LibreChat/api/server/services/MCP.js
Dustin Healy 7c71d6dc1a
🛂 fix: Preserve OpenID Re-Auth Errors Through MCP Tool Error Classification (#15010)
The MCP tool-call catch block classifies errors by message substring, so an OpenIDReauthRequiredError raised during header resolution was rewritten into an MCP OAuth configuration prompt and its class identity discarded. The typed error now passes through ahead of the heuristic, so the actionable re-authentication message reaches the caller intact.
2026-08-19 14:21:39 -04:00

1449 lines
49 KiB
JavaScript

const { tool } = require('@librechat/agents/langchain/tools');
const { logger, getTenantId } = require('@librechat/data-schemas');
const { Providers, Constants: AgentConstants } = require('@librechat/agents');
const {
sendEvent,
PENDING_STALE_MS,
MCPOAuthHandler,
MCPTokenStorage,
isMCPDomainAllowed,
splitMCPToolKey,
normalizeServerName,
normalizeMCPToolKey,
buildServerNameAliases,
findShadowedServerNames,
getAssistantToolDefinitions: loadAssistantToolDefinitions,
resolveMCPServerContext,
normalizeJsonSchema,
GenerationJobManager,
resolveJsonSchemaRefs,
sanitizeGeminiSchema,
buildMCPAuthStepId,
buildMCPAuthToolCall,
processMCPEnv,
preProcessGraphTokens,
buildMCPAuthRunStepEvent,
buildMCPAuthRunStepDeltaEvent,
buildMCPAuthRunStepEndDeltaEvent,
isUserSourced,
checkAccessWithRequestCache,
getMissingCustomUserVars,
getUserMCPAuthMap,
getServerCustomUserVars,
requiresEphemeralUserConnection,
requiresOAuthMachinery,
hasRuntimeUrlPlaceholders,
containsGraphTokenPlaceholder,
isOAuthServer,
OpenIDReauthRequiredError,
} = require('@librechat/api');
const {
Time,
CacheKeys,
Constants,
Permissions,
PermissionTypes,
isAssistantsEndpoint,
} = require('librechat-data-provider');
const {
getOAuthReconnectionManager,
getMCPServersRegistry,
getFlowStateManager,
getMCPManager,
} = require('~/config');
const db = require('~/models');
const { findToken, createToken, updateToken, deleteTokens, findPluginAuthsByKeys } = db;
const { getGraphApiToken } = require('./GraphTokenService');
const { exchangeOboToken } = require('./OboTokenService');
const { createOboTrustChecker } = require('./OboPolicyService');
const { reinitMCPServer } = require('./Tools/mcp');
const {
getAppConfig,
getCachedTools,
getMCPServerTools,
cacheMCPServerTools,
} = require('./Config');
const { getLogStores } = require('~/cache');
const MAX_CACHE_SIZE = 1000;
const lastReconnectAttempts = new Map();
const RECONNECT_THROTTLE_MS = 10_000;
const missingToolCache = new Map();
const MISSING_TOOL_TTL_MS = 10_000;
async function userCanUseMCPServers(user, req) {
if (!user?.id || !user?.role) {
return false;
}
try {
return await checkAccessWithRequestCache({
req,
user,
permissionType: PermissionTypes.MCP_SERVERS,
permissions: [Permissions.USE],
getRoleByName: db.getRoleByName,
});
} catch (error) {
logger.error(`[MCP][User: ${user.id}] Failed MCP permission check`, error);
return false;
}
}
function createMCPPermissionContext(req) {
return {
canUseServers: (user = req?.user) => userCanUseMCPServers(user, req),
};
}
function evictStale(map, ttl) {
if (map.size <= MAX_CACHE_SIZE) {
return;
}
const now = Date.now();
for (const [key, timestamp] of map) {
if (now - timestamp >= ttl) {
map.delete(key);
}
if (map.size <= MAX_CACHE_SIZE) {
return;
}
}
}
const unavailableMsg =
"This tool's MCP server is temporarily unavailable. Please try again shortly.";
function getOAuthFlowId(userId, serverName, tenantId = getTenantId()) {
if (!tenantId) {
return MCPOAuthHandler.generateFlowId(userId, serverName);
}
return MCPOAuthHandler.generateFlowId(userId, serverName, tenantId);
}
async function getAppConfigForRequest(req) {
const user = req?.user;
return await getAppConfigForUser(user?.id, user);
}
async function getAppConfigForUser(userId, user) {
return await getAppConfig({ role: user?.role, tenantId: getTenantId(), userId });
}
/**
* Resolves config-source MCP servers from admin Config overrides for the current
* request context. Returns the parsed configs keyed by server name.
