LibreChat/api/app/clients/tools/util/handleTools.js
Danny Avila 6b5cf0a231
🏝️ fix: Apply the No-Workspace Decision Wherever an Agent's Code Route Resolves (#16798)
* 🏝️ fix: Apply the No-Workspace Decision Wherever an Agent's Code Route Resolves

A conversation set to run without attached workspaces failed mid-turn with
"Choose an attached workspace before using this agent." when its agent's
default machine was attached and the turn loaded a skill or another tool at
execution time. Request-start initialization honoured the decision, but the
execution-time tool loader re-resolved the agent's attached default and then
demanded a workspace selection the conversation intentionally never made.

The per-agent code rule now lives in one typed function,
resolveAgentCodeExecution (packages/api/src/code/agent.ts): it applies the
conversation's no-workspace opt-out, the run-code grant, the stateful
capability and the stateful environment policy, then resolves the base route.
Request-start initialization, lazy subagent metadata and graph members, the
execution-time and definition tool loaders, and the legacy execute_code
loader all go through it, so an opted-out agent lands on the managed default
route with no code tools at every site. Per-call subagent machine choices
offer and accept no attached machine in such a conversation, and a source
invariant test keeps new resolver call sites on the shared rule.

* fix: Pass the Implicit Stateful Route Rollout Into the Shared Code Rule

The per-agent code rule read the implicit stateful route rollout from the environment itself. It now takes it as a parameter, and the request boundaries (initializeAgent and withRequestCodeInputs) resolve it from the deployment configuration, so the rule stays a pure function of its inputs.

* fix: Carry the Initializer's Code Opt-Out Into Tool Definition Loading

initializeAgent hands the tool loaders a partial agent record (id, tools, provider, model) together with the code route it already resolved. Without the agent's route fields the definition loaders could not see a no-workspace opt-out and recomputed code execution as enabled, so tool classification could advertise the programmatic bash tool that execution then refuses. initializeAgent now passes attachedEnvironmentOptOut through every tool loader, and the shared rule keeps an opt-out its caller already decided.
2026-10-06 07:40:42 -04:00

715 lines
25 KiB
JavaScript

const { logger, getTenantId } = require('@librechat/data-schemas');
const { Calculator, createSearchTool, createCodeExecutionTool } = require('@librechat/agents');
const {
checkAccess,
createGitHubCompareTool,
getProxyDispatcher,
toolkitParent,
toolRolePermissions,
checkToolRolePermission,
createSafeUser,
loadMCPTools,
createAuthIdentityContext,
selectMCPUpstreamTokenProvider,
mcpToolPattern,
loadWebSearchAuth,
splitMCPToolKey,
buildServerNameAliases,
findShadowedServerNames,
isNormalizationSensitiveName,
buildInlineMemoryTool,
getCodeApiAuthHeaders,
buildImageToolContext,
SET_MEMORY_TOOL_NAME,
buildWebSearchContext,
DELETE_MEMORY_TOOL_NAME,
createAskUserQuestionTool,
ASK_USER_QUESTION_TOOL_NAME,
resolveWebSearchSSRFAgents,
buildWebSearchDynamicContext,
codeExecutionAuthHeaders,
getCodeFileLocation,
withRequestCodeInputs,
resolveAgentCodeExecution,
resolveMCPClientCapabilityProfile,
} = require('@librechat/api');
const {
AuthType,
Tools,
Constants,
Permissions,
EToolResources,
PermissionTypes,
AgentCapabilities,
resolveMCPAppsPolicy,
} = require('librechat-data-provider');
const {
availableTools,
manifestToolMap,
// Basic Tools
GoogleSearchAPI,
// Structured Tools
DALLE3,
FluxAPI,
OpenWeather,
StructuredSD,
StructuredACS,
TraversaalSearch,
StructuredWolfram,
TavilySearchResults,
createGeminiImageTool,
createOpenAIImageTools,
} = require('../');
const {
createMCPTool,
createMCPTools,
createMCPPermissionContext,
resolveMcpServerContext,
resolveCollisionAuditNames,
} = require('~/server/services/MCP');
const { getMCPRequestContext } = require('~/server/services/MCPRequestContext');
const { createOpenIDSessionTokenProvider } = require('~/server/services/OpenIDSessionRefresh');
const { createFileSearchTool, primeFiles: primeSearchFiles } = require('./fileSearch');
const { primeFiles: primeCodeFiles } = require('~/server/services/Files/Code/process');
const { getUserPluginAuthValue } = require('~/server/services/PluginService');
const { loadAuthValues } = require('~/server/services/Tools/credentials');
const { getMCPServerTools, checkCapability } = require('~/server/services/Config');
const { getMCPServersRegistry } = require('~/config');
const { getRoleByName, setMemory, deleteMemory, getFormattedMemories } = require('~/models');
/**
* Validates the availability and authentication of tools for a user based on environment variables or user-specific plugin authentication values.
