LibreChat/api/server/controllers/agents/resume.js
Danny Avila 68fc46a055
🪢 feat: Resume Bound Event Actors from Checkpoint Forks (#15227)
* feat: resume event actors from checkpoint forks

* fix: fence event actor checkpoint uncertainty

* fix: satisfy event actor type contracts

* fix: make actor reconciliation recoverable

* fix: preserve event actor lifecycle transitions

* fix: fence event actor lifecycle outcomes

* fix: enforce event actor lifecycle ownership

* fix: retain event actor settlement proof

* 🔒 fix: Retain Event Actor Receipts Through Repair and Bound Their Journal

Repair and compensation deleted the reconciliation row they resolved, which
was the only durable proof that the invocation had already applied an external
action. A delayed duplicate owner could then reacquire the same invocation id
and repeat that action. Both resolutions now retire their receipt to `settled`
and record how it settled, so the same-id tombstone survives; `history_repaired`
and `action_compensated` still force a cold rebuild. Compensation undoes the
effect without re-authorizing the delivery, so a legitimate retry must arrive
under a new invocation id. A retried repair converges on its own receipt.

Bound the journal so a long-lived actor cannot grow its conversation document
without limit: a new fence is admitted only when no active lifecycle row
exists, so a capped push can evict nothing but the oldest settled receipts.

Stop shipping the unbounded source payload on every bound-child continuation.
It rode the delivery body regardless of the feature flag while the sibling
`fire` body deliberately sends event identity alone, so a large webhook payload
could push a previously working delivery past the chat route's body limit. The
actor binds an invocation from identity and never builds the prompt from it.

Blank the positional token map on warm continuations. It is derived from the
full DB history, while a warm run executes on checkpoint-restored state, so its
indices address different messages and the pruner never recounts them —
misattributing cached counts to the wrong messages in both directions.

Keep the replaced-claim exit on its cleanup path when preserving reconciliation
fails: the committing CAS already left a blocking row, so the failed status
upgrade costs provenance, not safety.

* 🧪 test: Pin the Warm Continuation's Map/Summary Asymmetry

Give the warm-continuation client test a populated token map and a real
cross-run summary so its assertions bite: the positional map must arrive
blank (checkpoint-restored state no longer matches DB-derived indices, and
the pruner never recounts a populated entry) while `initialSummary` must
pass through unchanged — it rides the system tail and summarizes
pre-boundary turns that were excluded from the very history the committed
checkpoint was built from, so blanking it would silently drop context no
warm run can recover.

* ⚖️ fix: Honor Compensation in Settlement and Age-Bound the Receipt Journal

A compensated receipt still tombstones its invocation id, but its external
effect was explicitly undone — the terminal handler nonetheless replayed
every settled lifecycle's stored action as authoritative and settled the
public outcome as applied, telling an action-aware source the operation
stands and suppressing the new-invocation retry compensation requires. The
handler now settles a compensated invocation as failed with an explicit
compensation error, overriding even fresh applied run evidence from a
replayed generation; verified and repaired receipts continue to replay
applied.

Receipt eviction is now primarily age-based: a stale same-id owner is
bounded by time, not by how many newer invocations settle, so the previous
count-only slice let a high-rate actor evict a tombstone while its delayed
duplicate owner could still wake and repeat the action. Admission prunes
only settled receipts older than a retention window that dwarfs every
generation, job, and delivery-retry lifetime, and the count cap is demoted
to a raised document-size backstop.

* 🔀 fix: Serialize Compensation Against Settlement and Never Evict Live Receipts

The terminal handler read its lifecycle snapshot, verified history, and then
settled the public outcome — so a compensation resolving the same receipt
during that window lost: the handler settled applied from its stale snapshot
and no retry could ever change the replay-identity-locked outcome. The
receipt's status CAS is now the serialization point: verification resolves
the receipt BEFORE settling, whichever transition wins determines the public
outcome, and a crash between resolve and settle converges through the
retained receipt's replay. The verified-replay probe requires the receipt's
own resolution, so a compensated receipt can never satisfy a verification
retry. This inverts the settle-before-receipt ordering deliberately: that
ordering guarded proof that resolution used to delete, and the receipt now
retains its full action proof through resolution.

The document-size cap is no longer an eviction quota. A receipt inside its
retention window is never discarded: when the journal holds a full cap of
unexpired receipts, new invocations are refused fail-closed until receipts
age out, making duplicate protection and document integrity simultaneous
invariants instead of a rate-dependent trade.

* 🎓 fix: Keep Skill-Bearing Event Actors on the Legacy Path

Skill primes are spliced into the message list directly ahead of the newest
message, and a warm continuation forwards only that newest message — so a
checkpoint-restored actor would keep serving the prime bodies baked in at
its last cold start and never observe an edited or newly attached skill.
Until the actor head carries a context fingerprint that forces a cold
rebuild when the agent's skill context changes, agents with always-apply or
manual skill primes stay on the legacy path, which re-primes fresh bodies
every turn: correct on every event, just never warm.

* 📜 fix: Gate Fork Mode on the Skills Capability, Not Just Request-Time Primes

History-derived re-priming was a third path into the same staleness class:
an actor that previously invoked a skill carries no request-time prime
arrays, yet primeInvokedSkills re-resolves that skill's current body from
history each turn and the warm slice drops the reconstruction — leaving the
checkpoint's old body active after edits. The fork gate now keys on the
priming hook itself (present exactly when the skills capability is enabled)
alongside the request-time arrays, so every skill-body path routes to the
legacy rebuild until #15235's context fingerprint restores warm
continuation for skill-bearing actors.

* 🧾 fix: Capture Applied-Action Proof at Tool Execution, Not After sendMessage

The executor read applied-action evidence from the run-step collection the
instant sendMessage resolved, but that collection is populated
asynchronously — an applied invocation could classify as actionless
(runSteps still empty while the tool result already streamed), discarding
its fork and stranding the actor cold while the terminal handler later
settled the same delivery as applied from the persisted evidence.

Authoritative proof is now recorded in graph context the moment the
expected tool executes: the request-owned recorder observes the tool-end
chain (which ToolNode dispatches synchronously with both input and output)
and applies the same fences as run-step evidence — exact tool name with the
MCP-suffixed form, the declared argument subset against the execution
input, an error-free result, and the background non-execution receipt
exclusion. readAppliedAction consults the receipt first; run-step
inspection remains the fallback for paths that bypass the tool-end chain.

Regression coverage reproduces the observed ordering: the real executor
commits the head from the receipt while run steps are empty, warm-continues
the next event, and never re-executes the action; recorder fences and the
receipt-first controller wiring are covered separately.

* 🎯 fix: Supply Execution Arguments to the Tool End Callback

The live Vertex + MCP canary exposed a contract mismatch the synthetic
fixtures hid: the ON_TOOL_EXECUTE execution path invoked its tool end
callback with output only, while the action recorder must verify the
declared argument subset against the execution input. The receipt never
qualified, every turn fell back to cold history rebuilds, and the
tournament advanced with zero actor heads and zero retained checkpoints
while looking successful.

The execution handler owns both halves at the same moment, so the fix is
at the source rather than a correlation store: ToolEndCallbackData gains
the executed call's input and every callback site passes tc.args. A
handler-level regression drives the real createToolExecuteHandler and
asserts the callback receives both fields; recorder regressions pin the
production shapes — an output-only tool end must starve an
argument-fenced receipt rather than trust an unfenced match, and still
qualifies a name-only expected action.

* 🕵️ fix: Mark Background Deliveries So They Cannot Impersonate Applied Actions

The background-claim callback reports the ORIGINAL tool's name for artifact
attribution on the poll turn that harvests a completed task. A name-only
expected action could therefore be impersonated by work some earlier turn
dispatched: the recorder would attribute that delivery to the current
invocation and commit a head whose state never contained the invocation's
own action. The run-step evidence path never had this hole — it sees the
poll tool's name — so the recorder must match its provenance discipline.

Delivery callbacks now carry an explicit backgroundDelivery marker set at
the one site that rewrites the name, and the recorder ignores marked
deliveries outright. Regressions pin both halves of the contract: the
delivery callback must carry the marker with the poll call's arguments,
and a marked delivery can never qualify even a name-only expected action.

* 🧿 fix: Version Invalidations, Keep Evidence Ahead of Output Policy, Gate Detachable Actions

Three closeout-round findings, each converted into an invariant.

Every legacy-path invalidation now advances a durable epoch — including for
headless and already cold-marked actors, where the marker alone leaves no
CAS-visible trace — and the actor-head CAS requires the epoch observed at
preparation. A concurrently prepared fork whose history predates an
intervening legacy turn can no longer commit past it; the commit reports an
ordinary conflict and journals.

Execution identity is now emitted before post-execution output policy: when
a side-effecting tool succeeds but its returned content is withheld by the
output filter, the callback delivers an outputFiltered receipt with blank
content — the recorder accepts it as proof (rejecting model-detached calls
it cannot distinguish through the blank shape), the artifact path never
sees it, and an applied action is no longer reclassified actionless and
re-executed on retry.

