LibreChat/api/server/services/ToolService.js
Danny Avila fa913148fb
🔒 fix: Refresh MCP OBO Tokens From the Live OpenID Session (#15334)
* 🧊 fix: Inline-refresh OpenID session tokens at MCP OBO call time

Resolves the walk-away failure mode where MCP tool calls using OBO auth
fail with "No valid OpenID access token is available for OBO exchange"
after a user idles past their access-token lifetime. The strategy-time
snapshot on `user.federatedTokens` could expire mid-stream before
`resolveOboToken` ran, while `req.session.openidTokens` carried a still-
valid (or refreshable) token that nothing read.

- New OpenIDSessionRefresh service: per-user single-flighted closure that
  reads `req.session.openidTokens` at OBO time and inline-refreshes via
  `openid-client.refreshTokenGrant` when expired (30s skew), persisting
  via `req.session.save()`. No cookie writes (headers already flushed).
- `resolveOboToken` gains a required UpstreamTokenProvider parameter
  (typed as `() => Promise<OIDCTokens | null>`, reusing the shared shape
  from @librechat/data-schemas). Compile-time guarantee that every call
  site is updated.
- New `session_refresh_failed` OboTokenResolutionReason distinguishes
  "session expired and IdP rejected refresh" from "no upstream token
  ever existed."
- `req` threaded through createMCPTool/createMCPTools/createToolInstance
  to construct the closure with captured request, plus fail-closed
  guards in MCPConnectionFactory.getOboTokens and MCPManager.callTool
  when the closure isn't plumbed.
- Startup warning in MCPServersInitializer when OBO is configured but
  OPENID_REUSE_TOKENS is unset (the strategy populating
  user.federatedTokens is only registered under reuse, so OBO would
  fail every call without it).

Tests: 16 new in OpenIDSessionRefresh.spec.js; obo.spec.ts extended
for the new param + error reason; wiring smoke tests in MCPManager,
MCPConnectionFactory, MCPServersInitializer, and MCP.spec.js.

* 🛡️ fix: Harden OBO inline-refresh against token type and session edge cases

- Token-preference asymmetry: live-token reuse and expires_at derivation
  now strictly gate on the access_token, not the id_token. Added a
  required `tokenPreference` parameter on isLiveSessionTokenStillValid,
  buildOIDCTokensFromSession, and createOpenIDSessionTokenProvider
  so every call site is explicit. Dropped the bogus id_token-exp
  fallback in performIdpRefresh — id_token TTL is governed by IdP
  session policy and would mark a short-lived access_token reusable
  past its real lifetime.
- Missing req in /reinitialize route: the manual reconnect
  endpoint now forwards req into reinitMCPServer, so OBO servers can
  build a session-aware upstream-token closure instead of failing with
  missing_upstream_token.
- Single-flight key collisions: composed key as
  tenantId:openidIssuer:openidId:sessionId via getSingleFlightKey.
  Concurrent calls in the same session still coalesce; separate sessions
  never share an in-flight refresh, preventing refresh-token rotation
  from breaking sibling sessions and preventing cross-tenant token
  crossover when distinct users share an IdP sub.
- Opaque access token reuse): persist accessTokenExpiresAt
  (unix seconds, from tokenset.expires_in) on each refresh AND on initial
  login / SPA refresh in setOpenIDAuthTokens. New getAccessTokenExp
  helper falls back to it when the access token isn't a JWT, avoiding
  redundant inline refreshes for Microsoft Graph and Auth0 default
  audiences.
- Log hygiene: the single-flight key (containing sessionId,
  openidId, openidIssuer, tenantId) is now SHA-256-hashed in the
  "Joining in-flight refresh" debug log. Preserves cross-line correlation
  via a 12-char prefix without leaking credential or PII material.

Documented req.session.openidTokens shape contract via JSDoc typedef so
the new accessTokenExpiresAt field has a discoverable home alongside the
existing accessToken/idToken/refreshToken/expiresAt/lastRefreshedAt.

Tests: OpenIDSessionRefresh.spec.js up to 30 passing (added coverage for
opaque-token reuse, JWT-access-token-exp fallback, no-id_token-fallback
regression, cross-session no-coalesce, persistence on refresh, and a
guard against stale accessTokenExpiresAt carryover). AuthService.spec.js
adds two cases covering accessTokenExpiresAt persistence on login.
mcp.spec.js (route) gains a regression test asserting req flows into
reinitMCPServer.

* 🔍 fix: Detect OBO-only MCP admin config overrides

Admin Config overlays for YAML-defined MCP servers compare only
ADMIN_CONFIGURABLE_FIELDS to decide whether to lazy-init a config-tier override.
The OBO config field was added after that fingerprint list, so an override that
only added or changed `obo` was treated as unchanged YAML and skipped.

Include `obo` in the admin-configurable field list and add a regression test for
an OBO-only override.

* 🔊 fix: Mock MCP OAuth timeout in SDK integration test

MCPConnectionFactory.attemptToConnect reads mcpConfig.OAUTH_HANDLING_TIMEOUT
when building the OAuth connection timeout. The SDK OAuth integration test
mocked mcpConfig without that field, which made the timeout calculation produce
NaN and caused the test to fail before the OAuth refresh/start path completed.

Add OAUTH_HANDLING_TIMEOUT to the test mock.

* ♻️ refactor: Pass OBO upstream-token closure into MCP instead of req

Build the OpenID upstream-token provider at the request boundary and thread
only the closure through MCP handling, so the MCP service layer no longer
receives the raw Express request. The closure still reads/refreshes the live
session at tool-call time, preserving the walk-away recovery.

- Drop `req`/`capturedReq` from createMCPTools, createMCPTool, reconnectServer,
  createToolInstance, and reinitMCPServer; forward `upstreamTokenProvider`
  instead. Closure is constructed in loadTools, loadToolDefinitionsWrapper, and
  the reinitialize route, where req/res are in scope.
- OBO: fall back to user.federatedTokens when the provider yields no live
  session, so OIDC remote-agent calls (verified bearer, no session) still work.
- Inline refresh: mirror a rotated refresh token to the refreshToken cookie via
  a shared setRefreshTokenCookie helper, guarded by !res.headersSent (no-op on
  the streaming path; session copy stays authoritative).
- Single-flight: hydrate a joining request's own session from the resolved
  tokens so a later OBO call doesn't replay a rotated-away refresh token.

Addresses owner feedback and three review findings.

* 🔒 fix: Recover OIDC refresh-token rotation after SSE OBO refresh

When an inline OBO refresh rotates the OpenID refresh token after SSE headers
have already been sent, the browser refreshToken cookie cannot be updated. Store
a short-lived encrypted bridge from the stale cookie token to the rotated token
so /api/auth/refresh can recover after express-session loss.

Use the signed openid_user_id cookie to load user context for bridge validation,
retry only on invalid_grant, and delete the bridge only after the bridged refresh
succeeds.

* 🔨 fix: hydrate joined OIDC refresh sessions with stable refresh tokens

Update single-flight OIDC refresh joiners whenever refreshed access token
state changes, even if the IdP keeps the refresh token unchanged.

This prevents joined requests from retaining stale accessToken or
accessTokenExpiresAt values and redundantly refreshing later in the same run.

* 🌉 Persist OIDC refresh-token recovery bridges in MongoDB

Store SSE OBO refresh-token recovery bridges in MongoDB instead of
process-local memory so /api/auth/refresh can recover after worker
restarts or cross-worker routing.

Derive bridge expiry from REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRY so the recovery window
matches the stale refreshToken cookie it repairs, and delete bridges
after successful recovery.

* 🤝 Coordinate OIDC inline refreshes across workers

Add a short-lived Mongo-backed refresh-flight record so concurrent
OBO refreshes for the same OpenID session do not redeem the same
rotating refresh token on different workers.

The winning worker performs the IdP refresh and stores an encrypted
result; joiners wait for that result, hydrate their request session,
and return without calling the IdP.

*  Keep OpenID marker cookies aligned on inline refresh

Refresh token_provider and openid_user_id with the same expiry as the
rotated refreshToken cookie when an inline OBO refresh can still write
headers.

Share the marker-cookie writer with the normal OpenID auth refresh path
so the fallback /api/auth/refresh branch continues to recognize valid
OpenID refresh tokens after session expiry.

* 🔑 fix: include refresh token in OIDC local refresh flight key

Key the process-local OIDC refresh coalescing by the current session
refresh token, matching the Mongo-backed flight key. This prevents a
request with a newly rotated token from joining an older pending refresh
and inheriting its failure/result.

* 🌉 fix: store OIDC refresh bridge without cookie response

Treat missing or non-cookie responses like headers-sent streaming
responses during inline OIDC refresh. When the IdP rotates the refresh
token and cookies cannot be written, persist a recovery bridge so a later
/auth/refresh can recover after session expiry.

* 🫙 fix: preserve stale OIDC cookie bridge key

Track the refresh token last written to the browser cookie separately
from the current session refresh token. When inline OIDC refreshes rotate
tokens without a writable response, keep bridging from the browser-stale
token directly to the latest session token.

* 🙌 fix: keep OIDC bridge recovery success on cleanup failure

Make refresh-token bridge cleanup best-effort after a bridged OIDC
refresh succeeds. A transient delete failure now logs a warning but does
not convert the already-refreshed session and cookies into a 403 response.

* 📦 test: Exclude RefreshTokenBridge from tenant-isolation coverage

Add RefreshTokenBridge to the tenant-isolation coverage allowlist because
refresh bridge lookups run during unauthenticated OpenID refresh recovery.
The controller first recovers user context from the signed OpenID marker
cookie, then the bridge methods apply explicit user and tenant filters.

Ambient tenant isolation would bind this recovery path to request-local
tenant context that is not available at the point the stale cookie is being
resolved

*  Fix OpenID refresh flight retry and marker hydration

Allow failed OpenID refresh flights to be reclaimed immediately instead of pinning transient errors.

Preserve the browser refresh-token marker when joined refreshes hydrate session tokens from a shared flight result.

Stabilize AuthService tests by isolating mocked module imports from prior suites.

* 🛠️ fix: centralize OBO identity scoping

Add shared auth identity helpers for app user ids, OpenID subjects,
tenant ids, and normalized OpenID issuers.

Thread a non-placeholder-visible OBO identity context from the real
request user through MCP connection, tool-call, reinit, and refresh
paths. Keep tenantId and openidIssuer out of createSafeUser so MCP
user placeholders do not expose those fields.

Scope OBO token cache and in-flight exchange keys by tenant, issuer,
OpenID subject, scopes, and a SHA-256 hash of the upstream assertion.
This prevents cross-tenant/cross-issuer collisions and avoids reusing
tokens minted from stale rotated assertions.

Use the shared identity helpers for OpenID refresh-flight keys and
refresh-token bridge recovery records so related OBO refresh paths share
the same identity normalization rules.

The helper is intended for auth-boundary and credential-cache code, not
as a blanket replacement for ordinary app user id ownership checks.

* 🛠️ fix: preserve OIDC refresh-token sync on save failures

Sync OpenID refresh-token cookie/bridge state before persisting the
session so a transient session-store failure cannot lose an IdP-rotated
refresh token.

Also trigger sync when the session refresh token differs from the
browser refresh-token marker, not only when the current grant rotates
the token. This lets later writable refreshes repair stale browser
cookies left behind by SSE refreshes.

Route refresh bridge identity through the shared identity helper with
the threaded OBO identity context, falling back to request/user context
when needed.

Add regression coverage for session-save failures, stale browser cookie
repair, non-writable bridge storage, and shared-helper identity fallback.

* 🛠️ fix: keep OIDC refresh bridge during recovery grace

After successful bridged refresh recovery, re-store the stale-cookie bridge
with a short grace TTL instead of deleting it immediately. This lets parallel
/api/auth/refresh requests that already sent the stale browser cookie recover
before they can observe the first response's Set-Cookie.

Retarget the bridge to the refresh token returned by the bridged retry so
B-to-C refresh-token rotation remains recoverable. The grace TTL is parsed with
math() and defaults to 60s, which shrinks the replay window from the original
REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRY bridge lifetime to the short recovery grace period.

Remove the now-unused explicit bridge delete path from the service and
data-schemas method surface. Add regression coverage for grace re-store,
identity symmetry, retry failure behavior, and same-key upsert replacement.

* 🛠️ fix: fail closed on OBO MCP user identity mismatch

Add an OBO-specific guard before MCP tool execution that requires the
effective invocation user and captured request user to both have ids and
to match. This prevents OBO tool calls from falling back to a separate
configurable.user_id identity after request-bound OBO context has already
been captured.

Keep the existing user id fallback behavior for non-OBO MCP calls.

Tests cover mismatched OBO users, missing user ids, and the matching-user
path ignoring a conflicting configurable.user_id.

* 🛠️ fix: Guard OpenID bridge retry user identity

Extract the shared OpenID refresh/user-resolution flow in AuthController
so the normal refresh path and bridge-recovery retry use the same grant,
claims, issuer, user lookup, and diagnostic logging code.

Preserve the existing path-specific behavior: the normal path still owns
migration updates and 401 login redirects, while the bridge retry still
falls through to the existing 403 invalid-token response.

