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* 🪟 feat: Undock the Artifacts Pane into Its Own Window The artifacts pane could only live in the chat's side panel, so viewing an artifact meant giving up half the conversation and there was no way to put it on a second screen. A header action now moves the pane into a separate browser window and back. The pane stays in the chat tab's React tree and is portaled into the popup's document, so artifacts keep streaming into it and docking back is a re-render rather than a reload. Everything a portal does not carry is mirrored: the host stylesheets (re-synced for lazy chunks, HMR and CSSOM-only rules), the resolved theme, a base URL for relative assets, and Sandpack's frame messages, which would otherwise never reach the listener the opener installed. * 🪟 fix: Keep the Artifacts Pane Whole When It Changes Windows Review of the undock change surfaced one cause behind most of its findings: the pane is a new component instance in every host, so anything a mount decides was lost or wrongly reset when it moved. - The code editor buffer now carries the artifact it belongs to, so a remount restores unsaved text instead of falling back to the persisted content, and the edit the debounce never got to send is handed to the mutation on mount. The share hosts take one provider around every branch for the same reason. - The artifact registry is cleared by the host that owns it: the pane keeps it while it only changes windows, and leaving the route wipes it, so no artifact follows the user to a shared conversation. - Fullscreen exits through the document that owns the container, Mermaid pan listens where its canvas lives, and Copy reports success only once the write resolves, with a toast when it does not. - Style mirroring compares what a sheet actually contains: rules a page inserts through the CSSOM are serialized, and a rewrite the observer saw refreshes its clone even when nothing measurable changed. - A child-activity panel opened while the pane is undocked stays open; the two panels are exclusive only while they compete for the side panel. Adds the scenario suite for the window behaviors (`@scenario:` tagged) plus unit coverage for the registry lifetime, the panel slot and buffer ownership. * 🧭 fix: Carry the Artifacts Tab Across a Window Change The pane's active tab lived in the component instance, so undocking from the code tab landed the user back on the preview — with their unsaved text out of sight, which reads as losing it. The tab is pane state now, next to the editor buffer it belongs with, and the scenario asserts both survive the move. * 🧹 chore: Drop Unused Imports From the Presentation Spec * 🎯 fix: Bound the Artifacts Pane's Shared State to Its Session The second review round found the cost of state that outlives an instance, all in the seams the first round opened. - Download now reads the editor buffer only when it belongs to the artifact on screen, so selecting another artifact cannot export the previous one's edits. - The active tab is reset when the pane session ends — close or conversation change — instead of following a later artifact onto the code tab. - A mutation started by a previous pane instance can no longer report back, so the mount releases the stale "mutating" flag before handing over the restored text; otherwise the edit queued behind a completion that never arrives. - The undocked window's size and position are read while it still has them, in its `pagehide`, so closing through the browser remembers the bounds too. - Docking from the window moves focus to the control that replaces the one the user pressed, which a keyboard user otherwise loses to the document. - The share host keeps one `EditorProvider` mounted across the closed and open branches, so opening the overlay no longer remounts the transcript. * 🎨 fix: Paint the Undocked Window Before Its Sheet Arrives A mirrored stylesheet is a fetch, so the popup showed its default white canvas for that moment — plain against a dark app, and visible to the scenario as a transparent pane. The host's resolved surface colour is now the `var()` fallback in the popup's own layout sheet, so the window opens on the app's canvas and the real token takes over when it lands. The two scenarios that read settled state — the painted canvas, and a keyboard Enter that closes the window it was pressed in — now wait for it instead of sampling the first frame. * 🔭 fix: Focus the Dock Target Once the Pane Has Mounted\n\nThe focus handoff ran before the pane rendered its toolbar, so the control it\nwas meant to focus did not exist yet and the request was never spent. It now\nwaits for the mount that creates that control. * 🧩 fix: Give the Edit Pipeline and the Transcript One Owner Each Round three found the same shape three more times: work that belongs to a session was still decided by an instance or by a branch. - The editor no longer infers whether a previous instance's save is running. React Query keeps a mutation's callbacks on the mutation, so that request settles the shared flag itself; the new instance waits for idle and submits the restored buffer once, instead of clearing a flag it does not own and resubmitting against an `original` the earlier request may have replaced. - The shared conversation keeps its transcript in one place — always the first panel of the resizable group — so opening the pane, undocking it or docking it again changes only the pane's host, not the transcript's ancestry. - The clipboard fallback runs in the pane's own document, so an undocked pane on a deployment without the Clipboard API can still copy instead of only reporting failure. * 🧷 fix: Tie the Editor Buffer and Focus to the Pane Session Round four found the last places where the retained buffer and the focus handoff were decided by a code path rather than by the session boundary. - Closing the pane discards the buffer, the tab and any pending focus request, so reopening an artifact starts from what is saved instead of restoring — and silently resubmitting — text the user abandoned. - Only the buffer an instance inherits at mount is drained. Navigating back to an artifact restores its own unsaved text in the editor instead of writing the persisted content over it, which used to queue that content behind the edit and undo it. - Closing the window through the browser hands focus back exactly as the Dock control does, rather than leaving a keyboard user on the document body. - The clipboard fallback restores focus by capability rather than `instanceof`, which never matches across the popup's realm. * 🔐 fix: Make Undocking Configurable and Its Saves Session-Bound - `interface.artifactUndocking` is a `configSchema` field, default enabled, so a deployment that cannot use popups keeps the docked pane. The hosts resolve it — the chat host from the startup config, the shared host from the shared-link config, which now carries the flag — and hand it to the pane through the context it already takes, rather than the pane reading config itself. - A save carries the editing session it was started in. React Query keeps its callbacks after the editor is gone, and those callbacks used to write the buffer a closed session had just cleared and submit its queued edit; they now stop at a session boundary, so a closed pane mutates nothing and leaves no text behind for the next one. * ✂️ fix: Stop the Editor from Overwriting Another Artifact's Unsaved Text - A write this component makes into the Monaco model comes back through `onChange` exactly like a keystroke. Restoring an artifact's text therefore looked like typing and keyed the shared buffer to the artifact now on screen — so selecting another artifact before the debounce fired replaced the text the first one was still holding, and returning to it showed the persisted content. The value written here is now recognised and consumed, and the retained buffer is sent deliberately when its artifact comes back, which is where its cancelled debounce finally becomes a save. - The save lock is the session's, not a request's. A save that outlives its session no longer clears the lock or the failure notice a later session took, and ending a session releases it — while an edit typed behind a lock whose owner is gone is sent by the editor holding it as soon as the lock is free, instead of waiting for the user to type again. * 🔔 fix: Report Failures in the Window the User Is Looking At The app's toast surface is mounted once in the chat tab, so a notice raised from the undocked pane — a copy that no clipboard path accepted, for instance — appeared in a document nobody was looking at. The window now carries a Radix toast provider and viewport of its own around the portaled pane; the toast state is shared, so the same notice is shown wherever the user is rather than routed by hand at each call site. * 🚧 fix: Offer Undocking Only Once the Deployment Has Answered An absent config read as enabled, which is the default, but a config request in flight reads the same way: a user could undock during that window and the arriving answer would then take the Dock control away with it. Both hosts now treat an unanswered config as no capability, and the pane keeps the control that docks it whenever it is undocked, so a capability that disappears cannot strand the pane in a window with no way back. * 🎯 fix: Land Queued Edits, the Config Toggle and Focus on the Window - A queued edit is sent against the content the artifact actually holds. The save that held the lock has already replaced what that edit was typed against, so submitting the captured `original` had the endpoint reject the newest text and leave it in the buffer alone. - `interface.artifactUndocking` now survives interface loading: `loadDefaultInterface` rebuilds the object property by property, so the flag never reached `/api/config` or the shared-link payload and a deployment that set `false` still saw the control. - Undocking hands focus to the pane the way docking already did. The control the user pressed goes away with the docked toolbar, so a keyboard user was left on the empty document of the window that had just opened; the focus request is now a move in either direction, which is what it is named after. * 🔓 fix: Let the Request Own the Save, Not the Session The save lock was a flag the editor set and cleared, which gave two ways to be wrong: a callback whose session had ended cleared a lock the next session was waiting on, and ending a session released a lock whose request was still running — so a pane reopened mid-save could start a second read-replace-save against content the first request was about to change. The state is now the request's. The artifact save carries a mutation key and `isMutating` is read from React Query's mutation cache, so it is true exactly while a save is in flight, whoever started it: nothing to release, nothing to leave behind, and an editor that appears mid-save queues its edit and sends it — rebased on the content that landed — once the request settles. * ⏱️ test: Give the Undocked Preview Time to Compile * 📌 fix: Rebase a Queued Edit on What the Save Actually Wrote The artifact registry catches up when the edited message propagates, not when the save returns, so an edit sent in between was rebased on content the server had already replaced and the endpoint rejected it. The text the last save wrote is on the request itself: the drain reads it from the keyed mutation in React Query's cache and falls back to the registry only when there is no save to speak of. The same applies to a buffer inherited at mount, which is submitted against that record too. * 🧷 fix: Keep the Pane's Tab and Its Storage Off the Instance Both findings of the review at a03ee0f7 are the same shape as the ones before them: something the pane needs was reached for where it does not survive. - The tab is pane state, but the reset that keeps it honest was an instance ref. A host change mounts a new pane, so that ref started empty, read the artifact already on screen as freshly opened and wrote `preview` back — undocking and docking both returned the user to the preview, which reads as the code they were editing having been thrown away. The marker moves to the atom beside the tab it guards, and ends with the pane session like the rest of it. Opening a *different* artifact still returns to the preview. - `localStorage` was reached for at the call site. A policy that denies Web Storage throws from the getter itself, before the guard around `getItem` could run, so undocking threw instead of falling back to default bounds and the redock and teardown paths threw on their way home — stranding the pane in a window whose control the user had just pressed. Both helpers take the window and touch storage inside their own guard. The scenario that should have caught the tab defect asserted `aria-checked` once, which matches the frame before the reset lands, so it is polled now. * 🧪 test: Drop the Denied-Storage Scenario the Shell Cannot Support Verification at c94e5ef showed the scenario asserting a capability LibreChat does not have: denying Web Storage in the browser replaces the page with the error boundary ("denied") before the pane's controls are reachable, so the popup never opened and the test timed out in all three projects. The finding behind it was about one call site — the pane reaching for `source.localStorage` outside the guard around its `getItem` — and that stays fixed and covered by the unit tests in `undockedWindow.spec.ts`, which reproduce the throwing getter and fail without the fix. Surviving denied storage app-wide is the shell's problem, not the pane's, and is tracked at berry-13/LibreChat#41. The spec says why the scenario is absent so it is not added back. * 🔗 fix: Match the Artifact Trigger's Name as Dev Now Builds It The scenarios opened the artifact by its full accessible name, spelled out as "<title> Click to open". Dev's "Unify Artifact Triggers as Tool Rows" (#15915) folded the format badge and whether the row renders a preview into that name, so it now reads "E2E HTML Artifact HTML Opens as a rendered preview Click to open" and an exact match finds nothing. Every scenario in the file failed at its first click, three retries deep, which is what pushed the e2e shard past its 30 minute ceiling. This did not show up locally because the mock harness serves `client/dist`, and mine was built before the rebase. The old bundle still rendered the old name, so the stale locator passed here and failed in CI — and dev's own `plain-text-artifact-row` spec failed locally for the mirror-image reason. Both pass against a freshly built client. The trigger is matched on its title now, the way dev's spec does it, so the badge and the preview hint can change again without breaking the file. * 🍞 fix: Share One Toast Viewport Between the App and the Window The undocked artifacts window needs a toast viewport of its own, and it carried its own copy of the app shell's class list — so any change to toast placement, stacking or width would have had to be made twice, or the popup's notices would drift from the app's.\n\nThe viewport is now one composition in \, rendered by both hosts. It keeps the class list it always had and still takes a \, so the popup can adjust its own placement without forking the primitive. * 🚫 fix: Keep a Rejected Edit Rejected Across a Host Change A save the endpoint answers with 400 is deterministic, and the editor already refuses to send that exact text again. The refusal lived in the editor instance while the text itself lives in the shared buffer, so moving the pane to another host — which remounts the editor — dropped the marker and the inherited-buffer drain immediately sent the rejected text back, against the same original that produced the 400. Every dock or undock cost another rejected request, with no new edit from the user.\n\nThe marker now sits beside the buffer it describes, in the editor session, and names the artifact it was recorded for. A remount inherits it; a successful save clears it; ending the session clears it with the buffer. Returning to an artifact no longer resends its rejected text either, for the same reason. A genuine new edit still saves. * 🧭 fix: Key the Artifact Registry to the Host's Conversation The guard that bounds the artifact registry to one conversation decided that the conversation had changed by reading the chat tab's Recoil slot, which the shared route never sets. A shared conversation's host stays mounted while the reader moves between shared links, so on that route the change was invisible and only the unmount cleanup ever fired: artifacts from the previous link stayed in the registry, and opening an artifact in the next one could list and navigate back to the previous share's content.\n\nThe identity is now the host's to supply — the chat tab passes its Recoil slot, a shared conversation passes its own id — which is also what keeps the hook from reaching into app-global state for something only its caller knows. The first observed identity still does not wipe, so the loading transition into a shared conversation keeps the artifacts that belong to it. * 🧪 test: Cover the Shared Host, a Blocked Popup and a Rejected Save Three paths the pane reaches that no scenario exercised: a shared conversation, whose host resolves the undock capability from the shared-link config; a browser that refuses the popup, where the pane has to stay put and say so; and an edit the endpoint rejected, which must not go back on the wire because the pane changed hosts. * 📝 docs: Document the Artifact Undocking Toggle in the Example Config \ reached the schema and the shared-link config without ever appearing in the example file a deployment copies, so the lever existed but was undiscoverable. Documented with the default that reproduces today's behavior. * 🔐 fix: Make the Undock Capability the Host's Answer, Not a Default \ filled \ with \ when a host left it out, so a host that forgot would offer a window the deployment may have turned off — the one field in that context with no sensible fallback. It is now required, which makes forgetting it a compile error instead of a capability grant. * 🕰️ fix: Read an Absent Conversation as Loading, Not as a Switch The registry guard normalized a missing identity to a sentinel and stored it, so a host that reported nothing for a render — a shared link whose data refetches, a chat tab reading its slot before it is filled — looked like a move to another conversation. The reader lost the artifact they had open, and the same conversation coming back read as a first sighting.