LibreChat/api/server/services/AuthService.js
J.C. Bartle 8b5cea29bc 🛠️ fix: Bind OpenID session tokens to authenticated identity
Stamp OpenID session token state with the LibreChat user id, OpenID subject,
tenant id, and normalized issuer when tokens are stored.

Fail closed before OBO inline token reuse/refresh when the session token
identity does not match the current authenticated identity, preventing a stale
or mixed Express session from supplying another user's upstream assertion.

Also validate the normal /api/auth/refresh session-token reuse shortcut against
the signed marker-cookie user before returning cached session tokens.

Note: sessions created before this change carry no identity stamp and are
treated as a mismatch. This is self-healing — the reuse path forces a full IdP
refresh (which re-stamps the session) and the OBO path throws, surfacing as a
one-time re-authentication for active OBO users at deploy time. The session
re-stamps within one session lifetime (SESSION_EXPIRY, default 15 min).
2026-06-28 17:53:46 -04:00

966 lines
30 KiB
JavaScript

const bcrypt = require('bcryptjs');
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
const { webcrypto } = require('node:crypto');
const {
logger,
getTenantId,
DEFAULT_SESSION_EXPIRY,
DEFAULT_REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRY,
} = require('@librechat/data-schemas');
const { ErrorTypes, SystemRoles, errorsToString } = require('librechat-data-provider');
const {
math,
isEnabled,
checkEmailConfig,
setCloudFrontCookies,
getCloudFrontConfig,
parseCloudFrontCookieScope,
CLOUDFRONT_SCOPE_COOKIE,
isEmailDomainAllowed,
shouldUseSecureCookie,
setRefreshTokenCookie,
setOpenIDMarkerCookies,
createOpenIDSessionIdentity,
resolveAppConfigForUser,
} = require('@librechat/api');
const {
findUser,
findToken,
createUser,
updateUser,
countUsers,
getUserById,
findSession,
createToken,
deleteTokens,
deleteSession,
createSession,
generateToken,
deleteUserById,
generateRefreshToken,
} = require('~/models');
const { registerSchema } = require('~/strategies/validators');
const { getAppConfig } = require('~/server/services/Config');
const { sendEmail } = require('~/server/utils');
const domains = {
client: process.env.DOMAIN_CLIENT,
server: process.env.DOMAIN_SERVER,
};
const AuthTokenTypes = Object.freeze({
EMAIL_VERIFICATION: 'email_verification',
PASSWORD_RESET: 'password_reset',
});
const latestAuthTokenOptions = Object.freeze({ sort: { createdAt: -1 } });
const genericVerificationMessage = 'Please check your email to verify your email address.';
const invalidEmailVerificationMessage = 'Invalid or expired email verification token';
const OPENID_SESSION_ID_TOKEN_EXPIRY_BUFFER_SECONDS = 30;
const findPasswordResetToken = async (userId) => {
const typedToken = await findToken(
{
userId,
type: AuthTokenTypes.PASSWORD_RESET,
},
latestAuthTokenOptions,
);
if (typedToken) {
return typedToken;
}
return await findToken(
{
userId,
email: null,
identifier: null,
type: null,
},
latestAuthTokenOptions,
);
};
const findEmailVerificationToken = async (user) => {
const typedToken = await findToken(
{
userId: user._id,
email: user.email,
type: AuthTokenTypes.EMAIL_VERIFICATION,
},
latestAuthTokenOptions,
);
if (typedToken) {
return typedToken;
}
return await findToken(
{
userId: user._id,
email: user.email,
identifier: null,
type: null,
},
latestAuthTokenOptions,
);
};
const deleteEmailVerificationTokens = (user) =>
Promise.all([
deleteTokens({
userId: user._id,
email: user.email,
type: AuthTokenTypes.EMAIL_VERIFICATION,
}),
deleteTokens({
userId: user._id,
email: user.email,
identifier: null,
type: null,
}),
]);
const getEmailVerificationTokenDeleteQuery = (emailVerificationToken) => {
if (!emailVerificationToken.identifier && !emailVerificationToken.type) {
return {
token: emailVerificationToken.token,
userId: emailVerificationToken.userId,
email: emailVerificationToken.email,
identifier: null,
type: null,
};
}
return {
token: emailVerificationToken.token,
type: AuthTokenTypes.EMAIL_VERIFICATION,
};
};
const getPasswordResetTokenDeleteQuery = (passwordResetToken) => {
if (!passwordResetToken.email && !passwordResetToken.type) {
return {
token: passwordResetToken.token,
email: null,
identifier: null,
type: null,
};
}
return {
token: passwordResetToken.token,
type: AuthTokenTypes.PASSWORD_RESET,
};
};
const getUnexpiredOpenIDSessionIdToken = (idToken) => {
if (!idToken) {
return;
}
const decoded = jwt.decode(idToken);
const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
