mode.
* @param {number} [params.jobCreatedAt] - The generation epoch that owns emitted events.
*/
function createRunStepDeltaEmitter({ res, stepId, toolCall, streamId = null, jobCreatedAt }) {
/**
* @param {string} authURL - The URL to redirect the user for OAuth authentication.
* @param {{ expiresAt?: number }} [options]
* @returns {Promise<void>}
*/
return async function (authURL, options) {
const eventData = buildMCPAuthRunStepDeltaEvent({ authURL, stepId, toolCall, options });
if (streamId) {
await GenerationJobManager.emitChunk(streamId, eventData, {
expectedCreatedAt: jobCreatedAt,
});
} else {
sendEvent(res, eventData);
}
};
}
/**
* @param {object} params
* @param {ServerResponse} params.res - The Express response object for sending events.
* @param {string} params.runId - The Run ID, i.e. message ID
* @param {string} params.stepId - The ID of the step in the flow.
* @param {ToolCallChunk} params.toolCall - The tool call object containing tool information.
* @param {number} [params.index]
* @param {string | null} [params.streamId] - The stream ID for resumable mode.
* @param {number} [params.jobCreatedAt] - The generation epoch that owns emitted events.
* @returns {() => Promise<void>}
*/
function createRunStepEmitter({
res,
runId,
stepId,
toolCall,
index,
streamId = null,
jobCreatedAt,
}) {
return async function () {
const eventData = buildMCPAuthRunStepEvent({ runId, stepId, toolCall, index });
if (streamId) {
await GenerationJobManager.emitChunk(streamId, eventData, {
expectedCreatedAt: jobCreatedAt,
});
} else {
sendEvent(res, eventData);
}
};
}
/**
* Creates a function used to ensure the flow handler is only invoked once
* @param {object} params
* @param {string} params.flowId - The ID of the login flow.
* @param {FlowStateManager<any>} params.flowManager - The flow manager instance.
* @param {(authURL: string, options?: { expiresAt?: number }) => void | Promise<void>} [params.callback]
*/
function createOAuthStart({ flowId, flowManager, callback }) {
/**
* Creates a function to handle OAuth login requests.
* @param {string} authURL - The URL to redirect the user for OAuth authentication.
* @param {{ expiresAt?: number }} [options]
* @returns {Promise<boolean>} Returns true to indicate the event was sent successfully.
*/
return async function (authURL, options) {
let emitted = false;
const emitOAuthStart = async (message) => {
if (options) {
await callback?.(authURL, options);
} else {
await callback?.(authURL);
}
emitted = true;
logger.debug(message);
};
const existingFlow = await flowManager.getFlowState(flowId, 'oauth_login');
if (existingFlow) {
await emitOAuthStart('Re-sent OAuth login request to client');
return true;
}
await flowManager.createFlowWithHandler(flowId, 'oauth_login', async () => {
await emitOAuthStart('Sent OAuth login request to client');
return true;
});
if (!emitted) {
await emitOAuthStart('Re-sent OAuth login request to client');
}
return true;
};
}
/**
* @param {object} params
* @param {ServerResponse} params.res - The Express response object for sending events.
* @param {string} params.stepId - The ID of the step in the flow.
* @param {ToolCallChunk} params.toolCall - The tool call object containing tool information.
* @param {string | null} [params.streamId] - The stream ID for resumable mode.
* @param {number} [params.jobCreatedAt] - The generation epoch that owns emitted events.
*/
function createOAuthEnd({ res, stepId, toolCall, streamId = null, jobCreatedAt }) {
return async function () {
const eventData = buildMCPAuthRunStepEndDeltaEvent({ stepId, toolCall });
if (streamId) {
await GenerationJobManager.emitChunk(streamId, eventData, {
expectedCreatedAt: jobCreatedAt,
});
} else {
sendEvent(res, eventData);
}
logger.debug('Sent OAuth login success to client');
};
}
/**
* @param {object} params
* @param {string} params.userId - The ID of the user.
* @param {string} params.serverName - The name of the server.
* @param {string} params.toolName - The name of the tool.
* @param {string} [params.tenantId] - The tenant ID for the current request.
* @param {FlowStateManager<any>} params.flowManager - The flow manager instance.