\n\nAn absent id is now no news at all: the last real identity stays the one the next id is compared against, so returning to it changes nothing and a real switch still wipes. Reported by Devin review of 097f9bfadd (BUG-0002), which also caught that ShareArtifactsContainer's comment already promised this behavior. * 🏷️ fix: File a Refused Save Under the Artifact That Was Refused The rejection marker was written with whichever artifact the pane happened to be showing when the 400 landed. A save answers after the user may have moved on, so a refusal for artifact A filed under artifact B left A free to send the same refused text again as soon as the user came back to it — and cleared B's own marker on A's next success.\n\nThe artifact a save was started for is captured when the request goes out, and both callbacks use it: the refusal names that artifact, and a success clears only that artifact's marker. Reported by Codex on 097f9bfadd. * 🖥️ fix: Do Not Reopen the Pane on a Monitor That Is Gone Remembered bounds are coordinates, and they outlive the monitor arrangement that produced them. Undocking takes the pane out of the page along with the only control that docks it, so a window reopened onto a display that no longer exists takes the artifact somewhere the user cannot reach.\n\nThe remembered rectangle is now used only when it can still be reached: it either overlaps this display's work area, or the browser says another display is attached, which is the case the feature exists for. A desktop reporting exactly one display is the only one where the rectangle is provably gone, and there the pane opens at the default bounds. A browser that does not report other displays keeps the user's placement. Reported by Devin review of a85d5c348e (BUG-0001). * 🪞 fix: Follow a Stylesheet the Host Switches, Not Only Rewrites The style mirror watched for nodes and text, so a sheet whose attributes changed — a \ switch, a \ flag, a \ that stops it being a stylesheet — left the popup showing styling the host had moved on from, with nothing to bring it back into line.\n\nThose attributes are part of the signature now, the observer watches them, and an update applies them to the clone alongside its content. Reported by Devin review of a853d48c90 (BUG-0002). * ♻️ fix: Rebase Every Resubmitted Edit on What the Last Save Wrote An edit replaces whatever the last save wrote, and the artifact registry only catches up when the edited message propagates. Three separate paths resubmit retained text — a queued edit, a buffer inherited at mount, and the edit restored when the user comes back to an artifact — and each had to learn that separately; the restore path had not, so it sent \ as the original, the endpoint refused it with a 400, and the text the user typed never landed.\n\nThe rebase now happens once, where the request is built: \ resolves the original from the save's own record unless a caller overrides it, so no path can forget — including the ordinary keystroke debounce, which had the same gap right after a save. Reported by Codex on a7c047cc2a, and the third finding in this family. * 🧪 test: Let the Shared-Link Dock Click Race Its Own Window Docking closes the window the click was made in, so the click can resolve against a page that has already gone — the same race the focus scenario already tolerates. The assertion that matters, the pane arriving back in the shared page, is unchanged. Seen once on desktop-dark while verifying a7c047cc2a. * 🪞 fix: Clone a Stylesheet in the State the Host Has It The attribute mirror kept a sheet current once the window was open, but the clone was built without those attributes — so a sheet the host had already switched off, or aimed at another medium, arrived in the popup switched on. Its signature matched from that moment, so the sync had nothing to correct.\n\nThe clone now carries the same attributes the sync keeps current. Reported by Devin review of c5d51b85fb (BUG-0002), and the same cause as its predecessor in that round. * 🧪 test: Match the Blocked-Popup Notice Where It Is Shown The notice is rendered in the toast and repeated in the live region, so the text matched two nodes and the assertion tripped strict mode on the slower mobile project. Either node proves the user was told; the assertion now takes the first. * 🗑️ fix: Never Let a Cleared Editor Save Itself as a Deletion Typing has always refused to save an empty editor: a user who selects all and deletes is mid-edit, not asking for the artifact's content to be removed. The paths that resubmit retained text did not know that, so a buffer holding an empty string was sent the moment the pane changed hosts or the user came back to the artifact — persisting a deletion nobody confirmed.\n\nThe rule now sits with the other decisions about whether a request goes out, in \, so the debounce, the queued edit, the inherited buffer and the restore all share it. Reported by Codex on a9a51439a5 (P1). * 🧹 fix: Retire the Inherited Buffer Once a Newer Edit Is in Play A host change hands the replacement editor the text its predecessor never sent, and the drain submits that once the save pipeline is idle. If the user kept typing in the replacement, the newer text queued behind the running save — and when it landed, the drain still had the older buffer in play and sent it, putting the artifact back the way it was.\n\nAnything an instance submits or queues now retires the buffer it inherited at mount, so the newest text is the last word. The drain passes the inherited text itself, which is how it stays exempt. Reported by Codex on 04a9f685b6 (P1). * 🎨 style: Satisfy the Tailwind v4 Class Order From Canary * 🧺 fix: Retain a Displaced Buffer Under the Artifact That Owns It Editing one artifact evicted another's unsaved text from the shared code buffer: the selection change had cancelled that edit's debounce, so the overwritten copy was the only place it lived and coming back to the artifact fell through to its persisted content. A buffer another artifact displaces is now retained under its owner, and the editor restores and sends it from there on the way back. Reported by Codex on 591ab13c96 (P1). * 🧪 test: Key the Tabs Spec's Mocked Buffer to Its Artifact The pane-wholeness change gated the preview on the buffer naming the artifact on screen, but the spec's useCodeState mock never set codeArtifactId, so the edited preview never applied. The mock now carries the owner the component reads, and the editor spec's mock grows the retained-buffer field the component destructures. * 🧪 test: Prove a Displaced Edit Returns With Its Artifact The displaced-buffer scenario gets its contract-level coverage: an edit the user leaves on one artifact, an edit that displaces it on another, and a return that has to land on the first artifact's own unsaved text. The fake model grows a reply carrying two artifacts so both trigger rows exist in one conversation, and its one nested ternary is unrolled so the file lints under the repo rules CI applies to staged files. * fix: Resolve Every Artifact Surface and Refusal Per Artifact Preview, download and the Mermaid host now read an artifact's retained buffer the same way the editor does, rejection markers are kept per artifact so one refusal no longer overwrites another, and the saved-content history is only preferred while the registry still sits on this session's chain of saves. * fix: Hold an Inherited Edit Until the Editor Can Save It A buffer inherited across a host change while a response was generating was marked drained before the read-only guard dropped the save, and the read-only transition then replaced it with persisted content. The drain now waits for editing to return and writes the inherited text back after that transition. * chore: Sort the Presentation Spec's Imports After the Canary Rebase * test: Prove Each Artifact Surface and Save Path End to End Covers the download of a displaced edit, a refusal per artifact, an edit after another session changed the artifact, and an edit carried through a response by a host change. * test: Give the Undocked Presentation Case the Canary Query Client * test: Start Artifact Scenarios From a Settled Reply on the Desktop Layout * test: Stub the Command Executor Stamp in the Callbacks Spec Mock Canary's #16556 calls stampCommandExecutor from callbacks.js, but this spec's @librechat/api mock predates it, so three cases failed on canary itself. The mock now carries the real helper, as it already does for isCodeArtifactToolOutput. * fix: Track What the Server Holds Per Artifact Instead of Inferring It The editor reconstructed the server's content from the mutation cache and treated every buffer as unsaved. A save now records what it wrote in a per-artifact ledger that the registry retires once it catches up, so a change made elsewhere (including a revert to an earlier value) wins over this tab's history, and text this tab already saved is never sent again by a host change or a return to the artifact. * fix: Hide the Undocked Pane While Its Conversation Route Is Pending The route keeps the previous conversation mounted but hidden while another one loads or fails to, and the undocked portal escaped that ancestry. The host now passes its pending state down and the window hides the pane with it. * fix: Mark the Saved Buffer Copy and Retire Lag the Registry Has Passed A buffer is saved only while it is the copy a save wrote, so editing away and back to the same text is still sent. Lag values the registry has already moved past are dropped in order, so a later change back to one of them is read as a change made elsewhere. * test: Drop the Callbacks Mock Stub Canary Now Carries * perf: Prune Settled Save Records When the Editing Session Ends
1587 lines
82 KiB
YAML
1587 lines
82 KiB
YAML
# For more information, see the Configuration Guide:
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# https://www.librechat.ai/docs/configuration/librechat_yaml
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# Configuration version (required)
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version: 1.3.17
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# Cache settings: Set to true to enable caching
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cache: true
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# Chat Projects: the ceilings a single project may reach. Every field is optional and
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# defaults to the value shown, which is the behavior when the block is absent.
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projects:
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# Reference files that may be attached to one project (maximum 500).
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maxFiles: 50
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# Characters of project instructions stored and sent as guidance (maximum 200000).
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maxInstructionsLength: 16000
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# Characters of the project description shown in the workspace and sidebar (maximum 10000).
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maxDescriptionLength: 1000
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# Langfuse connections are managed through Settings > Langfuse when available.
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# That flow verifies the credentials and stores the secret key encrypted; do not
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# place a plaintext langfuse.secretKey in this file. Environment-managed central
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# credentials and optional fanout routing are documented in .env.example.
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#
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# Self-hosted Langfuse behind an authenticating proxy or gateway can be given
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# custom request headers. They are sent on every outbound Langfuse request —
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# trace and media export, feedback scores, and credential verification.
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# Values support ${ENV_VAR} interpolation; a header whose variable is unset is
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# dropped with a warning rather than sent as a literal placeholder.
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#
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# These are deployment-level: trace export batches spans from every user through
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# a single exporter, so unlike endpoints.custom headers they cannot carry
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# per-user placeholders such as {{LIBRECHAT_USER_ID}}.
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#
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# Values are masked in admin config reads and in the startup config log, but
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# prefer ${ENV_VAR} references over literal credentials here regardless.
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#
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# Scope: these are sent only when the deployment configures exactly ONE Langfuse
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# origin (a self-hosted base URL, or a single tenant destination URL), and only
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# to that origin. The map has no way to say which endpoint it authenticates to,
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# so a deployment configuring several origins — e.g. a fanout collector plus a
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# separate central host — gets a warning and no headers, rather than having a
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# gateway credential sent somewhere it was not meant for.
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#
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# Fanout deployments additionally need collector support: the gateway forwards
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# only Authorization upstream, so a tenant Langfuse behind its own proxy is not
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# covered even when the collector receives these.
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#
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# Traces carry the internal user id as the Langfuse userId and no user or
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# request metadata unless langfuse.trace opts in. userIdField picks the user
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# field that becomes the trace userId (id, email, username, name, openidId,
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# samlId, ldapId, googleId, githubId, discordId, appleId, facebookId); a user
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# without a value for that field keeps the internal id. The two allowlists copy
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# fields into trace metadata as librechat.user.<field> (the userId fields plus
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# role and provider) and librechat.conversation.id, librechat.endpoint,
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# librechat.endpoint.type, librechat.provider, librechat.model,
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# librechat.model.label, librechat.spec.
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#
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# langfuse:
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# headers:
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# CF-Access-Client-Id: "${CF_ACCESS_CLIENT_ID}"
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# CF-Access-Client-Secret: "${CF_ACCESS_CLIENT_SECRET}"
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# trace:
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# userIdField: email
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# userMetadataFields: [email, username, role, provider]
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# conversationMetadataFields: [conversationId, endpoint, model, modelLabel, spec]
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# File storage configuration
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# Single strategy for all file types (legacy format, still supported)
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# fileStrategy: "s3"
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# Maximum rows returned when GET /files receives an explicit `limit` query parameter.
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# fileListLimit: 100
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# Granular file storage strategies (new format - recommended)
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# Allows different storage strategies for different file types
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# fileStrategy:
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# avatar: "s3" # Storage for user/agent avatar images
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# image: "firebase" # Storage for uploaded images in chats
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# document: "local" # Storage for document uploads (PDFs, text files, etc.)
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# Available strategies: "local", "s3", "firebase", "azure_blob", "cloudfront"
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# If not specified, defaults to "local" for all file types
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# You can mix and match strategies based on your needs:
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# - Use S3 for avatars for fast global access
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# - Use Firebase for images with automatic optimization
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# - Use local storage for documents for privacy/compliance
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# - Use CloudFront for CDN-accelerated delivery (requires S3 + cloudfront config below)