if (
decoded &&
typeof decoded === 'object' &&
decoded.exp > now + OPENID_SESSION_ID_TOKEN_EXPIRY_BUFFER_SECONDS
) {
return idToken;
}
};
/**
* Logout user
*
* @param {ServerRequest} req
* @param {string} refreshToken
* @returns
*/
const logoutUser = async (req, refreshToken) => {
try {
const userId = req.user._id;
const session = await findSession({ userId: userId, refreshToken });
if (session) {
try {
await deleteSession({ sessionId: session._id });
} catch (deleteErr) {
logger.error('[logoutUser] Failed to delete session.', deleteErr);
return { status: 500, message: 'Failed to delete session.' };
}
}
try {
req.session.destroy();
} catch (destroyErr) {
logger.debug('[logoutUser] Failed to destroy session.', destroyErr);
}
return { status: 200, message: 'Logout successful' };
} catch (err) {
return { status: 500, message: err.message };
}
};
/**
* Creates Token and corresponding Hash for verification
* @returns {[string, string]}
*/
const createTokenHash = () => {
const token = Buffer.from(webcrypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32))).toString('hex');
const hash = bcrypt.hashSync(token, 10);
return [token, hash];
};
/**
* Send Verification Email
* @param {Partial<IUser>} user
* @returns {Promise<void>}
*/
const sendVerificationEmail = async (user) => {
const [verifyToken, hash] = createTokenHash();
const verificationLink = `${
domains.client
}/verify?token=${verifyToken}&email=${encodeURIComponent(user.email)}`;
await sendEmail({
email: user.email,
subject: 'Verify your email',
payload: {
appName: process.env.APP_TITLE || 'LibreChat',
name: user.name || user.username || user.email,
verificationLink: verificationLink,
year: new Date().getFullYear(),
},
template: 'verifyEmail.handlebars',
});
await createToken({
userId: user._id,
email: user.email,
type: AuthTokenTypes.EMAIL_VERIFICATION,
token: hash,
createdAt: Date.now(),
expiresIn: 900,
});
logger.info(`[sendVerificationEmail] Verification link issued. [Email: ${user.email}]`);
};
/**
* Verify Email
* @param {ServerRequest} req
*/
const verifyEmail = async (req) => {
const { email, token } = req.body;
if (typeof email !== 'string' || typeof token !== 'string' || !email || !token) {
logger.warn('[verifyEmail] [Invalid email verification request]');
return new Error(invalidEmailVerificationMessage);
}
let decodedEmail;
try {
decodedEmail = decodeURIComponent(email);
} catch {
logger.warn(`[verifyEmail] [Invalid email encoding] [Email: ${email}]`);
return new Error(invalidEmailVerificationMessage);
}
const user = await findUser({ email: decodedEmail }, 'email _id emailVerified');
if (!user) {
logger.warn(`[verifyEmail] [User not found] [Email: ${decodedEmail}]`);
return new Error(invalidEmailVerificationMessage);
}
const emailVerificationData = await findEmailVerificationToken(user);
if (!emailVerificationData) {
logger.warn(`[verifyEmail] [No email verification data found] [Email: ${decodedEmail}]`);
return new Error(invalidEmailVerificationMessage);
}
if (!emailVerificationData.token) {
logger.warn(
`[verifyEmail] [Email verification token data is invalid] [Email: ${decodedEmail}]`,
);
return new Error(invalidEmailVerificationMessage);
}
const tokenUserId = emailVerificationData.userId?.toString();
const userId = user._id?.toString();
if (!tokenUserId || tokenUserId !== userId) {
logger.warn(`[verifyEmail] [Email verification token user mismatch] [Email: ${decodedEmail}]`);
return new Error(invalidEmailVerificationMessage);
}
const isValid = bcrypt.compareSync(token, emailVerificationData.token);
if (!isValid) {
logger.warn(
`[verifyEmail] [Invalid or expired email verification token] [Email: ${decodedEmail}]`,
);
return new Error(invalidEmailVerificationMessage);
}
if (user.emailVerified) {
await deleteTokens(getEmailVerificationTokenDeleteQuery(emailVerificationData));
logger.info(`[verifyEmail] Email already verified [Email: ${decodedEmail}]`);
return { message: 'Email verification was successful', status: 'success' };
}
const updatedUser = await updateUser(emailVerificationData.userId, { emailVerified: true });
if (!updatedUser) {
logger.warn(`[verifyEmail] [User update failed] [Email: ${decodedEmail}]`);
return new Error(invalidEmailVerificationMessage);
}
await deleteTokens(getEmailVerificationTokenDeleteQuery(emailVerificationData));
logger.info(`[verifyEmail] Email verification successful [Email: ${decodedEmail}]`);
return { message: 'Email verification was successful', status: 'success' };
};
/**
* Register a new user.