Add a bridge-recovery guard that rejects retry results whose resolved
user id differs from the signed openid_user_id cookie before issuing
tokens or re-storing the grace bridge. Cover both the successful
matching-user recovery and the mismatched-user rejection.

* 🛠️ fix: type-safety polish on OBO data layer

Replace refresh token bridge query/update Record<string, unknown> usage
with typed Mongoose FilterQuery and UpdateQuery definitions.

Harden OpenID marker cookie JWT expiry handling by converting refresh
expiry milliseconds to integer seconds and rejecting invalid or
non-positive durations.

Add focused CSRF tests for fractional refresh expiry values and invalid
expiry configuration.

* 🛠️ fix: Bind OpenID session tokens to authenticated identity

Stamp OpenID session token state with the LibreChat user id, OpenID subject,
tenant id, and normalized issuer when tokens are stored.

Fail closed before OBO inline token reuse/refresh when the session token
identity does not match the current authenticated identity, preventing a stale
or mixed Express session from supplying another user's upstream assertion.

Also validate the normal /api/auth/refresh session-token reuse shortcut against
the signed marker-cookie user before returning cached session tokens.

Note: sessions created before this change carry no identity stamp and are
treated as a mismatch. This is self-healing — the reuse path forces a full IdP
refresh (which re-stamps the session) and the OBO path throws, surfacing as a
one-time re-authentication for active OBO users at deploy time. The session
re-stamps within one session lifetime (SESSION_EXPIRY, default 15 min).

* 🛠️ fix: Recover OpenID refresh token drift

Prefer the browser refresh-token cookie when it differs from the
server-side OpenID session state, and force a real IdP refresh in that
case instead of reusing stale session tokens.

Store a short-lived refresh-token bridge when inline OBO refresh writes
a rotated browser cookie but session persistence fails, so follow-up
refreshes can still recover from the old token.

Keep the bridge grace TTL centralized in RefreshTokenBridge so both
recovery paths use the same env-backed value.

Note: drift is measured against the last-synced browserRefreshToken
marker, so the SSE path (intentionally stale cookie, authoritative
session) does not false-positive. Sessions predating the marker have no
browserRefreshToken; for those, drift falls back to comparing the cookie
against the session refresh token and prefers the cookie on difference.
This is the same self-healing pre-change-session window as the identity
binding fix and re-syncs within one session lifetime.

Tests cover cookie/session drift selection, reusable-session bypass on
drift, bridge storage after session-save failure, and the shared bridge
constant wiring.

* 🛠️ fix: Harden OBO token caching and expiry handling

Reject malformed OBO grant responses before writing them to the exchanged-token cache so a missing access_token cannot poison the cache.

Store absolute expires_at values with cached OBO tokens and ignore legacy cache entries without usable expiry metadata. This keeps cached-token freshness based on the token’s real
remaining lifetime instead of reusing the original relative expires_in on cache hits.

Move OBO expiry normalization and skew helpers into packages/api and use them from both the JS exchange service and the TS MCP resolver. Apply a 30-second safety margin with a one-
second floor for short-lived tokens, covered by direct helper tests and caller-level regression tests.

Tests:
- packages/api: npm run build
- packages/api: npx jest src/mcp/oauth/expiry.spec.ts src/mcp/oauth/obo.spec.ts
- api: npx jest server/services/OboTokenService.spec.js

* 🛠️ fix: Harden OBO refresh-token bridge lookup and indexing

Reuse getValidOpenIDReuseUserId for the bridge-recovery user lookup in
refreshController instead of re-verifying openid_user_id inline. The shared
helper enforces the JWT_REFRESH_SECRET presence check and a strict
typeof payload.id === 'string' guard, rejecting tokens whose id claim is
present but not a string (e.g. a numeric id) that the inline check accepted.

Fail closed on issuer mismatch in getRefreshTokenBridge. Both the stored and
the expected issuer are now normalized and compared for equality, so a bridge
is recovered only when both sides agree (both absent, or both present and
equal after normalization). Previously the check was skipped whenever the
stored issuer was absent, allowing recovery across mismatched issuer context.

Drop the unused {oldRefreshTokenHash, userId, tenantId, openidIssuer} index
and the openidIssuer field on RefreshTokenBridgeQuery. The data-layer filter
only queries the 3-field {oldRefreshTokenHash, userId, tenantId} index; the
issuer is verified in application code, not the query. Hoist the repeated
model accessor into getRefreshTokenBridgeModel.

Note: issuer is now load-bearing for recovery. A bridge stored with an issuer
recovers only when the lookup supplies a matching issuer; the recovery lookup
reads user.openidIssuer via AUTH_REFRESH_USER_PROJECTION (an exclusion
projection that retains the field). If a user's persisted openidIssuer is
empty while the stored bridge has one, recovery fails closed (falls through to
normal re-authentication) until the bridge TTLs out — no security regression.

Tests cover invalid signed-cookie payloads bypassing the bridge, both
asymmetric issuer-presence cases, issuer normalization before comparison, and
an index-alignment assertion guarding against re-adding the dropped index.

* 🛠️ fix: Degrade OBO discovery on token resolution failures

Catch expected OboTokenResolutionError failures during MCP tool discovery and
fall back to unauthenticated tool listing instead of aborting discovery. This
keeps discovery aligned with the existing unauthenticated listing behavior while
preserving unexpected errors as real failures.

Also correct OBO tool-call freshness comment and tighten the OBO trust-check
permissions type to the existing role permission shape.

Tests:
- npx jest src/mcp/__tests__/MCPConnectionFactory.test.ts --runInBand --coverage=false
- npx jest src/mcp/oauth/obo.spec.ts --runInBand --coverage=false

* 🛠️ fix: tighten OBO tool-call errors, bridge logging, and flight typing

Move resolveToolCallUserId inside the tool-call try/catch so an OBO
identity mismatch surfaces with serverName/toolName context and the
standard tool-call-failed message instead of an opaque bare Error.

Raise the refresh-token bridge lookup failure log from debug to warn so
transient infrastructure failures on the unauthenticated /api/auth/refresh
path are observable, and guard the message access against non-Error values.

Replace the unknown+cast in isDuplicateKeyError with a hasErrorCode type
predicate so the duplicate-key check reads error.code without an assertion.

Preserve real math/isEnabled in the MCPConnectionFactory test mock (mock
only processMCPEnv) so mcpConfig timeouts no longer resolve to NaN, fixing
the TimeoutNaNWarning that masked slow OAuth retry behavior.

* 🧪 fix: Restore the Flight Uniqueness Index and Buffer the Graph Cache TTL

Two CI failures on the merge, both in suites this environment cannot run
(their MongoDB binary download is blocked).

`GraphApiService.spec.js` still asserted the unbuffered TTL. Graph tokens
route through the same `getTokenCacheTtlMs` as the OBO and openidStrategy
caches, so the entry now expires 30s before the credential does.

`openidRefreshFlight.spec.ts` dropped the database between tests, which takes
the indexes with it, and Mongoose builds them only once when the model is
compiled. Whether the unique `key` index survived into a test was a race with
that one-time build. Without it a second `create` inserts instead of raising a
duplicate-key error, so every worker believes it won the flight — the
mutual exclusion the file exists to prove. Indexes are now rebuilt after each
drop, which also makes the reclaim and complete cases reach those paths for
the right reason.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SxKWxwqxAGckYpRsYTqx3F

* fix: address OBO review findings

* 🔐 fix: Install Bridge Indexes and Carry OBO Through Assistant Recovery

Two findings from the Codex pass on d08c82f0d.

The refresh-token bridge relied on Mongoose auto-indexing for both of its
indexes, and `MONGO_AUTO_INDEX=false` is a supported deployment setting. A
bridge holds an encrypted refresh token and the TTL index is the only thing
that ever deletes one, so under that setting they would accumulate for the
life of the collection while concurrent upserts lost the compound uniqueness
the filter assumes. Installed before the first write, matching the flight
methods and the session and schedule methods before them.

`recoverServerTools`, the assistant create/update path that reruns
`reinitMCPServer` when a referenced server's catalog and connection snapshot
are both missing, was the last reinit site not carrying the upstream-token
closure. For an OBO server the factory rejects the connection outright, so the
assistant write failed with unavailable MCP definitions. It now builds the
provider at that request boundary like the other entry points; assistant
writes have no `res`, so a rotation there falls back to the recovery bridge.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SxKWxwqxAGckYpRsYTqx3F

* fix: harden OBO refresh coordination

*  fix: Keep Elapsed Expiries Elapsed and Revoke the Superseded Session

Two of the five findings from the Codex pass on fcdc15885 — the two that are
defects in code this branch introduced rather than design questions about the
bridge.

`getSkewedTokenExpiresAtMs` floored every result at a second in the future,
including an expiry the provider had already declared elapsed. An exchange
answering `expires_in: 0` or a past `expires_at` was handed to the MCP
connection stamped valid for another second, which only moves the failure
downstream. The floor now applies to a lifetime that is still live, which is
what it was for; an elapsed one stays elapsed so the caller rejects it. Same
for the cache TTL, which falls back to the elapsed-credential floor.

Bridge recovery left the stale token's durable Session behind. Only the token
it recovered through was passed as `existingRefreshToken`, so that one's
session was replaced while the token the browser actually presented kept its
record until its original expiry. That record, with the marker cookie still
bound to it, is what authorizes local image access for OpenID users — so a
copy of the stale cookie outlived the rotation it had lost. Revoked
explicitly on successful recovery.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SxKWxwqxAGckYpRsYTqx3F

* fix: close OBO refresh review findings

* 🎟️ fix: Carry the Bridged Token Through a Non-Rotating Recovery

Bridge recovery passes the browser's stale token as `existingRefreshToken` so
the durable Session naming it is the record replaced. That also makes the
stale token the fallback the installed session and the refresh cookie use when
a tokenset carries no `refresh_token` of its own, which holds only while the
recovery grant rotates.

An IdP that answers that grant without rotating sends the browser back to the
very token the bridge exists to retire: `storeOpenIDSession` installs and
deletes the same stale record in one call, and the cookie is rewritten to a
token the IdP already rejected — a sign-out on the next refresh. The grace
bridge one line above already guards this with `|| bridgedRefreshToken`; the
resolved tokenset now does the same, so leader and followers alike publish the
recovered token.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SxKWxwqxAGckYpRsYTqx3F

* 🚫 fix: Reject an OBO Exchange That Returns an Expired Credential

Preserving an elapsed expiry through the skew helper only helps if something
acts on it, and nothing did: `MCPManager.callTool` checks the access token and
nothing else before setting the Authorization header, so a credential the IdP
declared spent still went downstream to fail there. It is rejected at the
exchange now, where the reason is known, and retryably — the exchange itself
worked, so a fresh grant can succeed.

Completes the elapsed-expiry change in cb26a6f7d, which made the stamp honest
without giving anyone a reason to look at it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SxKWxwqxAGckYpRsYTqx3F

* fix: close OpenID refresh review findings

* fix: coordinate OpenID refresh entry points

* chore: sort OpenID flight imports

* fix: fence OpenID refreshes during logout

* fix: close OpenID logout publication races

* fix: narrow completed refresh flight

* test: cover bridge cleanup failure after ownership loss

The compensating delete in storeRefreshTokenBridgeWithLease swallows its own
failure so the lease error stays the one the caller sees. Nothing asserted
that, so removing the inner catch left every suite green while callers began
receiving the cleanup error instead.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SxKWxwqxAGckYpRsYTqx3F

* fix: compensate OpenID bridges only on proven ownership loss

The post-write lease assertion deletes the bridge it just published when it
throws, but it threw for two different reasons: a coordination record that is
no longer ours, and a coordination read that simply failed. Treating the second
as the first destroys the only mapping from the token the browser still holds
to the one the IdP already rotated to, so a transient Mongo error on the
headers-already-sent path signed the user out.

Tag the ownership error where the lease raises it and compensate only for that,
preserving the bridge whenever ownership is merely undetermined. A preserved
bridge stays behind the logout revocation fence, so the safe default costs
nothing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SxKWxwqxAGckYpRsYTqx3F

* fix: reject spent OpenID refresh results

Two ways a refresh could report success while handing back a credential
nothing can use.

An inline refresh carries the previous id_token forward when the IdP omits
one on rotation, so tokenset.id_token is not necessarily freshly issued.
setOpenIDAuthTokens applied its freshness guard only to the session copy and
took tokenset.id_token unconditionally, so /refresh returned an expired
bearer even though the grant produced a usable access token. Skip it only
when it is provably expired: an id_token whose expiry cannot be read stays
preferred, since access_token may be opaque or scoped to another audience.

normalizeExpiresIn preserves a zero or negative lifetime rather than
discarding it, so a grant declaring an already-spent access token still
published, rotating the refresh token and returning a token every freshness
check rejects. Each OBO call then repeated the grant. Reject an elapsed
lifetime before publishing; an unknown lifetime still publishes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SxKWxwqxAGckYpRsYTqx3F

* fix: harden OpenID refresh publication

* fix: keep identity and results intact through OpenID refresh cleanup

Two follow-ons from the last round's fixes.

