Mail: host validation.

Now host name resolved from client address is validated to only contain
the characters specified in RFC 1034, Section 3.5.  The validation allows
to avoid injections when using the resolved host name in auth_http and
smtp proxy.

Reported by Asim Viladi Oglu Manizada, Colin Warren,
Xiao Liu (Yunnan University), Yuan Tan (UC Riverside), and
Bird Liu (Lanzhou University).
This commit is contained in:
Roman Arutyunyan 2026-02-26 11:52:53 +04:00 committed by Roman Arutyunyan
parent 9739e755b8
commit 6f3145006b

View file

@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
static void ngx_mail_smtp_resolve_addr_handler(ngx_resolver_ctx_t *ctx);
static ngx_int_t ngx_mail_smtp_validate_host(ngx_str_t *name);
static void ngx_mail_smtp_resolve_name(ngx_event_t *rev);
static void ngx_mail_smtp_resolve_name_handler(ngx_resolver_ctx_t *ctx);
static void ngx_mail_smtp_block_reading(ngx_event_t *rev);
@ -127,6 +128,20 @@ ngx_mail_smtp_resolve_addr_handler(ngx_resolver_ctx_t *ctx)
return;
}
if (ngx_mail_smtp_validate_host(&ctx->name) != NGX_OK) {
ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_ERR, c->log, 0,
"%V resolved to invalid host name \"%V\"",
&c->addr_text, &ctx->name);
s->host = smtp_tempunavail;
ngx_resolve_addr_done(ctx);
ngx_mail_smtp_greeting(s, s->connection);
return;
}
c->log->action = "in resolving client hostname";
s->host.data = ngx_pstrdup(c->pool, &ctx->name);
@ -149,6 +164,36 @@ ngx_mail_smtp_resolve_addr_handler(ngx_resolver_ctx_t *ctx)
}
static ngx_int_t
ngx_mail_smtp_validate_host(ngx_str_t *name)
{
u_char ch;
ngx_uint_t i;
if (name->len == 0) {
return NGX_DECLINED;
}
for (i = 0; i < name->len; i++) {
ch = name->data[i];
/* allow only characters from RFC 1034, Section 3.5 */
if ((ch >= 'a' && ch <= 'z')
|| (ch >= 'A' && ch <= 'Z')
|| (ch >= '0' && ch <= '9')
|| ch == '-' || ch == '.')
{
continue;
}
return NGX_DECLINED;
}
return NGX_OK;
}
static void
ngx_mail_smtp_resolve_name(ngx_event_t *rev)
{