* @param {IUser} user <email, password, name, username>
* @param {Partial<IUser>} [additionalData={}] Trusted server-provided fields, such as CLI overrides.
* @returns {Promise<{status: number, message: string, user?: IUser}>}
*/
const registerUser = async (user, additionalData = {}) => {
const result = registerSchema.safeParse(user);
if (!result.success) {
const errorMessage = errorsToString(result.error.errors);
logger.info(
'Route: register - Validation Error',
{ name: 'Request params:', value: user },
{ name: 'Validation error:', value: errorMessage },
);
return { status: 404, message: errorMessage };
}
const { email, password, name, username } = result.data;
const { provider, ...trustedAdditionalData } = additionalData ?? {};
let newUserId;
try {
const tenantId = getTenantId();
const appConfig = await getAppConfig(tenantId ? { tenantId } : {});
if (!isEmailDomainAllowed(email, appConfig?.registration?.allowedDomains)) {
const errorMessage =
'The email address provided cannot be used. Please use a different email address.';
logger.error(`[registerUser] [Registration not allowed] [Email: ${user.email}]`);
return { status: 403, message: errorMessage };
}
const existingUser = await findUser({ email }, 'email _id');
if (existingUser) {
logger.info(
'Register User - Email in use',
{ name: 'Request params:', value: user },
{ name: 'Existing user:', value: existingUser },
);
// Sleep for 1 second
await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 1000));
return { status: 200, message: genericVerificationMessage };
}
//determine if this is the first registered user (not counting anonymous_user)
const isFirstRegisteredUser = (await countUsers()) === 0;
const salt = bcrypt.genSaltSync(10);
const newUserData = {
provider: provider ?? 'local',
email,
username,
name,
avatar: null,
role: isFirstRegisteredUser ? SystemRoles.ADMIN : SystemRoles.USER,
password: bcrypt.hashSync(password, salt),
...trustedAdditionalData,
};
const emailEnabled = checkEmailConfig();
const disableTTL = isEnabled(process.env.ALLOW_UNVERIFIED_EMAIL_LOGIN);
const newUser = await createUser(newUserData, appConfig.balance, disableTTL, true);
newUserId = newUser._id;
if (emailEnabled && !newUser.emailVerified) {
await sendVerificationEmail({
_id: newUserId,
email,
name,
});
} else {
await updateUser(newUserId, { emailVerified: true });
}
return { status: 200, message: genericVerificationMessage };
} catch (err) {
logger.error('[registerUser] Error in registering user:', err);
if (newUserId) {
const result = await deleteUserById(newUserId);
logger.warn(
`[registerUser] [Email: ${email}] [Temporary User deleted: ${JSON.stringify(result)}]`,
);
}
return { status: 500, message: 'Something went wrong' };
}
};
/**
* Request password reset.
*
* Uses a two-phase domain check: fast-fail with the memory-cached base config
* (zero DB queries) to block globally denied domains before user lookup, then
* re-check with tenant-scoped config after user lookup so tenant-specific
* restrictions are enforced.
*
* Phase 1 (base check) returns an Error (HTTP 400) — this intentionally reveals
* that the domain is globally blocked, but fires before any DB lookup so it
* cannot confirm user existence. Phase 2 (tenant check) returns the generic
* success message (HTTP 200) to prevent user-enumeration via status codes.