Stripping an expired carried-forward id_token from the refresh result removed
the only identity material a rotation without id_token leaves behind. The
result is rebuilt by buildOIDCTokensFromSession, so it carries no provider
claims() either, and getTokenClaims accepts only those two — bridge recovery
failed with "no usable identity claims" before setOpenIDAuthTokens could hand
back the fresh access token. The stripped token now travels in a
non-enumerable marker, alongside the existing browser and predecessor markers,
which identity resolution reads and the authentication response never sees.

The lease drained a pending renewal by awaiting it in finally, so a transient
coordination failure there threw from finally and replaced the operation's
result. The refresh had already settled and published, so the caller saw a
failure on credentials that had rotated. Proven ownership loss is recorded on
ownershipLost and checked before the return, so the drain has nothing to add
but noise; it now absorbs and logs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SxKWxwqxAGckYpRsYTqx3F

* refactor: fence OpenID recovery publication

* fix: close OpenID publication transaction

* refactor: make OpenID publication transactional

* fix: satisfy OpenID publication type checks

* fix: fence OpenID session publication

* fix: authorize OpenID refresh publication

* fix: bind OpenID replay generations

* fix: fence OpenID response generations

* fix: authorize OpenID token delivery

* fix: linearize OpenID publication delivery

* chore: sort OpenID refresh flight imports

---------

Co-authored-by: J.C. Bartle <jcbartle@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: jbartle <jbartle@rand.org>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: jcbartle <7274202+jcbartle@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-29 23:55:58 -04:00