*/
function createAbortHandler({ userId, serverName, toolName, tenantId, flowManager }) {
return function () {
logger.info(`[MCP][User: ${userId}][${serverName}][${toolName}] Tool call aborted`);
const flowId = getOAuthFlowId(userId, serverName, tenantId);
// Clean up both mcp_oauth and mcp_get_tokens flows
flowManager.failFlow(flowId, 'mcp_oauth', new Error('Tool call aborted'));
flowManager.failFlow(flowId, 'mcp_get_tokens', new Error('Tool call aborted'));
};
}
/**
* @param {Object} params
* @param {() => Promise<void>} params.runStepEmitter
* @param {(authURL: string, options?: { expiresAt?: number }) => Promise<void>} params.runStepDeltaEmitter
* @returns {(authURL: string, options?: { expiresAt?: number }) => Promise<void>}
*/
function createOAuthCallback({ runStepEmitter, runStepDeltaEmitter }) {
return async function (authURL, options) {
await runStepEmitter();
await runStepDeltaEmitter(authURL, options);
};
}
/**
* @param {Object} params
* @param {ServerResponse} params.res - The Express response object for sending events.
* @param {IUser} params.user - The user from the request object.
* @param {string} params.serverName
* @param {AbortSignal} params.signal
* @param {string} params.model
* @param {number} [params.index]
* @param {string | null} [params.streamId] - The stream ID for resumable mode.
* @param {number} [params.jobCreatedAt] - The generation epoch that owns emitted events.
* @param {Record<string, Record<string, string>>} [params.userMCPAuthMap]
* @param {import('@librechat/api').RequestScopedMCPConnectionStore} [params.requestScopedConnections]
* @param {import('@librechat/api').ParsedServerConfig} [params.serverConfig] - Used to bypass reconnect throttling for request-scoped servers.
* @returns { Promise<Array<typeof tool | { _call: (toolInput: Object | string) => unknown}>> } An object with `_call` method to execute the tool input.
*/
async function reconnectServer({
res,
user,
index,
signal,
serverName,
serverConfig,
configServers,
userMCPAuthMap,
requestBody,
requestScopedConnections,
streamId = null,
jobCreatedAt,
}) {
logger.debug(
`[MCP][reconnectServer] serverName: ${serverName}, user: ${user?.id}, hasUserMCPAuthMap: ${!!userMCPAuthMap}`,
);
// Request-scoped servers reconnect on every message by design; throttling them
// would stub out healthy tools for messages sent within the throttle window.
const requestScoped = serverConfig ? requiresEphemeralUserConnection(serverConfig) : false;
if (!requestScoped) {
const throttleKey = `${user.id}:${serverName}`;
const now = Date.now();
const lastAttempt = lastReconnectAttempts.get(throttleKey) ?? 0;
if (now - lastAttempt < RECONNECT_THROTTLE_MS) {
logger.debug(`[MCP][reconnectServer] Throttled reconnect for ${serverName}`);
return null;
}
lastReconnectAttempts.set(throttleKey, now);
evictStale(lastReconnectAttempts, RECONNECT_THROTTLE_MS);
}
const runId = Constants.USE_PRELIM_RESPONSE_MESSAGE_ID;
const flowId = `${user.id}:${serverName}:${Date.now()}`;
const flowManager = getFlowStateManager(getLogStores(CacheKeys.FLOWS));
const stepId = buildMCPAuthStepId(serverName);
const toolCall = buildMCPAuthToolCall({
id: flowId,
serverName,
});
// Set up abort handler to clean up OAuth flows if request is aborted
const tenantId = user?.tenantId ?? getTenantId();
const oauthFlowId = getOAuthFlowId(user.id, serverName, tenantId);
const abortHandler = () => {
logger.info(
`[MCP][User: ${user.id}][${serverName}] Tool loading aborted, cleaning up OAuth flows`,
);
// Clean up both mcp_oauth and mcp_get_tokens flows
flowManager.failFlow(oauthFlowId, 'mcp_oauth', new Error('Tool loading aborted'));
flowManager.failFlow(oauthFlowId, 'mcp_get_tokens', new Error('Tool loading aborted'));
};
if (signal) {
signal.addEventListener('abort', abortHandler, { once: true });
}
try {
const runStepEmitter = createRunStepEmitter({
res,
index,
runId,
stepId,
toolCall,
streamId,
jobCreatedAt,
});
const runStepDeltaEmitter = createRunStepDeltaEmitter({
res,
stepId,
toolCall,
streamId,
jobCreatedAt,
});
const callback = createOAuthCallback({ runStepEmitter, runStepDeltaEmitter });
const oauthStart = createOAuthStart({
res,
flowId,
callback,
flowManager,
});
return await reinitMCPServer({
user,
signal,
serverName,
configServers,
oauthStart,
flowManager,
userMCPAuthMap,
requestBody,
requestScopedConnections,
forceNew: true,
returnOnOAuth: false,
connectionTimeout: Time.THIRTY_SECONDS,
});
} finally {
// Clean up abort handler to prevent memory leaks
if (signal) {
signal.removeEventListener('abort', abortHandler);
}
}
}
/**
* Creates all tools from the specified MCP Server via `toolKey`.