Background-capable expected actions stay off the fork path: dispatch
returns a launch handle every evidence fence correctly rejects, and the
completion is provenance-marked as another turn's work, so a fork would
settle actionless before the external effect lands with nothing to stop a
retry from dispatching it again. The gate mirrors the MCP-suffix name
matching of the evidence path.

* 🚧 fix: Seal the Whole Legacy Turn Behind a Second Epoch Advance

The epoch fenced only the legacy turn's start: a fork preparing after the
begin invalidation but before the turn's message persistence observed the
new epoch and cold marker, rebuilt from history that did not yet contain
the turn, and committed cleanly because nothing advanced the epoch again —
making the incomplete rebuild authoritative and clearing the marker.

Every legacy event turn now seals its invalidation at terminal persistence
with a second epoch advance, on the success, replaced-claim, and error
exits alike. Sealing deliberately carries no quiescence requirement — it
must succeed while a fork fence is active, because that is exactly the
mid-turn race it defeats — and a fork that already committed against the
begin epoch is healed the same way: the seal re-marks the head cold, so
the next event rebuilds with complete history. Seal failure never diverts
the turn's own exit; the begin bump still fences everything prepared
before the turn.

* 🔗 fix: Replace the Best-Effort Epoch Bump With a Durable Legacy-Turn Fence

The second epoch advance could not make a legacy turn atomic, and three
findings shared that root cause: two conditional updates left a headless
gap a fork could create the head inside; the error exit sealed before
saveErrorTurn made the error history durable; and any crash or failure
between persistence and sealing left an incomplete fork authoritative,
because the seal was best-effort and its failure was swallowed.

A legacy turn now carries one durable fence. A token is written before
execution by a single update-pipeline write — no two-write gap, and the
cold marker is applied only where a head exists via $cond/$$REMOVE. While
the token is present no fork may prepare (the adapter refuses) or commit
(the CAS requires its absence), because the turn's messages are not yet
durable. One atomic write clears the exact token and advances the epoch
once history is persisted — after saveErrorTurn on the error exit — and
success, replacement, and error exits all route through it.

Failure is now fail-closed rather than silent: a failed seal leaves the
token set, which keeps blocking forks and is logged as such, and a fence
abandoned by a crashed turn is reclaimed only once stale, advancing the
epoch and marking any head cold so the next event rebuilds from whatever
history actually survived.