2397 lines
80 KiB
JavaScript

const { logger, redactMessage, getTenantId } = require('@librechat/data-schemas');
const { tool: toolFn, DynamicStructuredTool } = require('@librechat/agents/langchain/tools');
const {
sleep,
createToolSearch,
createBashExecutionTool,
Constants: AgentConstants,
createBashProgrammaticToolCallingTool,
} = require('@librechat/agents');
const {
sendEvent,
getToolkitKey,
getUserMCPAuthMap,
createAuthIdentityContext,
loadToolDefinitions,
GenerationJobManager,
isActionDomainAllowed,
buildWebSearchContext,
buildImageToolContext,
buildToolClassification,
getMissingCustomUserVars,
buildWebSearchDynamicContext,
getCodeApiAuthHeaders,
getReplayablePendingMCPOAuthStart,
getMCPServerNamesFromTools,
buildMCPAuthToolCall,
buildMCPAuthStepId,
buildMCPAuthRunStepEvent,
buildMCPAuthRunStepDeltaEvent,
buildMCPAuthRunStepCompletedEvent,
inspectContentWithTraversal,
ContentFilterError,
assertModelBoundContent,
extractToolArgumentContent,
contentFilterModelBoundBlockResponse,
getSafeErrorMetadata,
isContentFilterError,
isFileAuthoringToolDefinition,
normalizeActionToolName,
ASK_USER_QUESTION_TOOL_NAME,
splitMCPToolKey,
buildServerNameAliases,
findShadowedServerNames,
isNormalizationSensitiveName,
AGENT_EXPECTED_MCP_TOOLS_UNAVAILABLE,
isFatalAgentInitializationError,
resolveCodeExecutionContext,
resolveCallerCapabilityProjectionSnapshot,
getTransactionsConfig,
} = require('@librechat/api');
const {
Time,
Tools,
Constants,
CacheKeys,
ErrorTypes,
ContentTypes,
imageGenTools,
AuthTypeEnum,
EModelEndpoint,
EToolResources,
isActionTool,
actionDelimiter,
ImageVisionTool,
hasActivePiiFields,
hasActivePiiPatterns,
openapiToFunction,
AgentCapabilities,
isEphemeralAgentId,
validateActionDomain,
actionDomainSeparator,
defaultAgentCapabilities,
validateAndParseOpenAPISpec,
} = require('librechat-data-provider');
const {
createActionTool,
legacyDomainEncode,
decryptMetadata,
loadActionSets,
domainParser,
} = require('./ActionService');
const {
getEndpointsConfig,
getMCPServerTools,
getCachedTools,
} = require('~/server/services/Config');
const { processFileURL, uploadImageBuffer } = require('~/server/services/Files/process');
const { primeFiles: primeSearchFiles } = require('~/app/clients/tools/util/fileSearch');
const { primeFiles: primeCodeFiles } = require('~/server/services/Files/Code/process');
const { manifestToolMap, toolkits } = require('~/app/clients/tools/manifest');
const { createOnSearchResults } = require('~/server/services/Tools/search');
const { reinitMCPServer } = require('~/server/services/Tools/mcp');
const {
createMCPPermissionContext,
resolveMcpServerContext,
getAccessibleMcpServerNames,
resolveCollisionAuditNames,
} = require('~/server/services/MCP');
const { createOpenIDSessionTokenProvider } = require('~/server/services/OpenIDSessionRefresh');
const { getMCPRequestContext } = require('~/server/services/MCPRequestContext');
const { recordUsage } = require('~/server/services/Threads');
const { loadTools } = require('~/app/clients/tools/util');
const { findPluginAuthsByKeys } = require('~/models');
const { getFlowStateManager, getMCPServersRegistry } = require('~/config');
const { getLogStores } = require('~/cache');
const domainSeparatorRegex = new RegExp(actionDomainSeparator, 'g');
const encryptedActionMetadataFields = ['api_key', 'oauth_client_id', 'oauth_client_secret'];
const requiredActionContentFields = ['name', 'arguments', 'output'];
const getActiveToolResources = (toolResources, tools) => {
if (toolResources == null) {
return null;
}
const activeResources = {};
if (tools.includes(Tools.execute_code) && toolResources[EToolResources.execute_code] != null) {
activeResources[EToolResources.execute_code] = toolResources[EToolResources.execute_code];
}
if (tools.includes(Tools.file_search) && toolResources[EToolResources.file_search] != null) {
activeResources[EToolResources.file_search] = toolResources[EToolResources.file_search];
}
if (
(tools.includes('image_gen_oai') || tools.includes('gemini_image_gen')) &&
toolResources[EToolResources.image_edit] != null
) {
activeResources[EToolResources.image_edit] = toolResources[EToolResources.image_edit];
}
return Object.keys(activeResources).length > 0 ? activeResources : null;
};
const assertToolResourcesAllowed = ({ req, toolResources, tools }) => {
const filters = req.config?.filters;
if (filters == null) {
return;
}
const activeResources = getActiveToolResources(toolResources, tools);
if (activeResources == null) {
return;
}
const files = Object.values(activeResources).flatMap((resource) =>
Array.isArray(resource?.files) ? resource.files : [],
);
assertModelBoundContent({
filters,
agents: [{ tool_resources: activeResources }],
files,
});
};
const withoutEncryptedActionSecrets = (action) => {
const metadata = { ...action.metadata };
delete metadata.api_key;
delete metadata.oauth_client_id;
delete metadata.oauth_client_secret;
return { ...action, metadata };
};
const prepareStoredActionsForUse = async ({ actions, filters, decrypt }) => {
if (filters != null) {
assertModelBoundContent({
filters,
actions: actions.map(withoutEncryptedActionSecrets),
});
}
const inspectDecryptedMetadata = hasActivePiiFields(
filters?.actionMetadata?.pii,
encryptedActionMetadataFields,
);
if (!decrypt && !inspectDecryptedMetadata) {
return actions;
}
const decryptedActions = await Promise.all(
actions.map(async (action) => ({
...action,
metadata: await decryptMetadata(action.metadata),
})),
);
if (filters != null) {
assertModelBoundContent({ filters, actions: decryptedActions });
}
return decryptedActions;
};
/**
* Loads and inspects the persisted action snapshot before any unrelated tool
* initialization can connect to MCP, emit OAuth state, prime provider files,
* or create generic tool instances. The caller reuses the returned snapshot
* for the rest of the request, avoiding a second read and TOCTOU drift.
*/
const prepareActionSnapshotForTools = async ({ agentId, toolNames, filters, decrypt }) => {
if (!toolNames.some((toolName) => isActionTool(toolName))) {
return null;
}
const storedActions = (await loadActionSets({ agent_id: agentId })) ?? [];
if (storedActions.length === 0) {
return { storedActions, actionSets: [] };
}
const actionSets = await prepareStoredActionsForUse({
actions: storedActions,
filters,
decrypt,
});
return { storedActions, actionSets };
};
/**
* Populate a `toolToAction` map with one slot per fully-qualified tool
* name (`<operationId><actionDelimiter><encoded-domain>`). Both the new
* and the legacy encodings of the domain are registered for every
* function so agents whose stored tool names predate the current
* encoding still resolve correctly.
*
* Indexing on the full tool name instead of the encoded domain alone is
* what makes multi-action agents work when two actions share a hostname:
* the operationId disambiguates them, so neither overwrites the other.
*
* Two actions that additionally share the same operationId still
* collide (nothing in the key distinguishes them). That case is
* pathological — `sanitizeOperationId` plus OpenAPI's own uniqueness
* requirement make it very unlikely — but when it does happen we log
* a warning so the silent-overwrite mode from the original bug cannot
* reappear under a different disguise.
*/
const registerActionTools = ({
toolToAction,
functionSignatures,
normalizedDomain,
legacyNormalized,
makeEntry,
}) => {
const setKey = (key, entry) => {
if (toolToAction.has(key)) {
logger.warn(
`[Actions] operationId collision: "${key}" already registered; ` +
`action "${entry.action?.action_id}" overwrites the previous entry. ` +
`Two actions share both the operationId and the encoded hostname.`,
);
}
toolToAction.set(key, entry);
};
for (const sig of functionSignatures) {
const entry = makeEntry(sig);
// Use `sig.name` verbatim: `openapiToFunction` keeps hyphens in
// generated operationIds, so `get_foo---bar` and `get_foo_bar` are
// distinct operations on the same spec. `normalizeActionToolName`
// only touches the encoded-domain suffix at lookup time, so map
// keys and lookups stay consistent without merging distinct
// operationIds into the same slot.
setKey(`${sig.name}${actionDelimiter}${normalizedDomain}`, entry);
if (legacyNormalized !== normalizedDomain) {
setKey(`${sig.name}${actionDelimiter}${legacyNormalized}`, entry);
}
}
};
/**
* Resolves the set of enabled agent capabilities from endpoints config,
* falling back to app-level or default capabilities for ephemeral agents.
* @param {ServerRequest} req
* @param {Object} appConfig
* @param {string} agentId
* @returns {Promise<Set<string>>}
*/
async function resolveAgentCapabilities(req, appConfig, agentId) {
const endpointsConfig = await getEndpointsConfig(req);
let capabilities = new Set(endpointsConfig?.[EModelEndpoint.agents]?.capabilities ?? []);
if (capabilities.size === 0 && isEphemeralAgentId(agentId)) {
capabilities = new Set(
appConfig.endpoints?.[EModelEndpoint.agents]?.capabilities ?? defaultAgentCapabilities,
);
}
return capabilities;
}
/**
* Processes the required actions by calling the appropriate tools and returning the outputs.
* @param {OpenAIClient} client - OpenAI or StreamRunManager Client.
* @param {RequiredAction} requiredActions - The current required action.
* @returns {Promise<ToolOutput>} The outputs of the tools.
*/
const processVisionRequest = async (client, currentAction) => {
if (!client.visionPromise) {
return {
tool_call_id: currentAction.toolCallId,
output: 'No image details found.',
};
}
/** @type {ChatCompletion | undefined} */
const completion = await client.visionPromise;
if (completion && completion.usage) {
recordUsage({
user: client.req.user.id,
model: client.req.body.model,
conversationId: (client.responseMessage ?? client.finalMessage).conversationId,
...completion.usage,
transactions: getTransactionsConfig(client.req.config),
});
}
const output = completion?.choices?.[0]?.message?.content ?? 'No image details found.';
return {
tool_call_id: currentAction.toolCallId,
output,
};
};
const getRequiredActionContentInspection = (client, input) => {
const filters = client.req.config?.filters;
const pii = filters?.toolArguments?.pii;
if (!hasActivePiiPatterns(pii)) {
return { finding: null, traversalError: null };
}
const candidateFields = requiredActionContentFields.filter((field) =>
Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(input, field),
);
if (!hasActivePiiFields(pii, candidateFields)) {
return { finding: null, traversalError: null };
}
const selectedInput = {};
for (const field of candidateFields) {
if (hasActivePiiFields(pii, [field])) {
selectedInput[field] = input[field];
}
}
return inspectContentWithTraversal(() => extractToolArgumentContent(selectedInput), { filters });
};
const getSafeRequiredActionOutput = (client, currentAction, output) => {
const { finding, traversalError } = getRequiredActionContentInspection(client, {
name: currentAction.tool,
output,
});
if (finding == null && traversalError == null) {
return output;
}
const blockResponse =
finding == null ? traversalError.body : contentFilterModelBoundBlockResponse(finding);
logger.warn('[required actions] Blocked tool output', {
toolCallId: currentAction.toolCallId,
source: blockResponse.source,
field: blockResponse.field,
});
return JSON.stringify(blockResponse);
};
/**
* Processes return required actions from run.
* @param {OpenAIClient | StreamRunManager} client - OpenAI (legacy) or StreamRunManager Client.
* @param {RequiredAction[]} requiredActions - The required actions to submit outputs for.
* @returns {Promise<ToolOutputs>} The outputs of the tools.
*/
async function processRequiredActions(client, requiredActions) {
for (const currentAction of requiredActions) {
const { finding, traversalError } = getRequiredActionContentInspection(client, {
name: currentAction.tool,
arguments: currentAction.toolInput,
});
if (traversalError != null) {
throw traversalError;
}
if (finding != null) {
throw new ContentFilterError(finding);
}
}
logger.debug(
`[required actions] user: ${client.req.user.id} | thread_id: ${requiredActions[0].thread_id} | run_id: ${requiredActions[0].run_id} | count: ${requiredActions.length}`,
);
const appConfig = client.req.config;
const toolDefinitions = (await getCachedTools()) ?? {};
const seenToolkits = new Set();
const tools = requiredActions
.map((action) => {
const toolName = action.tool;
const toolDef = toolDefinitions[toolName];
if (toolDef && !manifestToolMap[toolName]) {
for (const toolkit of toolkits) {
if (seenToolkits.has(toolkit.pluginKey)) {
return;
} else if (toolName.startsWith(`${toolkit.pluginKey}_`)) {
seenToolkits.add(toolkit.pluginKey);
return toolkit.pluginKey;
}
}
}
return toolName;
})
.filter((toolName) => !!toolName);
const { loadedTools } = await loadTools({
user: client.req.user.id,
model: client.req.body.model ?? 'gpt-4o-mini',
tools,
functions: true,
endpoint: client.req.body.endpoint,
options: {
processFileURL,
req: client.req,
res: client.res,
uploadImageBuffer,
openAIApiKey: client.apiKey,
returnMetadata: true,
},
webSearch: appConfig.webSearch,
fileStrategy: appConfig.fileStrategy,
imageOutputType: appConfig.imageOutputType,
});
const ToolMap = loadedTools.reduce((map, tool) => {
map[tool.name] = tool;
return map;
}, {});
const promises = [];
let actionSetsData = null;
let isActionTool = false;
const ActionToolMap = {};
const ActionBuildersMap = {};
for (let i = 0; i < requiredActions.length; i++) {
const currentAction = requiredActions[i];
if (currentAction.tool === ImageVisionTool.function.name) {
promises.push(
processVisionRequest(client, currentAction).then((result) => ({
...result,
output: getSafeRequiredActionOutput(client, currentAction, result.output),
})),
);
continue;
}
let tool = ToolMap[currentAction.tool] ?? ActionToolMap[currentAction.tool];
const handleToolOutput = async (rawOutput) => {
const output = getSafeRequiredActionOutput(client, currentAction, rawOutput);
requiredActions[i].output = output;
/** @type {FunctionToolCall & PartMetadata} */
const toolCall = {
function: {
name: currentAction.tool,
arguments: JSON.stringify(currentAction.toolInput),
output,
},
id: currentAction.toolCallId,
type: 'function',
progress: 1,
action: isActionTool,
};
const toolCallIndex = client.mappedOrder.get(toolCall.id);
if (imageGenTools.has(currentAction.tool)) {
const imageOutput = output;
