Minor patches

lib/core/settings.py

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ from lib.core.enums import OS
 from thirdparty import six
 
 # sqlmap version (<major>.<minor>.<month>.<monthly commit>)
-VERSION = "1.10.7.79"
+VERSION = "1.10.7.80"
 TYPE = "dev" if VERSION.count('.') > 2 and VERSION.split('.')[-1] != '0' else "stable"
 TYPE_COLORS = {"dev": 33, "stable": 90, "pip": 34}
 VERSION_STRING = "sqlmap/%s#%s" % ('.'.join(VERSION.split('.')[:-1]) if VERSION.count('.') > 2 and VERSION.split('.')[-1] == '0' else VERSION, TYPE)

lib/utils/prove.py

@@ -347,6 +347,10 @@ def proveExploitation():
     # back, exploitation is NOT proven; say so plainly instead of echoing the detection verdict.
     proven = bool(rungs)
 
+    # whether ANY confirmed technique here can return data inline; a stacked-query-only point cannot, so a
+    # failed read-back below is expected there and must NOT be spun into a "false positive" verdict
+    canReadBack = any(_ in injection.data for _ in (PAYLOAD.TECHNIQUE.BOOLEAN, PAYLOAD.TECHNIQUE.ERROR, PAYLOAD.TECHNIQUE.UNION, PAYLOAD.TECHNIQUE.TIME))
+
     if proven:
         if proof:
             fields.append(_field("Proof", proof))
@@ -361,7 +365,12 @@ def proveExploitation():
         verdict = ["no value could be read back through the injection (tried a random arithmetic product and the DBMS banner)"]
         if suspectWaf:
             verdict.append("the TRUE/FALSE difference is only an HTTP %s (blocked) response - characteristic of a WAF/IPS, not a database answer" % signal.get("trueCode"))
-        if wafInterfering:
+        if not canReadBack:
+            # e.g. stacked-query-only: no confirmed technique returns data inline, so a value cannot be read
+            # back here - that is expected by design and is NOT evidence of a false positive
+            verdict.append("this injection point exposes no data-returning channel (e.g. stacked queries), so a value cannot be read back inline - expected here, not a false positive")
+            verdict.append("=> confirm exploitation through a side effect instead (e.g. '--os-shell', or '--sql-query' run with '--technique=S')")
+        elif wafInterfering:
             # behind a WAF, an unconfirmed read-back is ambiguous: a genuine injection whose data-retrieval
             # payloads are being blocked looks the same as a pure WAF artifact - so don't assert "false
             # positive", point the user at the way to disambiguate instead

lib/utils/sqlalchemy.py

@@ -131,6 +131,15 @@ class SQLAlchemy(GenericConnector):
             retVal = True
         except (_sqlalchemy.exc.OperationalError, _sqlalchemy.exc.ProgrammingError) as ex:
             logger.log(logging.WARN if conf.dbmsHandler else logging.DEBUG, "(remote) %s" % getSafeExString(ex))
+            # Roll back the failed statement's transaction so it does not poison every following query with
+            # 'InFailedSqlTransaction' (SQLAlchemy 2.0+ keeps the transaction open after an error). Without this
+            # a single legitimately-failing probe - e.g. AURORA_VERSION() on vanilla PostgreSQL during
+            # fingerprinting - made all later queries silently return wrong values (e.g. '--is-dba' read False)
+            if hasattr(self.connector, "rollback"):
+                try:
+                    self.connector.rollback()
+                except Exception:
+                    pass
         except _sqlalchemy.exc.InternalError as ex:
             raise SqlmapConnectionException(getSafeExString(ex))
 

tamper/space2mssqlhash.py

@@ -15,11 +15,12 @@ def tamper(payload, **kwargs):
     Replaces space character (' ') with a pound character ('#') followed by a new line ('\n')
 
     Requirement:
-        * MSSQL
         * MySQL
 
     Notes:
         * Useful to bypass several web application firewalls
+        * The '#' single-line comment used here is MySQL-only (despite this script's legacy name);
+          T-SQL has no '#' comment, so it does not apply to Microsoft SQL Server
 
     >>> tamper('1 AND 9227=9227')
     '1%23%0AAND%23%0A9227=9227'