* fix: serialize legacy event actor turns

* fix: close legacy actor fence ownership gaps

* fix: preserve legacy actor persistence fences
2026-08-26 08:39:00 -04:00

1746 lines
67 KiB
JavaScript

const { randomUUID } = require('crypto');
const { logger } = require('@librechat/data-schemas');
const {
Constants,
ResourceType,
EModelEndpoint,
ViolationTypes,
PermissionBits,
} = require('librechat-data-provider');
const {
checkAccess,
GenerationJobManager,
isPendingActionStale,
mapToolApprovalResolutions,
resolveAskUserQuestionResume,
buildResolvedAskUserQuestion,
appendResolvedAskUserQuestion,
attachAskUserQuestionAnswers,
findAskUserQuestionContentIndex,
findUndecidedToolCalls,
findDisallowedDecisions,
findIncompleteDecisions,
computeAgentRequestFingerprint,
captureAgentCheckpointGeneration,
deleteAgentCheckpoint,
buildAbortedResponseMetadata,
sanitizeMessageForTransmit,
filterMalformedContentParts,
getAgentCheckpointer,
isContentFilterError,
preflightResumeContent,
getResumeProvenance,
getUserFacingResumeError,
decrementPendingRequest,
checkAndIncrementPendingRequest,
isSteerPreemptSupported,
isStopConfirmed,
toPendingSteer,
createMCPRuntimeRequestBody,
getSafeErrorMetadata,
isAgentEventRetentionActive,
} = require('@librechat/api');
const { disposeClient } = require('~/server/cleanup');
const { decryptMetadata } = require('~/server/services/ActionService');
const { checkPermission } = require('~/server/services/PermissionService');
const {
getMCPRequestContext,
cleanupMCPRequestContextForReq,
} = require('~/server/services/MCPRequestContext');
const {
saveMessage,
getConvo,
getMessages,
getFiles,
getAgent,
getActions,
getUserMemories,
getRoleByName,
isSubagentOwnerAdmissible,
completeAgentEventActorLegacyTurn,
} = require('~/models');
const {
acquireEventChildGenerationLease,
} = require('~/server/services/Endpoints/agents/eventChildLease');
const {
recordScheduleOutcome,
claimScheduleResume,
releaseScheduleResumeClaim,
finalizeScheduleResumeClaim,
releaseScheduleResumeFence,
isScheduleLive,
} = require('~/server/services/Schedules');
const {
GENERATION_PROTOCOL_HEADER,
negotiateNewGenerationProtocol,
negotiateExistingGenerationProtocol,
} = require('./protocol');
function sendGenerationJson(res, status, body, generationProtocolVersion) {
if (typeof res.set === 'function') {
res.set(GENERATION_PROTOCOL_HEADER, String(generationProtocolVersion));
} else if (typeof res.setHeader === 'function') {
res.setHeader(GENERATION_PROTOCOL_HEADER, String(generationProtocolVersion));
}
return res.status(status).json({ ...body, generationProtocolVersion });
}
/**
* How long a resume waits on best-effort steering bookkeeping before answering
* anyway. The approval is already consumed by that point, so a stalled Redis
* must not strand the client behind a chip label and an arm.
*/
const STEER_RESUME_SETUP_TIMEOUT_MS = 1000;
/**
* New jobs are physically isolated by an immutable saver namespace, so a
* terminal owner deletes the whole namespace and catches writes that landed
* after an earlier read. Pre-isolation jobs share the root namespace and must
* retain captured-id cleanup to avoid pruning a replacement.
*/
function deleteResumedGenerationCheckpoint({
conversationId,
checkpointerCfg,
job,
checkpointGeneration,
}) {
const checkpointNamespace =
typeof job?.metadata?.checkpointNamespace === 'string' ? job.metadata.checkpointNamespace : '';
if (checkpointNamespace !== '') {
return deleteAgentCheckpoint(conversationId, checkpointerCfg, undefined, {
checkpointNamespace,
});
}
return deleteAgentCheckpoint(conversationId, checkpointerCfg, checkpointGeneration);
}
async function sealResumedLegacyEventActorTurn({ userId, conversationId, metadata }) {
const token = metadata?.agentEventLegacyTurnToken;
if (typeof token !== 'string' || token === '') {
return;
}
try {
const sealed = await completeAgentEventActorLegacyTurn({
user: userId,
conversationId,
...(metadata?.tenantId == null ? {} : { tenantId: metadata.tenantId }),
token,
});
if (!sealed) {
logger.error(
`[event-actor] Resumed legacy turn fence ${token} was not sealed; forks stay blocked until bounded reclaim`,
);
}
} catch (error) {
logger.error(
`[event-actor] Failed to seal resumed legacy turn fence ${token}; forks stay blocked until bounded reclaim`,
getSafeErrorMetadata(error),
);
}
}
/** Error-path checkpoint cleanup runs after the HTTP ACK. A storage failure
* must be observable, but must not escape the controller catch and bypass the
* remaining request-context/concurrency/client cleanup in `finally`. */
async function deleteFailedResumeCheckpoint(args, context) {
try {
await deleteResumedGenerationCheckpoint(args);
} catch (error) {
logger.error(
`[ResumeAgentController] Failed to prune checkpoint after ${context}`,
getSafeErrorMetadata(error),
);
}
}
const GENERIC_RESUME_ERROR = 'Resume failed';
const resumeContentProtectionDependencies = {
getAgentCheckpointer,
checkAccess,
getMessages,
getFiles,
getAgent,
getActions,
getUserMemories,
getRoleByName,
decryptMetadata,
canAccessAgent: (agent, user) =>
checkPermission({
userId: user.id,
role: user.role,
resourceType: ResourceType.AGENT,
resourceId: agent._id,
requiredPermission: PermissionBits.VIEW,
}),
};
/** De-duplicate a merged attachment list by a stable artifact identity. */
function mergeAttachments(existing, incoming) {
const seen = new Set();
const out = [];
for (const attachment of [...(existing ?? []), ...(incoming ?? [])]) {
if (!attachment) {
continue;
}
const key =
attachment.file_id ??
attachment.filepath ??
attachment.filename ??
JSON.stringify(attachment);
if (seen.has(key)) {
continue;
}
seen.add(key);
out.push(attachment);
}
return out;
}
/**
* Resolve the current segment's tool artifacts and merge them with any already
* persisted on the response row. A resumed turn can span multiple pause segments;
* each rebuilt client has its own `artifactPromises`, and the final finalize would
* otherwise OVERWRITE the row's attachments with only the last segment's. Reading
* the persisted row and merging keeps every segment's artifacts on the saved message.
*/
async function resolveAccumulatedAttachments({ client, conversationId, responseMessageId }) {
const promises = Array.isArray(client?.artifactPromises) ? client.artifactPromises : [];
const resolved = promises.length > 0 ? (await Promise.all(promises)).filter(Boolean) : [];
let existing = [];
if (responseMessageId) {
try {
const [row] = await getMessages(
{ conversationId, messageId: responseMessageId },
'attachments',
);
existing = Array.isArray(row?.attachments) ? row.attachments : [];
} catch (err) {
logger.warn(
'[ResumeAgentController] Failed to read prior attachments for merge',
getSafeErrorMetadata(err),
);
}
}
return mergeAttachments(existing, resolved);
}
/** Resolve the segment's content for an unfinished save (mirrors finalize's source). */
async function resolveSegmentContent(client, streamId, expectedCreatedAt) {
const liveContent = Array.isArray(client?.contentParts) ? client.contentParts : [];
const rawContent =
liveContent.length > 0
? liveContent
: ((await GenerationJobManager.getResumeState(streamId, expectedCreatedAt))
?.aggregatedContent ?? []);
return filterMalformedContentParts(rawContent);
}
/**
* A resumed segment that streamed content / produced artifacts and then paused AGAIN
* must persist that progress before returning. The next resume rebuilds a fresh client
* (empty `contentParts`/`artifactPromises`), so without this an approval that later
* expires or is reaped would leave only the EARLIER pause's content on the saved row —
* the user loses everything streamed during this segment. Saved as a partial (`$set`,
* still `unfinished`) so a subsequent successful resume overwrites it on finalize.
*/
async function persistRePauseProgress({ req, client, job, streamId, conversationId }) {
const userId = req.user.id;
const meta = job.metadata ?? {};
const responseMessageId = meta.responseMessageId ?? client.responseMessageId;
if (!responseMessageId) {
return;
}
const content = await resolveSegmentContent(client, streamId, job.createdAt);
const { userSubmittedPaths, userSubmittedMessageFieldPaths } = getResumeProvenance({
content,
pendingAction: meta.pendingAction,
body: req.body,
existingPaths: meta.userSubmittedPaths,
existingMessageFieldPaths: meta.userSubmittedMessageFieldPaths,
});
const attachments = await resolveAccumulatedAttachments({
client,
conversationId,
responseMessageId,
});
if (content.length === 0 && attachments.length === 0) {
return;
}
const savedResponseMessage = await saveMessage(
{
userId,
isTemporary: meta.isTemporary ?? req.body?.isTemporary,
expiredAt: req._agentEventBindingRetention?.expiredAt,
interfaceConfig: req?.config?.interfaceConfig,
},
{
messageId: responseMessageId,
conversationId,
...(content.length > 0 && { content }),
...(attachments.length > 0 && { attachments }),
...(userSubmittedPaths.length > 0 && { userSubmittedPaths }),
...(userSubmittedMessageFieldPaths.length > 0 && { userSubmittedMessageFieldPaths }),
unfinished: true,
user: userId,
},
{ context: 'api/server/controllers/agents/resume.js - re-pause progress persist' },
);
if (!savedResponseMessage) {
throw new Error('Re-pause response progress could not be persisted');
}
}
/** Untenanted jobs (pre-multi-tenancy) remain accessible if the userId check passes. */
function hasTenantMismatch(job, user) {
return job.metadata?.tenantId != null && job.metadata.tenantId !== user.tenantId;
}
/**
* Build the SDK resume value from the wire decision payload, validating against the
* pending action. Returns `{ resumeValue }` on success or `{ error }` with an HTTP
* status for the route to surface.
*/
function resolveResumeValue(pendingAction, body) {
const payload = pendingAction.payload;
if (payload?.type === 'tool_approval') {
const resolutions = Array.isArray(body.decisions) ? body.decisions : [];
const undecided = findUndecidedToolCalls(payload, resolutions);