* Tools without required authentication or with valid authentication are considered valid.
*
* @param {Object} user The user object for whom to validate tool access.
* @param {Array<string>} tools An array of tool identifiers to validate. Defaults to an empty array.
* @returns {Promise<Array<string>>} A promise that resolves to an array of valid tool identifiers.
*/
const validateTools = async (user, tools = []) => {
try {
const validToolsSet = new Set(tools);
const availableToolsToValidate = availableTools.filter((tool) =>
validToolsSet.has(tool.pluginKey),
);
/**
* Validates the credentials for a given auth field or set of alternate auth fields for a tool.
* If valid admin or user authentication is found, the function returns early. Otherwise, it removes the tool from the set of valid tools.
*
* @param {string} authField The authentication field or fields (separated by "||" for alternates) to validate.
* @param {string} toolName The identifier of the tool being validated.
*/
const validateCredentials = async (authField, toolName) => {
const fields = authField.split('||');
for (const field of fields) {
const adminAuth = process.env[field];
if (adminAuth && adminAuth.length > 0) {
return;
}
let userAuth = null;
try {
userAuth = await getUserPluginAuthValue(user, field);
} catch (err) {
if (field === fields[fields.length - 1] && !userAuth) {
throw err;
}
}
if (userAuth && userAuth.length > 0) {
return;
}
}
validToolsSet.delete(toolName);
};
for (const tool of availableToolsToValidate) {
if (!tool.authConfig || tool.authConfig.length === 0) {
continue;
}
for (const auth of tool.authConfig) {
await validateCredentials(auth.authField, tool.pluginKey);
}
}
return Array.from(validToolsSet.values());
} catch (err) {
logger.error('[validateTools] There was a problem validating tools', err);
throw new Error(err);
}
};
/** @typedef {typeof import('@librechat/agents/langchain/tools').Tool} ToolConstructor */
/** @typedef {import('@librechat/agents/langchain/tools').Tool} Tool */
/**
* Initializes a tool with authentication values for the given user, supporting alternate authentication fields.
* Authentication fields can have alternates separated by "||", and the first defined variable will be used.
*
* @param {string} userId The user ID for which the tool is being loaded.
* @param {Array<string>} authFields Array of strings representing the authentication fields. Supports alternate fields delimited by "||".
* @param {ToolConstructor} ToolConstructor The constructor function for the tool to be initialized.
* @param {Object} options Optional parameters to be passed to the tool constructor alongside authentication values.
* @returns {() => Promise<Tool>} An Async function that, when called, asynchronously initializes and returns an instance of the tool with authentication.
