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* 🔒 fix: Prevent Cross-Tenant Role Grants on Shared Links The shared-link access middleware falls back to a system-wide lookup so a share owned by another tenant still resolves, then evaluates the ACL under the share owner's tenant. It was passing the viewer's `role` from their own tenant into that check. Role ACL principals are unqualified name strings, so a tenant-B user with role USER could satisfy a tenant-A private share granted to role USER (default role names collide across every tenant). Pass the viewer's role only for same-tenant views; use `null` for cross-tenant views so getUserPrincipals never builds a ROLE principal. `null` (not `undefined`) is required: `undefined` re-derives the role via an unscoped User lookup under runAsSystem for tenantId-less shares, reopening the bypass. Widen checkPermission's `role` param to `string | null`. Adds regression coverage for both the cross-tenant denial and same-tenant allow paths. * 🔒 fix: Use authenticated user tenant for same-tenant role trust Codex P2: share file routes (<img>/download) authenticate via optionalShareFileAuth from the refresh cookie and never establish tenant ALS context, so getTenantId() is undefined there. Comparing the share tenant to the ALS context wrongly denied a legitimate same-tenant viewer their ROLE grant on file/preview/download requests, even though the main share route authorized them. Compare the share tenant against the authenticated user's own tenantId, which is populated in both the JWT and cookie-auth paths (tenantContextMiddleware itself derives the ALS tenant from user.tenantId, and req.tenantId is never set, so user.tenantId is the authoritative, non-spoofable source). Adds a regression test for the no-ALS-context cookie-auth file request. |
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| .. | ||
| accessControlService.spec.ts | ||
| accessControlService.ts | ||