* @param {import('express').Request} req - Express request with user context
* @returns {Promise<Record<string, import('@librechat/api').ParsedServerConfig>>}
*/
async function resolveConfigServers(req) {
try {
const registry = getMCPServersRegistry();
const appConfig = await getAppConfigForRequest(req);
return await registry.ensureConfigServers(appConfig?.mcpConfig || {});
} catch (error) {
logger.warn(
'[resolveConfigServers] Failed to resolve config servers, degrading to empty:',
error,
);
return {};
}
}
/**
* Resolves operator-managed MCP server names from admin Config overrides for the current request.
* Returns a request-time snapshot for DB server creation, not a cross-process lock.
* @throws Propagates app config lookup errors to keep DB server creation fail-closed.
* @param {import('express').Request} req - Express request with user context
* @returns {Promise<string[]>}
*/
async function resolveMcpConfigNames(req) {
const appConfig = await getAppConfigForRequest(req);
return Object.keys(appConfig?.mcpConfig || {});
}
/**
* All configured server names in the normalized form tool keys are built with.
* Unlike `resolveConfigServers`, this keeps unmodified YAML servers, which
* `ensureConfigServers` skips - those are exactly the ones that must still
* resolve the tool-key boundary.
* @param {import('express').Request} req
* @returns {Promise<string[]>}
*/
async function resolveMcpServerNames(req) {
try {
const names = await resolveMcpConfigNames(req);
return names.map(normalizeServerName);
} catch (error) {
logger.warn(
'[resolveMcpServerNames] Failed to resolve server names, degrading to empty:',
error,
);
return [];
}
}
/**
* Config-source servers and all configured names from a single app-config read,
* so the tool-loading path does not pay two lookups for the same principal.
* Degrades to empty like `resolveConfigServers` rather than aborting tool loading.
* @param {import('express').Request} req
* @returns {Promise<{ configServers: Record<string, import('@librechat/api').ParsedServerConfig>, serverNames: string[] }>}
*/
async function resolveMcpServerContext(req) {
try {
const appConfig = await getAppConfigForRequest(req);
return await resolveMCPServerContext({
mcpConfig: appConfig?.mcpConfig || {},
ensureConfigServers: (mcpConfig) => getMCPServersRegistry().ensureConfigServers(mcpConfig),
});
} catch (error) {
logger.warn(
'[resolveMcpServerContext] Failed to resolve MCP servers, degrading to empty:',
error,
);
return { configServers: {}, serverNames: [], rawServerNames: [] };
}
}
/**
* Resolves config-source servers and merges all server configs (YAML + config + user DB)
* for the given user context. Shared helper for controllers needing the full merged config.
* @param {string} userId
* @param {{ id?: string, role?: string }} [user]
* @returns {Promise<Record<string, import('@librechat/api').ParsedServerConfig>>}
*/
/**
* Names of every MCP server the user can reach (operator config + user DB),
* for the legacy-key heal's collision detection in `initializeAgent`. Only
* consulted when a configured server name needs normalization.
* @param {string} [userId]
* @param {string} [role]
* @returns {Promise<string[]>}
*/
async function getAccessibleMcpServerNames(userId, role) {
const configs = await resolveAllMcpConfigs(
userId,
role != null ? { id: userId, role } : { id: userId },
);
return Object.keys(configs ?? {});
}
/**
* Heals legacy raw-keyed MCP tool names in an assistant payload to the
* current normalized cache keys. Cached tool definitions are keyed
* `${toolName}${mcp_delimiter}${normalizeServerName(server)}`, while an
* assistant saved before that convention resubmits the raw-suffixed string
* on every edit — the controllers' exact-only lookup would then silently
* drop the tool from the assistant. SHADOWED raw names (normalized slot
* claimed by another configured server) stay raw and fail closed, mirroring
* the runtime heal, with the shadow set built from the FULL accessible
* audit (cross-tier collisions included) and healing skipped outright when
* that audit cannot complete. Config names are read only when a
* delimiter-bearing name actually misses the cache; config-read failures
* propagate (write path) rather than silently dropping the tool. Healed
* string entries dedupe order-preserving so a payload carrying both
* spellings can't submit duplicate function names.