*/
const loadToolWithAuth = (userId, authFields, ToolConstructor, options = {}) => {
return async function () {
const authValues = await loadAuthValues({ userId, authFields });
const userProvidedAuthFields = new Set(
authFields
.flatMap((authField) => authField.split('||'))
.filter((authField) => {
const value = process.env[authField];
return !value || value.trim() === '' || value === AuthType.USER_PROVIDED;
}),
);
return new ToolConstructor({
...options,
...authValues,
userId,
userProvidedAuthFields,
});
};
};
/**
* @param {string} toolKey
* @returns {Array<string>}
*/
const getAuthFields = (toolKey) => {
return manifestToolMap[toolKey]?.authConfig.map((auth) => auth.authField) ?? [];
};
/**
*
* @param {object} params
* @param {string} params.user
* @param {Record<string, Record<string, string>>} [object.userMCPAuthMap]
* @param {AbortSignal} [object.signal]
* @param {Pick<Agent, 'id' | 'provider' | 'model'>} [params.agent]
* @param {string} [params.model]
* @param {EModelEndpoint} [params.endpoint]
* @param {LoadToolOptions} [params.options]
* @param {boolean} [params.useSpecs]
* @param {Array<string>} params.tools
* @param {boolean} [params.functions]
* @param {boolean} [params.returnMap]
* @param {AppConfig['webSearch']} [params.webSearch]
* @param {AppConfig['fileStrategy']} [params.fileStrategy]
* @param {AppConfig['imageOutputType']} [params.imageOutputType]
* @returns {Promise<{ loadedTools: Tool[], toolContextMap: Object<string, any>, dynamicToolContextMap?: Object<string, any> } | Record<string,Tool>>}
*/
const loadTools = async ({
user,
agent,
model,
signal,
endpoint,
userMCPAuthMap,
tools = [],
options = {},
functions = true,
returnMap = false,
webSearch,
fileStrategy,
imageOutputType,
}) => {
const toolConstructors = {
flux: FluxAPI,
calculator: Calculator,
google: GoogleSearchAPI,
open_weather: OpenWeather,
wolfram: StructuredWolfram,
'stable-diffusion': StructuredSD,
'azure-ai-search': StructuredACS,
traversaal_search: TraversaalSearch,
tavily_search_results_json: TavilySearchResults,
};
const customConstructors = {
github_compare: () =>
createGitHubCompareTool({
config: options.req?.config?.githubCompare,
toolRegistry: options.toolRegistry,
fetch,
getDispatcher: getProxyDispatcher,
}),
image_gen_oai: async (_toolContextMap, dynamicToolContextMap) => {
const authFields = getAuthFields('image_gen_oai');
const authValues = await loadAuthValues({ userId: user, authFields });
const imageFiles = options.tool_resources?.[EToolResources.image_edit]?.files ?? [];
const toolContext = buildImageToolContext({
imageFiles,
toolName: `${EToolResources.image_edit}_oai`,
contextDescription: 'image editing',
});
if (toolContext) {
dynamicToolContextMap.image_edit_oai = toolContext;
}
return createOpenAIImageTools({
...authValues,
isAgent: !!agent,
req: options.req,
imageOutputType,
fileStrategy,
imageFiles,
});
},
gemini_image_gen: async (_toolContextMap, dynamicToolContextMap) => {
const authFields = getAuthFields('gemini_image_gen');
const authValues = await loadAuthValues({ userId: user, authFields, throwError: false });
const imageFiles = options.tool_resources?.[EToolResources.image_edit]?.files ?? [];
const toolContext = buildImageToolContext({
imageFiles,
toolName: 'gemini_image_gen',
contextDescription: 'image context',
});
if (toolContext) {
dynamicToolContextMap.gemini_image_gen = toolContext;
}
return createGeminiImageTool({
...authValues,
isAgent: !!agent,
req: options.req,
imageFiles,
userId: user,
fileStrategy,
});
},
};
const requestedTools = {};
const hasMCPTools = tools.some((toolName) => toolName && mcpToolPattern.test(toolName));
const mcpPermissionContext =
options.mcpPermissionContext ?? createMCPPermissionContext(options.req);
const canUseMCP = hasMCPTools
? await mcpPermissionContext.canUseServers(options.req?.user)
: true;
let loggedMCPDenied = false;
if (functions === true) {
toolConstructors.dalle = DALLE3;
}
/** @type {ImageGenOptions} */
const imageGenOptions = {
isAgent: !!agent,
req: options.req,
fileStrategy,
processFileURL: options.processFileURL,
returnMetadata: options.returnMetadata,
uploadImageBuffer: options.uploadImageBuffer,
};
const toolOptions = {
flux: imageGenOptions,
dalle: imageGenOptions,
'stable-diffusion': imageGenOptions,
gemini_image_gen: imageGenOptions,
};
/** @type {Record<string, string>} */
const toolContextMap = {};
/** @type {Record<string, string>} */
const dynamicToolContextMap = {};
/**
* @type {import('@librechat/agents').CodeEnvFile[] | undefined}
* Captured by the `execute_code` factory when files are primed. Surfaced
* out of `loadTools` so client.js can seed `Graph.sessions[EXECUTE_CODE]`
* before run start — without that seed, the first `execute_code` /
* `bash_tool` call lands with empty `_injected_files` and the sandbox
* can't see the prior turn's generated artifacts.