*
* @param {ServerRequest} req
*/
const requestPasswordReset = async (req) => {
const { email } = req.body;
const baseConfig = await getAppConfig({ baseOnly: true });
if (!isEmailDomainAllowed(email, baseConfig?.registration?.allowedDomains)) {
logger.warn(
`[requestPasswordReset] Blocked - email domain not allowed [Email: ${email}] [IP: ${req.ip}]`,
);
const error = new Error(ErrorTypes.AUTH_FAILED);
error.code = ErrorTypes.AUTH_FAILED;
error.message = 'Email domain not allowed';
return error;
}
const user = await findUser({ email }, 'email _id role tenantId');
let appConfig = baseConfig;
if (user?.tenantId) {
try {
appConfig = await resolveAppConfigForUser(getAppConfig, user);
} catch (err) {
logger.error('[requestPasswordReset] Failed to resolve tenant config, using base:', err);
}
}
if (!isEmailDomainAllowed(email, appConfig?.registration?.allowedDomains)) {
logger.warn(
`[requestPasswordReset] Tenant config blocked domain [Email: ${email}] [IP: ${req.ip}]`,
);
return {
message: 'If an account with that email exists, a password reset link has been sent to it.',
};
}
const emailEnabled = checkEmailConfig();
logger.warn(`[requestPasswordReset] [Password reset request initiated] [Email: ${email}]`);
if (!user) {
logger.warn(`[requestPasswordReset] [No user found] [Email: ${email}] [IP: ${req.ip}]`);
return {
message: 'If an account with that email exists, a password reset link has been sent to it.',
};
}
await Promise.all([
deleteTokens({ userId: user._id, type: AuthTokenTypes.PASSWORD_RESET }),
deleteTokens({ userId: user._id, email: null, identifier: null, type: null }),
]);
const [resetToken, hash] = createTokenHash();
await createToken({
userId: user._id,
type: AuthTokenTypes.PASSWORD_RESET,
token: hash,
createdAt: Date.now(),
expiresIn: 900,
});
const link = `${domains.client}/reset-password?token=${resetToken}&userId=${user._id}`;
if (emailEnabled) {
await sendEmail({
email: user.email,
subject: 'Password Reset Request',
payload: {
appName: process.env.APP_TITLE || 'LibreChat',
name: user.name || user.username || user.email,
link: link,
year: new Date().getFullYear(),
},
template: 'requestPasswordReset.handlebars',
});
logger.info(
`[requestPasswordReset] Link emailed. [Email: ${email}] [ID: ${user._id}] [IP: ${req.ip}]`,
);
} else {
logger.info(
`[requestPasswordReset] Link issued. [Email: ${email}] [ID: ${user._id}] [IP: ${req.ip}]`,
);
return { link };
}
return {
message: 'If an account with that email exists, a password reset link has been sent to it.',
};
};
/**
* Reset Password
*
* @param {*} userId
* @param {String} token
* @param {String} password
* @returns
*/
const resetPassword = async (userId, token, password) => {
const passwordResetToken = await findPasswordResetToken(userId);
if (!passwordResetToken) {
return new Error('Invalid or expired password reset token');
}
const isValid = bcrypt.compareSync(token, passwordResetToken.token);
if (!isValid) {
return new Error('Invalid or expired password reset token');
}
const hash = bcrypt.hashSync(password, 10);
const user = await updateUser(userId, { password: hash });
if (checkEmailConfig()) {
await sendEmail({
email: user.email,
subject: 'Password Reset Successfully',
payload: {
appName: process.env.APP_TITLE || 'LibreChat',
name: user.name || user.username || user.email,
year: new Date().getFullYear(),
},
template: 'passwordReset.handlebars',
});
}
await deleteTokens(getPasswordResetTokenDeleteQuery(passwordResetToken));
logger.info(`[resetPassword] Password reset successful. [Email: ${user.email}]`);
return { message: 'Password reset was successful' };
};
/**
* Reads the previously issued CloudFront cookie scope used for stale cookie cleanup.
* @param {ServerRequest | null} [req=null]
* @returns {import('@librechat/api').CloudFrontCookieScope | null}
*/
const getPreviousCloudFrontScope = (req) =>
parseCloudFrontCookieScope(req?.cookies?.[CLOUDFRONT_SCOPE_COOKIE]);
const normalizeCloudFrontScopeValue = (value) => (value == null ? undefined : String(value));
const getCloudFrontScopeValue = (optionsValue, userValue, requestValue) =>
normalizeCloudFrontScopeValue(optionsValue ?? userValue ?? requestValue);
const getCloudFrontAuthCookieSkipReason = (scope) => {
const config = getCloudFrontConfig();
if (!config || config.imageSigning !== 'cookies' || !config.privateKey || !config.keyPairId) {
return 'cloudfront_disabled';
}
if (!config.cookieDomain) {
return 'missing_cookie_domain';
}
if (!scope.userId) {
return 'missing_user_id';
}
return null;
};
const shouldLogCloudFrontAuthCookieSkip = (reason) => reason !== 'cloudfront_disabled';
/**
* Refreshes CloudFront signed cookies for authenticated image/avatar access.