if (undecided.length > 0) {
return { status: 400, error: 'Every paused tool call must be decided', undecided };
}
// Enforce the policy's per-tool allowed_decisions — a crafted POST must not
// approve a tool the policy restricted to (e.g.) reject/respond.
const disallowed = findDisallowedDecisions(payload, resolutions);
if (disallowed.length > 0) {
return { status: 403, error: 'Decision not permitted for one or more tools', disallowed };
}
// `edit`/`respond` must carry their payload — otherwise toSdkDecision's defensive
// defaults ({} / '') would resume with an empty input/result the user didn't approve.
const incomplete = findIncompleteDecisions(resolutions);
if (incomplete.length > 0) {
return {
status: 400,
error: 'edit requires editedArguments and respond requires responseText',
incomplete,
};
}
return { resumeValue: mapToolApprovalResolutions(resolutions) };
}
if (payload?.type === 'ask_user_question') {
return resolveAskUserQuestionResume(payload, body);
}
return { status: 400, error: 'Unsupported pending action type' };
}
/**
* Finalize a resumed turn that ran to completion: persist the (now complete)
* response message, emit the terminal event over the existing SSE, complete the
* job, and prune the checkpoint. Mirrors the abort route's save shape but for a
* successful finish. Best-effort title generation for a first-turn pause.
*/
async function finalizeResumedTurn({
req,
client,
job,
streamId,
conversationId,
addTitle,
checkpointGeneration,
}) {
const userId = req.user.id;
const checkpointerCfg = req.config?.endpoints?.[EModelEndpoint.agents]?.checkpointer;
const meta = job.metadata ?? {};
const userMessage = meta.userMessage;
// The response hangs off the user message; the *user* message's own parent decides
// whether this is the first turn of the conversation (title eligibility).
const parentMessageId = userMessage?.messageId ?? Constants.NO_PARENT;
const isFirstTurn = (userMessage?.parentMessageId ?? Constants.NO_PARENT) === Constants.NO_PARENT;
const responseMessageId = meta.responseMessageId ?? `${userMessage?.messageId ?? 'resumed'}_`;
// Sourced from the paused job (persisted at creation), not the resume body — a
// temporary chat must stay temporary on resume so its messages aren't persisted.
const isTemporary = meta.isTemporary ?? req.body?.isTemporary;
// Read the raw job data BEFORE completeJob deletes it — its tracked token/context
// usage backs the response message's cost rollup (parity with normal completion).
const jobData = await GenerationJobManager.getJobStore().getJob(streamId);
// Job-replacement guard (mirrors the normal request path): jobs are keyed by streamId
// (== conversationId), so a new/concurrent request reusing this conversation overwrites
// the record with a fresh createdAt. If that happened while we were resuming, finalizing
// now would emit `done` to / complete / delete the NEWER turn's job. Skip all terminal
// side effects when the job we paused is no longer the live one; the caller's `finally`
// still disposes the client + releases the slot.
if (!jobData || jobData.createdAt !== job.createdAt) {
logger.warn(
`[ResumeAgentController] Skipping resumed finalization — job ${streamId} was replaced`,
);
return;
}
// Prefer the resumed run's live content: it's complete (seeded with the pre-pause
// content) and avoids a Redis re-read that can race appendChunk writes still in
// flight. Fall back to the aggregated store content only when the live array is empty.
const liveContent = Array.isArray(client?.contentParts) ? client.contentParts : [];
const rawContent =
liveContent.length > 0
? liveContent
: ((await GenerationJobManager.getResumeState(streamId, job.createdAt))?.aggregatedContent ??
[]);
// Parity with the normal agents path (AgentClient strips these before saving):
// drop empty/malformed tool_call parts so a resumed turn can't persist an invalid
// part that breaks reload/rendering.
const content = filterMalformedContentParts(rawContent);
const { userSubmittedPaths, userSubmittedMessageFieldPaths } = getResumeProvenance({
content,
pendingAction: meta.pendingAction,
body: req.body,
existingPaths: meta.userSubmittedPaths,
existingMessageFieldPaths: meta.userSubmittedMessageFieldPaths,
});
/**
* A resumed segment can end on an empty preempt boundary just as a fresh
* one can — the boundary hook is re-registered by `buildSteerWiring` on
* resume. Persisting that as complete would contradict the honest contract
* the normal request path now keeps.
*/
const preemptStats = client?.run?.getPreemptStats?.();
const preemptIncomplete =
(preemptStats?.emptyBoundaries ?? 0) > 0 ||
client?.run?.getHaltReason?.() === 'preempt_incomplete';
const responseMessage = {
messageId: responseMessageId,
parentMessageId,
conversationId,
content,
sender: meta.sender ?? client?.sender ?? 'AI',
endpoint: meta.endpoint,
iconURL: meta.iconURL,
model: meta.model,
unfinished: preemptIncomplete,
error: false,
isCreatedByUser: false,
user: userId,
...(userSubmittedPaths.length > 0 && { userSubmittedPaths }),
...(userSubmittedMessageFieldPaths.length > 0 && { userSubmittedMessageFieldPaths }),
};
if (meta.agent_id ?? req.body?.agent_id) {
responseMessage.agent_id = meta.agent_id ?? req.body.agent_id;
}
// Persist tool artifacts (code files, images, UI resources) the resumed continuation
// produced — BaseClient.sendMessage awaits these before saving, but the lean resume
// path bypasses it, so do it here or they vanish on reload / for late subscribers.
// MERGE with any already on the row (earlier pause segments) rather than overwrite —
// the final segment's client only holds its own segment's artifacts.
const attachments = await resolveAccumulatedAttachments({
client,
conversationId,
responseMessageId,
});
if (attachments.length > 0) {
responseMessage.attachments = attachments;
}
// Response metadata: the resume client only sees POST-resume usage, while the job's
// tracked tokenUsage is cumulative across the pause. Take the cumulative usage (+
// summary marker) from the job, and contextUsage / thoughtSignatures from the client
// (which the abort-only helper drops). Cumulative usage wins so cost isn't underreported.
const clientMeta = client?.buildResponseMetadata?.() ?? null;
const cumulativeMeta = jobData ? buildAbortedResponseMetadata(jobData) : null;
const responseMetadata = {
...(clientMeta ?? {}),
...(cumulativeMeta?.usage ? { usage: cumulativeMeta.usage } : {}),
...(cumulativeMeta?.summaryUsedTokens != null
? { summaryUsedTokens: cumulativeMeta.summaryUsedTokens }
: {}),
};
if (Object.keys(responseMetadata).length > 0) {
responseMessage.metadata = responseMetadata;
}
// Carry the resumed run's context-window calibration (BaseClient.sendMessage persists
// this on the response). Without it, the NEXT turn can't seed its pruner from this
// run and falls back to uncalibrated token accounting.
if (client?.contextMeta != null) {
responseMessage.contextMeta = client.contextMeta;
}
// Win terminal ownership BEFORE the outcome-defining response write. Stop
// and completion both write the same Mongo row; a later liveness read cannot
// fence that external write, while this CAS gives exactly one side authority.
// The durable pending marker keeps status/subscribers on the readiness path
// until the winner has persisted and published its FINAL.
const terminalClaim = await GenerationJobManager.claimTerminalJob(
streamId,
'complete',
undefined,
job.createdAt,
{ persistencePending: true },
);
if (!terminalClaim) {
logger.warn(
`[ResumeAgentController] Skipping resumed FINAL — another terminal/pause transition won for ${streamId}`,
);
return;
}
let terminalPublicationStarted = false;
try {
const savedResponseMessage = await saveMessage(
{
userId,
isTemporary,
expiredAt: req._agentEventBindingRetention?.expiredAt,
interfaceConfig: req?.config?.interfaceConfig,
},
responseMessage,
{ context: 'api/server/controllers/agents/resume.js - resumed response end' },
);
if (!savedResponseMessage) {
throw new Error('Resumed response could not be persisted before terminal publication');
}
/** The response row is now the durable history barrier for the resumed
* legacy turn. Seal its exact pre-pause token before publishing FINAL; a
* failed seal remains fail-closed and is recovered by the bounded path. */
await sealResumedLegacyEventActorTurn({
userId,
conversationId,
metadata: meta,
});
const convo = await getConvo(userId, conversationId);
const conversation = { ...(convo ?? {}), conversationId };
// First-turn pause: the title was deferred when the turn paused. Generate it BEFORE
// completing the stream so the `title` event still reaches the live client (emitChunk
// no-ops once completeJob tears down the runtime) and the final event carries the real
// title instead of "New Chat". Best-effort — a failure must not fail the resumed turn.
if (
addTitle &&
isFirstTurn &&
!isTemporary &&
userMessage?.text &&
(!convo || !convo.title || convo.title === 'New Chat')
) {
try {
await addTitle(req, {
text: userMessage.text,
conversationId,
client,
onTitleGenerated: ({ conversationId: titleConvoId, title }) => {
conversation.title = title;
return GenerationJobManager.emitChunk(
streamId,
{
event: 'title',
data: { conversationId: titleConvoId, title },
},
{ expectedCreatedAt: job.createdAt },
);
},
});
} catch (err) {
logger.error(
'[ResumeAgentController] Title generation failed after resume',
getSafeErrorMetadata(err),
);
}
}
conversation.title = conversation.title || 'New Chat';
if (meta.scheduleId) {
await recordScheduleOutcome({
scheduleId: meta.scheduleId,
scheduledFor: meta.scheduledFor,
streamId,
jobCreatedAt: job.createdAt,
status: preemptIncomplete ? 'interrupted' : 'success',
conversationId,
...(preemptIncomplete && {
error: 'Scheduled run was interrupted before completion',
}),
});
}
const pendingSteers = terminalClaim.drainedSteers.map(toPendingSteer);
const finalEvent = {