*/
let primedCodeFiles;
const requestedMCPTools = {};
/** Resolve config-source servers for the current user/tenant context */
let configServers;
/** All configured names, in the normalized form tool keys carry */
let mcpServerNames = [];
/** All configured names in raw config form, for normalized→raw resolution */
let mcpRawServerNames = [];
if (hasMCPTools && canUseMCP) {
/** Reuse the caller's context when it already resolved one, so the chat
* startup path reads the request app config once. */
({
configServers,
serverNames: mcpServerNames,
rawServerNames: mcpRawServerNames = [],
} = options.mcpServerContext ?? (await resolveMcpServerContext(options.req)));
}
/**
* Collision guards need the FULL accessible set (operator + user DB): a
* cross-tier collision (DB `foo` vs operator `foo!`) is invisible to the
* operator-config names alone. The caller's heal may have already fetched
* it (threaded via `mcpServerContext.accessibleServerNames`); otherwise it
* is fetched ONLY when a configured name actually needs normalizing. When
* the full set was needed but unavailable, normalization-sensitive
* references FAIL CLOSED below rather than auditing operator names alone.
*/
const collisionAudit = hasMCPTools
? await resolveCollisionAuditNames({
rawServerNames: mcpRawServerNames,
/** Load-time callers thread the audit inside `mcpServerContext`;
* deferred execution threads initialization's snapshot as a bare
* `accessibleMcpServerNames` (it resolves no server context). */
accessibleServerNames:
options.mcpServerContext?.accessibleServerNames ?? options.accessibleMcpServerNames,
userId: user,
role: options.req?.user?.role,
})
: { names: [], complete: true };
const serverNameAliases = buildServerNameAliases(collisionAudit.names);
const shadowedServers = findShadowedServerNames(collisionAudit.names);
for (const tool of tools) {
/** `loadTools` is the shared boundary for every runtime that equips these
* tools — agents, and the Assistants required-action flow via
* `processRequiredActions`, which never passes through the agent capability
* filter. Gate here so a denied role cannot reach the sandbox or the search
* index down any of them. The check is request-cached, so the agent path
* that already resolved this grant pays nothing for the second look. */
const rolePermission = toolRolePermissions[tool];
if (rolePermission != null && options.req?.user != null) {
const allowed = await checkToolRolePermission({
req: options.req,
user: options.req.user,
permissionType: rolePermission,
getRoleByName,
context: 'handleTools',
});
if (!allowed) {
continue;
}
}
if (tool === Tools.execute_code) {
requestedTools[tool] = async () => {
const codeExecutionContext =
options.codeExecutionContext ??
resolveAgentCodeExecution(
withRequestCodeInputs({
req: options.req ?? {},
agent,
codeExecutionAvailable: true,
statefulSessionsAvailable:
agent?.stateful_code_sessions === true &&
(await checkCapability(options.req, AgentCapabilities.stateful_code_sessions)),
userId: user,
conversationId: options.req?.body?.conversationId,
}),
).context;
const { files, toolContext } = await primeCodeFiles({
...options,
signal,
agentId: agent?.id,
codeApiBaseUrl: codeExecutionContext.baseUrl,
executionProfile: codeExecutionContext.executionProfile,
executionRouteKey: codeExecutionContext.executionRouteKey,
bridgeWorkerId: codeExecutionContext.bridgeWorkerId,
codeFileLocation: getCodeFileLocation(codeExecutionContext),
});
if (toolContext) {
dynamicToolContextMap[tool] = toolContext;
}
if (files?.length) {
primedCodeFiles = files;
}
return createCodeExecutionTool({
user_id: user,
files,
authHeaders: () =>
codeExecutionAuthHeaders(
(bridgeWorkerId) => getCodeApiAuthHeaders(options.req, bridgeWorkerId),
codeExecutionContext,
),
...codeExecutionContext,
});
};
continue;
} else if (tool === Tools.file_search) {
requestedTools[tool] = async () => {
const { files, toolContext } = await primeSearchFiles({
...options,
agentId: agent?.id,
});
if (toolContext) {