* @param {object} params
* @param {ServerRequest} params.req
* @param {Array<string | object>} [params.tools]
* @param {Record<string, unknown>} params.toolDefinitions
* @returns {Promise<Array<string | object>>}
*/
async function healMcpToolNames({ req, tools, toolDefinitions }) {
const list = tools ?? [];
const needsHeal = list.some(
(tool) =>
typeof tool === 'string' &&
tool.includes(Constants.mcp_delimiter) &&
toolDefinitions[tool] == null,
);
if (!needsHeal) {
return list;
}
const rawServerNames = await resolveMcpConfigNames(req);
/** Cross-tier shadowing (DB `foo` vs operator `foo!`) is invisible to
* operator names alone — the shadow set must come from the FULL
* accessible audit. Every rewrite candidate here is normalization-
* sensitive by construction, so an incomplete audit skips healing
* entirely (the raw key stays raw and fails closed). */
const audit = await resolveCollisionAuditNames({
rawServerNames,
userId: req.user?.id,
role: req.user?.role,
});
if (!audit.complete) {
return list;
}
const shadowed = findShadowedServerNames(audit.names);
const seen = new Set();
const healedList = [];
for (const tool of list) {
let healedTool = tool;
if (
typeof tool === 'string' &&
tool.includes(Constants.mcp_delimiter) &&
toolDefinitions[tool] == null
) {
const [, parsedServerName] = splitMCPToolKey(tool, rawServerNames);
if (
parsedServerName != null &&
rawServerNames.includes(parsedServerName) &&
!shadowed.has(parsedServerName)
) {
const healed = normalizeMCPToolKey(tool, rawServerNames);
if (toolDefinitions[healed] != null) {
healedTool = healed;
}
}
}
/** A payload carrying both spellings collapses to one entry after the
* heal — duplicate function names make providers reject the save. */
if (typeof healedTool === 'string') {
if (seen.has(healedTool)) {
continue;
}
seen.add(healedTool);
}
healedList.push(healedTool);
}
return healedList;
}
/**
* Loads static and MCP function definitions used by assistant create/update writes. MCP catalogs
* are stored per server and effective config, so assistant writers must resolve the referenced
* server slices instead of relying on the static aggregate cache.
* @param {object} params
* @param {ServerRequest} params.req
* @param {Array<string | object>} [params.tools]
* @returns {Promise<object>}
*/
async function getAssistantToolDefinitions({ req, tools }) {
const registry = getMCPServersRegistry();
const appConfig = await getAppConfigForRequest(req);
return await loadAssistantToolDefinitions(
{
user: req.user,
tools,
staticTools: (await getCachedTools()) ?? {},
mcpConfig: appConfig?.mcpConfig ?? {},
},
{
ensureConfigServers: (mcpConfig) => registry.ensureConfigServers(mcpConfig),
getAllServerConfigs: (userId, configServers, role) =>
registry.getAllServerConfigs(userId, configServers, role),
getMCPServerTools,
getServerToolFunctionsSnapshot: async (userId, serverName, serverConfig) =>
(await getMCPManager()?.getServerToolFunctionsSnapshot(
userId,
serverName,
serverConfig,
)) ?? {
tools: null,
},
recoverServerTools: async (serverName, serverConfig) => {
const userMCPAuthMap = await getUserMCPAuthMap({
userId: req.user.id,
servers: [serverName],
findPluginAuthsByKeys,
});
const result = await reinitMCPServer({
user: req.user,
serverName,
serverConfig,
userMCPAuthMap,
});
return result?.availableTools ?? null;
},
cacheMCPServerTools,
},
);
}
/**
* Resolves the name set MCP collision guards audit against. Prefers the
* caller-threaded accessible set; self-fetches only when a configured name
* needs normalization (safe-name deployments never pay the lookup); reports
* `complete: false` when the full set was needed but unavailable — callers
* must then fail closed for normalization-sensitive references instead of
* auditing against operator names alone.