*
* This function assumes tools could not be aggregated from the cache of tool definitions,
* i.e. `availableTools`, and will reinitialize the MCP server to ensure all tools are generated.
*
* @param {Object} params
* @param {ServerResponse} params.res - The Express response object for sending events.
* @param {{ canUseServers: (user?: IUser) => Promise<boolean> }} [params.mcpPermissionContext] - Request-scoped MCP permission context.
* @param {IUser} params.user - The user from the request object.
* @param {string} params.serverName
* @param {string} params.model
* @param {Providers | EModelEndpoint} params.provider - The provider for the tool.
* @param {number} [params.index]
* @param {AbortSignal} [params.signal]
* @param {string | null} [params.streamId] - The stream ID for resumable mode.
* @param {number} [params.jobCreatedAt] - The generation epoch that owns emitted events.
* @param {import('@librechat/api').ParsedServerConfig} [params.config]
* @param {import('@librechat/api').RequestBody} [params.requestBody]
* @param {import('@librechat/api').RequestScopedMCPConnectionStore} [params.requestScopedConnections]
* @param {Record<string, Record<string, string>>} [params.userMCPAuthMap]
* @returns { Promise<Array<typeof tool | { _call: (toolInput: Object | string) => unknown}>> } An object with `_call` method to execute the tool input.
*/
async function createMCPTools({
res,
mcpPermissionContext,
user,
index,
signal,
config,
provider,
serverName,
configServers,
userMCPAuthMap,
requestBody,
requestScopedConnections,
streamId = null,
jobCreatedAt,
}) {
const serverConfig =
config ?? (await getMCPServersRegistry().getServerConfig(serverName, user?.id, configServers));
if (serverConfig?.url) {
const appConfig = await getAppConfig({
role: user?.role,
tenantId: user?.tenantId,
userId: user?.id,
});
const allowedDomains = appConfig?.mcpSettings?.allowedDomains;
const allowedAddresses = appConfig?.mcpSettings?.allowedAddresses;
const isDomainAllowed = await isEarlyDomainAllowed({
serverConfig,
user,
requestBody,
userMCPAuthMap,
serverName,
allowedDomains,
allowedAddresses,
});
if (!isDomainAllowed) {
logger.warn(`[MCP][${serverName}] Domain not allowed, skipping all tools`);
return [];
}
}
const result = await reconnectServer({
res,
user,
index,
signal,
serverName,
serverConfig,
configServers,
userMCPAuthMap,
requestBody,
requestScopedConnections,
streamId,
jobCreatedAt,
});
if (result === null) {
logger.debug(`[MCP][${serverName}] Reconnect throttled, skipping tool creation.`);
return [];
}
if (!result || !result.tools) {
logger.warn(`[MCP][${serverName}] Failed to reinitialize MCP server.`);
return [];
}
const serverTools = [];
for (const tool of result.tools) {
const toolInstance = await createMCPTool({
res,
mcpPermissionContext,
user,
provider,
userMCPAuthMap,
configServers,
streamId,
jobCreatedAt,
availableTools: result.availableTools,
serverName,
toolKey: `${tool.name}${Constants.mcp_delimiter}${serverName}`,
requestBody,
requestScopedConnections,
config: serverConfig,
});
if (toolInstance) {
serverTools.push(toolInstance);
}
}
return serverTools;
}
/**
* Creates a single tool from the specified MCP Server via `toolKey`.