final: true,
conversation,
title: conversation.title,
requestMessage: userMessage
? sanitizeMessageForTransmit({
...userMessage,
conversationId,
isCreatedByUser: true,
// job.metadata.userMessage is persisted without files; carry the restored
// uploads (seeded onto req.body.files before reconstruction) so the final SSE
// doesn't blank the user bubble's attachments — matching the normal path.
...(Array.isArray(req.body?.files) && req.body.files.length > 0
? { files: req.body.files }
: {}),
})
: null,
responseMessage: { ...responseMessage },
...(pendingSteers.length > 0 && { pendingSteers }),
};
terminalPublicationStarted = true;
await GenerationJobManager.publishTerminalClaim(terminalClaim, finalEvent);
} catch (error) {
if (!terminalPublicationStarted) {
try {
await GenerationJobManager.publishTerminalClaim(terminalClaim, null);
} catch (publishError) {
logger.error(
'[ResumeAgentController] Failed to publish terminal persistence reconciliation',
getSafeErrorMetadata(publishError),
);
}
}
throw error;
} finally {
try {
// Cleanup must run even if persistence/publication fails. The claim
// carries the exact generation/runtime identity, so this cannot tear
// down a later run.
await GenerationJobManager.finishTerminalJob(terminalClaim);
} finally {
await deleteResumedGenerationCheckpoint({
conversationId,
checkpointerCfg,
job,
checkpointGeneration,
});
}
}
}
/**
* Resume a generation that paused for human-in-the-loop review.
*
* The original run lives in a detached background task that exits when the run
* pauses, so this REBUILDS the run from the durable checkpoint (same `thread_id`)
* and continues it with the user's decision. The continuation streams over the
* client's existing SSE (events flow through the same `streamId`).
*
* Flow: authorize → map decisions → atomically claim the resume (single-winner) →
* ACK → reconstruct the client → `resumeCompletion` → finalize (or re-pause).
*
* Shares chat.js's middleware (auth, agent access, `buildEndpointOption`) so the
* agent/endpoint are reconstructed from the request exactly like a normal turn.
*
* @param {express.Request} req
* @param {express.Response} res
* @param {express.NextFunction} next
* @param {Function} initializeClient
* @param {Function} addTitle
*/
const ResumeAgentController = async (req, res, next, initializeClient, addTitle) => {
const userId = req.user.id;
let generationProtocolVersion = negotiateNewGenerationProtocol(req, GenerationJobManager);
const { conversationId, actionId, generationCreatedAt } = req.body;
const streamId = conversationId;
if (!streamId || streamId === 'new') {
return sendGenerationJson(
res,
400,
{ error: 'conversationId is required to resume' },
generationProtocolVersion,
);
}
if (
generationCreatedAt != null &&
(!Number.isSafeInteger(generationCreatedAt) || generationCreatedAt < 0)
) {
return sendGenerationJson(
res,
400,
{ code: 'INVALID_GENERATION_IDENTITY' },
generationProtocolVersion,
);
}
const job = await GenerationJobManager.getJob(streamId);
if (!job) {
return sendGenerationJson(
res,
404,
{ error: 'No paused generation for this conversation' },
generationProtocolVersion,
);
}
// Every persisted generation is owner-scoped. A missing/corrupt owner is
// not a legacy wildcard: fail closed before reading or resolving its action.
if (job.metadata?.userId !== userId) {
return sendGenerationJson(res, 403, { error: 'Unauthorized' }, generationProtocolVersion);
}
if (hasTenantMismatch(job, req.user)) {
return sendGenerationJson(res, 403, { error: 'Unauthorized' }, generationProtocolVersion);
}
generationProtocolVersion = negotiateExistingGenerationProtocol(req, job);
if (generationCreatedAt != null && job.createdAt !== generationCreatedAt) {
return sendGenerationJson(res, 409, { code: 'RUN_REPLACED' }, generationProtocolVersion);
}
// The resume must rebuild the SAME agent/endpoint that paused. Require an EXACT
// agent_id match when the paused job had one — a request that omits agent_id (or
// claims an ephemeral / non-agents endpoint) must not rebuild the claimed checkpoint
// on a different graph. The conversation's agent is stable, so a correct client always
// sends the right one.
const originalAgentId = job.metadata?.agent_id;
if (originalAgentId && req.body.agent_id !== originalAgentId) {
return sendGenerationJson(
res,
403,
{ error: 'Cannot resume with a different agent' },
generationProtocolVersion,
);
}
// Require an EXACT endpoint match (like agent_id): a request that OMITS endpoint must
// not fall through — the shared chat middleware treats a missing/non-agents endpoint
// as the ephemeral agent, so omitting it could rebuild the claimed checkpoint on a
// different graph. A correct client always echoes the paused endpoint.
const originalEndpoint = job.metadata?.endpoint;
if (originalEndpoint && req.body.endpoint !== originalEndpoint) {
return sendGenerationJson(
res,
403,
{ error: 'Cannot resume on a different endpoint' },
generationProtocolVersion,
);
}
const scheduleId = job.metadata?.scheduleId;
const scheduledFor = job.metadata?.scheduledFor;
if (
scheduleId &&
!(await isScheduleLive(scheduleId, job.metadata?.scheduleConfigRevision, {
automatic: job.metadata?.scheduleManual !== true,
policy: true,
// Re-validate the destination THIS occurrence recorded, not the schedule's
// current one: a later fire can have redirected the schedule while this run sat
// paused, and its conversation stays where it was filed.
scheduledFor,
}))
) {
let stopped = false;
try {
const abortResult = await GenerationJobManager.abortJob(streamId, {
expectedCreatedAt: job.createdAt,
awaitProviderDrain: true,
});
// `success` is the authoritative signal, exactly as the abort route gates. A
// `success: false` result WITHOUT a failure reason no longer exists — an
// unreached job, a replacement, or a lost CAS all report one — so the old
// `failureReason == null` test settled the occurrence and pruned the
// checkpoint on aborts that were never confirmed.
stopped = isStopConfirmed(abortResult);
} catch (error) {
logger.warn('[ResumeAgentController] Failed to stop inactive scheduled run', error);
}
if (!stopped) {
res.set('Retry-After', '1');
return sendGenerationJson(
res,
503,
{
code: 'SCHEDULE_STOP_UNCONFIRMED',
error: 'The inactive scheduled run could not be confirmed stopped. Please retry.',
},
generationProtocolVersion,
);
}
await recordScheduleOutcome({
scheduleId,
scheduledFor,
streamId,
jobCreatedAt: job.createdAt,
status: 'interrupted',
conversationId,
error: 'Schedule was disabled, changed, or deleted before approval',
});
const checkpointNamespace = job.metadata?.checkpointNamespace;
if (typeof checkpointNamespace === 'string' && checkpointNamespace !== '') {
await deleteAgentCheckpoint(
conversationId,
req.config?.endpoints?.[EModelEndpoint.agents]?.checkpointer,
undefined,
{ checkpointNamespace },
).catch((error) => {
logger.warn('[ResumeAgentController] Failed to prune inactive schedule checkpoint', error);
});
}
return sendGenerationJson(
res,
409,
{ code: 'SCHEDULE_NO_LONGER_ACTIVE', error: 'This schedule can no longer be resumed' },
generationProtocolVersion,
);
}
const pendingAction = job.metadata?.pendingAction;
if (job.status !== 'requires_action') {
return sendGenerationJson(
res,
409,
{ error: 'No live pending action to resume' },
generationProtocolVersion,
);
}
if (isPendingActionStale({ pendingAction })) {
// The action expired between the pending-action SSE and this submit. Drive the expiry
// NOW (expire CAS + terminal SSE) instead of waiting for the periodic sweeper —
// otherwise the job sits `requires_action` with a dead action and any attached SSE
// client never gets a terminal event, so the stream appears to hang even though the
// UI already reported the action as expired.
try {
await GenerationJobManager.expireApproval(streamId, pendingAction?.actionId, job.createdAt);
} catch (err) {
logger.warn(
'[ResumeAgentController] Failed to expire stale action on submit',
getSafeErrorMetadata(err),
);
}
return sendGenerationJson(
res,
409,
{ error: 'No live pending action to resume' },
generationProtocolVersion,
);
}
// Require the actionId the UI sends: without it, a stale/malformed client could
// resolve whatever action is currently pending (e.g. answer a different question).
if (!actionId) {
return sendGenerationJson(
res,
400,
{ error: 'actionId is required to resume' },
generationProtocolVersion,
);
}
if (pendingAction.actionId !== actionId) {
return sendGenerationJson(
res,
409,
{ error: 'This decision targets a stale action' },
generationProtocolVersion,
);
}
// Pin the graph identity: the resume must rebuild the SAME agent/graph + tool set the
// run paused on. The agent_id + endpoint guards above cover saved agents; the
// fingerprint additionally catches an ephemeral-agent config swap (its agent_id is
// undefined, so the id guard can't tell two ephemeral configs apart). Enforced only
// when the paused action carries a fingerprint (in-flight pauses from before this
// change won't), and recomputed from the resume body's graph-determining fields.
const pinnedFingerprint = pendingAction.requestFingerprint;
if (pinnedFingerprint && pinnedFingerprint !== computeAgentRequestFingerprint(req.body ?? {})) {
return sendGenerationJson(
res,
403,
{ error: 'Cannot resume with a different agent configuration' },
generationProtocolVersion,
);
}
const mapped = resolveResumeValue(pendingAction, req.body);
if (mapped.error) {
return sendGenerationJson(
res,
mapped.status,
{
error: mapped.error,
...(mapped.undecided && { undecided: mapped.undecided }),
...(mapped.disallowed && { disallowed: mapped.disallowed }),
...(mapped.incomplete && { incomplete: mapped.incomplete }),
},
generationProtocolVersion,
);
}
let resolvedAskContentIndex;
let resolvedAskContentMissing = false;
if (pendingAction.payload.type === 'ask_user_question' && !pendingAction.payload.tool_call_id) {