* @param {ServerRequest | null} req
* @param {ServerResponse} res
* @param {Partial<IUser> | null} user
* @param {import('@librechat/api').CloudFrontCookieScope & { orgId?: string }} [options={}]
* @returns {boolean}
*/
const setCloudFrontAuthCookies = (req, res, user, options = {}) => {
const storageRegion = getCloudFrontScopeValue(
options.storageRegion,
user?.storageRegion,
req?.user?.storageRegion,
);
const scope = {
userId: getCloudFrontScopeValue(
options.userId,
user?._id ?? user?.id,
req?.user?._id ?? req?.user?.id,
),
tenantId: getCloudFrontScopeValue(
options.tenantId ?? options.orgId,
user?.tenantId ?? user?.orgId,
req?.user?.tenantId ?? req?.user?.orgId,
),
...(storageRegion ? { storageRegion } : {}),
};
const skipReason = getCloudFrontAuthCookieSkipReason(scope);
if (skipReason) {
if (shouldLogCloudFrontAuthCookieSkip(skipReason)) {
logger.debug('[setCloudFrontAuthCookies] CloudFront auth cookies skipped', {
attempted: false,
set: false,
reason: skipReason,
has_user_id: Boolean(scope.userId),
has_tenant_scope: Boolean(scope.tenantId),
has_storage_region: Boolean(scope.storageRegion),
has_previous_scope: Boolean(getPreviousCloudFrontScope(req)?.userId),
});
}
return false;
}
const previousScope = getPreviousCloudFrontScope(req);
const cookiesSet = setCloudFrontCookies(res, scope, previousScope);
logger.debug('[setCloudFrontAuthCookies] CloudFront auth cookies refreshed', {
attempted: true,
set: cookiesSet,
reason: cookiesSet ? undefined : 'set_failed',
has_user_id: true,
has_tenant_scope: Boolean(scope.tenantId),
has_storage_region: Boolean(scope.storageRegion),
has_previous_scope: Boolean(previousScope?.userId),
});
return cookiesSet;
};
/**
* Set Auth Tokens
* @param {String | ObjectId} userId
* @param {ServerResponse} res
* @param {ISession | null} [_session=null]
* @param {ServerRequest | null} [req=null]
* @returns
*/
const setAuthTokens = async (userId, res, _session = null, req = null) => {
try {
let session = _session;
let refreshToken;
let refreshTokenExpires;
const expiresIn = math(process.env.REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRY, DEFAULT_REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRY);
if (session && session._id && session.expiration != null) {
refreshTokenExpires = session.expiration.getTime();
refreshToken = await generateRefreshToken(session);
} else {
const result = await createSession(userId, { expiresIn });
session = result.session;
refreshToken = result.refreshToken;
refreshTokenExpires = session.expiration.getTime();
}
const user = await getUserById(userId);
const sessionExpiry = math(process.env.SESSION_EXPIRY, DEFAULT_SESSION_EXPIRY);
const token = await generateToken(user, sessionExpiry);
res.cookie('refreshToken', refreshToken, {
expires: new Date(refreshTokenExpires),
httpOnly: true,
secure: shouldUseSecureCookie(),
sameSite: 'strict',
});
res.cookie('token_provider', 'librechat', {
expires: new Date(refreshTokenExpires),
httpOnly: true,
secure: shouldUseSecureCookie(),
sameSite: 'strict',
});
setCloudFrontAuthCookies(req, res, user, { userId: user?._id ?? userId });
return token;
} catch (error) {
logger.error('[setAuthTokens] Error in setting authentication tokens:', error);
throw error;
}
};
const resolveOpenIDAuthTokenOptions = (optionsOrUserId, existingRefreshToken, tenantId) => {
if (optionsOrUserId != null && typeof optionsOrUserId === 'object') {
if (
'userId' in optionsOrUserId ||
'existingRefreshToken' in optionsOrUserId ||
'tenantId' in optionsOrUserId ||
'openidSubject' in optionsOrUserId ||
'openidIssuer' in optionsOrUserId
) {
return optionsOrUserId;
}
return {};
}
return { userId: optionsOrUserId, existingRefreshToken, tenantId };
};
const getOpenIDTokenClaims = (tokenset) => {
if (typeof tokenset?.claims === 'function') {
try {
const claims = tokenset.claims();
return claims && typeof claims === 'object' ? claims : {};