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||
|
||
# CloudFront CDN Configuration (optional)
|
||
# Use when fileStrategy: "cloudfront" or fileStrategies includes cloudfront
|
||
# Requires: AWS_REGION, AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, AWS_BUCKET_NAME
|
||
# For signed cookies and direct download URLs: CLOUDFRONT_KEY_PAIR_ID, CLOUDFRONT_PRIVATE_KEY
|
||
# cloudfront:
|
||
# domain: "https://cdn.example.com" # CloudFront domain (CNAME recommended for cookies)
|
||
# distributionId: "E1234ABCD" # Required if invalidateOnDelete is true
|
||
# invalidateOnDelete: false # Create cache invalidation on file delete
|
||
# imageSigning: "none" # "none" (public) | "cookies" (signed cookies)
|
||
# # When imageSigning: "cookies", API + CloudFront must share a parent domain.
|
||
# # Cookies are path-scoped to inline assets only:
|
||
# # /i/... private uploaded/generated images, user-scoped
|
||
# # /a/... tenant-visible avatars, tenant-scoped when tenantId is present
|
||
# # Downloads, documents, uploads, and code outputs stay outside /i and /a and
|
||
# # use backend-authorized signed URLs instead of signed cookies.
|
||
# # API: api.example.com, CloudFront CNAME: cdn.example.com, cookieDomain: ".example.com"
|
||
# cookieDomain: ".example.com" # Required for "cookies" - shared parent domain
|
||
# cookieExpiry: 1800 # Cookie lifetime in seconds (max: 604800 / 7 days, default: 1800 / 30 min)
|
||
# urlExpiry: 3600 # Signed CloudFront download URL lifetime in seconds
|
||
# # Optional multi-region S3/CloudFront layout. Default: false.
|
||
# # When enabled, new object keys include:
|
||
# # /i/r/{storageRegion}/t/{tenantId}/images/{userId}/{file} (private inline images)
|
||
# # /a/r/{storageRegion}/t/{tenantId}/avatars/{userId}/{file} (tenant-visible avatars)
|
||
# # /r/{storageRegion}/t/{tenantId}/{basePath}/{userId}/{file} (non-inline files)
|
||
# # storageRegion defaults to AWS_REGION when omitted, but only affects new keys
|
||
# # when includeRegionInPath is true. Existing files are not moved automatically.
|
||
# # LibreChat does not configure CloudFront origins, Route53, or regional routing.
|
||
# storageRegion: "us-east-2"
|
||
# includeRegionInPath: false
|
||
# # Direct-download filename/content-type overrides require the CloudFront cache/origin
|
||
# # request policy to forward and cache on response-content-disposition and
|
||
# # response-content-type query strings to S3.
|
||
# # Recommended for download paths: attach a CloudFront response headers policy
|
||
# # with X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff and CSP default-src 'none'.
|
||
|
||
# Skill sync configuration (optional)
|
||
# GitHub tokens are referenced from environment variables. Put the token in
|
||
# `.env`, then reference it here with `token: '${GITHUB_SKILLS_TOKEN}'`. Use a
|
||
# GitHub fine-grained personal access token scoped to the selected repository
|
||
# with read-only Contents and Metadata permissions.
|
||
# skillSync:
|
||
# github:
|
||
# enabled: false
|
||
# intervalMinutes: 60
|
||
# runOnStartup: true
|
||
# sources:
|
||
# - id: librechat-skills
|
||
# owner: your-org
|
||
# repo: your-skills-repo
|
||
# ref: main
|
||
# paths:
|
||
# - skills
|
||
# # Number of directory levels below each configured path to scan for
|
||
# # `SKILL.md`. Use 2 for repos shaped like `skills/<category>/<skill>`.
|
||
# skillDiscoveryDepth: 2
|
||
# token: '${GITHUB_SKILLS_TOKEN}'
|
||
# # Optional. Owns the mirrored skills under the given tenant so they are
|
||
# # created and shared within that tenant. Required for visibility when
|
||
# # tenant isolation is enabled. Omit for single-tenant deployments.
|
||
# # Treat as immutable per source id: changing (or adding/removing) the
|
||
# # tenantId later leaves previously mirrored skills in the old tenant,
|
||
# # where this source's sync can no longer see or clean them up. To move a
|
||
# # source between tenants, delete its mirrored skills in the old tenant
|
||
# # first, or use a new source id for the new tenant.
|
||
# # tenantId: your-tenant-id
|
||
|
||
# Custom interface configuration
|
||
interface:
|
||
customWelcome: 'Welcome to LibreChat! Enjoy your experience.'
|
||
# Minimum interval between syntax-highlighting passes while streamed code changes (default: 300 ms)
|
||
# codeHighlightThrottleMs: 300
|
||
# Deployment theme applied to every user, in both light and dark mode (default: unset).
|
||
# It is not saved to the browser, outranks REACT_APP_THEME_* colors and stored themes,
|
||
# and yields to the high-contrast modes. Either a bundled theme name (librechat, clickhouse):
|
||
# theme: clickhouse
|
||
# or an inline definition. Colors are space-separated RGB triplets keyed by rgb-* token:
|
||
# theme:
|
||
# version: 1
|
||
# name: acme
|
||
# modes:
|
||
# light:
|
||
# colors:
|
||
# rgb-surface-primary: '255 255 255'
|
||
# rgb-surface-submit: '21 21 21'
|
||
# appearance:
|
||
# controlRadius: '0.25rem'
|
||
# dark:
|
||
# colors:
|
||
# rgb-surface-primary: '31 31 28'
|
||
# rgb-surface-submit: '250 255 105'
|
||
# Enable/disable file search as a chatarea selection (default: true)
|
||
# Note: This setting does not disable the Agents File Search Capability.
|
||
# To disable the Agents Capability, see the Agents Endpoint configuration instead.
|
||
fileSearch: true
|
||
# Privacy policy settings
|
||
privacyPolicy:
|
||
externalUrl: 'https://librechat.ai/privacy-policy'
|
||
openNewTab: true
|
||
|
||
# Terms of service
|
||
termsOfService:
|
||
externalUrl: 'https://librechat.ai/tos'
|
||
openNewTab: true
|
||
modalAcceptance: true
|
||
modalTitle: 'Terms of Service for LibreChat'
|
||
modalContent: |
|
||
# Terms and Conditions for LibreChat
|
||
|
||
*Effective Date: February 18, 2024*
|
||
|
||
Welcome to LibreChat, the informational website for the open-source AI chat platform, available at https://librechat.ai. These Terms of Service ("Terms") govern your use of our website and the services we offer. By accessing or using the Website, you agree to be bound by these Terms and our Privacy Policy, accessible at https://librechat.ai//privacy.
|
||
|
||
## 1. Ownership
|
||
|
||
Upon purchasing a package from LibreChat, you are granted the right to download and use the code for accessing an admin panel for LibreChat. While you own the downloaded code, you are expressly prohibited from reselling, redistributing, or otherwise transferring the code to third parties without explicit permission from LibreChat.
|
||
|
||
## 2. User Data
|
||
|
||
We collect personal data, such as your name, email address, and payment information, as described in our Privacy Policy. This information is collected to provide and improve our services, process transactions, and communicate with you.
|
||
|
||
## 3. Non-Personal Data Collection
|
||
|
||
The Website uses cookies to enhance user experience, analyze site usage, and facilitate certain functionalities. By using the Website, you consent to the use of cookies in accordance with our Privacy Policy.
|
||
|
||
## 4. Use of the Website
|
||
|
||
You agree to use the Website only for lawful purposes and in a manner that does not infringe the rights of, restrict, or inhibit anyone else's use and enjoyment of the Website. Prohibited behavior includes harassing or causing distress or inconvenience to any person, transmitting obscene or offensive content, or disrupting the normal flow of dialogue within the Website.
|
||
|
||
## 5. Governing Law
|
||
|
||
These Terms shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the United States, without giving effect to any principles of conflicts of law.
|
||
|
||
## 6. Changes to the Terms
|
||
|
||
We reserve the right to modify these Terms at any time. We will notify users of any changes by email. Your continued use of the Website after such changes have been notified will constitute your consent to such changes.
|
||
|
||
## 7. Contact Information
|
||
|
||
If you have any questions about these Terms, please contact us at contact@librechat.ai.
|
||
|
||
By using the Website, you acknowledge that you have read these Terms of Service and agree to be bound by them.
|
||
|
||
modelSelect: true
|
||
parameters: true
|
||
presets: true
|
||
prompts:
|
||
use: true
|
||
create: true
|
||
share: false
|
||
public: false
|
||
bookmarks: true
|
||
multiConvo: true
|
||
# Allow the artifacts pane to be moved into its own browser window
|
||
# (desktop only; the mobile sheet is unaffected). Default: true.
|
||
artifactUndocking: true
|
||
agents:
|
||
use: true
|
||
create: true
|
||
share: false
|
||
public: false
|
||
# Scheduled chats are experimental and disabled unless explicitly enabled.
|
||
# A deployment with Redis-backed resumable streams can run this on every replica.
|
||
# A single-process deployment without Redis must also set
|
||
# `SCHEDULES_SINGLE_PROCESS=true`; unsafe multi-replica writes fail closed.
|
||
# Scheduled agents that can pause require both `USE_REDIS_STREAMS=true` for
|
||
# shared action state and a durable shared checkpointer for graph continuation.
|
||
# MongoDB is currently the built-in durable checkpointer (and the default).
|
||
# schedules:
|
||
# use: true
|
||
# create: true
|
||
# maxPerUser: 10
|
||
# minIntervalMinutes: 60
|
||
# autoDisableAfterFailures: 5
|
||
# # Maximum occurrences concurrently passing readiness admission per replica (1-100).
|
||
# admissionConcurrency: 20
|
||
# fireConcurrency: 5
|
||
# # Maximum MCP readiness connections opened at once by one schedule admission (1-10).
|
||
# mcpPreflightConcurrency: 3
|
||
# # Maximum wall-clock time for one MCP readiness admission (1000-600000 ms).
|
||
# mcpPreflightTimeoutMs: 300000
|
||
# # Require every schedule to be filed under a chat project. Enforced on
|
||
# # create/update AND at each fire, so turning it on stops (auto-disables)
|
||
# # schedules that predate it rather than letting their runs land loose.
|
||
# requireProject: false
|
||
# # Pin every scheduled run to ONE chat project, ignoring the user's choice.
|
||
# # Implies `requireProject`. Chat projects are user-owned, so a value set here
|
||
# # only makes sense as a per-user or per-role config override.
|
||
# # projectId: '000000000000000000000000'
|
||
peoplePicker:
|
||
users: true
|
||
groups: true
|
||
roles: true
|
||
marketplace:
|
||
use: false
|
||
fileCitations: true
|
||
# Show the thumbs up/thumbs down feedback buttons on responses (default: true)
|
||
feedback: true
|
||
# Unseen-reply alerts: what this deployment lets a reader turn on. Each field gates a
|
||
# capability; the preference itself stays per device, because notification permission and
|
||
# audio output belong to the machine the reader is sitting at. Sidebar unread dots and
|
||
# Mark as unread are not gated here, they are part of the conversation list.
|
||
# replyNotifications:
|
||
# tabBadge: true # Allow the unseen count in the tab title and favicon (default: true)
|
||
# desktop: true # Allow readers to turn on desktop notifications for replies (default: true)
|
||
# sound: true # Allow readers to turn on the reply chime (default: true)
|
||
# # How many conversations one background poll looks at (1-100, default: 100). The list's
|
||
# # own maximum page is the ceiling, so covering a deployment whose replies outpace one
|
||
# # page is not a matter of raising this.
|
||
# pollLimit: 100
|
||
# # Milliseconds between list checks while a tab is away (10000-600000, default: 30000).
|
||
# pollIntervalMs: 30000
|
||
# # Milliseconds between list refreshes while a tab is focused (60000-300000, default: 300000).
|
||
# # It renews the snapshot the unread count reads, so it cannot be slower than five minutes.
|
||
# focusedRefreshMs: 300000
|
||
# Conversation trace viewer: a waterfall of the model calls and tool spans behind
|
||
# each response, read from the deployment's Langfuse project. The control only
|
||
# appears on the requesting user's own conversations with a sampled trace, and
|
||
# needs a Langfuse release that serves the v2 Observations API.
|
||
# traceViewer:
|
||
# enabled: false
|
||
# # Traces are matched to users by the internal user id, so no trace is shown while
|
||
# # langfuse.trace.userIdField exports another user field.
|
||
# # Return observation input, output and metadata in the record inspector. Input
|
||
# # carries system prompts, agent instructions and tool definitions, which a
|
||
# # user chatting with a shared agent cannot otherwise see.
|
||
# showInputOutput: false
|
||
# # Name the tools of each tool round from the round's own record. This adds
|
||
# # requests to Langfuse per listed page, and Langfuse returns each round's full
|
||
# # input and output to serve them, though only the tool names are kept and sent
|
||
# # on; arguments and results stay behind showInputOutput. When off, a round is
|
||
# # named only where the conversation's messages can be matched to the trace.
|
||
# showToolNames: false
|
||
# # Observations read per request (1-10000); older records load on demand.
|
||
# maxRecords: 1000
|
||
# # Characters kept from each input, output and metadata value (1-1000000).
|
||
# maxContentLength: 50000
|
||
# # Trace reads one user may start per minute (1-1000).
|
||
# requestsPerMinute: 30
|
||
# # Budget for each request to Langfuse, in milliseconds (1000-300000).
|
||
# requestTimeoutMs: 10000
|
||
# Tools pinned to the prompt bar by default for all users.
|
||
# Only seeds the initial state — once a user pins/unpins a tool, their choice is kept.
|
||
# Valid tool keys: artifacts, execute_code, web_search, file_search, skills.
|
||
# Use 'mcp' (or a specific MCP server name) to pin the MCP servers dropdown.
|
||
# When omitted, tools start unpinned and the MCP dropdown keeps its default (pinned).
|
||
# defaultPinnedTools:
|
||
# - 'artifacts'
|
||
# - 'execute_code'
|
||
# - 'mcp'
|
||
# Remote Agents configuration
|
||
# Controls user permissions for remote agents with external API support
|
||
# remoteAgents:
|
||
# use: false
|
||
# create: false
|
||
# share: false
|
||
# public: false
|
||
# MCP Servers configuration example
|
||
# Shared Links configuration
|
||
# Controls user permissions for shared links (e.g. sharing conversations via link)
|
||
# sharedLinks:
|
||
# create: false
|
||
# share: true
|
||
# public: true # Allows users to toggle "share with everyone" for their links. Whether anonymous access is permitted is controlled by ALLOW_SHARED_LINKS_PUBLIC.
|
||
# snapshotFiles: true # Snapshot files referenced by a shared chat so viewers can preview/download them via the link. Enabled by default; the SHARED_LINKS_SNAPSHOT_FILES env var overrides this.
