Rectifies SOCKS5 protocol field overrun hazards

This commit is contained in:
nnposter 2019-01-19 23:50:18 +00:00
parent 6bb36b1ca2
commit cb9559b342
2 changed files with 21 additions and 20 deletions

View file

@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ struct socks5_request {
char cmd;
char rsv;
char atyp;
char dst[SOCKS_BUFF_SIZE]; // addr/name and port info
unsigned char dst[SOCKS_BUFF_SIZE]; // addr/name and port info
} __attribute__((packed));
#ifdef WIN32
#pragma pack()
@ -265,11 +265,16 @@ struct socks5_request {
#define SOCKS5_USR_MAXLEN 255
#define SOCKS5_PWD_MAXLEN 255
#define SOCKS5_DST_MAXLEN 255
#if SOCKS_BUFF_SIZE < (1 + SOCKS5_USR_MAXLEN) + (1 + SOCKS5_PWD_MAXLEN)
#error SOCKS_BUFF_SIZE is defined too small to handle SOCKS5 authentication
#endif
#if SOCKS_BUFF_SIZE < (1 + SOCKS5_DST_MAXLEN) + 2
#error SOCKS_BUFF_SIZE is defined too small to handle SOCKS5 destination
#endif
/* Length of IPv6 address */
#ifndef INET6_ADDRSTRLEN
#define INET6_ADDRSTRLEN 46

View file

@ -661,9 +661,10 @@ static int do_proxy_socks5(void)
struct socks5_connect socks5msg;
uint32_t inetaddr;
char inet6addr[16];
unsigned short proxyport = htons(o.portno);
uint16_t proxyport = htons(o.portno);
char socksbuf[8];
int sd,len,lenfqdn;
int sd;
size_t dstlen, targetlen;
struct socks5_request socks5msg2;
struct socks5_auth socks5auth;
char *uptr, *pptr;
@ -816,43 +817,38 @@ static int do_proxy_socks5(void)
socks5msg2.atyp = SOCKS5_ATYP_IPv4;
inetaddr = inet_addr(o.target);
memcpy(socks5msg2.dst, &inetaddr, 4);
len = 4;
dstlen = 4;
break;
case 2: // IPv6 address family
socks5msg2.atyp = SOCKS5_ATYP_IPv6;
inet_pton(AF_INET6,o.target,&inet6addr);
memcpy(socks5msg2.dst, inet6addr,16);
len = 16;
dstlen = 16;
break;
case -1: // FQDN
socks5msg2.atyp = SOCKS5_ATYP_NAME;
lenfqdn=strlen(o.target);
if (lenfqdn > SOCKS_BUFF_SIZE-5){
loguser("Error: host name too long.\n");
targetlen=strlen(o.target);
if (targetlen > SOCKS5_DST_MAXLEN){
loguser("Error: hostname length exceeds %d.\n", SOCKS5_DST_MAXLEN);
close(sd);
return -1;
}
socks5msg2.dst[0]=lenfqdn;
memcpy(socks5msg2.dst+1,o.target,lenfqdn);
len = 1 + lenfqdn;
dstlen = 0;
socks5msg2.dst[dstlen++] = targetlen;
memcpy(socks5msg2.dst + dstlen, o.target, targetlen);
dstlen += targetlen;
break;
default: // this shall not happen
ncat_assert(0);
}
memcpy(socks5msg2.dst+len, &proxyport, sizeof(proxyport));
len += 2 + 1 + 3;
memcpy(socks5msg2.dst + dstlen, &proxyport, 2);
dstlen += 2;
if (len > sizeof(socks5msg2)){
loguser("Error: address information too large.\n");
close(sd);
return -1;
}
if (send(sd, (char *) &socks5msg2, len, 0) < 0) {
if (send(sd, (char *) &socks5msg2, offsetof(struct socks5_request , dst) + dstlen, 0) < 0) {
loguser("Error: sending proxy request: %s.\n", socket_strerror(socket_errno()));
close(sd);
return -1;