} catch (error) {
logger.debug('[setOpenIDAuthTokens] Unable to read tokenset claims', error?.message);
}
}
if (typeof tokenset?.id_token !== 'string') {
return {};
}
const decoded = jwt.decode(tokenset.id_token);
return decoded && typeof decoded === 'object' ? decoded : {};
};
const getStringClaim = (claims, claim) => {
const value = claims?.[claim];
return typeof value === 'string' && value ? value : undefined;
};
const applyOpenIDSessionIdentity = (sessionOpenidTokens, identity) => {
if (identity.appUserId) {
sessionOpenidTokens.appUserId = identity.appUserId;
}
if (identity.openidSubject) {
sessionOpenidTokens.openidSubject = identity.openidSubject;
}
if (identity.tenantId) {
sessionOpenidTokens.tenantId = identity.tenantId;
}
if (identity.openidIssuer) {
sessionOpenidTokens.openidIssuer = identity.openidIssuer;
}
};
/**
* @function setOpenIDAuthTokens
* Set OpenID Authentication Tokens
* Stores tokens server-side in express-session to avoid large cookie sizes
* that can exceed HTTP/2 header limits (especially for users with many group memberships).
*
* @param {import('openid-client').TokenEndpointResponse & import('openid-client').TokenEndpointResponseHelpers} tokenset
* - The tokenset object containing access and refresh tokens
* @param {Object} req - request object (for session access)
* @param {Object} res - response object
* @param {Object} [options] - Optional token/cookie context
* @param {string} [options.userId] - Optional MongoDB user ID for image path validation
* @param {string} [options.existingRefreshToken] - Optional existing refresh token to preserve
* @param {string} [options.tenantId] - Optional tenant identifier for CloudFront cookie scoping
* @param {string} [options.openidSubject] - Optional OpenID subject bound to the session tokens
* @param {string} [options.openidIssuer] - Optional OpenID issuer bound to the session tokens
* @returns {String} - id_token (preferred) or access_token as the app auth token
*/
const setOpenIDAuthTokens = (
tokenset,
req,
res,
optionsOrUserId = null,
existingRefreshTokenArg,
tenantIdArg,
) => {
try {
const { userId, existingRefreshToken, tenantId, openidSubject, openidIssuer } =
resolveOpenIDAuthTokenOptions(optionsOrUserId, existingRefreshTokenArg, tenantIdArg);
if (!tokenset) {
logger.error('[setOpenIDAuthTokens] No tokenset found in request');
return;
}
const expiryInMilliseconds = math(
process.env.REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRY,
DEFAULT_REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRY,
);
const expirationDate = new Date(Date.now() + expiryInMilliseconds);
if (!tokenset.access_token) {
logger.error('[setOpenIDAuthTokens] No access token found in tokenset');
return;
}
const refreshToken = tokenset.refresh_token || existingRefreshToken;
if (!refreshToken) {
logger.error('[setOpenIDAuthTokens] No refresh token available');
return;
}
/**
* Use id_token as the app authentication token (Bearer token for JWKS validation).
* The id_token is always a standard JWT signed by the IdP's JWKS keys with the app's
* client_id as audience. The access_token may be opaque or intended for a different
* audience (e.g., Microsoft Graph API), which fails JWKS validation.
* Falls back to access_token for providers where id_token is not available.
*/
const sessionIdToken = req.session?.openidTokens?.idToken;
const appAuthToken =
tokenset.id_token ||
getUnexpiredOpenIDSessionIdToken(sessionIdToken) ||
tokenset.access_token;
const logoutIdToken = tokenset.id_token || sessionIdToken;
const claims = getOpenIDTokenClaims(tokenset);
const sessionIdentity = createOpenIDSessionIdentity({
user: req?.user,
userId,
openidSubject: openidSubject ?? getStringClaim(claims, 'sub'),
tenantId,
openidIssuer: openidIssuer ?? getStringClaim(claims, 'iss'),
});
/**
* Always set refresh token cookie so it survives express session expiry.