|
||
# mcpServers:
|
||
# # Poll only while MCP controls are visible, in milliseconds (0 disables polling).
|
||
# toolsRefreshInterval: 300000
|
||
# statusRefreshInterval: 30000
|
||
# Controls user permissions for MCP (Model Context Protocol) server management
|
||
# - use: Allow users to use configured MCP servers
|
||
# - create: Allow users to create and manage new MCP servers
|
||
# - share: Allow users to share MCP servers with other users
|
||
# - public: Allow users to share MCP servers publicly (with everyone)
|
||
|
||
# Creation / edit MCP server config Dialog config example
|
||
# trustCheckbox:
|
||
# label:
|
||
# en: 'I understand and I want to continue'
|
||
# de: 'Ich verstehe und möchte fortfahren'
|
||
# de-DE: 'Ich verstehe und möchte fortfahren' # You can narrow translation to regions like (de-DE or de-CH)
|
||
# subLabel:
|
||
# en: |
|
||
# Librechat hasn't reviewed this MCP server. Attackers may attempt to steal your data or trick the model into taking unintended actions, including destroying data. <a href="https://google.de" target="_blank"><strong>Learn more.</strong></a>
|
||
# de: |
|
||
# LibreChat hat diesen MCP-Server nicht überprüft. Angreifer könnten versuchen, Ihre Daten zu stehlen oder das Modell zu unbeabsichtigten Aktionen zu verleiten, einschließlich der Zerstörung von Daten. <a href="https://google.de" target="_blank"><strong>Mehr erfahren.</strong></a>
|
||
|
||
# Temporary chat retention period in hours (default: 720, min: 1, max: 8760)
|
||
# temporaryChatRetention: 1
|
||
# Regular chat retention in hours under retentionMode: "all" (min: 1, max: 8760).
|
||
# Defaults to the temporary chat retention policy when omitted.
|
||
# generalChatRetention: 2160 # 90 days, independently of temporary chats
|
||
# Existing stored deadlines are not migrated when these settings change.
|
||
# Retention mode: "temporary" (default) applies expiry only to chats users mark temporary;
|
||
# "all" applies expiry to all data types while keeping chats visible in history;
|
||
# "ephemeral" forces every chat to be temporary (always on, not user-toggleable) and applies expiry to all data.
|
||
# Before switching from "all"/"ephemeral" back to "temporary", remove retention deadlines from non-temporary data
|
||
# that should stop expiring:
|
||
# db.conversations.updateMany({ isTemporary: false, expiredAt: { $ne: null } }, { $unset: { expiredAt: 1 } })
|
||
# db.messages.updateMany({ isTemporary: false, expiredAt: { $ne: null } }, { $unset: { expiredAt: 1 } })
|
||
# MongoDB does not drop superseded indexes automatically. After upgrading, old Meili indexes
|
||
# such as "_meiliIndex_1_expiredAt_1" can be dropped from conversations/messages once the new
|
||
# "_meiliIndex_1_isTemporary_1_expiredAt_1" indexes exist.
|
||
# retentionMode: "temporary"
|
||
# Set retainAgentFiles to true to keep persistent agent resource files from expiring under
|
||
# retentionMode: "all"; non-agent files still expire.
|
||
# retainAgentFiles: false
|
||
|
||
# Example Cloudflare turnstile (optional)
|
||
#turnstile:
|
||
# siteKey: "your-site-key-here"
|
||
# options:
|
||
# language: "auto" # "auto" or an ISO 639-1 language code (e.g. en)
|
||
# size: "normal" # Options: "normal", "compact", "flexible", or "invisible"
|
||
|
||
# Example Registration Object Structure (optional)
|
||
# Changing the registered email address from Settings > Account.
|
||
# Omitted, these fall back to ALLOW_EMAIL_CHANGE and a 15-minute link.
|
||
# emailChange:
|
||
# enabled: true
|
||
# tokenTTLSeconds: 900
|
||
|
||
# Passkey (WebAuthn) enrollment limits.
|
||
# Omitted, perUserMax falls back to MAX_PASSKEYS_PER_USER, then 20.
|
||
# passkeys:
|
||
# perUserMax: 20
|
||
|
||
registration:
|
||
socialLogins: ['github', 'google', 'discord', 'openid', 'facebook', 'apple', 'saml']
|
||
# allowedDomains:
|
||
# - "gmail.com"
|
||
# How long a started social login may take to return from the provider (ms, default 600000)
|
||
# oauthStateTtlMs: 600000
|
||
# OpenID discovery retries when the provider is unreachable (overrides OPENID_DISCOVERY_RETRY_* env vars)
|
||
# openidDiscovery:
|
||
# startupAttempts: 1 # attempts before startup continues; 0 = background retries only
|
||
# retryDelayMs: 5000 # delay between startup and background attempts
|
||
|
||
# Example Balance settings
|
||
# balance:
|
||
# enabled: false
|
||
# startBalance: 20000
|
||
# autoRefillEnabled: false
|
||
# refillIntervalValue: 30
|
||
# refillIntervalUnit: 'days'
|
||
# refillAmount: 10000
|
||
# reservationTtlMs: 1800000 # How long an in-flight request's reserved credits count if never released
|
||
|
||
# Example Transactions settings
|
||
# Controls whether to save transaction records to the database
|
||
# Default is true (enabled)
|
||
#transactions:
|
||
# enabled: false
|
||
# Note: If balance.enabled is true, transactions will always be enabled
|
||
# regardless of this setting to ensure balance tracking works correctly
|
||
|
||
# Speech (STT/TTS) outbound requests to operator-provided target URLs are SSRF-guarded
|
||
# at connect time: private, loopback, link-local, and cloud-metadata targets are blocked
|
||
# by default. To point STT/TTS at a private or self-hosted service (LocalAI, a self-hosted
|
||
# Whisper server), add its host:port to `allowedAddresses` on the `stt` / `tts` section.
|
||
# SECURITY: `allowedAddresses` entries are trusted before the private-IP check. A listed
|
||
# host:port is permitted even when it resolves to a private IP, so list only hosts you fully
|
||
# control and that cannot be repointed by an attacker. Do not list attacker-controllable or
|
||
# DNS-rebindable hostnames, because doing so re-opens the private-address path this guard
|
||
# closes. Prefer a private IP literal over a hostname when exempting a private target. Entries
|
||
# must include a port (`host:port`, `private.ip:port`, or `[ipv6]:port`); do not use URLs, paths,
|
||
# CIDR ranges, bare hosts/IPs, or public IP literals.
|
||
# When a forward proxy is configured (PROXY / HTTP(S)_PROXY), it performs DNS and egress in its
|
||
# own network context, so these requests are delegated to it and it must be SSRF-enforcing; the
|
||
# connect-time guard only covers direct, non-proxied connections.
|
||
# speech:
|
||
# tts:
|
||
# openai:
|
||
# url: ''
|
||
# apiKey: '${TTS_API_KEY}'
|
||
# model: ''
|
||
# voices: ['']
|
||
# allowedAddresses:
|
||
# - 'localhost:8020'
|
||
# - '127.0.0.1:8020'
|
||
#
|
||
# stt:
|
||
# openai:
|
||
# url: ''
|
||
# apiKey: '${STT_API_KEY}'
|
||
# model: ''
|
||
# allowedAddresses:
|
||
# - 'localhost:8000'
|
||
# - '127.0.0.1:8000'
|
||
|
||
# OCR (Mistral / Mistral-compatible) outbound requests to `ocr.baseURL` are SSRF-guarded at
|
||
# connect time with the same default-deny for private targets. To point OCR at a private or
|
||
# self-hosted Mistral-compatible service, add its host:port to `allowedAddresses`. The same
|
||
# trust caveat as speech applies: a listed host:port is trusted before the private-IP check,
|
||
# so list only hosts you fully control and that cannot be repointed by an attacker. Entries
|
||
# must include a port and must not be URLs, paths, CIDR ranges, bare hosts/IPs, or public IP
|
||
# literals.
|
||
# ocr:
|
||
# baseURL: '${OCR_BASEURL}'
|
||
# apiKey: '${OCR_API_KEY}'
|
||
# allowedAddresses:
|
||
# - 'localhost:8080'
|
||
# - '127.0.0.1:8080'
|
||
|
||
# rateLimits:
|
||
# # Per-user MCP App browser-route limits. Each limit uses a fixed one-minute window.
|
||
# mcpApps:
|
||
# resourcesPerMinute: 120
|
||
# toolCallsPerMinute: 60
|
||
# # Shared account budget for all authenticated 2FA management operations.
|
||
# # Always active; successful and failed requests count. Uses Redis when enabled.
|
||
# # Minimum 3, so enable -> verify -> confirm can complete within one window.
|
||
# twoFactorManagement:
|
||
# requestsPerFiveMinutes: 7
|
||
# # Authenticated agent-event admission has its own API-key-principal bucket.
|
||
# agentEvents:
|
||
# userMax: 40
|
||
# userWindowInMinutes: 1
|
||
# fileUploads:
|
||
# ipMax: 100
|
||
# ipWindowInMinutes: 60 # Rate limit window for file uploads per IP
|
||
# userMax: 50
|
||
# userWindowInMinutes: 60 # Rate limit window for file uploads per user
|
||
# conversationsImport:
|
||
# ipMax: 100
|
||
# ipWindowInMinutes: 60 # Rate limit window for conversation imports per IP
|
||
# userMax: 50
|
||
# userWindowInMinutes: 60 # Rate limit window for conversation imports per user
|
||
# # Asking for a change of the registered email, per authenticated user.
|
||
# emailChange:
|
||
# userMax: 3
|
||
# userWindowInMinutes: 2
|
||
# # Opening a verification link. The endpoint is unauthenticated, so the source
|
||
# # address is bounded as well as the account the link names.
|
||
# emailChangeConfirm:
|
||
# ipMax: 20
|
||
# ipWindowInMinutes: 2
|
||
# userMax: 2
|
||
# userWindowInMinutes: 2
|
||
|
||
# Agent Actions domain restrictions (OpenAPI spec validation)
|
||
# SECURITY: If not configured, SSRF targets are blocked (localhost, private IPs, .internal/.local TLDs).
|
||
# Prefer `allowedAddresses` for permitting internal targets — adding a private IP to
|
||
# `allowedDomains` switches the field into strict-whitelist mode and blocks every
|
||
# public destination not also listed.
|
||
# Supports wildcards: '*.example.com' and protocol/port restrictions: 'https://api.example.com:8443'
|
||
actions:
|
||
allowedDomains:
|
||
- 'swapi.dev'
|
||
- 'librechat.ai'
|
||
- 'google.com'