* @param {Object} params
* @param {ServerResponse} params.res - The Express response object for sending events.
* @param {{ canUseServers: (user?: IUser) => Promise<boolean> }} [params.mcpPermissionContext] - Request-scoped MCP permission context.
* @param {IUser} params.user - The user from the request object.
* @param {string} params.toolKey - The toolKey for the tool.
* @param {string} params.model - The model for the tool.
* @param {number} [params.index]
* @param {AbortSignal} [params.signal]
* @param {string | null} [params.streamId] - The stream ID for resumable mode.
* @param {Providers | EModelEndpoint} params.provider - The provider for the tool.
* @param {LCAvailableTools} [params.availableTools]
* @param {import('@librechat/api').RequestBody} [params.requestBody]
* @param {import('@librechat/api').RequestScopedMCPConnectionStore} [params.requestScopedConnections]
* @param {Record<string, Record<string, string>>} [params.userMCPAuthMap]
* @param {import('@librechat/api').ParsedServerConfig} [params.config]
* @param {(availableTools: LCAvailableTools) => void} [params.onAvailableTools]
* @param {number} [params.jobCreatedAt] - The generation epoch that owns emitted events.
* @returns { Promise<typeof tool | { _call: (toolInput: Object | string) => unknown}> } An object with `_call` method to execute the tool input.
*/
async function createMCPTool({
res,
mcpPermissionContext,
user,
index,
signal,
toolKey,
provider,
userMCPAuthMap,
availableTools,
requestBody,
requestScopedConnections,
config,
configServers,
serverName: resolvedServerName,
onAvailableTools,
streamId = null,
jobCreatedAt,
}) {
/** `loadTools` already resolved the server for this key; parsing is the fallback. */
const [parsedToolName, parsedServerName] = splitMCPToolKey(
toolKey,
/** Tool keys embed the normalized server name, so the candidate list must be
* normalized too or a name needing normalization never matches. */
resolvedServerName
? [normalizeServerName(resolvedServerName)]
: Object.keys(configServers ?? {}).map(normalizeServerName),
);
const serverName = resolvedServerName ?? parsedServerName;
const toolName = parsedToolName;
const serverConfig =
config ?? (await getMCPServersRegistry().getServerConfig(serverName, user?.id, configServers));
const requestScopedTools = serverConfig ? requiresEphemeralUserConnection(serverConfig) : false;
const useMissingToolCache = !requestScopedTools;
if (serverConfig?.url) {
const appConfig = await getAppConfig({
role: user?.role,
tenantId: user?.tenantId,
userId: user?.id,
});
const allowedDomains = appConfig?.mcpSettings?.allowedDomains;
const allowedAddresses = appConfig?.mcpSettings?.allowedAddresses;
const isDomainAllowed = await isEarlyDomainAllowed({
serverConfig,
user,
requestBody,
userMCPAuthMap,
serverName,
allowedDomains,
allowedAddresses,
});
if (!isDomainAllowed) {
logger.warn(`[MCP][${serverName}] Domain no longer allowed, skipping tool: ${toolName}`);
return undefined;
}
}
/** @type {LCTool | undefined} */
let toolDefinition = availableTools?.[toolKey]?.function;
if (!toolDefinition) {
const cachedAt = useMissingToolCache ? missingToolCache.get(toolKey) : undefined;
if (cachedAt && Date.now() - cachedAt < MISSING_TOOL_TTL_MS) {
logger.debug(
`[MCP][${serverName}][${toolName}] Tool in negative cache, returning unavailable stub.`,
);
return createUnavailableToolStub(toolName, serverName);
}
logger.warn(
`[MCP][${serverName}][${toolName}] Requested tool not found in available tools, re-initializing MCP server.`,
);
const result = await reconnectServer({
res,
user,
index,
signal,
serverName,
serverConfig,
configServers,
userMCPAuthMap,
requestBody,
requestScopedConnections,
streamId,
jobCreatedAt,
});
if (result?.availableTools) {
onAvailableTools?.(result.availableTools);
}
toolDefinition = result?.availableTools?.[toolKey]?.function;
if (!toolDefinition && useMissingToolCache) {
