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d1573a8493
* 🔒 fix: Validate MCP OAuth Protected Resource Metadata binding (GHSA-gvpj-vm2f-2m23) RFC 9728 §3.3/§7.3 requires clients to verify that the `resource` identifier advertised by an OAuth Protected Resource Metadata document matches the URL used to fetch it. Without this check, a malicious MCP server can serve metadata pointing at a legitimate server's `authorization_servers`, causing LibreChat to obtain an access token for the real server and send it to the attacker in subsequent API calls. Validation happens at discovery time so the entire metadata document is discarded on mismatch — `authorization_servers` on a spoofed document is equally untrustworthy and is the primary theft vector in the PoC. Uses the MCP SDK's own `checkResourceAllowed` (origin + path-prefix) for semantic parity with `selectResourceURL`, a SDK code path LibreChat bypasses. This is looser than RFC-strict equality (handles common cases like `/mcp/sse` server vs `/mcp` advertised resource, or trailing-slash normalization) while still rejecting cross-origin spoofs and same-origin sibling-path confusion. * 🛡️ fix: Re-validate Resource Binding at MCP OAuth Token Exchange Adds a defense-in-depth re-assertion of the RFC 9728 §3.3 resource/server binding inside `completeOAuthFlow`. Flows have a 10-minute TTL, so a flow initiated under pre-fix (vulnerable) code could still be in-flight at upgrade time carrying unvalidated resource metadata. Re-checking here closes that window without requiring operators to flush flow state on deploy. Also guards against future regressions that might re-introduce unvalidated paths into the flow-metadata pipeline (GHSA-gvpj-vm2f-2m23). * ✅ test: Address Review Findings on MCP OAuth Resource Validation Follow-up to GHSA-gvpj-vm2f-2m23 fix. Resolves three reviewer findings: - Assert `failFlow` is called when `completeOAuthFlow` rejects at re-validation — locks in the "no stuck PENDING entry" guarantee that the catch block already provides in production code. - Update the "no resource metadata" warning in `initiateOAuthFlow`: post-fix, that branch is only reachable when PRM discovery returned nothing (404, network error, server without RFC 9728). A document with a missing `resource` field now throws earlier in `assertResourceBoundToServer`, so the old "missing 'resource' property" phrasing described a case that can no longer reach this branch. - Add a test for an unparseable `resource` string triggering the error-wrapping path in `assertResourceBoundToServer` (verifies the wrapper surfaces a descriptive message instead of leaking a raw `TypeError: Invalid URL` from the SDK's `new URL()` call). |
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| admin | ||
| agents | ||
| apiKeys | ||
| app | ||
| auth | ||
| cache | ||
| cdn | ||
| cluster | ||
| crypto | ||
| db | ||
| endpoints | ||
| files | ||
| flow | ||
| mcp | ||
| memory | ||
| middleware | ||
| oauth | ||
| prompts | ||
| storage | ||
| stream | ||
| tools | ||
| types | ||
| utils | ||
| web | ||
| index.ts | ||