|
||
# - 'http://10.225.26.25:7894' # Internal IP with protocol/port (uncomment if needed)
|
||
# `allowedAddresses` is an SSRF exemption list, NOT a strict whitelist.
|
||
# Hostname/IP + port pairs listed here bypass the default-deny block for that
|
||
# one private/loopback/link-local service. Public domains continue to work
|
||
# normally — listing private targets here does not restrict access to anything else.
|
||
#
|
||
# Entries must include a port: `host:port`, `private.ip:port`, or `[ipv6]:port`.
|
||
# Do not use URLs, paths, CIDR ranges, bare hosts/IPs, or public IP literals.
|
||
# Public IP literals are rejected at config load (the field is scoped to
|
||
# private IP space; public IPs aren't SSRF targets).
|
||
#
|
||
# NOTE on hostnames: a hostname entry trusts whatever IP that name resolves to
|
||
# on the listed port. If DNS for that name is hijacked or rotated to a different
|
||
# private IP, the exemption follows. Only list hostnames whose DNS you control.
|
||
# Prefer literal IPs when you can.
|
||
# allowedAddresses:
|
||
# - 'host.docker.internal:11434'
|
||
# - '127.0.0.1:11434'
|
||
# - '10.0.0.5:8080'
|
||
|
||
# Custom endpoint baseURL exemption list
|
||
# SECURITY: User-provided baseURLs (`baseURL: 'user_provided'`) are validated against
|
||
# the same SSRF block as Actions and MCP. If your users legitimately point at private
|
||
# services (self-hosted Ollama, internal LLM gateway, etc.), list those hostname/IP
|
||
# + port pairs here so the validator allows them through. Public destinations are
|
||
# unaffected.
|
||
#
|
||
# Entries must include a port: `host:port`, `private.ip:port`, or `[ipv6]:port`.
|
||
# Do not use URLs, paths, CIDR ranges, bare hosts/IPs, or public IP literals.
|
||
# Hostname entries trust whatever IP they resolve to on the listed port — only
|
||
# list names whose DNS you control.
|
||
# endpoints:
|
||
# allowedAddresses:
|
||
# - 'localhost:11434'
|
||
# - '127.0.0.1:11434'
|
||
# - 'ollama:11434'
|
||
# - '10.0.0.5:8080'
|
||
|
||
# MCP Server domain restrictions for remote transports (SSE, WebSocket, HTTP)
|
||
# SECURITY: If not configured, SSRF targets are blocked (localhost, private IPs, .internal/.local TLDs).
|
||
# Prefer `allowedAddresses` for permitting internal targets — adding a private host to
|
||
# `allowedDomains` switches the field into strict-whitelist mode and blocks every
|
||
# public destination not also listed.
|
||
# Supports wildcards: '*.example.com' matches 'api.example.com', 'staging.example.com', etc.
|
||
# Supports protocol/port restrictions: 'https://api.example.com:8443' restricts to specific protocol/port.
|
||
# mcpSettings:
|
||
# # New MCP Apps require explicit opt-in. If omitted, legacy inline HTML remains enabled;
|
||
# # false disables both MCP Apps and legacy inline HTML.
|
||
# apps: true
|
||
# allowedDomains:
|
||
# - 'host.docker.internal' # Docker host access (required for Docker setups)
|
||
# - 'localhost' # Local development
|
||
# - '*.example.com' # Wildcard subdomain
|
||
# - 'https://secure.api.com' # Protocol-restricted
|
||
# - 'http://internal:8080' # Protocol and port restricted
|
||
# # allowedAddresses is an SSRF exemption list (private-IP-space only).
|
||
# # Hostname/IP + port pairs listed here bypass the default-deny block for that
|
||
# # one private service; public destinations remain reachable. Useful when you
|
||
# # want default SSRF protection AND specific internal MCP servers. Entries must
|
||
# # include a port (`host:port`, `private.ip:port`, or `[ipv6]:port`) and must
|
||
# # not be URLs, paths, CIDR ranges, bare hosts/IPs, or public IP literals.
|
||
# # Hostname entries trust whatever IP they resolve to on the listed port.
|
||
# allowedAddresses:
|
||
# - 'host.docker.internal:8080'
|
||
# - '127.0.0.1:8080'
|
||
|
||
# Deployment-owned MCP App sandbox settings. These cannot be overridden by role, group, or user
|
||
# configuration. Set url to a dedicated origin routed to /api/mcp/sandbox. Defaults are shown.
|
||
# mcpAppSandbox:
|
||
# url: https://mcp-sandbox.example.com/api/mcp/sandbox
|
||
# maxSourcesPerDirective: 32
|
||
# maxSerializedLength: 4096
|
||
# maxPersistedAppBytes: 1048576
|
||
# maxAdmissionRequestsPerMinute: 240
|
||
# maxActiveViews: 3 # simultaneous interactive App views per browser
|
||
# maxActionPreviewChars: 16384 # App tool arguments and chat message preview
|
||
|
||
# Example MCP Servers Object Structure
|
||
# mcpServers:
|
||
# everything:
|
||
# # type: sse # type can optionally be omitted
|
||
# url: http://localhost:3001/sse
|
||
# # proxy: "${MCP_PROXY_URL}" # optional outbound proxy (http/https/socks/socks5)
|
||
# timeout: 60000 # 1 minute timeout for this server, this is the default timeout for MCP servers.
|
||
# coordinated-oauth:
|
||
# type: streamable-http
|
||
# url: https://mcp.example.com/mcp
|
||
# requiresOAuth: true
|
||
# # Stage rollout with coordination disabled (the default). Once EVERY replica is upgraded,
|
||
# # pause MCP traffic and drain active refreshes/callbacks on EVERY replica before changing
|
||
# # this flag. Apply the same value everywhere while paused, then resume. For rollback, drain,
|
||
# # disable everywhere, replace the replicas, then resume. Do not toggle during live traffic.
|
||
# # All coordinated replicas must use the same Redis cache.
|
||
# oauthRefreshCoordination: false
|
||
# # Peer refresh wait; capped at 30000 ms by the refresh execution budget.
|
||
# oauthRefreshWaitTimeout: 15000
|
||
# # Callback/adoption persistence wait; raise for longer publication budgets (max 840000 ms).
|
||
# oauthPersistenceWaitTimeout: 15000
|
||
# private-openid:
|
||
# type: streamable-http
|
||
# url: https://mcp.example.com/mcp
|
||
# headers:
|
||
# # Trusted operator configs automatically use the live session token and replace the
|
||
# # connection once after a 401/403. A rejected tools/call is never replayed automatically.
|
||
# # Enabled oauth or obo configuration takes precedence over this passthrough mode.
|
||
# Authorization: "Bearer {{LIBRECHAT_OPENID_ACCESS_TOKEN}}"
|
||
# # Sent only during a chat turn, merged over `headers` (these win on a duplicate name).
|
||
# # Tool discovery has no conversation to resolve them against, so it omits them entirely:
|
||
# # a `{{LIBRECHAT_BODY_*}}` placeholder here no longer hides the server's tool list.
|
||
# requestHeaders:
|
||
# X-Conversation-Id: "{{LIBRECHAT_BODY_CONVERSATIONID}}"
|
||
# puppeteer:
|
||
# type: stdio
|
||
# command: npx
|
||
# args:
|
||
# - -y
|
||
# - "@modelcontextprotocol/server-puppeteer"
|
||
# timeout: 300000 # 5 minutes timeout for this server
|
||
# filesystem:
|
||
# # type: stdio
|
||
# command: npx
|
||
# args:
|
||
# - -y
|
||
# - "@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem"
|
||
# - /home/user/LibreChat/
|
||
# iconPath: /home/user/LibreChat/client/public/assets/logo.svg
|
||
# mcp-obsidian:
|
||
# command: npx
|
||
# args:
|
||
# - -y
|
||
# - "mcp-obsidian"
|
||
# - /path/to/obsidian/vault
|
||
|
||
# Definition of custom endpoints
|
||
endpoints:
|
||
# assistants:
|
||
# disableBuilder: false # Disable Assistants Builder Interface by setting to `true`
|
||
# pollIntervalMs: 3000 # Polling interval for checking assistant updates
|
||
# timeoutMs: 180000 # Timeout for assistant operations
|
||
# # Should only be one or the other, either `supportedIds` or `excludedIds`
|
||
# supportedIds: ["asst_supportedAssistantId1", "asst_supportedAssistantId2"]
|
||
# # excludedIds: ["asst_excludedAssistantId"]
|
||
# # Only show assistants that the user created or that were created externally (e.g. in Assistants playground).
|
||
# # privateAssistants: false # Does not work with `supportedIds` or `excludedIds`
|
||
# # (optional) Models that support retrieval, will default to latest known OpenAI models that support the feature
|
||
# retrievalModels: ["gpt-4-turbo-preview"]
|
||
# # (optional) Assistant Capabilities available to all users. Omit the ones you wish to exclude. Defaults to list below.
|
||
# capabilities: ["code_interpreter", "retrieval", "actions", "tools", "image_vision"]
|
||
# agents:
|
||
# # Maximum provider response-body inactivity for Agent model calls. Defaults to 15 minutes;
|
||
# # each received chunk resets the timer. Set to 0 to disable the idle timeout.
|
||
# modelResponseBodyTimeoutMs: 900000
|
||
# # Maximum wait for provider response headers. Defaults to 5 minutes; 0 disables.
|
||
# modelResponseHeadersTimeoutMs: 300000
|
||
# # (optional) Default recursion depth for agents, defaults to 25
|
||
# recursionLimit: 50
|
||
# # Maximum provider error characters retained without content protection (0 hides detail).
|
||
# maxProviderErrorChars: 2000
|
||
# # (optional) Max recursion depth for agents, defaults to 25
|
||
# maxRecursionLimit: 100
|
||
# # (optional) Abort a run once a single streamed tool call's arguments exceed this many bytes.
|
||
# # Guards against runaway malformed tool-call generation. Defaults to 65536 (64 KiB); 0 disables.
|
||
# maxToolCallArgBytes: 65536
|
||
# # (optional) Abort a run once a single model generation emits more than this many stream events.
|
||
# # Defense in depth against looping provider streams. Disabled by default.
|
||
# maxDeltaEventsPerTurn: 100000
|
||
# # (optional) Per-tool overrides for maxToolCallArgBytes, keyed by tool name; 0 disables that
|
||
# # tool's guard. LibreChat ships { create_file: 131072 } so document-sized file writes are not
|
||
# # cut off; entries here merge over (and can replace) that default.
|
||
# maxToolCallArgBytesByTool:
|
||
# create_file: 131072
|
||
# # (optional) Disable the builder interface for agents
|
||
# disableBuilder: false
|
||
# # (optional) When conversation titles are generated:
|
||
# # immediate (default): generate as soon as the request is made, in parallel
|
||
# # with the response, from the user's first message (title appears within ~1-2s).
|
||
# # final: defer generation until the full response completes (legacy behavior).
|
||
# # Set under `endpoints.all` instead to apply as the global default for all endpoints.
|
||
# titleTiming: immediate
|
||
# # (optional) Generate one-line headers for blocks of Agent reasoning and tool calls.
|
||
# # Header generation is a separate model call whose usage and cost are recorded.
|
||
# activityLabel: true
|
||
# activityEndpoint: openAI
|
||
# activityModel: gpt-4.1-nano
|
||
# # activityPrompt: 'Write a short activity label...'
|
||
# # activityMaxPerRun: 20
|
||
# # activityCharLimit: 600
|
||
# # (optional) Replace the generic Thinking/Thoughts heading with a live
|
||
# # generated orientation as sufficiently long top-level reasoning evolves.
|
||
# # Enabling this sends a bounded snapshot (up to 4,000 characters) of the
|
||
# # visible reasoning to the resolved label endpoint, which may be a different provider.
|
||
# # With Langfuse tracing enabled, that snapshot is also recorded as generation input
|
||
# # unless the active redaction policy suppresses the label call.
|
||
# # reasoningLabel: true
|
||
# # reasoningLabelModel: gpt-4.1-nano # falls back to activity/title/run model
|
||
# # reasoningLabelEndpoint: openAI # falls back to activity/run endpoint
|
||
# # reasoningLabelPrompt: 'Describe the current reasoning direction...'
|
||
# # reasoningLabelMinChars: 500 # text required before the first label
|
||
# # reasoningLabelUpdateChars: 400 # new text between streaming revisions
|
||
# # reasoningLabelUpdateIntervalMs: 3000 # minimum time between streaming revisions
|
||
# # A final rewrite may run immediately after a meaningful 120-character tail.
|
||
# # reasoningLabelMaxPerRun: 8 # provider-call cap per response
|
||
# # (optional) Maximum total citations to include in agent responses, defaults to 30
|
||
# maxCitations: 30
|
||
# # (optional) Maximum citations per file to include in agent responses, defaults to 7
|
||
# maxCitationsPerFile: 7
|
||
# # (optional) Minimum relevance score for sources to be included in responses, defaults to 0.45 (45% relevance threshold)
|
||
# # Set to 0.0 to show all sources (no filtering), or higher like 0.7 for stricter filtering
|
||
# minRelevanceScore: 0.45
|
||
# # (optional) Maximum explicit subagents per agent, for both the flat list and
|
||
# # graph definitions. Defaults to 10; hard cap 50.
|
||
# maxSubagents: 20
|
||
# # (optional) Shared files during an active agent run. Each delegating agent must
|
||
# # also opt in with subagents.shareFiles. Inputs are read-only; outputs stay
|
||
# # private until explicitly published. Published files remain downloadable.
|
||
# fileSharing:
|
||
# enabled: false
|
||
# allowSiblingSharing: false # permit explicitly named sibling/descendant recipients
|
||
# maxFiles: 100 # manifest capacity, 1–1000
|
||
# maxPrivateBytes: 268435456 # aggregate private output snapshots, 256 MiB
|
||
# ttlMs: 3600000 # active manifest lifetime, at most 24 hours
|
||
# # (optional) Maximum concurrent Code API uploads per route and user. Defaults to 3.
|
||
# codeApiUploadConcurrency: 3
|
||
# # (optional) Maximum total time spent waiting on Code API rate limits. Defaults to 20000 ms.
|
||
# codeApiMaxRetryWaitMs: 20000
|
||
# # (optional) Cap the number of active accessible skills shown in the model-visible catalog.
|
||
# # Useful for large organizations where many department-specific skills may be available.
|
||
# skills:
|
||
# maxCatalogSkills: 20
|
||
# # (optional) Agent Capabilities available to all users. Omit the ones you wish to exclude. Defaults to list below.
|
||
# capabilities: ["deferred_tools", "execute_code", "file_search", "web_search", "artifacts", "subagents", "actions", "context", "skills", "memory", "ask_user_question", "tools", "chain", "ocr"]