missingToolCache.set(toolKey, Date.now());
evictStale(missingToolCache, MISSING_TOOL_TTL_MS);
}
}
if (!toolDefinition) {
logger.warn(
`[MCP][${serverName}][${toolName}] Tool definition not found, returning unavailable stub.`,
);
return createUnavailableToolStub(toolName, serverName);
}
return createToolInstance({
res,
mcpPermissionContext,
user,
requestBody,
requestScopedConnections,
provider,
toolName,
serverName,
serverConfig,
toolDefinition,
streamId,
jobCreatedAt,
});
}
function createToolInstance({
res,
mcpPermissionContext,
user: capturedUser = null,
requestBody: capturedRequestBody,
requestScopedConnections: capturedRequestScopedConnections,
toolName,
serverName,
serverConfig: capturedServerConfig,
toolDefinition,
provider: capturedProvider,
streamId = null,
jobCreatedAt,
}) {
/** @type {LCTool} */
const { description, parameters } = toolDefinition;
const isGoogle = capturedProvider === Providers.VERTEXAI || capturedProvider === Providers.GOOGLE;
let schema = parameters ? normalizeJsonSchema(resolveJsonSchemaRefs(parameters)) : null;
if (schema && isGoogle) {
// Gemini/Vertex AI accept only a subset of JSON Schema; sanitize so MCP tools with
// unions, non-string enums, etc. don't 400 (they work as-is on OpenAI/Claude).
schema = sanitizeGeminiSchema(schema);
}
if (!schema || (isGoogle && isEmptyObjectSchema(schema))) {
schema = {
type: 'object',
properties: {
input: { type: 'string', description: 'Input for the tool' },
},
required: [],
};
}
const normalizedToolKey = `${toolName}${Constants.mcp_delimiter}${normalizeServerName(serverName)}`;
/** @type {(toolArguments: Object | string, config?: GraphRunnableConfig) => Promise<unknown>} */
const _call = async (toolArguments, config) => {
const effectiveUser = config?.configurable?.user ?? capturedUser;
const permissionUser = effectiveUser;
const userId = effectiveUser?.id || config?.configurable?.user_id || capturedUser?.id;
/** @type {ReturnType<typeof createAbortHandler>} */
let abortHandler = null;
/** @type {AbortSignal} */
let derivedSignal = null;
try {
const provider = (config?.metadata?.provider || capturedProvider)?.toLowerCase();
const canUseMCP = mcpPermissionContext
? await mcpPermissionContext.canUseServers(permissionUser)
: await userCanUseMCPServers(permissionUser);
if (!canUseMCP) {
throw new Error('Forbidden: Insufficient MCP server permissions');
}
const flowsCache = getLogStores(CacheKeys.FLOWS);
const flowManager = getFlowStateManager(flowsCache);
derivedSignal = config?.signal ? AbortSignal.any([config.signal]) : undefined;
const mcpManager = getMCPManager(userId);
const { args: _args, stepId, ...toolCall } = config.toolCall ?? {};
const flowId = `${serverName}:oauth_login:${config.metadata.thread_id}:${config.metadata.run_id}`;
const runStepDeltaEmitter = createRunStepDeltaEmitter({
res,
stepId,
toolCall,
streamId,
jobCreatedAt,
});
const oauthStart = createOAuthStart({
flowId,
flowManager,
callback: runStepDeltaEmitter,
});
const oauthEnd = createOAuthEnd({
res,
stepId,
toolCall,
streamId,
jobCreatedAt,
});
if (derivedSignal) {
const tenantId = config?.configurable?.user?.tenantId ?? getTenantId();
abortHandler = createAbortHandler({ userId, serverName, toolName, tenantId, flowManager });
derivedSignal.addEventListener('abort', abortHandler, { once: true });
}
const customUserVars =
config?.configurable?.userMCPAuthMap?.[`${Constants.mcp_prefix}${serverName}`];
const result = await mcpManager.callTool({
serverName,
serverConfig: capturedServerConfig,
toolName,
provider,
toolArguments,
options: {
signal: derivedSignal,
},
user: effectiveUser,
requestBody: config?.configurable?.requestBody ?? capturedRequestBody,
requestScopedConnections:
config?.configurable?.requestScopedConnections ?? capturedRequestScopedConnections,
customUserVars,
flowManager,
tokenMethods: {
findToken,
createToken,
updateToken,