const answerSnapshot = await GenerationJobManager.getResumeState(streamId, job.createdAt);
if (answerSnapshot == null) {
return sendGenerationJson(res, 409, { code: 'RUN_REPLACED' }, generationProtocolVersion);
}
const askRequest = Array.isArray(pendingAction.payload.questions)
? { questions: pendingAction.payload.questions }
: pendingAction.payload.question;
const answerContent = answerSnapshot.aggregatedContent ?? [];
if (answerContent.length > 0) {
resolvedAskContentIndex = findAskUserQuestionContentIndex(
answerContent,
undefined,
askRequest,
);
if (resolvedAskContentIndex < 0) {
resolvedAskContentIndex = undefined;
resolvedAskContentMissing = true;
}
} else {
resolvedAskContentMissing = true;
}
}
const resolvedAskUserQuestion = buildResolvedAskUserQuestion(
pendingAction,
req.body,
resolvedAskContentIndex,
resolvedAskContentMissing,
);
const resolvedAskUserQuestions = appendResolvedAskUserQuestion(
job.metadata?.resolvedAskUserQuestions,
resolvedAskUserQuestion,
);
// A legacy job has no saver-level generation namespace, so snapshot its exact
// durable ids before the atomic resume claim. New jobs can skip this indexed
// read: terminal cleanup deletes their whole immutable namespace, including
// writes that land while the continuation is running.
//
// Start the indexed read alongside the independent concurrency check so the
// generation guard adds minimal time to the resume ACK path.
const checkpointerCfg = req.config?.endpoints?.[EModelEndpoint.agents]?.checkpointer;
const checkpointNamespace =
typeof job.metadata?.checkpointNamespace === 'string' ? job.metadata.checkpointNamespace : '';
const checkpointGenerationPromise =
checkpointNamespace !== ''
? Promise.resolve(undefined)
: captureAgentCheckpointGeneration(conversationId, checkpointerCfg).catch((err) => {
logger.warn(
'[ResumeAgentController] Failed to capture checkpoint generation',
getSafeErrorMetadata(err),
);
return {
threadId: conversationId,
checkpointIds: [],
};
});
// Reconstruct and inspect the exact paused input before acquiring a slot,
// consuming the pending action, seeding MCP state, or acknowledging success.
// A rejected answer/checkpoint therefore leaves the approval live and
// retryable, with no resource initialization or externally visible side
// effect beyond owner-scoped reads.
req.body.parentMessageId = job.metadata.userMessage?.parentMessageId ?? Constants.NO_PARENT;
// Rebuild the same persistence/retention mode as the paused turn. The resume body
// is not authoritative: tools inspect this field during client initialization.
req.body.isTemporary = job.metadata.isTemporary === true;
const metaFiles = job.metadata.userMessage?.files;
if (Array.isArray(metaFiles) && metaFiles.length > 0) {
req.body.files = metaFiles;
} else {
let restoredFiles = false;
const pausedUserMessageId = job.metadata.userMessage?.messageId;
if (pausedUserMessageId) {
try {
const [row] = await getMessages(
{ conversationId, messageId: pausedUserMessageId },
'files',
);
if (Array.isArray(row?.files) && row.files.length > 0) {
req.body.files = row.files;
restoredFiles = true;
}
} catch (err) {
logger.warn(
'[ResumeAgentController] Failed to restore paused user message files',
getSafeErrorMetadata(err),
);
}
}
if (!restoredFiles) {
req.body.files = [];
}
}
let resumeState;
let preparedContent;
try {
resumeState = await GenerationJobManager.getResumeState(streamId, job.createdAt);
const batchedAnswer =
mapped.resumeValue?.answers != null &&
typeof mapped.resumeValue.answers === 'object' &&
!Array.isArray(mapped.resumeValue.answers)
? JSON.stringify({ answers: mapped.resumeValue.answers })
: undefined;
const provenanceBody =
batchedAnswer === undefined ? req.body : { ...req.body, answer: batchedAnswer };
const resumeValueForInspection =
batchedAnswer === undefined
? mapped.resumeValue
: { ...mapped.resumeValue, answer: batchedAnswer };
const retainedAskAnswers = job.metadata.resolvedAskUserQuestions;
const initialSeedContent = resumeState?.aggregatedContent ?? [];
const preflightResumeState =
Array.isArray(retainedAskAnswers) && retainedAskAnswers.length > 0
? {
...(resumeState ?? {}),
aggregatedContent: attachAskUserQuestionAnswers(initialSeedContent, retainedAskAnswers),
}
: resumeState;
const preflightPendingAction =
batchedAnswer !== undefined && Array.isArray(pendingAction.payload.questions)
? {
...pendingAction,
payload: {
...pendingAction.payload,
question: { questions: pendingAction.payload.questions },
},
}
: pendingAction;
preparedContent = await preflightResumeContent(
{
appConfig: req.config,
endpointOption: req.body.endpointOption,
conversationId,
user: req.user,
jobMetadata: job.metadata,
pendingAction: preflightPendingAction,
body: provenanceBody,
resumeValue: resumeValueForInspection,
resumeState: preflightResumeState,
liveFiles: Array.isArray(req.body.files) ? req.body.files : [],
isTemporary: job.metadata.isTemporary === true,
checkpointNamespace,
resolvedAddedAgent: req.resolvedAddedAgent,
},
resumeContentProtectionDependencies,
);
} catch (err) {
logger.warn(
'[ResumeAgentController] Resume content preflight failed',
getSafeErrorMetadata(err),
);
if (isContentFilterError(err)) {
return sendGenerationJson(res, err.statusCode, err.body, generationProtocolVersion);
}
return sendGenerationJson(res, 500, { error: GENERIC_RESUME_ERROR }, generationProtocolVersion);
}
const { seedContent, storedMessages, userSubmittedPaths, userSubmittedMessageFieldPaths } =
preparedContent;
// Count the resume against the concurrency limit. The original turn released its slot
// when it paused, so resuming must re-acquire one — otherwise pausing several turns
// and resuming them at once would bypass LIMIT_CONCURRENT_MESSAGES.
const { allowed } = await checkAndIncrementPendingRequest(userId);
if (!allowed) {
return sendGenerationJson(
res,
429,
{ error: 'Too many concurrent requests' },
generationProtocolVersion,
);
}
// Finish the legacy checkpoint snapshot before claiming scheduled capacity.
// It is independent of the approval claim, and holding a deployment-wide slot
// while an indexed saver read stalls would unnecessarily block other schedules
// and lengthen the Mongo-claim -> approval-CAS hand-off window below.
const checkpointGeneration = await checkpointGenerationPromise;
// A pause frees its scheduled-run capacity slot. Before consuming the approval,
// atomically promote the run row back to `started` and claim a fresh global slot.
// The database's partial unique indexes arbitrate both deployment capacity and a
// concurrent active occurrence of the same schedule.
let scheduleCapacitySlot;
let scheduleResumeClaimToken;
let scheduleResumeLeaseBy;
const scheduleResumeOptions = {
expectedConfigRevision: job.metadata?.scheduleConfigRevision,
automatic: job.metadata?.scheduleManual !== true,
};
if (scheduleId) {
let scheduleClaim;
try {
scheduleClaim = await claimScheduleResume(scheduleId, scheduledFor, scheduleResumeOptions);
} catch (err) {
await decrementPendingRequest(userId);
logger.error('[ResumeAgentController] Failed to claim scheduled resume capacity', err);
return sendGenerationJson(
res,
500,
{ error: 'Failed to reserve scheduled-run capacity' },
generationProtocolVersion,
);
}
if ('conflict' in scheduleClaim) {
await decrementPendingRequest(userId);
if (scheduleClaim.conflict === 'capacity' || scheduleClaim.conflict === 'overlap') {
res.set('Retry-After', '1');
return sendGenerationJson(
res,
429,
{
code:
scheduleClaim.conflict === 'capacity'
? 'SCHEDULE_CAPACITY'
: 'SCHEDULE_OCCURRENCE_ACTIVE',
error:
scheduleClaim.conflict === 'capacity'
? 'Scheduled-run capacity is currently full. Please retry.'
: 'Another occurrence of this schedule is still running. Please retry.',
},
generationProtocolVersion,
);
}
return sendGenerationJson(
res,
409,
{
code:
scheduleClaim.conflict === 'inactive'
? 'SCHEDULE_NO_LONGER_ACTIVE'
: 'SCHEDULE_RUN_NOT_PAUSED',
error: 'This scheduled run can no longer be resumed',
},
generationProtocolVersion,
);
}
scheduleCapacitySlot = scheduleClaim.capacitySlot;
scheduleResumeClaimToken = scheduleClaim.claimToken;
scheduleResumeLeaseBy = scheduleClaim.leaseBy;
}
const releaseScheduleFence = async () => {
if (scheduleId == null || scheduleResumeLeaseBy == null) {
return;
}
try {
await releaseScheduleResumeFence(scheduleId, scheduleResumeLeaseBy);
} catch (releaseError) {
logger.warn('[ResumeAgentController] Failed to release scheduled resume fence', releaseError);
}
};
/** Release only when the exact generation demonstrably remains paused. If the
* approval CAS reply is ambiguous and the job cannot be read, retaining the slot
* until reconciliation is the safe direction: releasing it could exceed the cap
* while a committed continuation is already running. */
const rollbackUnconsumedScheduleClaim = async (currentJob) => {
if (
scheduleId == null ||
scheduleCapacitySlot == null ||
currentJob?.createdAt !== job.createdAt ||
currentJob?.status !== 'requires_action'
) {
return;
}
try {
await releaseScheduleResumeClaim(scheduleId, scheduledFor, scheduleCapacitySlot);
} catch (rollbackError) {
logger.warn(
'[ResumeAgentController] Failed to release unconsumed scheduled resume capacity',
rollbackError,
);
}
};
let releaseEventChildLease;
let eventLeaseTransferredToRun = false;
const providerExecutionId = randomUUID();
try {
if (req._agentEventBindingParentConversationId != null) {
req._agentEventTaskId = job.metadata.idempotencyClientRequestId;
try {
releaseEventChildLease = await acquireEventChildGenerationLease({
userId,
tenantId: req._agentEventBindingTenantId,
conversationId,
streamId,
taskId: job.metadata.idempotencyClientRequestId,
jobCreatedAt: job.createdAt,
retentionExpiresAt: req._agentEventBindingRetention?.expiredAt,
});
} catch (error) {
logger.warn('[ResumeAgentController] Event actor resume lease is unavailable', error);
const currentJob = await GenerationJobManager.getJob(streamId).catch(() => null);
await rollbackUnconsumedScheduleClaim(currentJob);