|
||
# # The following capabilities are opt-in and must be added explicitly:
|
||
# # "programmatic_tools", "stateful_code_sessions", "run_in_background", "tool_intents"
|
||
# # "stateful_code_sessions" is highly experimental and may change substantially.
|
||
# # (optional) Limit the workspace scopes users may select. Omit to allow all three.
|
||
# statefulCodeSessions:
|
||
# # Keep move-only behavior unless attach/detach is explicitly enabled.
|
||
# # Enable only after ALL API replicas run this build and advertise decision protocol 1
|
||
# # (CODE_ENVIRONMENT_DECISION_VERSION=1), then refresh clients.
|
||
# conversationMoves:
|
||
# enabled: true
|
||
# allowAttachDetach: false
|
||
# allowedEnvironments: ["user", "agent-user", "conversation"]
|
||
# # Personal BYOM enrollment. Requires allowPrincipalWorkers on a control plane.
|
||
# # Omitted values default to enabled and five registered environments per user.
|
||
# # Principal config overrides may tighten, but cannot raise, this ceiling.
|
||
# # Lowering the limit, or disabling enrollment, does not revoke existing machines.
|
||
# # This counts registered environments across control planes, not online workers.
|
||
# principalWorkers:
|
||
# enabled: true
|
||
# maxPerUser: 25
|
||
# # Route an agent to an operator-managed Code API or to a Code API whose
|
||
# # `remote-bridge` backend leases work to an outbound @librechat/code worker.
|
||
# environments:
|
||
# - id: managed-default
|
||
# name: Managed Code API
|
||
# type: managed
|
||
# baseURL: https://code.example.com/v1
|
||
# default: true
|
||
# - id: engineering-vm
|
||
# name: Engineering VM
|
||
# type: attached
|
||
# baseURL: https://code-bridge.example.com/v1
|
||
# # Pins an administrator-managed environment to one worker.
|
||
# owner: deployment
|
||
# pairing:
|
||
# workerId: engineering-vm
|
||
# tokenEnv: CODE_BRIDGE_ADMIN_TOKEN
|
||
# - id: personal-workers
|
||
# name: Personal Code Workers
|
||
# type: attached
|
||
# baseURL: https://code-bridge.example.com/v1
|
||
# # Lets authenticated users create principal-bound environments and
|
||
# # receive a one-time code for an outbound @librechat/code worker.
|
||
# # The administrator secret stays in the named environment variable.
|
||
# owner: deployment
|
||
# # Optionally expose only these bounded preferences to environment owners.
|
||
# configSchema:
|
||
# limits:
|
||
# # Maximum Bash execution budget the model may request per call.
|
||
# # Omit to preserve the historical 30-second limit. Hard cap: 300000.
|
||
# maxCommandTimeoutMs: 120000
|
||
# # Optional total HTTP budget per workspace tool call, including
|
||
# # admission, retries, worst-case execution, settlement, and delivery.
|
||
# # Do NOT enable until every LibreChat API replica recognizes this
|
||
# # strict config field, Code API honors X-LibreChat-Workspace-Queue-Wait-Ms,
|
||
# # and a non-mutating timed canary verifies the live CDN, load balancer,
|
||
# # ingress, and caller can all outlast this value. The Nginx example
|
||
# # (120s) cannot establish the live limit. Omission keeps 30s admission.
|
||
# # With 125s total, a read can queue <=90s, a default command <=85s,
|
||
# # a 90s command <=25s. With the default 10s admission reserve,
|
||
# # commands >105s cannot fit; the 120s command ceiling above requires
|
||
# # a VERIFIED total budget of at least 140s to be usable.
|
||
# # maxRequestTimeoutMs: 125000
|
||
# # Optional command admission allowance before local dispatch overhead.
|
||
# # Omission reserves 10s; valid range: 1000–300000 ms. The HTTP budget
|
||
# # must exceed this allowance plus 10s settlement/delivery grace;
|
||
# # with the 10s default, a budget of 20s or less is rejected.
|
||
# # Smaller allowances give a busy worker less time to accept the call.
|
||
# # minCommandAdmissionMs: 10000
|
||
# permissions:
|
||
# fileWrite:
|
||
# allowed: [allow, ask, deny]
|
||
# default: ask
|
||
# commandExecution:
|
||
# # Add allow to offer Full access in the chat composer. Both
|
||
# # permission categories must permit allow; defaults can stay ask.
|
||
# # Full access skips routine code prompts within the worker sandbox.
|
||
# # Explicit endpoint ask/deny rules and hooks still apply.
|
||
# allowed: [ask, deny]
|
||
# default: ask
|
||
# pairing:
|
||
# allowPrincipalWorkers: true
|
||
# tokenEnv: CODE_BRIDGE_ADMIN_TOKEN
|
||
# # (optional) Trusted origin for internal event delivery. By default, LibreChat
|
||
# # uses its own bound listener; override only for an internal TLS/front-door route.
|
||
# eventDriven:
|
||
# # selfUrl: 'https://librechat.internal'
|
||
# # (optional) Automatic conversational delivery for supported completed background tasks.
|
||
# # Enabled by default; set false to keep background tools and subagents poll-only.
|
||
# backgroundTasks:
|
||
# completionWakeups: true
|
||
# # Allow owners to cooperatively cancel ordinary background tools, including BYOM Bash.
|
||
# ordinaryToolCancellation: false
|
||
# # "run_in_background" makes Code Interpreter tools eligible by default and enables per-tool MCP opt-in.
|
||
# # "tool_intents" enables live model-written labels for native tools and opted-in MCP tools.
|
||
# # (optional) Require user approval before matching tool calls. Disabled by default.
|
||
# toolApproval:
|
||
# enabled: true
|
||
# mode: default # default, dontAsk, or bypass
|
||
# allow: ["mcp:trusted-server:read_*"]
|
||
# deny: ["mcp:*:delete_*"] # Deny rules always take precedence
|
||
# ask: ["mcp:*:*"]
|
||
# reason: "Review {tool} before it runs."
|
||
# # (optional) Persist Agent runs paused for approval or Ask User. MongoDB is the durable default.
|
||
# checkpointer:
|
||
# type: mongo # mongo (default) or memory (single-process development only)
|
||
# ttl: 86400 # Approval window in seconds; defaults to 24 hours
|
||
# # (optional) Keep the user's answers to Ask User questions in the model context verbatim,
|
||
# # even after the messages that carried them were summarized or pruned. On by default.
|
||
# askUserQuestion:
|
||
# retainedAnswers:
|
||
# enabled: true
|
||
# maxTokens: 4096 # Older answers drop first past this budget; the newest is always kept
|
||
# # (optional) Authenticate machine clients for the Agent Management API.
|
||
# # Each verified OAuth client is bound server-side to one existing LibreChat
|
||
# # user and tenant; that user's normal role and Agent ACLs still apply.
|
||
# managementApi:
|
||
# auth:
|
||
# oidc:
|
||
# enabled: true
|
||
# issuer: 'https://identity.example.com/'
|
||
# audience: 'https://librechat.example.com/agents'
|
||
# # jwksUri: 'https://identity.example.com/.well-known/jwks.json'
|
||
# # Cognito M2M access tokens use client_id instead of aud. For that
|
||
# # profile, omit audience and require the access-token type and scope:
|
||
# # tokenUse: access
|
||
# # requiredScopes: ['agents-api/manage']
|
||
# clients:
|
||
# - clientId: 'machine-client-id'
|
||
# # subject: 'provider-specific-service-principal-subject'
|
||
# userId: '507f1f77bcf86cd799439011'
|
||
# tenantId: 'tenant-id'
|
||
|
||
# (optional) Custom request headers for the built-in OpenAI / Google endpoints.
|
||
# Forwarded on every request to the provider (or an AI gateway / reverse proxy
|
||
# in front of it) while keeping provider-native request shaping intact. Values
|
||
# support env vars (${VAR}), user fields ({{LIBRECHAT_USER_*}}), and request-body
|
||
# fields ({{LIBRECHAT_BODY_CONVERSATIONID}}). Set the same `headers:` block under
|
||
# `endpoints.all` to apply globally across endpoints (endpoint values win on key
|
||
# collisions). NOTE: send metadata headers like these only behind a gateway that
|
||
# consumes them — native provider APIs ignore unknown headers.
|
||
# openAI:
|
||
# headers:
|
||
# cf-aig-metadata: '{"user_email":"{{LIBRECHAT_USER_EMAIL}}","app":"librechat"}'
|
||
# google:
|
||
# headers:
|
||
# cf-aig-metadata: '{"user_email":"{{LIBRECHAT_USER_EMAIL}}","app":"librechat"}'
|
||
|
||
# Anthropic endpoint configuration with Vertex AI support
|
||
# Use this to run Anthropic Claude models through Google Cloud Vertex AI
|
||
# anthropic:
|
||
# # (optional) Override the adaptive stream-smoothing cadence in milliseconds.
|
||
# # Agents SDK-backed providers smooth at 25ms by default; set 0 to disable
|
||
# # smoothing. (Legacy Assistants/Ollama paths sleep this long per chunk instead.)
|
||
# streamRate: 20
|
||
# # (optional) Title model for conversation titles
|
||
# titleModel: claude-3.5-haiku # Use the visible model name (key from models config)
|
||
# # (optional) Custom request headers, same placeholder resolution as above.
|
||
# # Useful for correlating reverse-proxied requests by conversation, since an
|
||
# # unknown header is simply ignored by the native Anthropic API.
|
||
# headers:
|
||
# cf-aig-metadata: '{"user_email":"{{LIBRECHAT_USER_EMAIL}}","app":"librechat"}'
|
||
# X-Conversation-Id: '{{LIBRECHAT_BODY_CONVERSATIONID}}'
|
||
#
|
||
# # Vertex AI Configuration - enables running Claude models via Google Cloud
|
||
# # This is similar to Azure OpenAI but for Anthropic models on Google Cloud
|
||
# # Vertex AI is automatically enabled when this config section is present
|
||
# vertex:
|
||
# # Vertex AI region (optional, defaults to 'us-east5')
|
||
# # Available regions: us-east5, us-central1, europe-west1, europe-west4, asia-southeast1
|
||
# # Multi-region endpoints: us, eu, global
|
||
# # IMPORTANT: specific regional endpoints only serve Claude Sonnet 4.6 and earlier. Newer
|
||
# # models (Opus 4.7+, Opus 5, Sonnet 5, Fable 5/5.1) require "global" or a multi-region value
|
||
# # ("us"/"eu") and will 404 on a specific region. "global" also avoids the 10% regional premium.
|
||
# region: "us-east5"
|
||
# # Path to Google service account key file (optional)
|
||
# # If not specified, uses GOOGLE_SERVICE_KEY_FILE env var or default path (api/data/auth.json)
|
||
# # The project_id is automatically extracted from the service key file
|
||
# # serviceKeyFile: "/path/to/service-account.json"
|
||
# # Google Cloud Project ID (optional) - auto-detected from service key file
|
||
# # Only specify if you need to override the project_id in your service key
|
||
# # projectId: "${VERTEX_PROJECT_ID}"
|
||
#
|
||
# # ============================================================================
|
||
# # Model Configuration - Set Visible Model Names and Deployment Mappings
|
||
# # Similar to Azure OpenAI model naming pattern
|
||
# # ============================================================================
|
||
#
|
||
# # Option 1: Simple array (legacy format - model name = deployment name)
|
||
# # Use this if you want the technical model IDs to show in the UI
|
||
# # models:
|
||
# # - "claude-fable-5-1"
|
||
# # - "claude-fable-5"
|
||
# # - "claude-opus-5"
|
||
# # - "claude-opus-4-8"
|
||
# # - "claude-sonnet-4-6"
|
||
# # - "claude-3-7-sonnet-20250219"
|
||
# # - "claude-3-5-sonnet-v2@20241022"
|
||
# # - "claude-3-5-haiku@20241022"
|
||
#
|
||
# # Option 2: Object format with custom visible names (RECOMMENDED)
|
||
# # The key is the visible model name shown in the UI (can be any name you want)
|
||
# # The deploymentName is the actual Vertex AI model ID used for API calls
|
||
# # You can use friendly names (avoid spaces for cleaner YAML) or technical IDs as keys
|
||
# models:
|
||
# claude-fable-5.1:
|
||
# deploymentName: claude-fable-5-1
|
||
# claude-fable-5:
|
||
# deploymentName: claude-fable-5
|
||
# claude-opus-5:
|
||
# deploymentName: claude-opus-5
|
||
# claude-opus-4.8:
|
||
# deploymentName: claude-opus-4-8
|
||
# claude-opus-4.5:
|
||
# deploymentName: claude-opus-4-5@20251101
|
||
# claude-sonnet-4:
|
||
# deploymentName: claude-sonnet-4-6
|
||
# claude-3.7-sonnet:
|
||
# deploymentName: claude-3-7-sonnet-20250219
|
||
# claude-3.5-sonnet:
|
||
# deploymentName: claude-3-5-sonnet-v2@20241022
|
||
# claude-3.5-haiku:
|
||
# deploymentName: claude-3-5-haiku@20241022
|
||
#
|
||
# # Option 3: Mixed format with default deploymentName
|
||
# # Set a default deploymentName and use boolean values for models
|
||
# # deploymentName: claude-sonnet-4-6
|
||
# # models:
|
||
# # claude-sonnet-4: true # Will use the default deploymentName
|
||
# # claude-3.5-haiku:
|
||
# # deploymentName: claude-3-5-haiku@20241022 # Override for this model
|
||
|
||
custom:
|
||
# xAI: Grok 4.7 uses the existing OpenAI-compatible chat and agent paths.
|
||
# https://docs.x.ai/developers/grok-4-7
|
||
# Set XAI_API_KEY in your environment. No separate SpaceXAI provider is needed.
|
||
- name: 'xai'
|
||
# Optional: expose this endpoint only to users in the named tenant.
|
||
# tenantId: 'your-tenant-id'
|
||
apiKey: '${XAI_API_KEY}'
|
||
baseURL: 'https://api.x.ai/v1'
|
||
models:
|
||
default: ['grok-4.7']
|
||
fetch: true
|
||
titleConvo: true
|
||
titleModel: 'grok-4.7'
|
||
modelDisplayLabel: 'xAI'
|
||
|
||
# Anthropic-compatible Example (native `/v1/messages` API)
|
||
# Set `provider: anthropic` to use the native Anthropic client instead of the
|
||
# default OpenAI-compatible one — for Anthropic itself or Anthropic-compatible
|
||
# gateways (e.g. AI gateways, OpenCode Zen). The `baseURL` must be the API root
|
||
# the Anthropic SDK appends `/v1/messages` to. List models explicitly: model
|
||
# auto-fetch uses the OpenAI `/models` convention and is not used for this provider.
|
||
- name: 'Claude-Compatible'
|
||
provider: 'anthropic'
|
||
apiKey: '${ANTHROPIC_API_KEY}'
|
||
baseURL: 'https://api.anthropic.com'
|
||
# (optional) headers forwarded on every request (e.g. for a reverse proxy);
|
||
# values support the same placeholders as built-in endpoints.
|
||
headers:
|
||
anthropic-version: '2023-06-01'
|
||
models:
|
||
default:
|
||
- 'claude-sonnet-4-5'
|
||
- 'claude-opus-4-5'
|
||
fetch: false
|
||
titleConvo: true
|
||
titleModel: 'claude-sonnet-4-5'
|
||
# Agent activity groups: collapse each block of reasoning + tool calls
|
||
# under a generated one-line header. Same shape as the title options.
|
||
activityLabel: true
|
||
activityModel: 'claude-3-5-haiku'
|
||
# activityEndpoint: 'anthropic' # run labels on another endpoint's credentials
|
||
# activityPrompt: 'Write a 5-9 word past-tense label...'
|
||
# activityMaxPerRun: 20 # cost cap per response
|
||
# activityCharLimit: 600 # per-entry prompt truncation
|
||
# Parent phase summaries are an independent opt-in. They collapse 2+
|
||
# logical activities before the answer into one run-level summary.
|
||
# activityPhaseLabel: true
|
||
# activityPhaseModel: 'claude-3-5-haiku' # falls back to activity/title/run model
|
||
# activityPhaseEndpoint: 'anthropic' # falls back to activity/run endpoint
|
||
# activityPhasePrompt: 'Summarize the completed agent phase...'
|
||
# activityPhaseMaxPerRun: 5 # cost cap per response
|
||
# Live reasoning labels are also independent. They update one top-level
|
||
# THINK heading in place and never create or shift message content parts.
|
||
# Enabling this sends a bounded snapshot (up to 4,000 characters) of the
|
||
# visible reasoning to the resolved label endpoint, which may be a different provider.
|
||
# With Langfuse tracing enabled, that snapshot is also recorded as generation input
|
||
# unless the active redaction policy suppresses the label call.
|
||
# reasoningLabel: true
|
||
# reasoningLabelModel: 'claude-3-5-haiku' # falls back to activity/title/run model
|
||
# reasoningLabelEndpoint: 'anthropic' # falls back to activity/run endpoint
|
||
# reasoningLabelPrompt: 'Describe the current reasoning direction...'
|
||
# reasoningLabelMinChars: 500
|
||
# reasoningLabelUpdateChars: 400
|
||
# reasoningLabelUpdateIntervalMs: 3000
|
||
# A final rewrite may run immediately after a meaningful 120-character tail.
|
||
# reasoningLabelMaxPerRun: 8
|
||
modelDisplayLabel: 'Claude (Compatible)'
|
||
|
||
# Groq Example
|
||
- name: 'groq'
|
||
apiKey: '${GROQ_API_KEY}'
|
||
baseURL: 'https://api.groq.com/openai/v1/'
|
||
models:
|
||
default:
|
||
- 'llama3-70b-8192'
|
||
- 'llama3-8b-8192'
|
||
- 'llama2-70b-4096'
|
||
- 'mixtral-8x7b-32768'
|
||
- 'gemma-7b-it'
|
||
fetch: false
|
||
titleConvo: true
|
||
titleModel: 'mixtral-8x7b-32768'
|
||
modelDisplayLabel: 'groq'
|
||
|
||
# Mistral AI Example
|
||
- name: 'Mistral' # Unique name for the endpoint
|
||
# For `apiKey` and `baseURL`, you can use environment variables that you define.
|
||
# recommended environment variables:
|
||
apiKey: '${MISTRAL_API_KEY}'
|
||
baseURL: 'https://api.mistral.ai/v1'
|
||
|
||
# Models configuration
|
||
models:
|
||
# List of default models to use. At least one value is required.
|
||
default: ['mistral-tiny', 'mistral-small', 'mistral-medium']
|
||
# Fetch option: Set to true to fetch models from API.
|
||
fetch: true # Defaults to false.