deleteTokens,
},
oauthStart,
oauthEnd,
graphTokenResolver: getGraphApiToken,
oboTokenResolver: exchangeOboToken,
oboTrustChecker: createOboTrustChecker(),
});
if (isAssistantsEndpoint(provider) && Array.isArray(result)) {
return result[0];
}
return result;
} catch (error) {
logger.error(
`[MCP][${serverName}][${toolName}][User: ${userId}] Error calling MCP tool:`,
error,
);
/** OAuth error, provide a helpful message */
const isOAuthError =
error.message?.includes('401') ||
error.message?.includes('OAuth') ||
error.message?.includes('authentication') ||
error.message?.includes('Non-200 status code (401)');
if (isOAuthError) {
throw new Error(
`[MCP][${serverName}][${toolName}] OAuth authentication required. Please check the server logs for the authentication URL.`,
);
}
throw new Error(
`[MCP][${serverName}][${toolName}] tool call failed${error?.message ? `: ${error?.message}` : '.'}`,
);
} finally {
// Clean up abort handler to prevent memory leaks
if (abortHandler && derivedSignal) {
derivedSignal.removeEventListener('abort', abortHandler);
}
}
};
const toolInstance = tool(_call, {
schema,
name: normalizedToolKey,
description: description || '',
responseFormat: AgentConstants.CONTENT_AND_ARTIFACT,
});
toolInstance.mcp = true;
toolInstance.mcpRawServerName = serverName;
// Ephemeral request-scoped servers (runtime body placeholders) tear their
// connection down at request end, so they must never be backgrounded. A
// missing/stale config means the server's lifetime is unknowable, so fail
// closed (foreground) rather than risk a detached call against a torn-down
// connection.
toolInstance.mcpRequiresEphemeralConnection = capturedServerConfig
? requiresEphemeralUserConnection(capturedServerConfig)
: true;
// On Google/Vertex, propagate the union-flattened schema so definitions extracted
// from this instance don't reach the Gemini converter with unsupported unions.
toolInstance.mcpJsonSchema = isGoogle ? schema : parameters;
return toolInstance;
}
/**
* Get MCP setup data including config, connections, and OAuth servers.
* Resolves config-source servers from admin Config overrides when tenant context is available.
* @param {string} userId - The user ID
* @param {{ role?: string, tenantId?: string }} [options] - Optional role/tenant context
* @returns {Object} Object containing mcpConfig, appConnections, userConnections, and oauthServers
*/
async function getMCPSetupData(userId, options = {}) {
const registry = getMCPServersRegistry();
const { role, tenantId } = options;
const appConfig = await getAppConfig({ role, tenantId, userId });
const configServers = await registry.ensureConfigServers(appConfig?.mcpConfig || {});
const mcpConfig = role
? await registry.getAllServerConfigs(userId, configServers, role)
: await registry.getAllServerConfigs(userId, configServers);
const mcpManager = getMCPManager(userId);
/** @type {Map<string, import('@librechat/api').MCPConnection>} */
let appConnections = new Map();
try {
// Use getLoaded() instead of getAll() to avoid forcing connection creation.
// getAll() creates connections for all servers, which is problematic for servers
// that require user context (e.g., those with {{LIBRECHAT_USER_ID}} placeholders).
appConnections = (await mcpManager.appConnections?.getLoaded()) || new Map();
} catch (error) {
logger.error(`[MCP][User: ${userId}] Error getting app connections:`, error);
}
const userConnections = mcpManager.getUserConnections(userId) || new Map();
const oauthServers = new Set(
Object.entries(mcpConfig)
.filter(([, config]) => config.requiresOAuth)
.map(([name]) => name),
);
return {
mcpConfig,
oauthServers,
appConnections,
userConnections,
};
}
/**
* Check OAuth flow status for a user and server
* @param {string} userId - The user ID
* @param {string} serverName - The server name
* @param {string} [tenantId] - The tenant ID for the current request.