dynamicToolContextMap[tool] = toolContext;
}
/** @type {boolean | undefined} Check if user has FILE_CITATIONS permission */
let fileCitations;
if (fileCitations == null && options.req?.user != null) {
try {
fileCitations = await checkAccess({
user: options.req.user,
permissionType: PermissionTypes.FILE_CITATIONS,
permissions: [Permissions.USE],
getRoleByName,
});
} catch (error) {
logger.error('[handleTools] FILE_CITATIONS permission check failed:', error);
fileCitations = false;
}
}
return createFileSearchTool({
appConfig: options.req.config,
userId: user,
files,
entity_id: agent?.id,
fileCitations,
});
};
continue;
} else if (tool === Tools.web_search) {
const result = await loadWebSearchAuth({
userId: user,
loadAuthValues,
webSearchConfig: webSearch,
});
if (!result.authenticated) {
logger.warn('[handleTools] Skipping web search because authentication is incomplete.');
continue;
}
const { onSearchResults, onGetHighlights } = options?.[Tools.web_search] ?? {};
const { httpAgent, httpsAgent } = resolveWebSearchSSRFAgents(
result.authResult,
webSearch?.allowedAddresses,
);
requestedTools[tool] = async () => {
toolContextMap[tool] = buildWebSearchContext();
dynamicToolContextMap[tool] = buildWebSearchDynamicContext(options.req?.turnStartedAt);
return createSearchTool({
...result.authResult,
httpAgent,
httpsAgent,
onSearchResults,
onGetHighlights,
logger,
});
};
continue;
} else if (tool === ASK_USER_QUESTION_TOOL_NAME) {
requestedTools[tool] = async () => createAskUserQuestionTool();
continue;
} else if (tool === SET_MEMORY_TOOL_NAME || tool === DELETE_MEMORY_TOOL_NAME) {
requestedTools[tool] = () =>
buildInlineMemoryTool({
toolName: tool,
req: options.req,
agent,
userId: user,
memoryMethods: { setMemory, deleteMemory, getFormattedMemories },
getRoleByName,
});
continue;
} else if (tool && mcpToolPattern.test(tool)) {
if (!canUseMCP) {
if (!loggedMCPDenied) {
logger.warn(
`[handleTools] User ${options.req?.user?.id} lacks MCP server use permission`,
);
loggedMCPDenied = true;
}
continue;
}
/** Keys carry the normalized server name (raw in pre-normalization data),
* so both spellings resolve the boundary; everything downstream — the
* registry, config maps, cache, and auth rows — is keyed by the RAW name. */
const [toolName, parsedServerName] = splitMCPToolKey(tool, [
...mcpServerNames,
...serverNameAliases.values(),
]);
if (toolName === Constants.mcp_server) {
/** Placeholder used for UI purposes */
continue;
}
/** DIRECT-FIRST: a server resolving under the parsed name as-is wins
* (a user-DB server may be named exactly like an operator server's
* normalized form); only when nothing resolves is the parsed name
* treated as a normalized spelling of a raw config name. */
let serverName = parsedServerName;
let serverConfig = serverName
? await getMCPServersRegistry().getServerConfig(serverName, user, configServers)
: null;
if (!serverConfig && serverName != null) {
const aliasedName = serverNameAliases.get(serverName);
if (aliasedName != null && aliasedName !== serverName) {
serverConfig = await getMCPServersRegistry().getServerConfig(
aliasedName,
user,
configServers,
);
if (serverConfig) {
serverName = aliasedName;
}
}
}
/** A shadowed server's instances (wildcard-expanded or single) get the
* SAME normalized names as the winning server's — in-run dispatch
* could execute either. Fail closed at execution too, since legacy
* raw keys and `mcp_all` tokens bypass catalog filtering. Under an
* incomplete audit, any normalization-sensitive reference is
* potentially shadowed and fails closed the same way. */
if (
serverName != null &&
(shadowedServers.has(serverName) ||
(!collisionAudit.complete && isNormalizationSensitiveName(serverName, mcpRawServerNames)))
) {
logger.warn(
`[handleTools] Skipping MCP tool "${tool}": server "${serverName}" is shadowed by a name collision (or the collision audit is unavailable); rename one server or retry.`,
);
continue;
}
if (!serverConfig) {
logger.warn(