|
||
|
||
# Optional configurations
|
||
|
||
# Title Conversation setting
|
||
titleConvo: true # Set to true to enable title conversation
|
||
|
||
# Title Method: Choose between "completion" or "functions".
|
||
# titleMethod: "completion" # Defaults to "completion" if omitted.
|
||
|
||
# Title Model: Specify the model to use for titles.
|
||
titleModel: 'mistral-tiny' # Defaults to "gpt-3.5-turbo" if omitted.
|
||
|
||
# Summarize setting: Set to true to enable summarization.
|
||
# summarize: false
|
||
|
||
# Summary Model: Specify the model to use if summarization is enabled.
|
||
# summaryModel: "mistral-tiny" # Defaults to "gpt-3.5-turbo" if omitted.
|
||
|
||
# The label displayed for the AI model in messages.
|
||
modelDisplayLabel: 'Mistral' # Default is "AI" when not set.
|
||
|
||
# Add additional parameters to the request. Default params will be overwritten.
|
||
# addParams:
|
||
# safe_prompt: true # This field is specific to Mistral AI: https://docs.mistral.ai/api/
|
||
|
||
# Drop Default params parameters from the request. See default params in guide linked below.
|
||
# NOTE: For Mistral, it is necessary to drop the following parameters or you will encounter a 422 Error:
|
||
dropParams: ['stop', 'user', 'frequency_penalty', 'presence_penalty']
|
||
|
||
# OpenRouter Example
|
||
- name: 'OpenRouter'
|
||
# For `apiKey` and `baseURL`, you can use environment variables that you define.
|
||
# recommended environment variables:
|
||
apiKey: '${OPENROUTER_KEY}'
|
||
baseURL: 'https://openrouter.ai/api/v1'
|
||
headers:
|
||
x-librechat-body-parentmessageid: '{{LIBRECHAT_BODY_PARENTMESSAGEID}}'
|
||
models:
|
||
default: ['meta-llama/llama-3-70b-instruct']
|
||
fetch: true
|
||
titleConvo: true
|
||
titleModel: 'meta-llama/llama-3-70b-instruct'
|
||
# Recommended: Drop the stop parameter from the request as Openrouter models use a variety of stop tokens.
|
||
dropParams: ['stop']
|
||
modelDisplayLabel: 'OpenRouter'
|
||
|
||
# AWS Bedrock Example
|
||
# Note: Bedrock endpoint is configured via environment variables
|
||
# bedrock:
|
||
# # Models Configuration
|
||
# # Specify which models are available (equivalent to BEDROCK_AWS_MODELS env variable)
|
||
# models:
|
||
# - "anthropic.claude-3-7-sonnet-20250219-v1:0"
|
||
# - "anthropic.claude-3-5-sonnet-20241022-v2:0"
|
||
#
|
||
# # Inference Profiles Configuration
|
||
# # Maps model IDs to their inference profile ARNs
|
||
# # IMPORTANT: The model ID (key) MUST be a valid AWS Bedrock model ID that you've added to the models list above
|
||
# # The ARN (value) is the inference profile you wish to map to for that model
|
||
# # Both the model ID and ARN are sent to AWS - the model ID for validation/metadata, the ARN for routing
|
||
# inferenceProfiles:
|
||
# "us.anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-6": "${BEDROCK_INFERENCE_PROFILE_CLAUDE_SONNET}"
|
||
# "anthropic.claude-3-7-sonnet-20250219-v1:0": "arn:aws:bedrock:us-west-2:123456789012:application-inference-profile/abc123"