* @param {object} params
* @param {readonly string[]} params.rawServerNames
* @param {readonly string[]} [params.accessibleServerNames]
* @param {string} [params.userId]
* @param {string} [params.role]
* @returns {Promise<{ names: readonly string[], complete: boolean }>}
*/
async function resolveCollisionAuditNames({ rawServerNames, accessibleServerNames, userId, role }) {
if (accessibleServerNames?.length) {
return { names: accessibleServerNames, complete: true };
}
const needsFullAudit = rawServerNames.some((name) => normalizeServerName(name) !== name);
if (!needsFullAudit) {
return { names: rawServerNames, complete: true };
}
try {
const names = await getAccessibleMcpServerNames(userId, role);
/** `resolveAllMcpConfigs` tolerates `ensureConfigServers` failures, so
* the merged read can silently omit config-only servers. The caller's
* raw config names come from the app-config snapshot (registry-
* independent), so the union keeps `complete: true` honest. */
return { names: [...new Set([...names, ...rawServerNames])], complete: true };
} catch (error) {
logger.warn(
'[MCP] Collision audit unavailable; normalization-sensitive references fail closed:',
error,
);
return { names: rawServerNames, complete: false };
}
}
async function resolveAllMcpConfigs(userId, user) {
const registry = getMCPServersRegistry();
const appConfig = await getAppConfigForUser(userId, user);
let configServers = {};
try {
configServers = await registry.ensureConfigServers(appConfig?.mcpConfig || {});
} catch (error) {
logger.warn(
'[resolveAllMcpConfigs] Config server resolution failed, continuing without:',
error,
);
}
if (user?.role) {
return await registry.getAllServerConfigs(userId, configServers, user.role);
}
return await registry.getAllServerConfigs(userId, configServers);
}
/**
* Best-effort early gate; the authoritative check is
* `assertResolvedRuntimeConfigAllowed` in `@librechat/api`, whose resolution
* this must mirror. Graph placeholders resolve later (async), so a URL still
* carrying one defers to the authoritative check instead of rejecting here.
*/
async function isEarlyDomainAllowed({
serverConfig,
user,
requestBody,
userMCPAuthMap,
serverName,
allowedDomains,
allowedAddresses,
}) {
const validationConfig = processMCPEnv({
user,
body: requestBody,
dbSourced: isUserSourced(serverConfig),
options: serverConfig,
customUserVars: getServerCustomUserVars(userMCPAuthMap, serverName),
});
if (
typeof validationConfig?.url === 'string' &&
containsGraphTokenPlaceholder(validationConfig.url)
) {
return true;
}
return await isMCPDomainAllowed(validationConfig, allowedDomains, allowedAddresses);
}
/**
* @param {string} toolName
* @param {string} serverName
*/
function createUnavailableToolStub(toolName, serverName) {
const normalizedToolKey = `${toolName}${Constants.mcp_delimiter}${normalizeServerName(serverName)}`;
const _call = async () => [unavailableMsg, null];
const toolInstance = tool(_call, {
schema: {
type: 'object',
properties: {
input: { type: 'string', description: 'Input for the tool' },
},
required: [],
},
name: normalizedToolKey,
description: unavailableMsg,
responseFormat: AgentConstants.CONTENT_AND_ARTIFACT,
});
toolInstance.mcp = true;
toolInstance.mcpRawServerName = serverName;
return toolInstance;
}
function isEmptyObjectSchema(jsonSchema) {
return (
jsonSchema != null &&
typeof jsonSchema === 'object' &&
jsonSchema.type === 'object' &&
(jsonSchema.properties == null || Object.keys(jsonSchema.properties).length === 0) &&
!jsonSchema.additionalProperties
);
}
/**
* @param {object} params
* @param {ServerResponse} params.res - The Express response object for sending events.
* @param {string} params.stepId - The ID of the step in the flow.
* @param {ToolCallChunk} params.toolCall - The tool call object containing tool information.
* @param {string | null} [params.streamId] - The stream ID for resumable mode.
* @param {number} [params.jobCreatedAt] - The generation epoch that owns emitted events.
*/
function createRunStepDeltaEmitter({ res, stepId, toolCall, streamId = null, jobCreatedAt }) {
/**
* @param {string} authURL - The URL to redirect the user for OAuth authentication.
* @param {{ expiresAt?: number }} [options]
* @returns {Promise<void>}
*/
return async function (authURL, options) {
const eventData = buildMCPAuthRunStepDeltaEvent({ authURL, stepId, toolCall, options });
if (streamId) {
await GenerationJobManager.emitChunk(streamId, eventData, {
expectedCreatedAt: jobCreatedAt,
});
} else {
sendEvent(res, eventData);
}
};
}
/**
* @param {object} params
* @param {ServerResponse} params.res - The Express response object for sending events.