toolCall.function.output = `${currentAction.tool} displayed an image. All generated images are already plainly visible, so don't repeat the descriptions in detail. Do not list download links as they are available in the UI already. The user may download the images by clicking on them, but do not mention anything about downloading to the user.`;
// Streams the "Finished" state of the tool call in the UI
client.addContentData({
[ContentTypes.TOOL_CALL]: toolCall,
index: toolCallIndex,
type: ContentTypes.TOOL_CALL,
});
await sleep(500);
/** @type {ImageFile} */
const imageDetails = {
...imageOutput,
...currentAction.toolInput,
};
const image_file = {
[ContentTypes.IMAGE_FILE]: imageDetails,
type: ContentTypes.IMAGE_FILE,
// Replace the tool call output with Image file
index: toolCallIndex,
};
client.addContentData(image_file);
// Update the stored tool call
client.seenToolCalls && client.seenToolCalls.set(toolCall.id, toolCall);
return {
tool_call_id: currentAction.toolCallId,
output: toolCall.function.output,
};
}
client.seenToolCalls && client.seenToolCalls.set(toolCall.id, toolCall);
client.addContentData({
[ContentTypes.TOOL_CALL]: toolCall,
index: toolCallIndex,
type: ContentTypes.TOOL_CALL,
// TODO: to append tool properties to stream, pass metadata rest to addContentData
// result: tool.result,
});
return {
tool_call_id: currentAction.toolCallId,
output,
};
};
if (!tool) {
// throw new Error(`Tool ${currentAction.tool} not found.`);
if (!actionSetsData) {
/** @type {Action[]} */
const storedActions =
(await loadActionSets({
assistant_id: client.req.body.assistant_id,
})) ?? [];
const actionSets = await prepareStoredActionsForUse({
actions: storedActions,
filters: client.req.config?.filters,
decrypt: true,
});
// See registerActionTools for the key-shape rationale.
const toolToAction = new Map();
for (let actionIndex = 0; actionIndex < actionSets.length; actionIndex++) {
const action = actionSets[actionIndex];
const storedAction = storedActions[actionIndex];
const domain = await domainParser(action.metadata.domain, true);
const normalizedDomain = domain.replace(domainSeparatorRegex, '_');
const legacyDomain = legacyDomainEncode(action.metadata.domain);
const legacyNormalized = legacyDomain.replace(domainSeparatorRegex, '_');
const isDomainAllowed = await isActionDomainAllowed(
action.metadata.domain,
appConfig?.actions?.allowedDomains,
appConfig?.actions?.allowedAddresses,
);
if (!isDomainAllowed) {
continue;
}
// Validate and parse OpenAPI spec
const validationResult = validateAndParseOpenAPISpec(action.metadata.raw_spec);
if (!validationResult.spec || !validationResult.serverUrl) {
throw new Error(
`Invalid spec: user: ${client.req.user.id} | thread_id: ${requiredActions[0].thread_id} | run_id: ${requiredActions[0].run_id}`,
);
}
// SECURITY: Validate the domain from the spec matches the stored domain
// This is defense-in-depth to prevent any stored malicious actions
const domainValidation = validateActionDomain(
action.metadata.domain,
validationResult.serverUrl,
);
if (!domainValidation.isValid) {
logger.error(`Domain mismatch in stored action: ${domainValidation.message}`, {
userId: client.req.user.id,
action_id: action.action_id,
});
continue; // Skip this action rather than failing the entire request
}
// Process the OpenAPI spec
const { requestBuilders, functionSignatures } = openapiToFunction(validationResult.spec);
// Store encrypted values for OAuth flow
const encrypted = {
oauth_client_id: storedAction.metadata.oauth_client_id,
oauth_client_secret: storedAction.metadata.oauth_client_secret,
};
registerActionTools({
toolToAction,
functionSignatures,
normalizedDomain,
legacyNormalized,
makeEntry: (sig) => ({
action,
requestBuilder: requestBuilders[sig.name],
encrypted,
}),
});
// Store builders for reuse
ActionBuildersMap[action.metadata.domain] = requestBuilders;
}
actionSetsData = toolToAction;
}
const entry = actionSetsData.get(normalizeActionToolName(currentAction.tool));
if (!entry) {
continue;
}
const { action, requestBuilder, encrypted } = entry;
// We've already decrypted the metadata, so we can pass it directly
const _allowedDomains = appConfig?.actions?.allowedDomains;
const _allowedAddresses = appConfig?.actions?.allowedAddresses;
tool = await createActionTool({
userId: client.req.user.id,
res: client.res,
action,
requestBuilder,
// Note: intentionally not passing zodSchema, name, and description for assistants API
encrypted, // Pass the encrypted values for OAuth flow
useSSRFProtection: !Array.isArray(_allowedDomains) || _allowedDomains.length === 0,
allowedAddresses: _allowedAddresses,
});
if (!tool) {
logger.warn(
`Invalid action: user: ${client.req.user.id} | thread_id: ${requiredActions[0].thread_id} | run_id: ${requiredActions[0].run_id} | toolName: ${currentAction.tool}`,
);
throw new Error(`{"type":"${ErrorTypes.INVALID_ACTION}"}`);
}
isActionTool = !!tool;
ActionToolMap[currentAction.tool] = tool;
}
if (currentAction.tool === 'calculator') {
currentAction.toolInput = currentAction.toolInput.input;
}
const handleToolError = (error) => {
logger.error('[required actions] Tool execution failed', {
toolCallId: currentAction.toolCallId,
errorName: error?.name,
errorCode: error?.code,
});
if (error instanceof ContentFilterError) {
return {
tool_call_id: currentAction.toolCallId,
output: JSON.stringify(contentFilterModelBoundBlockResponse(error.body)),
};
}
const output = getSafeRequiredActionOutput(
client,
currentAction,
`Error processing tool ${currentAction.tool}: ${redactMessage(error.message, 256)}`,
);
return {
tool_call_id: currentAction.toolCallId,
output,
};
};
try {
const promise = tool
._call(currentAction.toolInput)
.then(handleToolOutput)
.catch(handleToolError);
promises.push(promise);
} catch (error) {
const toolOutputError = handleToolError(error);
promises.push(Promise.resolve(toolOutputError));
}
}
return {
tool_outputs: await Promise.all(promises),
};
}
/**
* Processes the runtime tool calls and returns the tool classes.
* @param {Object} params - Run params containing user and request information.
* @param {ServerRequest} params.req - The request object.
* @param {ServerResponse} params.res - The request object.
* @param {AbortSignal} params.signal
* @param {Pick<Agent, 'id' | 'provider' | 'model' | 'tools'} params.agent - The agent to load tools for.
* @param {string | undefined} [params.openAIApiKey] - The OpenAI API key.
* @returns {Promise<{
* tools?: StructuredTool[];
* toolContextMap?: Record<string, unknown>;
* dynamicToolContextMap?: Record<string, unknown>;
* userMCPAuthMap?: Record<string, Record<string, string>>;
* toolRegistry?: Map<string, import('~/utils/toolClassification').LCTool>;
* hasDeferredTools?: boolean;
* }>} The agent tools and registry.
*/
/** Native LibreChat tools that are not in the manifest */
const nativeTools = new Set([
Tools.execute_code,
Tools.file_search,
Tools.web_search,
Tools.memory,
]);
const mcpServerPinPrefix = `${Constants.mcp_server}${Constants.mcp_delimiter}`;
const isExpectedMCPTool = (toolName) =>
toolName?.includes(Constants.mcp_delimiter) &&
!toolName.startsWith(mcpServerPinPrefix) &&
!isActionTool(toolName);
const isExpectedMCPToolsUnavailableError = (error) =>
error?.code === AGENT_EXPECTED_MCP_TOOLS_UNAVAILABLE;
const createExpectedMCPToolsUnavailableError = (agentName, cause) => {
const subject = agentName ? `Agent "${agentName}"` : 'The agent';
const error = new Error(
`${subject} is configured to use MCP tools, but none are available. Verify that the MCP server is connected and this agent can access its selected tools, then try again.`,
);
error.name = 'AgentToolInitializationError';
error.code = AGENT_EXPECTED_MCP_TOOLS_UNAVAILABLE;
error.status = 503;
error.statusCode = 503;
if (cause != null) {
error.cause = cause;
}
return error;
};
/** Checks if a tool name is a known built-in tool */
const isBuiltInTool = (toolName) =>
Boolean(
manifestToolMap[toolName] ||
toolkits.some((t) => t.pluginKey === toolName) ||
nativeTools.has(toolName),
);
/**
* Loads only tool definitions without creating tool instances.
* This is the efficient path for event-driven mode where tools are loaded on-demand.
*
* @param {Object} params
* @param {ServerRequest} params.req - The request object
* @param {ServerResponse} [params.res] - The response object for SSE events
* @param {Object} params.agent - The agent configuration
* @param {import('@librechat/api').RequestBody} [params.requestBody] - Normalized MCP body
* @param {string} [params.agentResourceType] - Permission resource type for the authorized agent route
* @param {string|null} [params.streamId] - Stream ID for resumable mode
* @param {number} [params.jobCreatedAt] - The generation epoch that owns emitted tool events
* @returns {Promise<{
* toolDefinitions?: import('@librechat/api').LCTool[];
* toolRegistry?: Map<string, import('@librechat/api').LCTool>;
* mcpAvailableTools?: Record<string, import('@librechat/api').LCAvailableTools>;
* userMCPAuthMap?: Record<string, Record<string, string>>;
* hasDeferredTools?: boolean;
* }>}
*/
async function loadToolDefinitionsWrapper({
req,
res,
agent,
requestBody,
agentResourceType,
streamId = null,
jobCreatedAt,
tool_resources,
codeExecutionContext,
accessibleMcpServerNames,
}) {
if (!agent.tools || agent.tools.length === 0) {
return { toolDefinitions: [] };
}
if (
agent.tools.length === 1 &&
(agent.tools[0] === AgentCapabilities.context || agent.tools[0] === AgentCapabilities.ocr)
) {
return { toolDefinitions: [] };
}
const appConfig = req.config;
const runtimeRequestBody = requestBody ?? req.body;
const hasExpectedMCPTools = agent.tools.some(isExpectedMCPTool);
const enabledCapabilities = await resolveAgentCapabilities(req, appConfig, agent.id);
const checkCapability = (capability) => enabledCapabilities.has(capability);
const areToolsEnabled = checkCapability(AgentCapabilities.tools);
const actionsEnabled = checkCapability(AgentCapabilities.actions);
const deferredToolsEnabled = checkCapability(AgentCapabilities.deferred_tools);
const programmaticToolsEnabled = enabledCapabilities.has(AgentCapabilities.programmatic_tools);
const codeExecutionEnabled =
agent.tools?.includes(Tools.execute_code) === true &&
enabledCapabilities.has(AgentCapabilities.execute_code);
const resolvedCodeExecutionContext =
codeExecutionContext ??
resolveCodeExecutionContext({
statefulSessions:
codeExecutionEnabled &&
enabledCapabilities.has(AgentCapabilities.stateful_code_sessions) &&
agent.stateful_code_sessions === true,
environment: agent.stateful_code_environment,
userId: req.user.id,
agentId: agent.id,
conversationId: runtimeRequestBody?.conversationId,
});
const hasMCPTools = agent.tools?.some((tool) => tool?.includes(Constants.mcp_delimiter));
const mcpPermissionContext = createMCPPermissionContext(req);
const canUseMCP = hasMCPTools ? await mcpPermissionContext.canUseServers(req.user) : true;
const filteredTools = agent.tools?.filter((tool) => {
if (tool === Tools.file_search) {
return checkCapability(AgentCapabilities.file_search);
}
if (tool === Tools.execute_code) {
return checkCapability(AgentCapabilities.execute_code);
}
if (tool === Tools.web_search) {
return checkCapability(AgentCapabilities.web_search);
}
if (tool === Tools.memory) {
return checkCapability(AgentCapabilities.memory);
}
if (tool === ASK_USER_QUESTION_TOOL_NAME) {
return checkCapability(AgentCapabilities.ask_user_question);
}
if (isActionTool(tool)) {
return actionsEnabled;
}
if (tool?.includes(Constants.mcp_delimiter)) {
return areToolsEnabled && canUseMCP;
}
if (!areToolsEnabled) {
return false;
}
return true;
});
if (!filteredTools || filteredTools.length === 0) {
if (hasExpectedMCPTools) {
throw createExpectedMCPToolsUnavailableError(agent.name);
}
return { toolDefinitions: [] };
}
assertToolResourcesAllowed({
req,
toolResources: tool_resources,
tools: filteredTools,
});
const preparedActionSnapshot = await prepareActionSnapshotForTools({
agentId: agent.id,
toolNames: filteredTools,
filters: req.config?.filters,
decrypt: false,
});
/** Only MCP tool keys need the server context; a purely non-MCP agent should not
* pay an app-config lookup on startup. */
const hasFilteredMCPTools = filteredTools.some((t) => t.includes(Constants.mcp_delimiter));
const {
configServers,
serverNames: mcpServerNames,
rawServerNames: mcpRawServerNames = [],
} = hasFilteredMCPTools
? await resolveMcpServerContext(req)
: { configServers: {}, serverNames: [], rawServerNames: [] };
/**
* Shadowed servers must not emit definitions: their normalized function
* names equal the winning server's, and the default execution path later
* resolves those names directly — selecting a shadowed server's definition
* could execute another server's action. Audited against the full
* accessible set (threaded from the caller's heal, or fetched only when a
* configured name needs normalization); normalization-sensitive references
* fail closed when the audit is incomplete.
*/
let defsFilteredTools = filteredTools;
/** Complete audit names, forwarded to the definitions loader so its alias
* fallback can tell "server not found" from "server found but currently
* unavailable" — only the former may fall back to the raw alias. */
let defsAccessibleServerNames;
if (hasFilteredMCPTools) {
const collisionAudit = await resolveCollisionAuditNames({
rawServerNames: mcpRawServerNames,
accessibleServerNames: accessibleMcpServerNames,
userId: req.user.id,
role: req.user?.role,
});
if (collisionAudit.complete) {
defsAccessibleServerNames = collisionAudit.names;
}
const defsShadowedServers = findShadowedServerNames(collisionAudit.names);
if (defsShadowedServers.size > 0 || !collisionAudit.complete) {
const defsAliases = buildServerNameAliases(collisionAudit.names);
const boundaryCandidates = [...collisionAudit.names, ...defsAliases.keys()];
defsFilteredTools = filteredTools.filter((tool) => {
if (!tool.includes(Constants.mcp_delimiter)) {
return true;
}
const [, parsed] = splitMCPToolKey(tool, boundaryCandidates);
const serverName = parsed != null ? (defsAliases.get(parsed) ?? parsed) : parsed;
if (serverName == null) {
return true;
}
if (
defsShadowedServers.has(serverName) ||
(!collisionAudit.complete && isNormalizationSensitiveName(serverName, mcpRawServerNames))
) {
logger.warn(
`[Tool Definitions] Skipping MCP tool "${tool}": server "${serverName}" is shadowed by a name collision (or the collision audit is unavailable); rename one server or retry.`,