|
||
#
|
||
# # Guardrail Configuration
|
||
# guardrailConfig:
|
||
# guardrailIdentifier: "your-guardrail-id"
|
||
# guardrailVersion: "1"
|
||
#
|
||
# # Trace behavior for debugging (optional)
|
||
# # - "enabled": Include basic trace information about guardrail assessments
|
||
# # - "enabled_full": Include comprehensive trace details (recommended for debugging)
|
||
# # - "disabled": No trace information (default)
|
||
# # Trace output is logged to application log files for compliance auditing
|
||
# trace: "enabled"
|
||
# Example modelSpecs configuration showing grouping options
|
||
# The 'group' field organizes model specs in the UI selector:
|
||
# - If 'group' matches an endpoint name (e.g., "openAI", "groq"), the spec appears nested under that endpoint
|
||
# - If 'group' is a custom name (doesn't match any endpoint), it creates a separate collapsible section
|
||
# - If 'group' is omitted, the spec appears as a standalone item at the top level
|
||
#
|
||
# The 'groupIcon' field sets an icon for custom groups:
|
||
# - Only needs to be set on one spec per group (first one is used)
|
||
# - Can be a URL or a built-in endpoint key (e.g., "openAI", "anthropic", "groq")
|
||
# modelSpecs:
|
||
# list:
|
||
# # Example 1: Nested under an endpoint (grouped with openAI endpoint)
|
||
# - name: "gpt-4o"
|
||
# label: "GPT-4 Optimized"
|
||
# description: "Most capable GPT-4 model with multimodal support"
|
||
# # default: true # Hard admin default; takes precedence over prior user choices
|
||
# # softDefault: true # First-time default only; skipped after a user selects a model/spec/agent
|
||
# # showInMenu: false # Hide from the model selector while keeping explicit `spec` access
|
||
# group: "openAI" # String value matching the endpoint name
|
||
# preset:
|
||
# endpoint: "openAI"
|
||
# model: "gpt-4o"
|
||
# # Skills can be enabled per model spec. Use true for the user's active
|
||
# # accessible skill catalog, false to force skills off, or a name list as
|
||
# # a strict allowlist for catalog, manual, and always-apply resolution.
|
||
# # skills: ["brand-guidelines", "code-review"]
|
||
# # Subagents can be enabled per model spec. `allowSelf: true` lets the
|
||
# # ephemeral agent spawn a fresh isolated copy of itself for focused work.
|
||
# # subagents:
|
||
# # enabled: true
|
||
# # allowSelf: true
|
||
# # agent_ids: []
|
||
#
|
||
# # Example 2: Nested under a custom endpoint (grouped with groq endpoint)
|
||
# - name: "llama3-70b-8192"
|
||
# label: "Llama 3 70B"
|
||
# description: "Fastest inference available - great for quick responses"
|
||
# group: "groq" # String value matching your custom endpoint name from endpoints.custom
|
||
# preset:
|
||
# endpoint: "groq"
|
||
# model: "llama3-70b-8192"
|
||
#
|
||
# # Example 3: Custom group with icon (creates a separate collapsible section)
|
||
# - name: "coding-assistant"
|
||
# label: "Coding Assistant"
|
||
# description: "Specialized for coding tasks"
|
||
# group: "my-assistants" # Custom string - doesn't match any endpoint, so creates its own group
|
||
# groupIcon: "https://example.com/icons/assistants.png" # Icon URL for the group
|
||
# preset:
|
||
# endpoint: "openAI"
|
||
# model: "gpt-4o"
|
||
# instructions: "You are an expert coding assistant..."
|
||
# temperature: 0.3
|
||
#
|
||
# - name: "writing-assistant"
|
||
# label: "Writing Assistant"
|
||
# description: "Specialized for creative writing"
|
||
# group: "my-assistants" # Same custom group name - both specs appear in same section
|
||
# # No need to set groupIcon again - the first spec's icon is used
|
||
# preset:
|
||
# endpoint: "anthropic"
|
||
# model: "claude-sonnet-4"
|
||
# instructions: "You are a creative writing expert..."
|
||
#
|
||
# # Example 4: Custom group using built-in icon key
|
||
# - name: "fast-models"
|
||
# label: "Fast Response Model"
|
||
# group: "Fast Models"
|
||
# groupIcon: "groq" # Uses the built-in Groq icon
|
||
# preset:
|
||
# endpoint: "groq"
|
||
# model: "llama3-8b-8192"
|
||
#
|
||
# # Example 5: Standalone (no group - appears at top level)
|
||
# - name: "general-assistant"
|
||
# label: "General Assistant"
|
||
# description: "General purpose assistant"
|
||
# # No 'group' field - appears as standalone item at top level (not nested)
|
||
# # hideBadgeRow: true # Optional: hides the tool badge row for this spec
|
||
# preset:
|
||
# endpoint: "openAI"
|
||
# model: "gpt-4o-mini"
|
||
|
||
# Automatic conversation summarization (optional)
|
||
# summarization:
|
||
# enabled: true
|
||
# provider: "openAI"
|
||
# model: "gpt-4o-mini"
|
||
# retainRecent:
|
||
# turns: 2 # Keep the newest complete user/assistant turns outside the summary
|
||
# tokens: 2000 # Also preserve up to this many recent tokens
|
||
|
||
# fileConfig:
|
||
# skills:
|
||
# # Bound parallel storage deletes after a failed archive import (default: 8).
|
||
# # Set to 1 for serial cleanup on storage backends that require it.
|
||
# importCleanupConcurrency: 8
|
||
# # Store best-effort text for inferred tool-routed message attachments. On each turn,
|
||
# # deliver it only if no available tool can read the type. Off by default; also configurable
|
||
# # under endpoints.default or a provider/custom endpoint name. Explicit destinations stand.
|
||
# # Existing files without extracted text are not backfilled. Paused runs retain encoded text
|
||
# # and conservatively count referenced fallback text against current limits on resume.
|
||
# textFallbackWithoutTools: false
|
||
# fileContextSizeLimit: 128 # Maximum aggregate model-bound attachment size in one agent turn (MB)
|
||
# fileContextCharLimit: 1000000 # Maximum aggregate extracted-text characters in one agent turn
|
||
# endpoints:
|
||
# agents:
|
||
# fileLimit: 10
|
||
# assistants:
|
||
# fileLimit: 5
|
||
# fileSizeLimit: 10 # Maximum size for an individual file in MB
|
||
# totalSizeLimit: 50 # Maximum total size for all files in a single request in MB
|
||
# supportedMimeTypes:
|
||
# - "image/.*"
|
||
# - "application/pdf"
|
||
# openAI:
|
||
# disabled: true # Disables file uploading to the OpenAI endpoint
|
||
# default:
|
||
# totalSizeLimit: 20
|
||
# YourCustomEndpointName:
|
||
# fileLimit: 2
|
||
# fileSizeLimit: 5
|
||
# serverFileSizeLimit: 100 # Global server file size limit in MB
|
||
# avatarSizeLimit: 2 # Limit for user avatar image size in MB
|
||
# imageGeneration: # Image Gen settings, either percentage or px
|
||
# percentage: 100
|
||
# px: 1024
|
||
# # Client-side image resizing to prevent upload errors
|
||
# # Users can toggle this in Settings > Chat. Setting `enabled` here overrides
|
||
# # that choice for everyone and locks the toggle; omit it to leave users in control.
|
||
# clientImageResize:
|
||
# enabled: false # Enable/disable client-side image resizing (default: false)
|
||
# maxWidth: 1900 # Maximum width for resized images (default: 1900)
|
||
# maxHeight: 1900 # Maximum height for resized images (default: 1900)
|
||
# quality: 0.92 # JPEG quality for compression (0.0-1.0, default: 0.92)
|
||
# # See the Custom Configuration Guide for more information on Assistants Config:
|
||
# # https://www.librechat.ai/docs/configuration/librechat_yaml/object_structure/assistants_endpoint
|
||
|
||
# Web Search Configuration (optional)
|
||
# webSearch:
|
||
# # Jina Reranking Configuration
|
||
# jinaApiKey: '${JINA_API_KEY}' # Your Jina API key
|
||
# jinaApiUrl: '${JINA_API_URL}' # Custom Jina API URL (optional, defaults to https://api.jina.ai/v1/rerank)
|
||
# # Other rerankers
|
||
# cohereApiKey: '${COHERE_API_KEY}'
|
||
# # Search providers
|
||
# serperApiKey: '${SERPER_API_KEY}'
|
||
# searxngInstanceUrl: '${SEARXNG_INSTANCE_URL}'
|
||
# searxngApiKey: '${SEARXNG_API_KEY}'
|
||
# # Tavily (search provider and/or scraper)
|
||
# tavilyApiKey: '${TAVILY_API_KEY}'
|
||
# # Keenable (search provider; keyless by default, a key only lifts rate limits)
|
||
# keenableApiKey: '${KEENABLE_API_KEY}'
|
||
# # Content scrapers
|
||
# firecrawlApiKey: '${FIRECRAWL_API_KEY}'
|
||
# firecrawlApiUrl: '${FIRECRAWL_API_URL}'
|
||
# # Outbound search and scrape requests are validated at connect time against
|
||
# # their resolved IP and blocked from reaching private, loopback, link-local,
|
||
# # or cloud-metadata space. `allowedAddresses` is an SSRF exemption list, NOT a
|
||
# # strict whitelist: hostname/IP + port pairs listed here bypass that block for
|
||
# # one deliberately-private endpoint (for example a self-hosted SearXNG
|
||
# # instance); public destinations continue to work normally.
|
||
# #
|
||
# # Entries must include a port: `host:port`, `private.ip:port`, or `[ipv6]:port`.
|
||
# # Do not use URLs, paths, CIDR ranges, bare hosts/IPs, or public IP literals.
|
||
# # A hostname entry trusts whatever IP that name resolves to on the listed port,
|
||
# # so only list hosts you fully control and whose DNS cannot be repointed by an
|
||
# # attacker. Listing an attacker-controllable or DNS-rebindable host re-opens the
|
||
# # private-address path this guard closes. Prefer literal IPs where you can.
|
||
# #
|
||
# # Self-hosted endpoints need an entry. A private destination such as
|
||
# # `http://searxng:8080`, `http://firecrawl:3002`, or `http://127.0.0.1:8080` is
|
||
# # blocked once this guard is active, so list it here or those requests will fail.
|
||
# #
|
||
# # A proxy from `HTTP_PROXY`, `HTTPS_PROXY`, or `ALL_PROXY` (either case) is
|
||
# # exempted automatically and needs no entry. That exemption is applied to the
|
||
# # whole tool rather than per destination, so a host `NO_PROXY` sends direct also
|
||
# # carries it. Note that when a proxy carries the request the proxy resolves the
|
||
# # destination, so destination egress policy is the proxy's to enforce, and for
|
||
# # https targets the proxy's own tunnel replaces this guard entirely.
|
||
# # allowedAddresses:
|
||
# # - 'searxng:8080'
|
||
# # - '127.0.0.1:8080'
|
||
#
|
||
# Tavily as both search and scraper provider example:
|
||
# webSearch:
|
||
# searchProvider: tavily
|
||
# scraperProvider: tavily
|
||
# tavilyApiKey: '${TAVILY_API_KEY}'
|
||
# # Optional: custom API URLs (defaults to https://api.tavily.com/search and https://api.tavily.com/extract)
|
||
# # tavilySearchUrl: '${TAVILY_SEARCH_URL}'
|
||
# # tavilyExtractUrl: '${TAVILY_EXTRACT_URL}'
|
||
# tavilySearchOptions:
|
||
# searchDepth: basic # 'basic', 'advanced', 'fast', or 'ultra-fast' (default: basic)
|
||
# maxResults: 5 # 1-20 results per search (default: 5)
|
||
# topic: general # 'general', 'news', or 'finance'
|
||
# # includeAnswer: basic # Include answer summary: true, 'basic', or 'advanced'
|
||
# # includeRawContent: markdown # Include raw content: true, 'markdown', or 'text'
|
||
# # includeImages: true # Include images in results
|
||
# # includeFavicon: true # Include favicon URL for each result
|
||
# # chunksPerSource: 3 # Chunks per source, only with 'advanced' depth (1-3)
|
||
# # safeSearch: false # Override Tavily safe_search filtering (true is enterprise-only)
|
||
# # includeDomains: # Restrict search to specific domains (max 300)
|
||
# # - 'example.com'
|
||
# # - 'docs.example.com'
|
||
# # excludeDomains: # Exclude specific domains from results (max 150)
|
||
# # - 'spam.com'
|
||
# # timeRange: week # 'day', 'week', 'month', or 'year'
|
||
# # timeout: 15000 # HTTP request timeout in milliseconds (max 120000)
|
||
# tavilyScraperOptions:
|
||
# extractDepth: basic # 'basic' (1 credit/5 URLs) or 'advanced' (2 credits/5 URLs, more thorough)
|
||
# # includeImages: false # Include images extracted from URLs
|
||
# # includeFavicon: false # Include favicon URL for each result
|
||
# # format: markdown # 'markdown' (default) or 'text' (plain text, may increase latency)
|
||
# # timeout: 15000 # HTTP request timeout in milliseconds (max 120000); Tavily Extract receives seconds clamped to 1-60
|
||
#
|
||
# Keenable as both search provider and scraper example — a fully keyless web
|
||
# search stack: no API key for any of the three categories. The public search and
|
||
# fetch endpoints are rate-limited; a key only lifts the cap.
|
||
# webSearch:
|
||
# searchProvider: keenable
|
||
# scraperProvider: keenable
|
||
# rerankerType: none # Rerankers all require a key; 'none' skips reranking
|
||
# # keenableApiKey: '${KEENABLE_API_KEY}' # Optional: a key only lifts rate limits (public endpoints used when unset)
|
||
# # keenableApiUrl: '${KEENABLE_API_URL}' # Optional: search API URL override (fetch uses KEENABLE_FETCH_URL)
|
||
# keenableSearchOptions:
|
||
# maxResults: 5 # 1-20 results per search (default: 8)
|
||
# # site: example.com # Restrict search to a single domain
|
||
# # attributionTitle: LibreChat # X-Keenable-Title header sent with each request
|
||
# # timeout: 15000 # HTTP request timeout in milliseconds (max 120000)
|
||
# keenableScraperOptions:
|
||
# # attributionTitle: LibreChat # X-Keenable-Title header sent with each fetch
|
||
# timeout: 15000 # HTTP request timeout in milliseconds (max 120000)
|
||
#
|
||
# Keenable search paired with another scraper (Firecrawl here) also works; each
|
||
# category is configured independently:
|
||
# webSearch:
|
||
# searchProvider: keenable
|
||
# scraperProvider: firecrawl
|
||
# firecrawlApiKey: '${FIRECRAWL_API_KEY}'
|
||
#
|
||
# The reverse (someone else's search, Keenable as the scraper) also works. Pin
|
||
# the stack for every user as shown below, or leave the providers unpinned so
|
||
# each user can save this same keyless combination in the API-key dialog:
|
||
# webSearch:
|
||
# searchProvider: searxng
|
||
# searxngInstanceUrl: '${SEARXNG_INSTANCE_URL}'
|
||
# scraperProvider: keenable
|
||
# rerankerType: none
|
||
#
|
||
# SearXNG as the search provider example:
|
||
# webSearch:
|
||
# searchProvider: searxng
|
||
# searxngInstanceUrl: '${SEARXNG_INSTANCE_URL}'
|
||
# # searxngApiKey: '${SEARXNG_API_KEY}'
|
||
# searxngSearchOptions:
|
||
# # Engines your instance should query. Accepts a comma-separated string or a list.
|
||
# # Defaults to 'google,bing,duckduckgo'; DuckDuckGo serves CAPTCHAs to most
|
||
# # self-hosted instances, so override it when results come back empty.
|
||
# #
|
||
# # Names must match engines enabled on your own instance. SearXNG ignores an
|
||
# # engine it does not know instead of reporting an error, so a typo or a
|
||
# # disabled engine shows up as fewer results rather than a failure. Check the
|
||
# # enabled list at https://your-instance/config before setting this.
|
||
# engines:
|
||
# - google
|
||
# - bing
|
||
# - startpage
|
||
# - qwant
|
||
# # language: en # Result language code (default: 'all')
|
||
# # timeRange: month # 'day', 'month', or 'year'
|
||
# # timeout: 10000 # HTTP request timeout in milliseconds (1-120000, default: 10000)
|
||
|
||
# Memory configuration for user memories
|
||
# memory:
|
||
# # (optional) Disable memory functionality
|
||
# disabled: false
|
||
# # (optional) Restrict memory keys to specific values to limit memory storage and improve consistency
|
||
# validKeys: ["preferences", "work_info", "personal_info", "skills", "interests", "context"]
|
||
# # (optional) Maximum token limit for stored memory values
|
||
# tokenLimit: 10000
|
||
# # (optional) Maximum tokens from recent chat sent to the memory agent before truncation
|
||
# maxInputTokens: 12000
|
||
# # (optional) Enable personalization features (defaults to true if memory is configured)
|
||
# # When false, users will not see the Personalization tab in settings
|
||
# personalize: true
|
||
# # (optional) Memory agent configuration for automatic memory updates from chat messages.
|
||
# # If omitted, users can still create, edit, delete, and reference memories manually.
|
||
# agent:
|
||
# # Explicitly enables automatic memory updates from chat messages.
|
||
# enabled: true
|
||
# # Option 1: Use existing agent by ID
|
||
# id: "your-memory-agent-id"
|
||
# # Option 2: Define agent inline
|
||
# # provider: "openai"
|
||
# # model: "gpt-4o-mini"
|
||
# # instructions: "You are a memory management assistant. Store and manage user information accurately."
|
||
# # model_parameters:
|
||
# # temperature: 0.1
|
||
|
||
# Apply opt-in content filters to source-classified submitted and reusable content.
|
||
# `filters` is base-config-only: database overrides and tombstones cannot add,
|
||
# change, or remove this policy for individual users, groups, or roles.
|
||
# In multi-replica deployments, use a coordinated deploy or restart and verify
|
||
# every replica loaded the same base config before considering policy active;
|
||
# local cache invalidation is not a rollout barrier.
|
||
# Omit `filters` or a source to leave that scope disabled. Omitting a source's
|
||
# `pii` block disables its source-aware detectors; for messages, `inspect` can
|
||
# still change how an enabled legacy `messageFilter.pii` attributes old rows.
|
||
# Omit `fields` to filter every supported field for an enabled source.
|
||
# `starterPatterns` and `customPatterns` can be configured independently
|
||
# under any source so each input surface can use a different policy. Starter
|
||
# ids are closed to the catalog below. Custom regexes use bounded,
|
||
# linear-time syntax; unsupported constructs are rejected at config load.
|
||
# `action` defaults to `block`. Set it to `audit` for a shadow rollout that
|
||
# records raw-free findings without rejecting or modifying content. Redaction
|
||
# is intentionally not an action yet because safe replacement requires a
|
||
# mutation-aware boundary and match spans; configuring an unsupported action
|
||
# is rejected rather than silently treated as enforcement.
|
||
# Omit `starterPatterns` to enable the full starter catalog; set it to `[]`
|
||
# to disable starters while retaining any configured custom patterns.
|
||
# Enabling or changing this policy does not rewrite or delete stored records.
|
||
# Current policy rechecks protected fields when they are resubmitted and when
|
||
# records are copied, shared, or become model-bound. Safe partial metadata edits
|
||
# can succeed so records remain repairable, but persisted protected fields remain
|
||
# unusable on those paths until repaired. Protected prompt or preset fields may
|
||
# be blanked with `contentFilterBlocked: true` in management views. Prompt-group
|
||
# metadata blocked by policy returns an explicit error on direct GET, while
|
||
# collection and reuse responses omit that group.
|
||
# Automatic memory maintenance may log and skip a rejected background update
|
||
# while allowing the main chat response to continue.
|
||
# Legacy assistant rows without provenance default to `model_output`, preserving
|
||
# legacy behavior. Inventory or migrate those records before relying on retroactive
|
||
# enforcement. Opting into `inspect` treats otherwise unattributed assistant content,
|
||
# including selected attachment projections, as submitted; explicit model provenance
|
||
# remains exempt.
|
||
# Roll out strict file inspection deliberately: `uninspectable: block` can make
|
||
# older opaque files unavailable for reuse until inspectable text is present.
|
||
# filters:
|
||
# messages:
|
||
# unattributedAssistantContent: model_output # `model_output` (default) or `inspect`
|
||
# pii:
|
||
# action: audit # `block` (default), `audit`, or `redact` (reserved for transformation-aware ingress; current routes still block)
|
||
# # `redact` requires the later encrypted owner-view and canonical-message integration.
|
||
# # maxCharacters: 65536 # bounded total inspected text per transformation session
|
||
# # maxMatches: 256 # bounded matches per transformation session
|
||
# # Custom patterns may set category: email, phone, name, credential, or custom.
|
||
# fields: [name, text, summary, quote, answer, decision_response, decision_reason, content_part, attachment_reference, assembled_context]
|
||
# starterPatterns: [sk_prefix, bearer_header, api_key_header]
|
||
# customPatterns:
|
||
# - id: organization_identifier
|
||
# label: Organization identifier
|
||
# regex: "ORG-[A-Z0-9]{12}"
|
||
# prompts:
|
||
# pii:
|
||
# fields: [name, description, oneliner, category, command, text, preset_text, system, context, instructions, additional_instructions, greeting, example_input, example_output]
|
||
# agentInstructions:
|
||
# pii:
|
||
# fields: [name, category, description, instructions, additional_instructions, edge_description, edge_prompt, edge_prompt_key, artifacts, support_contact_name, support_contact_email]
|
||
# conversationStarters:
|
||
# pii:
|
||
# fields: [text]
|
||
# conversationTitles:
|
||
# pii:
|
||
# fields: [title]
|
||
# feedback:
|
||
# pii:
|
||
# fields: [text]
|
||
# skills:
|
||
# pii:
|
||
# fields: [name, display_title, description, category, frontmatter, instructions, imported_text, file_name, file_text]
|
||
# memories:
|
||
# pii:
|
||
# fields: [key, value, summary]
|
||
# files:
|
||
# pii:
|
||
# fields: [name, content, extracted_text, transcript, uri]
|
||
# # `allow` is the compatibility default. `block` rejects opaque or
|
||
# # oversized selected file content before provider/storage side effects.
|
||
# uninspectable: block
|
||
# toolArguments:
|
||
# pii:
|
||
# fields: [name, arguments, output]
|
||
# modelParameters:
|
||
# pii:
|
||
# fields: [stop, request_fields, response_format, metadata]
|
||
# actionMetadata:
|
||
# pii:
|
||
# fields: [raw_spec, domain, privacy_policy_url, authorization_type, custom_auth_header, authorization_content_type, authorization_url, client_url, scope, token_exchange_method, api_key, oauth_client_id, oauth_client_secret]
|
||
|
||
# Legacy message-only filter configuration. Existing deployments can continue
|
||
# using this shape while migrating message policy into `filters.messages`.
|
||
# When both shapes are configured, both policies apply. Prefer
|
||
# `filters.messages` for centrally managed source-aware policy.
|
||
# messageFilter:
|
||
# pii:
|
||
# # (optional) Pick a subset of the starter catalog by id; omit to
|
||
# # enable all starters (sk_prefix, bearer_header, api_key_header).
|
||
# starterPatterns: [sk_prefix, bearer_header, api_key_header]
|
||
# # (optional) Operator-defined patterns. Each entry needs id, label,
|
||
# # and a regex in RE2 syntax and semantics (RE2 is a linear-time engine
|
||
# # with no catastrophic backtracking; a few escapes such as \p, \A, and
|
||
# # \s differ from JavaScript). Backreferences and lookaround are not
|
||
# # supported; the regex is validated against the RE2 engine at config
|
||
# # load time and a pattern it cannot compile is rejected.
|
||
# customPatterns:
|
||
# - id: anthropic_api_key
|
||
# label: Anthropic API key
|
||
# regex: "sk-ant-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}"
|
||
|
||
# ACL writes retry only conflicts on an individual document.
|
||
# permissions:
|
||
# maxWriteAttempts: 3 # Integer 1-100, including the first attempt.
|