await releaseScheduleFence();
await decrementPendingRequest(userId);
res.set('Retry-After', '1');
return sendGenerationJson(
res,
503,
{
code: 'EVENT_ACTOR_LEASE_UNAVAILABLE',
error: 'The event actor lease is temporarily unavailable',
},
generationProtocolVersion,
);
}
if (releaseEventChildLease == null) {
const bindingActive = isAgentEventRetentionActive(
req._agentEventBindingRetention?.expiredAt,
);
const currentJob = await GenerationJobManager.getJob(streamId).catch(() => null);
await rollbackUnconsumedScheduleClaim(currentJob);
await releaseScheduleFence();
await decrementPendingRequest(userId);
if (bindingActive) {
res.set('Retry-After', '1');
}
return sendGenerationJson(
res,
409,
{
code: bindingActive ? 'EVENT_ACTOR_NOT_READY' : 'EVENT_BINDING_PARENT_ENDED',
error: bindingActive
? 'The event actor is still finishing its previous segment'
: 'The event binding parent is no longer available',
},
generationProtocolVersion,
);
}
/** Validate the durable parent/owner fence before consuming the HITL action.
* Once `approvals.resolve` wins its CAS, the action is irreversibly spent; a
* retryable fence rejection after that point could never replay the user's
* decision. A deletion that starts after this check observes the generation
* job plus the event-child lease and owns the corresponding abort. */
let eventActorRejection;
try {
const [eventParent, ownerAdmissible] = await Promise.all([
getConvo(userId, req._agentEventBindingParentConversationId),
isSubagentOwnerAdmissible(userId),
]);
if (!ownerAdmissible) {
eventActorRejection = {
code: 'EVENT_ACTOR_NOT_READY',
error: 'The event actor owner is temporarily unavailable',
};
} else if (
eventParent == null ||
eventParent.subagentThread != null ||
eventParent.agent_id !== req._agentEventBindingParentAgentId ||
(eventParent.tenantId ?? undefined) !== req._agentEventBindingTenantId ||
!isAgentEventRetentionActive(req._agentEventBindingRetention?.expiredAt) ||
!isAgentEventRetentionActive(eventParent.expiredAt)
) {
eventActorRejection = {
code: 'EVENT_BINDING_PARENT_ENDED',
error: 'The event binding parent is no longer available',
};
}
} catch (error) {
logger.warn('[ResumeAgentController] Event actor fence recheck failed', error);
eventActorRejection = {
code: 'EVENT_ACTOR_NOT_READY',
error: 'The event actor owner is temporarily unavailable',
};
}
if (eventActorRejection != null) {
const currentJob = await GenerationJobManager.getJob(streamId).catch(() => null);
await rollbackUnconsumedScheduleClaim(currentJob);
await releaseScheduleFence();
await decrementPendingRequest(userId);
return sendGenerationJson(res, 409, eventActorRejection, generationProtocolVersion);
}
}
// Atomically claim the resume. The single winner drives the run; a racing second
// submit (double-click, two tabs) gets false and must not re-drive — that would
// re-execute tools and double-bill.
//
// The claim runs AFTER the slot increment above but BEFORE the run's own try/finally
// that releases it, so a store/Redis error here (unlike the clean `!claimed` branch)
// would leak the concurrency slot until the counter TTL expires — spuriously 429'ing
// the user when they retry the still-paused approval. Release the slot on that path too.
let claimed;
try {
/** The CAS that reopens steering must also publish THIS owner's seal
* capability. A separate write after status=`running` leaves a window in
* which steer/arm requests read the previous replica's capability. */
claimed = await GenerationJobManager.approvals.resolve(
streamId,
pendingAction.actionId,
{
preemptCapable: isSteerPreemptSupported(),
// The handover owner's quote handling replaces the previous
// replica's flag, mirroring `preemptCapable` above.
steerQuotesCapable: true,
providerExecutionId,
providerDrained: true,
...(resolvedAskUserQuestion && { resolvedAskUserQuestions }),
},
job.createdAt,
);
} catch (err) {
const currentJob = await GenerationJobManager.getJob(streamId).catch(() => null);
await rollbackUnconsumedScheduleClaim(currentJob);
await releaseScheduleFence();
await decrementPendingRequest(userId);
logger.error('[ResumeAgentController] Failed to claim resume', getSafeErrorMetadata(err));
return sendGenerationJson(res, 500, { error: 'Failed to resume' }, generationProtocolVersion);
}
if (!claimed) {
await decrementPendingRequest(userId);
const currentJob = await GenerationJobManager.getJob(streamId).catch(() => null);
await rollbackUnconsumedScheduleClaim(currentJob);
await releaseScheduleFence();
if (currentJob != null && currentJob.createdAt !== job.createdAt) {
return sendGenerationJson(res, 409, { code: 'RUN_REPLACED' }, generationProtocolVersion);
}
return sendGenerationJson(
res,
409,
{ error: 'This action was already resolved or has expired' },
generationProtocolVersion,
);
}
// Linearize the consumed approval against the schedule's live config. The schedule
// document fence was acquired only after all async policy reads, and this atomic
// consume checks its token/revision/enabled state immediately after the approval CAS.
// An edit/disable that won first makes this fail; one that lands afterward is ordered
// after the continuation has started. Never begin provider execution on a stale claim.
if (scheduleId) {
let scheduleClaimCurrent = false;
try {
scheduleClaimCurrent = await finalizeScheduleResumeClaim(
scheduleId,
scheduleResumeClaimToken,
scheduleResumeLeaseBy,
scheduleResumeOptions,
);
} catch (error) {
logger.error('[ResumeAgentController] Failed to finalize scheduled resume fence', error);
await releaseScheduleFence();
}
if (!scheduleClaimCurrent) {
await decrementPendingRequest(userId);
let stopped = false;
try {
const abortResult = await GenerationJobManager.abortJob(streamId, {
expectedCreatedAt: job.createdAt,
awaitProviderDrain: true,
});
// Same authoritative gate as the inactive-schedule path above: only a landed
// abort (or an already-terminal, drained generation) may settle this occurrence.
stopped = isStopConfirmed(abortResult);
} catch (error) {
logger.warn('[ResumeAgentController] Failed to stop stale scheduled resume', error);
}
if (!stopped) {
res.set('Retry-After', '1');
return sendGenerationJson(
res,
503,
{
code: 'SCHEDULE_STOP_UNCONFIRMED',
error: 'The stale scheduled resume could not be confirmed stopped.',
},
generationProtocolVersion,
);
}
await recordScheduleOutcome({
scheduleId,
scheduledFor,
streamId,
jobCreatedAt: job.createdAt,
status: 'interrupted',
conversationId,
error: 'Schedule was disabled, changed, or deleted before approval',
});
if (checkpointNamespace !== '') {
await deleteAgentCheckpoint(conversationId, checkpointerCfg, undefined, {
checkpointNamespace,
}).catch((error) => {
logger.warn('[ResumeAgentController] Failed to prune stale schedule checkpoint', error);
});
}
return sendGenerationJson(
res,
409,
{ code: 'SCHEDULE_NO_LONGER_ACTIVE', error: 'This schedule can no longer be resumed' },
generationProtocolVersion,
);
}
}
eventLeaseTransferredToRun = true;
} finally {
if (!eventLeaseTransferredToRun) {
await releaseEventChildLease?.();
releaseEventChildLease = undefined;
}
}
/**
* An interrupt steer enqueued just before the pause survives durably with
* its `preempt` flag, but the ARM lived only in the previous owner's
* runtime. Rebuild it from the queue so the resumed segment honours an
* interrupt the user already had acknowledged.
*/
const preemptRearm = GenerationJobManager.rearmQueuedPreempts(streamId, job.createdAt).catch(
(error) => {
logger.error(
'[ResumeAgentController] Failed to re-arm queued preempts',
getSafeErrorMetadata(error),
);
},
);
/**
* BOUNDED, and the bound is the point. `.catch` only fires on rejection,
* but ioredis queues commands while a connection is down instead of
* rejecting, so either of these can simply never settle. That would block
* here — after `approvals.resolve` has already consumed the action and
* flipped the job to `running`, and before both `res.json` and the resume
* lifecycle's own try/finally. The client times out, its retry gets a 409
* because the action is spent, and neither the continuation nor the
* failed-resume cleanup ever runs.
*
* Re-arming is steering bookkeeping that the next tool boundary would
* honour anyway, so it finishes in the background rather than holding a
* resume the user is waiting on. Capability is not in this best-effort path:
* it was committed atomically by the resume claim above.
*/
let steeringSetupTimer;
await Promise.race([
preemptRearm,
new Promise((resolve) => {
steeringSetupTimer = setTimeout(() => {
logger.warn(
`[ResumeAgentController] Steering setup for ${streamId} still pending after ` +
`${STEER_RESUME_SETUP_TIMEOUT_MS}ms; continuing the resume without it`,
);
resolve();
}, STEER_RESUME_SETUP_TIMEOUT_MS);
}),
]);
clearTimeout(steeringSetupTimer);
// Seed the run-scoped MCP request-context store BEFORE the ACK: once `res.json`
// finishes the response, a later `getMCPRequestContext(req, res)` (from tool loading)
// sees `res` as ended and returns undefined, leaving the resumed run without its MCP
// connection store — approved MCP / OAuth-overlay tools would then run without their
// request-scoped connections. Pre-seeding with a null `res` + `cleanupOnResponse:false`
// mirrors the normal stream path (request.js); torn down in the `finally` below.
req._resumableStreamId = streamId;
getMCPRequestContext(req, undefined, { cleanupOnResponse: false });
// ACK immediately; the continuation streams over the client's existing SSE.
sendGenerationJson(
res,
200,
{ streamId, conversationId, status: 'resuming' },
generationProtocolVersion,
);
// Restore the conversation's createdAt so temporal prompt vars ({{current_datetime}},
// {{iso_datetime}}, ...) resolve against the SAME anchor the paused graph used rather
// than the resume wall-clock. initializeAgent reads `req.conversationCreatedAt`; the
// normal path sets it from the convo timestamp (resolveConversationCreatedAt), so mirror