);
return false;
}
return true;
});
}
}
/** @type {Record<string, Record<string, string>>} */
let userMCPAuthMap;
if (hasFilteredMCPTools) {
userMCPAuthMap = await getUserMCPAuthMap({
tools: filteredTools,
userId: req.user.id,
serverNames: mcpRawServerNames,
findPluginAuthsByKeys,
});
}
const flowsCache = getLogStores(CacheKeys.FLOWS);
const flowManager = getFlowStateManager(flowsCache);
const pendingOAuthServers = new Set();
const pendingOAuthStarts = new Map();
const emittedOAuthStarts = new Map();
const oauthToolCallIds = new Map();
const oauthStepIndexes = new Map();
/** @type {Record<string, import('@librechat/api').LCAvailableTools>} */
const mcpAvailableTools = {};
const requestScopedConnections = getMCPRequestContext(req, res);
/**
* Build the OBO upstream-token closure once at this request boundary and pass
* the function into MCP handling, so `reinitMCPServer` never receives the raw
* Express request. `res` is forwarded so a rotated refresh token can be
* mirrored to the `refreshToken` cookie when the response is still writable.
*/
const oboIdentityContext = createAuthIdentityContext({
user: req.user,
tenantId: getTenantId(),
});
const upstreamTokenProvider = createOpenIDSessionTokenProvider({
req,
res,
user: req.user,
identityContext: oboIdentityContext,
tokenPreference: 'access_token',
});
const rememberMCPAvailableTools = (serverName, availableTools) => {
if (!availableTools || Object.keys(availableTools).length === 0) {
return;
}
mcpAvailableTools[serverName] = availableTools;
};
const createOAuthEmitter = (serverName, index) => {
return async (authURL, options) => {
if (emittedOAuthStarts.get(serverName) === authURL) {
return;
}
emittedOAuthStarts.set(serverName, authURL);
const flowId =
oauthToolCallIds.get(serverName) ?? `${req.user.id}:${serverName}:${Date.now()}`;
const stepId = buildMCPAuthStepId(serverName);
oauthToolCallIds.set(serverName, flowId);
oauthStepIndexes.set(serverName, index);
const toolCall = buildMCPAuthToolCall({
id: flowId,
serverName,
});
const runStepEvent = buildMCPAuthRunStepEvent({ stepId, toolCall, index });
const runStepDeltaEvent = buildMCPAuthRunStepDeltaEvent({
authURL,
stepId,
toolCall,
options,
});
if (streamId) {
await GenerationJobManager.emitChunk(streamId, runStepEvent, {
expectedCreatedAt: jobCreatedAt,
});
await GenerationJobManager.emitChunk(streamId, runStepDeltaEvent, {
expectedCreatedAt: jobCreatedAt,
});
} else if (res && !res.writableEnded) {
sendEvent(res, runStepEvent);
sendEvent(res, runStepDeltaEvent);
} else {
logger.warn('[Tool Definitions] Cannot emit MCP OAuth event', {
hasStreamId: Boolean(streamId),
hasResponse: Boolean(res),
responseEnded: Boolean(res?.writableEnded),
});
}
};
};
const createOAuthEndEmitter = (serverName) => {
return async () => {
const stepId = buildMCPAuthStepId(serverName);
const toolCall = buildMCPAuthToolCall({
id: oauthToolCallIds.get(serverName),
args: '',
output: 'OAuth authentication completed',
serverName,
type: 'tool_call',
});
const runStepCompletedEvent = buildMCPAuthRunStepCompletedEvent({
stepId,
toolCall,
index: oauthStepIndexes.get(serverName) ?? 0,
});
if (streamId) {
await GenerationJobManager.emitChunk(streamId, runStepCompletedEvent, {
expectedCreatedAt: jobCreatedAt,
});
} else if (res && !res.writableEnded) {
sendEvent(res, runStepCompletedEvent);
} else {
logger.warn('[Tool Definitions] Cannot emit MCP OAuth completion', {
hasStreamId: Boolean(streamId),
hasResponse: Boolean(res),
responseEnded: Boolean(res?.writableEnded),
});
}
};
};
const getPendingOAuthStartForEmit = async (serverName) => {
const cachedOAuthStart = pendingOAuthStarts.get(serverName);
if (cachedOAuthStart?.options?.expiresAt != null) {
return cachedOAuthStart;
}
const pendingOAuthStart = await getReplayablePendingMCPOAuthStart({
flowManager,
userId: req.user.id,
serverName,
});
if (!pendingOAuthStart) {
return cachedOAuthStart;
}
if (!cachedOAuthStart || pendingOAuthStart.authURL === cachedOAuthStart.authURL) {
pendingOAuthStarts.set(serverName, pendingOAuthStart);
return pendingOAuthStart;
}
return cachedOAuthStart;
};
/** Name-preserving: the definitions loader resolves normalized-vs-raw
* spellings itself (direct identity first, alias fallback), so this
* closure must look up EXACTLY the name it is given. */
const getOrFetchMCPServerTools = async (userId, serverName) => {
const addPendingOAuthServer = async () => {
const pendingOAuthStart = await getReplayablePendingMCPOAuthStart({
flowManager,
userId,
serverName,
});
if (!pendingOAuthStart) {
return false;
}
pendingOAuthServers.add(serverName);
pendingOAuthStarts.set(serverName, pendingOAuthStart);
return true;
};
let serverConfig;
try {
serverConfig =
configServers?.[serverName] ??
(await getMCPServersRegistry().getServerConfig(serverName, userId, configServers));
} catch {
logger.warn(
'[Tool Definitions] MCP registry unavailable; skipping tool exposure for one server',
);
return null;
}
if (!serverConfig) {
logger.warn(
'[Tool Definitions] Skipping one MCP server because its configuration is unavailable',
);
return null;
}
const customUserVars = userMCPAuthMap?.[`${Constants.mcp_prefix}${serverName}`];
const missingUserVars = getMissingCustomUserVars(serverConfig, customUserVars);
if (missingUserVars.length > 0) {
logger.warn('[Tool Definitions] Skipping one MCP server with missing user configuration', {
missingVariableCount: missingUserVars.length,
});
return null;
}
if (mcpAvailableTools[serverName]) {
return mcpAvailableTools[serverName];
}
const cached = await getMCPServerTools(userId, serverName, serverConfig);
if (cached) {
rememberMCPAvailableTools(serverName, cached);
await addPendingOAuthServer();
return cached;
}
if (await addPendingOAuthServer()) {
return null;
}
const oauthStart = async (authURL, options) => {
pendingOAuthServers.add(serverName);
if (typeof authURL === 'string' && authURL.length > 0) {
pendingOAuthStarts.set(serverName, { authURL, options });
}
};
const result = await reinitMCPServer({
user: req.user,
oauthStart,
flowManager,
serverName,
configServers,
userMCPAuthMap,
requestBody: runtimeRequestBody,
requestScopedConnections,
upstreamTokenProvider,
oboIdentityContext,
});
rememberMCPAvailableTools(serverName, result?.availableTools);
return result?.availableTools || null;
};
const refreshMCPServerTools = async (_userId, serverName) => {
if (pendingOAuthServers.has(serverName)) {
return null;
}
const oauthStart = async (authURL, options) => {
pendingOAuthServers.add(serverName);
if (typeof authURL === 'string' && authURL.length > 0) {
pendingOAuthStarts.set(serverName, { authURL, options });
}
};
const result = await reinitMCPServer({
user: req.user,
forceNew: true,
oauthStart,
flowManager,
serverName,
configServers,
userMCPAuthMap,
requestBody: runtimeRequestBody,
requestScopedConnections,
upstreamTokenProvider,
oboIdentityContext,
});
rememberMCPAvailableTools(serverName, result?.availableTools);
return result?.availableTools || null;
};
const getActionToolDefinitions = async (agentId, actionToolNames) => {
if (agentId !== agent.id || preparedActionSnapshot == null) {
return [];
}
const { actionSets } = preparedActionSnapshot;
if (actionSets.length === 0) {
return [];
}
const definitions = [];
const allowedDomains = appConfig?.actions?.allowedDomains;
const allowedAddresses = appConfig?.actions?.allowedAddresses;
const normalizedToolNames = new Set(
actionToolNames.map((n) => n.replace(domainSeparatorRegex, '_')),
);
for (const action of actionSets) {
const domain = await domainParser(action.metadata.domain, true);
const normalizedDomain = domain.replace(domainSeparatorRegex, '_');
const legacyDomain = legacyDomainEncode(action.metadata.domain);
const legacyNormalized = legacyDomain.replace(domainSeparatorRegex, '_');
const isDomainAllowed = await isActionDomainAllowed(
action.metadata.domain,
allowedDomains,
allowedAddresses,
);
if (!isDomainAllowed) {
logger.warn(
`[Actions] Domain "${action.metadata.domain}" not in allowedDomains. ` +
`Add it to librechat.yaml actions.allowedDomains to enable this action.`,
);
continue;
}
const validationResult = validateAndParseOpenAPISpec(action.metadata.raw_spec);
if (!validationResult.spec || !validationResult.serverUrl) {
logger.warn(`[Actions] Invalid OpenAPI spec for domain: ${domain}`);
continue;
}
const { functionSignatures } = openapiToFunction(validationResult.spec, true);
for (const sig of functionSignatures) {
const toolName = `${sig.name}${actionDelimiter}${normalizedDomain}`;
const legacyToolName = `${sig.name}${actionDelimiter}${legacyNormalized}`;
const matchesCurrentName = normalizedToolNames.has(toolName);
const matchesLegacyName = normalizedToolNames.has(legacyToolName);
if (!matchesCurrentName && !matchesLegacyName) {
continue;
}
definitions.push({
/** Keep the selected legacy spelling when that is the only match so
* persisted tool_options resolve against the emitted definition. */
name: matchesCurrentName ? toolName : legacyToolName,
description: sig.description,
parameters: sig.parameters,
oauth: action.metadata.auth?.type === AuthTypeEnum.OAuth,
});
}
}
return definitions;
};
let {
toolDefinitions,
toolRegistry,
hasDeferredTools,
mcpToolAliases,
mcpResolution,
oauthActionToolNames,
} = await loadToolDefinitions(
{
userId: req.user.id,
agentId: agent.id,
tools: defsFilteredTools,
toolOptions: agent.tool_options,
deferredToolsEnabled,
programmaticToolsEnabled,
codeExecutionEnabled,
provider: agent.provider,
mcpServerNames,
rawServerNames: mcpRawServerNames,
accessibleServerNames: defsAccessibleServerNames,
},
{
isBuiltInTool,
getOrFetchMCPServerTools,
refreshMCPServerTools,
getActionToolDefinitions,
},
);
/** OAuth discovery must not reconnect (or prompt for) a server whose
* definitions the collision filter deliberately rejected. */
for (const serverName of getMCPServerNamesFromTools(defsFilteredTools, mcpServerNames)) {
if (pendingOAuthServers.has(serverName)) {
continue;
}
const pendingOAuthStart = await getReplayablePendingMCPOAuthStart({
flowManager,
userId: req.user.id,
serverName,
});
if (pendingOAuthStart) {
pendingOAuthServers.add(serverName);
pendingOAuthStarts.set(serverName, pendingOAuthStart);
}
}
if (pendingOAuthServers.size > 0 && (res || streamId)) {
const serverNames = Array.from(pendingOAuthServers);
logger.info(
`[Tool Definitions] MCP OAuth required for ${serverNames.length} server(s); emitting events and waiting`,
);
const oauthWaitPromises = serverNames.map(async (serverName, index) => {
try {
const pendingOAuthStart = await getPendingOAuthStartForEmit(serverName);
const oauthStart = createOAuthEmitter(serverName, index);
if (pendingOAuthStart) {
await oauthStart(pendingOAuthStart.authURL, pendingOAuthStart.options);
}
const result = await reinitMCPServer({
user: req.user,
serverName,
configServers,
userMCPAuthMap,
flowManager,
requestBody: runtimeRequestBody,
returnOnOAuth: false,
oauthStart,
oauthEnd: createOAuthEndEmitter(serverName),
connectionTimeout: Time.TWO_MINUTES,
upstreamTokenProvider,
oboIdentityContext,
});
if (result?.availableTools && Object.keys(result.availableTools).length > 0) {
rememberMCPAvailableTools(serverName, result.availableTools);
logger.info('[Tool Definitions] MCP OAuth completed; tools available');
return { serverName, success: true };
}
return { serverName, success: false };
} catch {
logger.debug('[Tool Definitions] MCP OAuth wait failed for one server');
return { serverName, success: false };
}
});
const results = await Promise.allSettled(oauthWaitPromises);
const successfulServers = results
.filter((r) => r.status === 'fulfilled' && r.value.success)
.map((r) => r.value.serverName);
if (successfulServers.length > 0) {
logger.info(
`[Tool Definitions] Reloading tools after OAuth for ${successfulServers.length} server(s)`,
);
const reloadResult = await loadToolDefinitions(
{
userId: req.user.id,
agentId: agent.id,
tools: defsFilteredTools,
toolOptions: agent.tool_options,
deferredToolsEnabled,
programmaticToolsEnabled,
codeExecutionEnabled,
provider: agent.provider,
mcpServerNames,
rawServerNames: mcpRawServerNames,
accessibleServerNames: defsAccessibleServerNames,
},
{
isBuiltInTool,
getOrFetchMCPServerTools,
refreshMCPServerTools,
getActionToolDefinitions,
},
);
toolDefinitions = reloadResult.toolDefinitions;
toolRegistry = reloadResult.toolRegistry;
hasDeferredTools = reloadResult.hasDeferredTools;
mcpToolAliases = reloadResult.mcpToolAliases;
mcpResolution = reloadResult.mcpResolution;
oauthActionToolNames = reloadResult.oauthActionToolNames;
}
}
if (hasExpectedMCPTools && mcpResolution?.resolvedToolCount === 0) {
throw createExpectedMCPToolsUnavailableError(agent.name);
}
/** @type {Record<string, string>} */
const toolContextMap = {};
/** @type {Record<string, string>} */
const dynamicToolContextMap = {};
const hasWebSearch = filteredTools.includes(Tools.web_search);
const hasFileSearch = filteredTools.includes(Tools.file_search);
const hasExecuteCode = filteredTools.includes(Tools.execute_code);
if (hasWebSearch) {
toolContextMap[Tools.web_search] = buildWebSearchContext();
dynamicToolContextMap[Tools.web_search] = buildWebSearchDynamicContext(
req.conversationCreatedAt,
);
}
/**
* `files` carry the upload session_ids; we surface them so client.js can
* seed `Graph.sessions[EXECUTE_CODE]` before run start. Without that seed,
* the agents-side `ToolNode.getCodeSessionContext` returns undefined on
* call #1, `_injected_files` is never set on the tool call, and the
* sandbox can't see the prior turn's generated artifacts on first read.
*/
let primedCodeFiles;
if (hasExecuteCode && tool_resources) {
try {
const { toolContext, files } = await primeCodeFiles({
req,
tool_resources,
agentId: agent.id,
agentResourceType,
codeApiBaseUrl: resolvedCodeExecutionContext.baseUrl,
executionProfile: resolvedCodeExecutionContext.executionProfile,
});
if (toolContext) {
dynamicToolContextMap[Tools.execute_code] = toolContext;
}
if (files?.length) {
primedCodeFiles = files;
}
} catch (error) {
if (isFatalAgentInitializationError(error)) {
throw error;
}
logger.error(
'[loadToolDefinitionsWrapper] Error priming code files:',
getSafeErrorMetadata(error),
);
}
}
if (hasFileSearch && tool_resources) {
try {
const { toolContext } = await primeSearchFiles({
req,
tool_resources,
agentId: agent.id,