`MCP server "${serverName}" for "${toolName}" tool is not configured${agent?.id != null && agent.id ? ` but attached to "${agent.id}"` : ''}`,
);
continue;
}
if (toolName === Constants.mcp_all) {
requestedMCPTools[serverName] = [
{
type: 'all',
serverName,
config: serverConfig,
},
];
continue;
}
requestedMCPTools[serverName] = requestedMCPTools[serverName] || [];
requestedMCPTools[serverName].push({
type: 'single',
toolKey: tool,
serverName,
config: serverConfig,
});
continue;
}
const toolKey = customConstructors[tool] ? tool : toolkitParent[tool];
if (toolKey && customConstructors[toolKey]) {
if (!requestedTools[toolKey]) {
let cached;
requestedTools[toolKey] = async () => {
cached ??= customConstructors[toolKey](toolContextMap, dynamicToolContextMap);
return cached;
};
}
requestedTools[tool] = requestedTools[toolKey];
continue;
}
if (toolConstructors[tool]) {
const options = toolOptions[tool] || {};
const toolInstance = loadToolWithAuth(
user,
getAuthFields(tool),
toolConstructors[tool],
options,
);
requestedTools[tool] = toolInstance;
continue;
}
}
if (returnMap) {
return requestedTools;
}
const toolPromises = [];
for (const tool of tools) {
const validTool = requestedTools[tool];
if (validTool) {
toolPromises.push(
validTool().catch((error) => {
logger.error(`Error loading tool ${tool}:`, error);
return null;
}),
);
}
}
const loadedTools = (await Promise.all(toolPromises)).flatMap((plugin) => plugin || []);
const safeUser = createSafeUser(options.req?.user);
const admittedAppConfig = options.req?.config;
const admittedMCPAppsPolicy = resolveMCPAppsPolicy(
admittedAppConfig?.mcpSettings?.apps,
admittedAppConfig?.mcpAppSandbox,
admittedAppConfig?.mcpAppSandbox?.maxPersistedAppBytes,
admittedAppConfig?.mcpAppSandbox?.maxAdmissionRequestsPerMinute,
admittedAppConfig?.mcpAppSandbox?.url,
admittedAppConfig?.mcpAppSandbox?.maxActiveViews,
admittedAppConfig?.mcpAppSandbox?.maxActionPreviewChars,
admittedAppConfig?.mcpAppSandbox?.operationLimits,
);
const capabilityProfile = resolveMCPClientCapabilityProfile(admittedMCPAppsPolicy);
const requestScopedConnections =
options.requestScopedConnections ?? getMCPRequestContext(options.req, options.res);
/**
* Build the OBO upstream-token closure once at the request boundary (where
* `req`/`res` are in scope) and thread the function into MCP handling, so the
* MCP layer never receives the raw Express request. The closure reads/refreshes
* the live `req.session.openidTokens` at tool-call time and mirrors rotations
* to the `refreshToken` cookie when the response is still writable.
*/
const oboIdentityContext = createAuthIdentityContext({
user: options.req?.user,
tenantId: getTenantId(),
});
const upstreamTokenProviderResolver = options.upstreamTokenProviderResolver;
const upstreamTokenProvider = selectMCPUpstreamTokenProvider({
upstreamTokenProvider: options.upstreamTokenProvider,
upstreamTokenProviderResolver,
createSessionProvider: () =>
createOpenIDSessionTokenProvider({
req: options.req,
res: options.res,
user: options.req?.user,
identityContext: oboIdentityContext,
tokenPreference: 'access_token',
}),
});
loadedTools.push(
...(await loadMCPTools({
userId: user,
requestedTools: requestedMCPTools,
availableTools: options.mcpAvailableTools,
createTools: createMCPTools,
createTool: createMCPTool,
getAvailableTools: (userId, serverName, config) =>
getMCPServerTools(userId, serverName, config, capabilityProfile),
context: {
agentId: agent?.id,
mcpPermissionContext,
signal,
user: safeUser,
userMCPAuthMap,
mcpApps: admittedMCPAppsPolicy,
configServers,
requestBody: options.requestBody ?? options.req?.body,
requestScopedConnections,
res: options.res,
upstreamTokenProvider,
upstreamTokenProviderResolver,
oboIdentityContext,
streamId: options.req?._resumableStreamId || null,
jobCreatedAt: options.jobCreatedAt,
model: agent?.model ?? model,
provider: agent?.provider ?? endpoint,
},
})),
);
return { loadedTools, toolContextMap, dynamicToolContextMap, primedCodeFiles };
};
module.exports = {
loadToolWithAuth,
validateTools,
loadTools,
};