update to go1.26.4
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This release include 3 security fixes following the security policy:

- mime: quadratic complexity in WordDecoder.DecodeHeader

    Decoding a maliciously-crafted MIME header containing many invalid
    encoded-words could consume excessive CPU.
    The MIME decoder now better handles this case.

    Thanks to p4p3r (https://hackerone.com/p4p3r_hak) for reporting this issue.

    This is CVE-2026-42504 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/79217.

- net/textproto: arbitrary input are included in errors without any escaping

    When returning errors, functions in the net/textproto package would
    include its input as part of the error, without any escaping. Note that
    said input is often controlled by external parties when using this
    package naturally. For example, a net/http client uses ReadMIMEHeader
    when parsing the headers it receive from a server.

    As a result, an attacker could inject arbitrary content into the error.
    Practically, this can result in an attacker injecting misleading
    content, terminal control bytes, etc. into a victim's output or logs.

    This is CVE-2026-42507 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/79346

- crypto/x509: split candidate hostname only once

    (*x509.Certificate).VerifyHostname previously called matchHostnames in a loop
    over all DNS Subject Alternative Name (SAN) entries. This caused
    strings.Split(host, ".") to execute repeatedly on the same input hostname.

    With a large DNS SAN list, verification costs scaled quadratically based on the
    number of SAN entries multiplied by the hostname's label count. Because
    x509.Verify validates hostnames before building the certificate chain, this
    overhead occurred even for untrusted certificates.

    Thanks to Jakub Ciolek (https://ciolek.dev) for reporting this issue.

    This is CVE-2026-27145 and https://go.dev/issue/79694.

View the release notes for more information:
https://go.dev/doc/devel/release#go1.26.4

Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
This commit is contained in:
Sebastiaan van Stijn 2026-06-08 12:24:20 +02:00 committed by Guillaume Lours
parent 77ec74ee67
commit a4ec1dcd89
2 changed files with 2 additions and 2 deletions

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@ -1 +1 @@
1.26.3
1.26.4

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@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
# limitations under the License.
ARG GO_VERSION=1.26.3
ARG GO_VERSION=1.26.4
ARG XX_VERSION=1.9.0
ARG GOLANGCI_LINT_VERSION=v2.11.3
ARG ADDLICENSE_VERSION=v1.0.0