* The session cookie maxAge (SESSION_EXPIRY, default 15 min) is typically shorter
* than the OIDC token lifetime (~1 hour). Without this cookie fallback, the refresh
* token stored only in the session is lost when the session expires, causing the user
* to be signed out on the next token refresh attempt.
* The refresh token is small (opaque string) so it doesn't hit the HTTP/2 header
* size limits that motivated session storage for the larger access_token/id_token.
*/
setRefreshTokenCookie(res, refreshToken, expirationDate);
/** Store tokens server-side in session to avoid large cookies */
if (req.session) {
const sessionOpenidTokens = {
accessToken: tokenset.access_token,
idToken: logoutIdToken,
refreshToken: refreshToken,
browserRefreshToken: refreshToken,
expiresAt: expirationDate.getTime(),
lastRefreshedAt: Date.now(),
};
applyOpenIDSessionIdentity(sessionOpenidTokens, sessionIdentity);
/**
* Capture the access-token's own expiry (unix seconds) when the IdP
* advertises one. Lets downstream consumers — notably the OBO inline-
* refresh path in `OpenIDSessionRefresh.js` — reuse opaque (non-JWT)
* access tokens without burning an IdP refresh on the first tool call.
* Without this, the very first OBO call after login or SPA refresh would
* always trigger a redundant inline refresh whenever the IdP issues
* opaque access tokens (e.g. Microsoft Graph audiences).
*/
if (typeof tokenset.expires_in === 'number') {
sessionOpenidTokens.accessTokenExpiresAt =
Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) + tokenset.expires_in;
}
req.session.openidTokens = sessionOpenidTokens;
} else {
logger.warn('[setOpenIDAuthTokens] No session available, falling back to cookies');
res.cookie('openid_access_token', tokenset.access_token, {
expires: expirationDate,
httpOnly: true,
secure: shouldUseSecureCookie(),
sameSite: 'strict',
});
if (tokenset.id_token) {
res.cookie('openid_id_token', tokenset.id_token, {
expires: expirationDate,
httpOnly: true,
secure: shouldUseSecureCookie(),
sameSite: 'strict',
});
}
}
setOpenIDMarkerCookies(res, {
userId,
expires: expirationDate,
refreshExpiryMs: expiryInMilliseconds,
});
setCloudFrontAuthCookies(req, res, req.user, { userId, tenantId });
return appAuthToken;
} catch (error) {
logger.error('[setOpenIDAuthTokens] Error in setting authentication tokens:', error);
throw error;
}
};
/**
* Resend Verification Email
* @param {Object} req
* @param {Object} req.body
* @param {String} req.body.email
* @returns {Promise<{status: number, message: string}>}
*/
const resendVerificationEmail = async (req) => {
try {
const { email } = req.body;
const user = await findUser({ email }, 'email _id name');
if (!user) {
logger.warn(`[resendVerificationEmail] [No user found] [Email: ${email}]`);
return { status: 200, message: genericVerificationMessage };
}
await deleteEmailVerificationTokens(user);
const [verifyToken, hash] = createTokenHash();
const verificationLink = `${
domains.client
}/verify?token=${verifyToken}&email=${encodeURIComponent(user.email)}`;
await sendEmail({
email: user.email,
subject: 'Verify your email',
payload: {
appName: process.env.APP_TITLE || 'LibreChat',
name: user.name || user.username || user.email,
verificationLink: verificationLink,
year: new Date().getFullYear(),
},
template: 'verifyEmail.handlebars',
});
await createToken({
userId: user._id,
email: user.email,
type: AuthTokenTypes.EMAIL_VERIFICATION,
token: hash,
createdAt: Date.now(),
expiresIn: 900,
});
logger.info(`[resendVerificationEmail] Verification link issued. [Email: ${user.email}]`);
return {
status: 200,
message: genericVerificationMessage,
};
} catch (error) {
logger.error(`[resendVerificationEmail] Error resending verification email: ${error.message}`);
return {
status: 500,
message: 'Something went wrong.',
};
}
};
module.exports = {
logoutUser,
verifyEmail,
registerUser,
setAuthTokens,
resetPassword,
setOpenIDAuthTokens,
setCloudFrontAuthCookies,
requestPasswordReset,
resendVerificationEmail,
};