* @returns {Object} Object containing hasActiveFlow and hasFailedFlow flags
*/
async function checkOAuthFlowStatus(userId, serverName, tenantId = getTenantId()) {
const flowsCache = getLogStores(CacheKeys.FLOWS);
const flowManager = getFlowStateManager(flowsCache);
const flowId = getOAuthFlowId(userId, serverName, tenantId);
try {
const flowState = await flowManager.getFlowState(flowId, 'mcp_oauth');
if (!flowState) {
return { hasActiveFlow: false, hasFailedFlow: false };
}
const flowAge = Date.now() - flowState.createdAt;
// Report active only while the flow is still usable (the handling/reuse window),
// not for the full Keyv retention TTL — otherwise the UI shows "connecting" for a
// flow the initiate/callback paths already reject, hiding the connect button.
const flowTTL = flowState.ttl || PENDING_STALE_MS;
if (flowState.status === 'FAILED' || flowAge > flowTTL) {
const wasCancelled = flowState.error && flowState.error.includes('cancelled');
if (wasCancelled) {
logger.debug(`[MCP Connection Status] Found cancelled OAuth flow for ${serverName}`, {
flowId,
status: flowState.status,
error: flowState.error,
});
return { hasActiveFlow: false, hasFailedFlow: false };
} else {
logger.debug(`[MCP Connection Status] Found failed OAuth flow for ${serverName}`, {
flowId,
status: flowState.status,
flowAge,
flowTTL,
timedOut: flowAge > flowTTL,
error: flowState.error,
});
return { hasActiveFlow: false, hasFailedFlow: true };
}
}
if (flowState.status === 'PENDING') {
logger.debug(`[MCP Connection Status] Found active OAuth flow for ${serverName}`, {
flowId,
flowAge,
flowTTL,
});
return { hasActiveFlow: true, hasFailedFlow: false };
}
return { hasActiveFlow: false, hasFailedFlow: false };
} catch (error) {
logger.error(`[MCP Connection Status] Error checking OAuth flows for ${serverName}:`, error);
return { hasActiveFlow: false, hasFailedFlow: false };
}
}
/**
* Get connection status for a specific MCP server
* @param {string} userId - The user ID
* @param {string} serverName - The server name
* @param {import('@librechat/api').ParsedServerConfig} config - The server configuration
* @param {Map<string, import('@librechat/api').MCPConnection>} appConnections - App-level connections
* @param {Map<string, import('@librechat/api').MCPConnection>} userConnections - User-level connections
* @param {Set} oauthServers - Set of OAuth servers
* @returns {Object} Object containing requiresOAuth and connectionState
*/
async function getServerConnectionStatus(
userId,
serverName,
config,
appConnections,
userConnections,
oauthServers,
) {
const connection = appConnections.get(serverName) || userConnections.get(serverName);
const isStaleOrDoNotExist = connection ? connection?.isStale(config.updatedAt) : true;
const baseConnectionState = isStaleOrDoNotExist
? 'disconnected'
: connection?.connectionState || 'disconnected';
let finalConnectionState = baseConnectionState;
// connection state overrides specific to OAuth servers
if (baseConnectionState === 'disconnected' && oauthServers.has(serverName)) {
// check if server is actively being reconnected
const oauthReconnectionManager = getOAuthReconnectionManager();
if (oauthReconnectionManager.isReconnecting(userId, serverName)) {
finalConnectionState = 'connecting';
} else {
const { hasActiveFlow, hasFailedFlow } = await checkOAuthFlowStatus(userId, serverName);
if (hasFailedFlow) {
finalConnectionState = 'error';
} else if (hasActiveFlow) {
finalConnectionState = 'connecting';
}
}
}
return {
requiresOAuth: oauthServers.has(serverName),
connectionState: finalConnectionState,
};
}
module.exports = {
createMCPTool,
createMCPTools,
createMCPPermissionContext,
userCanUseMCPServers,
getMCPSetupData,
resolveConfigServers,
resolveMcpServerNames,
resolveMcpServerContext,
resolveMcpConfigNames,
resolveAllMcpConfigs,
createOAuthStart,
checkOAuthFlowStatus,
getServerConnectionStatus,
createUnavailableToolStub,
};