Exact

Exact Union RegExp

Farhad H. P. Shirvan 428f1333ac Security hardening: sessions, SSRF, CSP nonce, CSRF logout, trusted proxies (#4275) ... * refactor(session): store user ID in session instead of full struct Replaces storing the full User object in the session cookie with just the user ID. GetLoginUser now re-fetches the user from the database on every request so credential/permission changes take effect immediately without requiring a re-login. Includes a backward-compatible migration path for existing sessions that still carry the old struct payload. * feat(auth): block panel with default admin/admin credentials and guide credential change checkLogin middleware now detects default admin/admin credentials and redirects every panel route to /panel/settings until they are changed. The settings page auto-opens the Authentication tab, shows a non-dismissible error banner, and lists 'Default credentials' first in the security checklist. Login response includes mustChangeCredentials so the login page can redirect directly. Logout is now POST-only. Password must be at least 10 characters and cannot be admin/admin. * feat(settings): redact secrets in AllSettingView and add TrustedProxyCIDRs Introduces AllSettingView which strips tgBotToken, twoFactorToken, ldapPassword, apiToken and warp/nord secrets before sending them to the browser, replacing them with boolean hasFoo presence flags. A new /panel/setting/secret endpoint allows updating individual secrets by key. Secrets that arrive blank on a save are preserved from the DB rather than overwritten. Adds TrustedProxyCIDRs as a configurable setting (defaults to localhost CIDRs). URL fields are validated before save. * fix(security): SSRF prevention, trusted-proxy header gating, CSP nonce, HTTP timeouts Adds SanitizeHTTPURL / SanitizePublicHTTPURL to reject private-range and loopback targets before any outbound HTTP request (node probe, xray download, outbound test, external traffic inform, tgbot API server, panel updater). Forwarded headers (X-Real-IP, X-Forwarded-For, X-Forwarded-Host) are now only trusted when the direct connection arrives from a CIDR in TrustedProxyCIDRs. CSP policy is tightened with a per-request nonce. HTTP server gains read/write/idle timeouts. Panel updater downloads the script to a temp file instead of piping curl into shell. Xray archive download adds a size cap and response-code check. backuptotgbot is changed from GET to POST. * feat(nodes): add allow-private-address toggle per node Adds AllowPrivateAddress to the Node model (DB default false). When enabled it bypasses the SSRF private-range check for that node's probe URL, allowing nodes hosted on RFC-1918 or loopback addresses (e.g. a private VPN or LAN setup). * chore: frontend UX improvements, CI pipeline, and dev tooling - AppSidebar: logout via POST /logout instead of navigating to GET - InboundList: persist filter state (search, protocol, node) to localStorage across page reloads; add protocol and node filter dropdowns - IndexPage: add health status strip (Xray, CPU, Memory, Update) with quick-action buttons - dependabot: weekly go mod and npm update schedule - ci.yml: add GitHub Actions workflow for build and vet - .nvmrc: pin Node 22 for local development - frontend: bump package.json and package-lock.json - SubPage, DnsPresetsModal, api-docs: minor fixes * fix(ci): stub web/dist before go list to satisfy go:embed at compile time * chore(ui): remove health-strip bar from dashboard top * Revert "feat(auth): block panel with default admin/admin credentials and guide credential change" This reverts commit 56ce6073ce. * fix(auth): make logout POST+CSRF and propagate session loss to other tabs - Switch /logout from GET to POST with CSRFMiddleware so it matches the SPA's existing HttpUtil.post('/logout') call (previously 404'd silently) and blocks GET-based logout via image tags or link prefetchers. Handler now returns JSON; the SPA already navigates client-side. - Return 401 (instead of 404) from /panel/api/* when the caller is a browser XHR (X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest) so the axios interceptor redirects to the login page on logout-in-another-tab, cookie expiry, and server restart. Anonymous callers still get 404 to keep endpoints hidden from casual scanners. - One-shot the 401 redirect in axios-init.js and hang the rejected promise so queued polls don't stack reloads or surface error toasts while the browser is navigating away. - Add the CSP nonce to the runtime-injected <script> in dist.go so the panel loads under the existing script-src 'nonce-...' policy. - Update api-docs endpoints.js: GET /logout doc entry was missing. * fix(settings): POST /logout after credential change * fix(auth): invalidate other sessions when credentials change When the admin changes username/password from one machine, sessions on every other machine kept working until they manually logged out because session storage is a signed client-side cookie — there is no server-side session list to revoke. Add a per-user LoginEpoch counter stamped into the session at login and re-verified on every authenticated request. UpdateUser and UpdateFirstUser bump the epoch (UpdateUser via gorm.Expr so a single update statement is atomic), so any cookie issued before the change no longer matches the user's current epoch and GetLoginUser returns nil — the SPA's 401 interceptor then redirects to the login page. Backward compatible: the column defaults to 0 and missing cookie values are treated as 0, so sessions issued before this change remain valid until the first credential update. --------- Co-authored-by: Sanaei <ho3ein.sanaei@gmail.com>		2026-05-13 12:52:52 +02:00
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csrf.go	Implement CSRF protection and security hardening across the application (#4179)	2026-05-07 23:36:11 +02:00
session.go	Security hardening: sessions, SSRF, CSP nonce, CSRF logout, trusted proxies (#4275)	2026-05-13 12:52:52 +02:00
session_test.go	Security hardening: sessions, SSRF, CSP nonce, CSRF logout, trusted proxies (#4275)	2026-05-13 12:52:52 +02:00