agentResourceType,
});
if (toolContext) {
dynamicToolContextMap[Tools.file_search] = toolContext;
}
} catch (error) {
logger.error(
'[loadToolDefinitionsWrapper] Error priming search files:',
getSafeErrorMetadata(error),
);
}
}
const imageFiles = tool_resources?.[EToolResources.image_edit]?.files ?? [];
if (imageFiles.length > 0) {
const hasOaiImageGen = filteredTools.includes('image_gen_oai');
const hasGeminiImageGen = filteredTools.includes('gemini_image_gen');
if (hasOaiImageGen) {
const toolContext = buildImageToolContext({
imageFiles,
toolName: `${EToolResources.image_edit}_oai`,
contextDescription: 'image editing',
});
if (toolContext) {
dynamicToolContextMap.image_edit_oai = toolContext;
}
}
if (hasGeminiImageGen) {
const toolContext = buildImageToolContext({
imageFiles,
toolName: 'gemini_image_gen',
contextDescription: 'image context',
});
if (toolContext) {
dynamicToolContextMap.gemini_image_gen = toolContext;
}
}
}
return {
toolRegistry,
mcpAvailableTools,
requestScopedConnections,
userMCPAuthMap,
toolContextMap,
dynamicToolContextMap,
toolDefinitions,
hasDeferredTools,
mcpToolAliases,
actionsEnabled,
primedCodeFiles,
oauthActionToolNames,
};
}
/**
* Loads agent tools for initialization or execution.
* @param {Object} params
* @param {ServerRequest} params.req - The request object
* @param {ServerResponse} params.res - The response object
* @param {Object} params.agent - The agent configuration
* @param {import('@librechat/api').RequestBody} [params.requestBody] - Normalized MCP body
* @param {string} [params.agentResourceType] - Permission resource type for the authorized agent route
* @param {AbortSignal} [params.signal] - Abort signal
* @param {Object} [params.tool_resources] - Tool resources
* @param {string} [params.openAIApiKey] - OpenAI API key
* @param {string|null} [params.streamId] - Stream ID for resumable mode
* @param {number} [params.jobCreatedAt] - The generation epoch that owns emitted tool events
* @param {boolean} [params.definitionsOnly=true] - When true, returns only serializable
* tool definitions without creating full tool instances. Use for event-driven mode
* where tools are loaded on-demand during execution.
*/
async function loadAgentTools({
req,
res,
agent,
requestBody,
agentResourceType,
signal,
tool_resources,
openAIApiKey,
streamId = null,
jobCreatedAt,
definitionsOnly = true,
codeExecutionContext: providedCodeExecutionContext,
accessibleMcpServerNames,
}) {
if (definitionsOnly) {
try {
return await loadToolDefinitionsWrapper({
req,
res,
agent,
requestBody,
agentResourceType,
streamId,
jobCreatedAt,
tool_resources,
codeExecutionContext: providedCodeExecutionContext,
accessibleMcpServerNames,
});
} catch (error) {
if (
isFatalAgentInitializationError(error) ||
isContentFilterError(error) ||
!agent.tools?.some(isExpectedMCPTool)
) {
throw error;
}
throw createExpectedMCPToolsUnavailableError(agent.name, error);
}
}
if (!agent.tools || agent.tools.length === 0) {
return { toolDefinitions: [] };
} else if (
agent.tools &&
agent.tools.length === 1 &&
/** Legacy handling for `ocr` as may still exist in existing Agents */
(agent.tools[0] === AgentCapabilities.context || agent.tools[0] === AgentCapabilities.ocr)
) {
return { toolDefinitions: [] };
}
const appConfig = req.config;
const enabledCapabilities = await resolveAgentCapabilities(req, appConfig, agent.id);
const checkCapability = (capability) => {
const enabled = enabledCapabilities.has(capability);
if (!enabled) {
const isToolCapability = [
AgentCapabilities.file_search,
AgentCapabilities.execute_code,
AgentCapabilities.web_search,
].includes(capability);
const suffix = isToolCapability ? ' despite configured tool.' : '.';
logger.warn(
`Capability "${capability}" disabled${suffix} User: ${req.user.id} | Agent: ${agent.id}`,
);
}
return enabled;
};
const areToolsEnabled = checkCapability(AgentCapabilities.tools);
const actionsEnabled = checkCapability(AgentCapabilities.actions);
const hasMCPTools = agent.tools?.some((tool) => tool?.includes(Constants.mcp_delimiter));
const mcpPermissionContext = createMCPPermissionContext(req);
const canUseMCP = hasMCPTools ? await mcpPermissionContext.canUseServers(req.user) : true;
let includesWebSearch = false;
const _agentTools = agent.tools?.filter((tool) => {
if (tool === Tools.file_search) {
return checkCapability(AgentCapabilities.file_search);
} else if (tool === Tools.execute_code) {
return checkCapability(AgentCapabilities.execute_code);
} else if (tool === Tools.web_search) {
includesWebSearch = checkCapability(AgentCapabilities.web_search);
return includesWebSearch;
} else if (tool === Tools.memory) {
return checkCapability(AgentCapabilities.memory);
} else if (tool === ASK_USER_QUESTION_TOOL_NAME) {
return checkCapability(AgentCapabilities.ask_user_question);
} else if (isActionTool(tool)) {
return actionsEnabled;
} else if (tool?.includes(Constants.mcp_delimiter)) {
return areToolsEnabled && canUseMCP;
} else if (!areToolsEnabled) {
return false;
}
return true;
});
if (!_agentTools || _agentTools.length === 0) {
return {};
}
assertToolResourcesAllowed({
req,
toolResources: tool_resources,
tools: _agentTools,
});
const preparedActionSnapshot = await prepareActionSnapshotForTools({
agentId: agent.id,
toolNames: _agentTools,
filters: req.config?.filters,
decrypt: true,
});
/** @type {ReturnType<typeof createOnSearchResults>} */
let webSearchCallbacks;
if (includesWebSearch) {
webSearchCallbacks = createOnSearchResults(res, streamId, jobCreatedAt);
}
/** Resolved once and threaded into `loadTools` so the request app config is
* read once. The accessible set (operator + user DB), when the caller's
* heal already fetched it, rides along so execution-side collision guards
* see cross-tier shadowing without another registry round-trip. */
let mcpServerContext = _agentTools?.some((t) => t.includes(Constants.mcp_delimiter))
? await resolveMcpServerContext(req)
: undefined;
if (mcpServerContext && accessibleMcpServerNames?.length) {
mcpServerContext = { ...mcpServerContext, accessibleServerNames: accessibleMcpServerNames };
}
/** @type {Record<string, Record<string, string>>} */
let userMCPAuthMap;
if (mcpServerContext) {
userMCPAuthMap = await getUserMCPAuthMap({
tools: _agentTools,
userId: req.user.id,
serverNames: mcpServerContext.rawServerNames ?? mcpServerContext.serverNames,
findPluginAuthsByKeys,
});
}
const codeExecutionEnabled =
agent.tools?.includes(Tools.execute_code) === true &&
enabledCapabilities.has(AgentCapabilities.execute_code);
const statefulCodeSessions =
codeExecutionEnabled &&
enabledCapabilities.has(AgentCapabilities.stateful_code_sessions) &&
agent.stateful_code_sessions === true;
const codeExecutionContext =
providedCodeExecutionContext ??
resolveCodeExecutionContext({
statefulSessions: statefulCodeSessions,
environment: agent.stateful_code_environment,
userId: req.user.id,
agentId: agent.id,
conversationId: requestBody?.conversationId ?? req.body?.conversationId,
});
const { loadedTools, toolContextMap, dynamicToolContextMap, primedCodeFiles } = await loadTools({
agent,
signal,
userMCPAuthMap,
functions: true,
user: req.user.id,
tools: _agentTools,
options: {
req,
res,
requestBody,
agentResourceType,
mcpServerContext,
jobCreatedAt,
openAIApiKey,
tool_resources,
processFileURL,
uploadImageBuffer,
returnMetadata: true,
mcpPermissionContext,
requestScopedConnections: getMCPRequestContext(req, res),
codeExecutionContext,
[Tools.web_search]: webSearchCallbacks,
},
webSearch: appConfig.webSearch,
fileStrategy: appConfig.fileStrategy,
imageOutputType: appConfig.imageOutputType,
});
/** Build tool registry from MCP tools and create PTC/tool search tools if configured */
const deferredToolsEnabled = checkCapability(AgentCapabilities.deferred_tools);
const programmaticToolsEnabled = enabledCapabilities.has(AgentCapabilities.programmatic_tools);
const { toolRegistry, toolDefinitions, additionalTools, hasDeferredTools, mcpToolAliases } =
await buildToolClassification({
loadedTools,
userId: req.user.id,
agentId: agent.id,
provider: agent.provider,
agentToolOptions: agent.tool_options,
deferredToolsEnabled,
programmaticToolsEnabled,
codeExecutionEnabled,
authHeaders: () => getCodeApiAuthHeaders(req),
codeExecutionContext,
});
const agentTools = [];
for (let i = 0; i < loadedTools.length; i++) {
const tool = loadedTools[i];
if (tool.name && (tool.name === Tools.execute_code || tool.name === Tools.file_search)) {
agentTools.push(tool);
continue;
}
if (!areToolsEnabled) {
continue;
}
if (tool.mcp === true) {
agentTools.push(tool);
continue;
}
if (tool instanceof DynamicStructuredTool) {
agentTools.push(tool);
continue;
}
const toolDefinition = {
name: tool.name,
schema: tool.schema,
description: tool.description,
};
if (imageGenTools.has(tool.name)) {
toolDefinition.responseFormat = 'content_and_artifact';
}
const toolInstance = toolFn(async (...args) => {
return tool['_call'](...args);
}, toolDefinition);
agentTools.push(toolInstance);
}
const ToolMap = loadedTools.reduce((map, tool) => {
map[tool.name] = tool;
return map;
}, {});
agentTools.push(...additionalTools);
if (preparedActionSnapshot == null) {
return {
toolRegistry,
requestScopedConnections: getMCPRequestContext(req, res),
userMCPAuthMap,
toolContextMap,
dynamicToolContextMap,
toolDefinitions,
hasDeferredTools,
mcpToolAliases,
actionsEnabled,
tools: agentTools,
primedCodeFiles,
};
}
const { storedActions, actionSets } = preparedActionSnapshot;
if (storedActions.length === 0) {
if (_agentTools.length > 0 && agentTools.length === 0) {
logger.warn(`No tools found for ${_agentTools.length} specified tool call(s)`);
}
return {
toolRegistry,
requestScopedConnections: getMCPRequestContext(req, res),
userMCPAuthMap,
toolContextMap,
dynamicToolContextMap,
toolDefinitions,
hasDeferredTools,
mcpToolAliases,
actionsEnabled,
tools: agentTools,
primedCodeFiles,
};
}
// See registerActionTools for the key-shape rationale.
const toolToAction = new Map();
for (let index = 0; index < actionSets.length; index++) {
const action = actionSets[index];
const storedAction = storedActions[index];
const domain = await domainParser(action.metadata.domain, true);
const normalizedDomain = domain.replace(domainSeparatorRegex, '_');
const legacyDomain = legacyDomainEncode(action.metadata.domain);
const legacyNormalized = legacyDomain.replace(domainSeparatorRegex, '_');
const isDomainAllowed = await isActionDomainAllowed(
action.metadata.domain,
appConfig?.actions?.allowedDomains,
appConfig?.actions?.allowedAddresses,
);
if (!isDomainAllowed) {
continue;
}
// Validate and parse OpenAPI spec once per action set
const validationResult = validateAndParseOpenAPISpec(action.metadata.raw_spec);
if (!validationResult.spec || !validationResult.serverUrl) {
continue;
}
// SECURITY: Validate the domain from the spec matches the stored domain
// This is defense-in-depth to prevent any stored malicious actions
const domainValidation = validateActionDomain(
action.metadata.domain,
validationResult.serverUrl,
);
if (!domainValidation.isValid) {
logger.error(`Domain mismatch in stored action: ${domainValidation.message}`, {
userId: req.user.id,
agent_id: agent.id,
action_id: action.action_id,
});
continue; // Skip this action rather than failing the entire request
}
const encrypted = {
oauth_client_id: storedAction.metadata.oauth_client_id,
oauth_client_secret: storedAction.metadata.oauth_client_secret,
};
// Process the OpenAPI spec once per action set
const { requestBuilders, functionSignatures, zodSchemas } = openapiToFunction(
validationResult.spec,
true,
);
registerActionTools({
toolToAction,
functionSignatures,
normalizedDomain,
legacyNormalized,
makeEntry: (sig) => ({
action,
requestBuilder: requestBuilders[sig.name],
zodSchema: zodSchemas[sig.name],
functionSignature: sig,
encrypted,
}),
});
}
// Now map tools to the processed action sets
const ActionToolMap = {};
for (const toolName of _agentTools) {
if (ToolMap[toolName]) {
continue;
}
const entry = toolToAction.get(normalizeActionToolName(toolName));
if (!entry) {
continue;
}
const { action, encrypted, zodSchema, requestBuilder, functionSignature } = entry;
const _allowedDomains = appConfig?.actions?.allowedDomains;
const _allowedAddresses = appConfig?.actions?.allowedAddresses;
const tool = await createActionTool({
userId: req.user.id,
res,
action,
requestBuilder,
zodSchema,
encrypted,
name: toolName,
description: functionSignature.description,
streamId,
jobCreatedAt,
useSSRFProtection: !Array.isArray(_allowedDomains) || _allowedDomains.length === 0,
allowedAddresses: _allowedAddresses,
});
if (!tool) {
logger.warn(
`Invalid action: user: ${req.user.id} | agent_id: ${agent.id} | toolName: ${toolName}`,
);
throw new Error(`{"type":"${ErrorTypes.INVALID_ACTION}"}`);
}
agentTools.push(tool);
ActionToolMap[toolName] = tool;
}
if (_agentTools.length > 0 && agentTools.length === 0) {
logger.warn(`No tools found for ${_agentTools.length} specified tool call(s)`);
return {};
}
return {
toolRegistry,
requestScopedConnections: getMCPRequestContext(req, res),
toolContextMap,
dynamicToolContextMap,
userMCPAuthMap,
toolDefinitions,
hasDeferredTools,
mcpToolAliases,
actionsEnabled,
tools: agentTools,
primedCodeFiles,
};
}
/**
* Loads tools for event-driven execution (ON_TOOL_EXECUTE handler).
* This function encapsulates all dependencies needed for tool loading,
* so callers don't need to import processFileURL, uploadImageBuffer, etc.
*
* Handles both regular tools (MCP, built-in) and action tools.
*
* @param {Object} params
* @param {ServerRequest} params.req - The request object
* @param {ServerResponse} params.res - The response object
* @param {AbortSignal} [params.signal] - Abort signal
* @param {Object} params.agent - The agent object
* @param {import('@librechat/api').RequestBody} [params.requestBody] - Normalized MCP body
* @param {string} [params.agentResourceType] - Permission resource type for the authorized agent route
* @param {string[]} params.toolNames - Names of tools to load
* @param {Map} [params.toolRegistry] - Tool registry
* @param {unknown} [params.callerCapabilityProjection] - SDK-owned live caller projection
* @param {Record<string, import('@librechat/api').LCAvailableTools>} [params.mcpAvailableTools] - Run-scoped MCP tool definitions
* @param {import('@librechat/api').RequestScopedMCPConnectionStore} [params.requestScopedConnections] - Run-scoped MCP connections