// that here. (The original `timezone` is replayed onto req.body via RESUME_CONTEXT_KEYS.)
try {
const resumedConvo = await getConvo(userId, conversationId);
const createdAt = resumedConvo?.createdAt ? new Date(resumedConvo.createdAt) : null;
if (createdAt && !Number.isNaN(createdAt.getTime())) {
req.conversationCreatedAt = createdAt.toISOString();
}
} catch (err) {
logger.warn(
'[ResumeAgentController] Failed to restore conversation timestamp anchor',
getSafeErrorMetadata(err),
);
}
let client = null;
/** Re-pause progress failures use the action/epoch-scoped terminal CAS. The
* generic resume catch must not subsequently call completeJob, because the
* failed pause may have lost ownership to a newer action or generation. */
let pausePersistenceFailed = false;
let pausePersistenceFailureFinalized = false;
try {
if (
!(await GenerationJobManager.beginProviderExecution(
streamId,
job.createdAt,
providerExecutionId,
))
) {
throw Object.assign(new Error('Generation stopped before provider resume'), {
code: 'RUN_REPLACED',
});
}
if (userSubmittedPaths.length > 0) {
job.metadata.userSubmittedPaths = userSubmittedPaths;
}
if (userSubmittedMessageFieldPaths.length > 0) {
job.metadata.userSubmittedMessageFieldPaths = userSubmittedMessageFieldPaths;
}
if (userSubmittedPaths.length > 0 || userSubmittedMessageFieldPaths.length > 0) {
await GenerationJobManager.getJobStore().updateJob(
streamId,
{
...(userSubmittedPaths.length > 0 && { userSubmittedPaths }),
...(userSubmittedMessageFieldPaths.length > 0 && {
userSubmittedMessageFieldPaths,
}),
},
job.createdAt,
);
}
const result = await initializeClient({
req,
res,
endpointOption: req.body.endpointOption,
signal: job.abortController.signal,
jobCreatedAt: job.createdAt,
checkpointNamespace,
requestBody:
job.metadata.mcpRequestBody ??
createMCPRuntimeRequestBody({
messageId: job.metadata.responseMessageId,
conversationId: streamId,
parentMessageId: job.metadata.userMessage?.messageId ?? Constants.NO_PARENT,
}),
});
client = result.client;
// Bind the rebuilt client to the in-flight turn's identity (no new user message).
client.conversationId = streamId;
// The resume operates on the SAME job (it moved it running again), so its identity is
// the paused job's createdAt — used by the re-pause CAS pre-check + checkpoint prune to
// avoid acting on a job a newer request has since replaced.
client.jobCreatedAt = job.createdAt;
client.checkpointNamespace = checkpointNamespace;
client.responseMessageId = job.metadata.responseMessageId;
client.parentMessageId = job.metadata.userMessage?.messageId ?? Constants.NO_PARENT;
if (client.contentParts) {
GenerationJobManager.setContentParts(streamId, client.contentParts, job.createdAt);
}
await client.resumeCompletion({
resumeValue: mapped.resumeValue,
seedContent,
runSteps: resumeState?.runSteps ?? [],
storedMessages,
abortController: job.abortController,
// Carry the user's MCP auth so approved MCP tools run with their credentials.
userMCPAuthMap: result.userMCPAuthMap,
// Replay deferred tools discovered before the pause (captured at pause). The rebuilt
// graph passes `messages: []`, so without these the model would lose their schemas.
discoveredToolNames: job.metadata?.discoveredTools,
activityPhaseSnapshot: job.metadata?.activityPhaseSnapshot,
});
// The model may pause AGAIN (another tool, or a follow-up question). The pending
// action is already persisted + emitted; leave the job `requires_action`.
if (client.pendingApproval) {
logger.debug(`[ResumeAgentController] Re-paused for approval: ${streamId}`);
const pauseActionId = client.pendingApproval.actionId;
const pauseCreatedAt = client.jobCreatedAt ?? job.createdAt;
const ownsPausePersistence = await GenerationJobManager.approvals.ownsPausePersistence(
streamId,
pauseActionId,
pauseCreatedAt,
);
if (ownsPausePersistence) {
try {
// Persist this segment's content + artifacts before the fresh client (next
// resume) drops them, so an expiring re-pause doesn't lose them; finalize later
// overwrites content and merges attachments onto the saved message. A failed
// required write must reject into the error-finalization path rather than expose
// the next action while its preceding segment is absent from durable history.
await persistRePauseProgress({ req, client, job, streamId, conversationId });
} catch (pausePersistenceError) {
pausePersistenceFailed = true;
try {
pausePersistenceFailureFinalized =
(await GenerationJobManager.failPausePersistence(
streamId,
pauseActionId,
getUserFacingResumeError(pausePersistenceError, req.config),
pauseCreatedAt,
)) === true;
if (!pausePersistenceFailureFinalized) {
logger.warn(
`[ResumeAgentController] Skipping stale re-pause persistence failure — ${streamId} no longer owns its barrier`,
);
}
} catch (failError) {
logger.error(
`[ResumeAgentController] Failed to terminalize re-pause persistence error for ${streamId}`,
getSafeErrorMetadata(failError),
);
}
throw pausePersistenceError;
}
const released = await GenerationJobManager.approvals.finishPausePersistence(
streamId,
pauseActionId,
pauseCreatedAt,
);
if (!released) {
logger.warn(
`[ResumeAgentController] Re-pause persistence barrier changed before release: ${streamId}`,
);
}
if (scheduleId) {
await recordScheduleOutcome({
scheduleId,
scheduledFor,
streamId,
jobCreatedAt: job.createdAt,
status: 'requires_action',
conversationId,
});
}
} else {
logger.debug(
`[ResumeAgentController] Skipping stale re-pause persistence — ${streamId} no longer owns its barrier`,
);
}
return;
}
// If the user aborted mid-resume, the abort route already emitted the terminal
// event and finalized the job — don't double-save / double-finalize here. This
// continuation is nevertheless the scheduled-run owner, so it must settle the
// run row after observing its own abort; the generic Stop route deliberately
// delegates a running generation's settlement to that generation owner.
if (job.abortController.signal.aborted) {
logger.debug(
`[ResumeAgentController] Aborted during resume; abort route finalizes: ${streamId}`,
);
if (scheduleId) {
await recordScheduleOutcome({
scheduleId,
scheduledFor,
streamId,
jobCreatedAt: job.createdAt,
status: 'interrupted',
conversationId,
error: 'Scheduled run was stopped',
});
}
return;
}
await finalizeResumedTurn({
req,
client,
job,
streamId,
conversationId,
addTitle,
checkpointGeneration,
});
} catch (err) {
logger.error('[ResumeAgentController] Resume failed', getSafeErrorMetadata(err));
if (pausePersistenceFailed) {
// failPausePersistence already performed the exact requires_action ->
// error transition. Only its CAS winner owns this generation's checkpoint
// cleanup; a stale/mismatched failure must leave the live scope intact.
if (pausePersistenceFailureFinalized) {
await deleteFailedResumeCheckpoint(
{
conversationId,
checkpointerCfg,
job,
checkpointGeneration,
},
're-pause persistence failure',
);
}
if (scheduleId && pausePersistenceFailureFinalized) {
await recordScheduleOutcome({
scheduleId,
scheduledFor,
streamId,
jobCreatedAt: job.createdAt,
status: 'error',
conversationId,
error: err?.message ?? 'Re-pause persistence failed',
});
}
return;
}
const errorMessage = getUserFacingResumeError(err, req.config);
// Job-replacement guard (mirrors finalizeResumedTurn's success-path guard): if a
// newer request reused this conversationId while the resume was failing, do NOT emit
// the error to / complete / prune the NEWER turn's job. The finally still releases
// the slot + disposes. Proceed with finalization if the replacement check itself fails.
let stillLive = true;
try {
const liveJob = await GenerationJobManager.getJobStore().getJob(streamId);
stillLive = !!liveJob && liveJob.createdAt === job.createdAt;
} catch (readErr) {
logger.warn(
'[ResumeAgentController] Replacement check failed; finalizing anyway',
getSafeErrorMetadata(readErr),
);
}
if (!stillLive) {
logger.warn(
`[ResumeAgentController] Skipping failed-resume finalization — job ${streamId} was replaced`,
);
} else {
// completeJob atomically claims running -> error and parks steers before
// publishing. If abort or a re-pause won, it returns false; only the
// terminal-CAS winner may delete this generation's checkpoint scope.
let errorFinalized = false;
try {
errorFinalized =
(await GenerationJobManager.completeJob(streamId, errorMessage, job.createdAt)) === true;
} catch (completeErr) {
logger.error(
'[ResumeAgentController] Failed to finalize failed resume',
getSafeErrorMetadata(completeErr),
);
}
if (errorFinalized) {
await deleteFailedResumeCheckpoint(
{
conversationId,
checkpointerCfg,
job,
checkpointGeneration,
},
'failed resume finalization',
);
}
if (scheduleId && errorFinalized) {
const balanceRefusal = err?.message?.includes(ViolationTypes.TOKEN_BALANCE);
await recordScheduleOutcome({
scheduleId,
scheduledFor,
streamId,
jobCreatedAt: job.createdAt,
status: balanceRefusal ? 'skipped_balance' : 'error',
conversationId,
...(!balanceRefusal && { error: err?.message ?? 'Resume failed' }),
});
}
}
} finally {
try {
// Tear down the MCP request-context store seeded before the ACK (parity with
// request.js's finishResumableRequest). No-op if it was never seeded.
await cleanupMCPRequestContextForReq(req);
// Release the concurrency slot taken above — UNLESS handleRunInterrupt already
// released it on a re-pause (so a fast /resume isn't 429'd). On a normal finish or
// error it didn't, so release here. A re-pause re-acquires its own slot next resume.
if (!client?.pendingRequestReleased) {
await decrementPendingRequest(userId);
}
if (client) {
disposeClient(client);
}
} finally {
await GenerationJobManager.markProviderExecutionDrained?.(
streamId,
job.createdAt,
providerExecutionId,
).catch((drainError) => {
logger.warn('[ResumeAgentController] Failed to record provider drain', drainError);
});
await releaseEventChildLease?.();
}
}
};
module.exports = ResumeAgentController;