* @param {Record<string, Record<string, string>>} [params.userMCPAuthMap] - User MCP auth map
* @param {Object} [params.tool_resources] - Tool resources
* @param {string|null} [params.streamId] - Stream ID for web search callbacks
* @param {number} [params.jobCreatedAt] - The generation epoch that owns emitted tool events
* @param {string} [params.conversationId] - Resolved conversation identity for this request
* @param {boolean} [params.actionsEnabled] - Whether the actions capability is enabled
* @param {readonly string[]} [params.accessibleMcpServerNames] - COMPLETE accessible-server audit resolved at initialization
* @returns {Promise<{ loadedTools: Array, configurable: Object }>}
*/
async function loadToolsForExecution({
req,
res,
signal,
agent,
requestBody,
agentResourceType,
toolNames,
toolRegistry,
callerCapabilityProjection,
backgroundToolNames,
intentToolNames,
mcpAvailableTools,
requestScopedConnections,
userMCPAuthMap,
tool_resources,
streamId = null,
jobCreatedAt,
conversationId,
actionsEnabled,
accessibleMcpServerNames,
}) {
const appConfig = req.config;
const allLoadedTools = [];
const runtimeRequestBody = requestBody ?? req.body;
const mcpRequestScopedConnections = requestScopedConnections ?? getMCPRequestContext(req, res);
const configurable = {
userMCPAuthMap,
requestBody: runtimeRequestBody,
requestScopedConnections: mcpRequestScopedConnections,
};
const activeCallerCapabilities = resolveCallerCapabilityProjectionSnapshot(
callerCapabilityProjection,
);
const activeCodeExecutionToolNames = activeCallerCapabilities
? new Set(activeCallerCapabilities.codeExecutionToolNames)
: undefined;
/** Per-agent set of tools that received the injected `run_in_background`
* param; the event-driven executor gates background dispatch and the
* `check_background_task` poll tool on this reliable per-agent channel. */
if (backgroundToolNames?.length) {
configurable.backgroundToolNames = backgroundToolNames;
}
/** Per-agent set of tools that received the host-injected `intent` label
* param; the executor strips the arg before invocation and removes the
* param from schemas the PTC sandbox sees. */
if (intentToolNames?.length) {
configurable.intentToolNames = intentToolNames;
}
const isToolSearch = toolNames.includes(AgentConstants.TOOL_SEARCH);
const ptcToolNames = [
AgentConstants.BASH_PROGRAMMATIC_TOOL_CALLING,
AgentConstants.PROGRAMMATIC_TOOL_CALLING,
].filter((name) => toolNames.includes(name));
const isPTCRequested = ptcToolNames.length > 0;
const isBashToolRequested = toolNames.includes(AgentConstants.BASH_TOOL);
const isLegacyExecuteCodeRequested = toolNames.includes(Tools.execute_code);
const isCodeExecutionToolRequested = isBashToolRequested || isLegacyExecuteCodeRequested;
const isSkillToolRequested = toolNames.includes(AgentConstants.SKILL_TOOL);
const isSandboxFileToolRequested = toolNames.some((name) =>
[AgentConstants.READ_FILE, AgentConstants.CREATE_FILE, AgentConstants.EDIT_FILE].includes(name),
);
let enabledCapabilities;
if (
actionsEnabled === undefined ||
isPTCRequested ||
isCodeExecutionToolRequested ||
isSkillToolRequested ||
isSandboxFileToolRequested
) {
enabledCapabilities = await resolveAgentCapabilities(req, appConfig, agent?.id);
}
if (actionsEnabled === undefined) {
actionsEnabled = enabledCapabilities.has(AgentCapabilities.actions);
}
const codeExecutionEnabled =
enabledCapabilities?.has(AgentCapabilities.execute_code) === true &&
agent?.tools?.includes(Tools.execute_code) === true;
/** Resolve the trusted endpoint/profile from the actually executing agent.
* This stays per-agent across handoffs and subagents; no graph-global stateful
* flag or model-supplied value is consulted. */
const statefulCodeSessions =
codeExecutionEnabled &&
enabledCapabilities?.has(AgentCapabilities.stateful_code_sessions) === true &&
agent?.stateful_code_sessions === true;
const codeExecutionContext = resolveCodeExecutionContext({
statefulSessions: statefulCodeSessions,
environment: agent?.stateful_code_environment,
userId: req.user.id,
agentId: agent?.id,
conversationId: conversationId ?? runtimeRequestBody?.conversationId,
});
configurable.codeExecutionContext = codeExecutionContext;
const isPTC =
isPTCRequested &&
enabledCapabilities.has(AgentCapabilities.programmatic_tools) &&
codeExecutionEnabled;
const requestedActionToolNames = toolNames.filter((name) => isActionTool(name));
const orchestratedActionToolNames =
isPTC && toolRegistry
? Array.from(toolRegistry.keys()).filter((name) => isActionTool(name))
: [];
const preflightActionToolNames = [
...new Set([...requestedActionToolNames, ...orchestratedActionToolNames]),
];
const preparedActionSnapshot =
agent && actionsEnabled
? await prepareActionSnapshotForTools({
agentId: agent.id,
toolNames: preflightActionToolNames,
filters: req.config?.filters,
decrypt: true,
})
: null;
logger.debug(
`[loadToolsForExecution] isToolSearch: ${isToolSearch}, toolRegistry: ${toolRegistry?.size ?? 'undefined'}`,
);
if (isToolSearch && toolRegistry) {
const toolSearchTool = createToolSearch({
mode: 'local',
toolRegistry,
});
allLoadedTools.push(toolSearchTool);
configurable.toolRegistry = toolRegistry;
}
if (isPTC && toolRegistry) {
configurable.toolRegistry = toolRegistry;
try {
/**
* LibreChat threads per-request Code API auth through the agents
* library so PTC calls share the same managed auth context.
*/
for (const name of ptcToolNames) {
const ptcTool = createBashProgrammaticToolCallingTool({
authHeaders: () => getCodeApiAuthHeaders(req),
baseUrl: codeExecutionContext.baseUrl,
executionProfile: codeExecutionContext.executionProfile,
runtimeSessionHint: codeExecutionContext.runtimeSessionHint,
});
ptcTool.name = name;
allLoadedTools.push(ptcTool);
}
} catch (error) {
logger.error('[loadToolsForExecution] Error creating PTC tool:', getSafeErrorMetadata(error));
}
}
const isBashTool =
isBashToolRequested &&
codeExecutionEnabled &&
toolRegistry?.has(AgentConstants.BASH_TOOL) === true;
if (isBashToolRequested && !isBashTool) {
logger.warn(
`[loadToolsForExecution] Skipping unregistered or unauthorized ${AgentConstants.BASH_TOOL}. ` +
`User: ${req.user.id} | Agent: ${agent?.id ?? 'unknown'}`,
);
}
if (isBashTool) {
try {
const bashTool = createBashExecutionTool({
authHeaders: () => getCodeApiAuthHeaders(req),
...codeExecutionContext,
});
allLoadedTools.push(bashTool);
} catch (error) {
logger.error(
'[loadToolsForExecution] Failed to create bash_tool',
getSafeErrorMetadata(error),
);
}
}
const fileAuthoringToolNames = new Set(
toolRegistry
? Array.from(toolRegistry.values())
.filter((definition) => isFileAuthoringToolDefinition(definition))
.map((definition) => definition.name)
: [],
);
const specialToolNames = new Set([
AgentConstants.TOOL_SEARCH,
AgentConstants.PROGRAMMATIC_TOOL_CALLING,
AgentConstants.BASH_PROGRAMMATIC_TOOL_CALLING,
AgentConstants.BASH_TOOL,
AgentConstants.SKILL_TOOL,
AgentConstants.READ_FILE,
...fileAuthoringToolNames,
]);
let ptcOrchestratedToolNames = [];
if (isPTC && toolRegistry) {
ptcOrchestratedToolNames = Array.from(toolRegistry.values())
.filter(
(toolDef) =>
!specialToolNames.has(toolDef.name) &&
(toolDef.allowed_callers ?? ['direct']).includes('code_execution') &&
(activeCodeExecutionToolNames == null || activeCodeExecutionToolNames.has(toolDef.name)),
)
.map((toolDef) => toolDef.name);
}
const requestedNonSpecialToolNames = toolNames.filter((name) => !specialToolNames.has(name));
const allowedNonSpecialToolNames = requestedNonSpecialToolNames.filter((name) => {
if (name !== Tools.execute_code) {
return true;
}
const allowed = codeExecutionEnabled && toolRegistry?.has(Tools.execute_code) === true;
if (!allowed) {
logger.warn(
`[loadToolsForExecution] Skipping unregistered or unauthorized ${Tools.execute_code}. ` +
`User: ${req.user.id} | Agent: ${agent?.id ?? 'unknown'}`,
);
}
return allowed;
});
const allToolNamesToLoad = isPTC
? [...new Set([...allowedNonSpecialToolNames, ...ptcOrchestratedToolNames])]
: allowedNonSpecialToolNames;
const actionToolNames = [];
const regularToolNames = [];
for (const name of allToolNamesToLoad) {
(isActionTool(name) ? actionToolNames : regularToolNames).push(name);
}
if (regularToolNames.length > 0) {
const includesWebSearch = regularToolNames.includes(Tools.web_search);
const webSearchCallbacks = includesWebSearch
? createOnSearchResults(res, streamId, jobCreatedAt)
: undefined;
const { loadedTools } = await loadTools({
agent,
signal,
userMCPAuthMap,
functions: true,
tools: regularToolNames,
user: req.user.id,
options: {
req,
res,
requestBody: runtimeRequestBody,
agentResourceType,
jobCreatedAt,
tool_resources,
processFileURL,
uploadImageBuffer,
returnMetadata: true,
mcpAvailableTools,
/** Initialization's COMPLETE audit snapshot — reused so a transient
* registry failure at execution can't fail-closed a tool the same
* turn already advertised. */
accessibleMcpServerNames,
requestScopedConnections: mcpRequestScopedConnections,
[Tools.web_search]: webSearchCallbacks,
},
webSearch: appConfig?.webSearch,
fileStrategy: appConfig?.fileStrategy,
imageOutputType: appConfig?.imageOutputType,
});
if (loadedTools) {
allLoadedTools.push(...loadedTools);
}
}
if (actionToolNames.length > 0 && agent && actionsEnabled) {
const actionTools = await loadActionToolsForExecution({
req,
res,
agent,
appConfig,
streamId,
jobCreatedAt,
actionToolNames,
preparedActionSnapshot,
});
allLoadedTools.push(...actionTools);
} else if (actionToolNames.length > 0 && agent && !actionsEnabled) {
logger.warn(
`[loadToolsForExecution] Capability "${AgentCapabilities.actions}" disabled. ` +
`Skipping action tool execution. User: ${req.user.id} | Agent: ${agent.id} | Tools: ${actionToolNames.join(', ')}`,
);
}
if (isPTC && allLoadedTools.length > 0) {
const ptcToolMap = new Map();
for (const tool of allLoadedTools) {
if (
tool.name &&
tool.name !== AgentConstants.PROGRAMMATIC_TOOL_CALLING &&
tool.name !== AgentConstants.BASH_PROGRAMMATIC_TOOL_CALLING &&
(toolRegistry.get(tool.name)?.allowed_callers ?? ['direct']).includes('code_execution') &&
(activeCodeExecutionToolNames == null || activeCodeExecutionToolNames.has(tool.name))
) {
ptcToolMap.set(tool.name, tool);
}
}
configurable.ptcToolMap = ptcToolMap;
}
return {
configurable,
loadedTools: allLoadedTools,
};
}
/**
* Loads action tools for event-driven execution.
* @param {Object} params
* @param {ServerRequest} params.req - The request object
* @param {ServerResponse} params.res - The response object
* @param {Object} params.agent - The agent object
* @param {Object} params.appConfig - App configuration
* @param {string|null} params.streamId - Stream ID
* @param {number} [params.jobCreatedAt] - The generation epoch that owns emitted tool events
* @param {string[]} params.actionToolNames - Action tool names to load
* @param {{storedActions: Array, actionSets: Array}} params.preparedActionSnapshot - Pre-inspected action snapshot
* @returns {Promise<Array>} Loaded action tools
*/
async function loadActionToolsForExecution({
req,
res,
agent,
appConfig,
streamId,
jobCreatedAt,
actionToolNames,
preparedActionSnapshot,
}) {
const loadedActionTools = [];
const { storedActions, actionSets } = preparedActionSnapshot ?? {
storedActions: [],
actionSets: [],
};
if (storedActions.length === 0) {
return loadedActionTools;
}
// See registerActionTools for the key-shape rationale.
const toolToAction = new Map();
const allowedDomains = appConfig?.actions?.allowedDomains;
const allowedAddresses = appConfig?.actions?.allowedAddresses;
for (let index = 0; index < actionSets.length; index++) {
const action = actionSets[index];
const storedAction = storedActions[index];
const domain = await domainParser(action.metadata.domain, true);
const normalizedDomain = domain.replace(domainSeparatorRegex, '_');
const legacyDomain = legacyDomainEncode(action.metadata.domain);
const legacyNormalized = legacyDomain.replace(domainSeparatorRegex, '_');
const isDomainAllowed = await isActionDomainAllowed(
action.metadata.domain,
allowedDomains,
allowedAddresses,
);
if (!isDomainAllowed) {
logger.warn(
`[Actions] Domain "${action.metadata.domain}" not in allowedDomains. ` +
`Add it to librechat.yaml actions.allowedDomains to enable this action.`,
);
continue;
}
const validationResult = validateAndParseOpenAPISpec(action.metadata.raw_spec);
if (!validationResult.spec || !validationResult.serverUrl) {
logger.warn(`[Actions] Invalid OpenAPI spec for domain: ${domain}`);
continue;
}
const domainValidation = validateActionDomain(
action.metadata.domain,
validationResult.serverUrl,
);
if (!domainValidation.isValid) {
logger.error(`Domain mismatch in stored action: ${domainValidation.message}`, {
userId: req.user.id,
agent_id: agent.id,
action_id: action.action_id,
});
continue;
}
const encrypted = {
oauth_client_id: storedAction.metadata.oauth_client_id,
oauth_client_secret: storedAction.metadata.oauth_client_secret,
};
const { requestBuilders, functionSignatures, zodSchemas } = openapiToFunction(
validationResult.spec,
true,
);
registerActionTools({
toolToAction,
functionSignatures,
normalizedDomain,
legacyNormalized,
makeEntry: (sig) => ({
action,
requestBuilder: requestBuilders[sig.name],
zodSchema: zodSchemas[sig.name],
functionSignature: sig,
encrypted,
}),
});
}
for (const toolName of actionToolNames) {
const entry = toolToAction.get(normalizeActionToolName(toolName));
if (!entry) {
continue;
}
const { action, encrypted, zodSchema, requestBuilder, functionSignature } = entry;
const tool = await createActionTool({
userId: req.user.id,
res,
action,
streamId,
jobCreatedAt,
zodSchema,
encrypted,
requestBuilder,
name: toolName,
description: functionSignature.description,
useSSRFProtection: !Array.isArray(allowedDomains) || allowedDomains.length === 0,
allowedAddresses,
});
if (!tool) {
logger.warn(`[Actions] Failed to create action tool: ${toolName}`);
continue;
}
loadedActionTools.push(tool);
}
return loadedActionTools;
}
module.exports = {
loadTools,
isBuiltInTool,
getToolkitKey,
loadAgentTools,
loadToolsForExecution,
processRequiredActions,
resolveAgentCapabilities,
isFatalAgentInitializationError,
isExpectedMCPToolsUnavailableError,
/** Re-exported for controllers that already depend on (and mock) this
* module, avoiding a fresh heavy `services/MCP` require chain there. */
getAccessibleMcpServerNames,
};