* @param {string} params.runId - The Run ID, i.e. message ID
* @param {string} params.stepId - The ID of the step in the flow.
* @param {ToolCallChunk} params.toolCall - The tool call object containing tool information.
* @param {number} [params.index]
* @param {string | null} [params.streamId] - The stream ID for resumable mode.
* @param {number} [params.jobCreatedAt] - The generation epoch that owns emitted events.
* @returns {() => Promise<void>}
*/
function createRunStepEmitter({
res,
runId,
stepId,
toolCall,
index,
streamId = null,
jobCreatedAt,
}) {
return async function () {
const eventData = buildMCPAuthRunStepEvent({ runId, stepId, toolCall, index });
if (streamId) {
await GenerationJobManager.emitChunk(streamId, eventData, {
expectedCreatedAt: jobCreatedAt,
});
} else {
sendEvent(res, eventData);
}
};
}
/**
* Creates a function used to ensure the flow handler is only invoked once
* @param {object} params
* @param {string} params.flowId - The ID of the login flow.
* @param {FlowStateManager<any>} params.flowManager - The flow manager instance.
* @param {(authURL: string, options?: { expiresAt?: number }) => void | Promise<void>} [params.callback]
*/
function createOAuthStart({ flowId, flowManager, callback }) {
/**
* Creates a function to handle OAuth login requests.
* @param {string} authURL - The URL to redirect the user for OAuth authentication.
* @param {{ expiresAt?: number }} [options]
* @returns {Promise<boolean>} Returns true to indicate the event was sent successfully.
*/
return async function (authURL, options) {
let emitted = false;
const emitOAuthStart = async (message) => {
if (options) {
await callback?.(authURL, options);
} else {
await callback?.(authURL);
}
emitted = true;
logger.debug(message);
};
const existingFlow = await flowManager.getFlowState(flowId, 'oauth_login');
if (existingFlow) {
await emitOAuthStart('Re-sent OAuth login request to client');
return true;
}
await flowManager.createFlowWithHandler(flowId, 'oauth_login', async () => {
await emitOAuthStart('Sent OAuth login request to client');
return true;
});
if (!emitted) {
await emitOAuthStart('Re-sent OAuth login request to client');
}
return true;
};
}
/**
* @param {object} params
* @param {ServerResponse} params.res - The Express response object for sending events.
* @param {string} params.stepId - The ID of the step in the flow.
* @param {ToolCallChunk} params.toolCall - The tool call object containing tool information.
* @param {string | null} [params.streamId] - The stream ID for resumable mode.
* @param {number} [params.jobCreatedAt] - The generation epoch that owns emitted events.
*/
function createOAuthEnd({ res, stepId, toolCall, streamId = null, jobCreatedAt }) {
return async function () {
const eventData = buildMCPAuthRunStepEndDeltaEvent({ stepId, toolCall });
if (streamId) {
await GenerationJobManager.emitChunk(streamId, eventData, {
expectedCreatedAt: jobCreatedAt,
});
} else {
sendEvent(res, eventData);
}
logger.debug('Sent OAuth login success to client');
};
}
/**
* @param {Object} params
* @param {() => Promise<void>} params.runStepEmitter
* @param {(authURL: string, options?: { expiresAt?: number }) => Promise<void>} params.runStepDeltaEmitter
* @returns {(authURL: string, options?: { expiresAt?: number }) => Promise<void>}
*/
function createOAuthCallback({ runStepEmitter, runStepDeltaEmitter }) {
return async function (authURL, options) {
await runStepEmitter();
await runStepDeltaEmitter(authURL, options);
};
}
/**
* @param {Object} params
* @param {ServerResponse} params.res - The Express response object for sending events.
* @param {IUser} params.user - The user from the request object.
* @param {string} params.serverName
* @param {AbortSignal} params.signal
* @param {string} params.model
* @param {number} [params.index]
* @param {string | null} [params.streamId] - The stream ID for resumable mode.
* @param {number} [params.jobCreatedAt] - The generation epoch that owns emitted events.
* @param {Record<string, Record<string, string>>} [params.userMCPAuthMap]
* @param {import('@librechat/api').RequestScopedMCPConnectionStore} [params.requestScopedConnections]
* @param {import('@librechat/api').ParsedServerConfig} [params.serverConfig] - Used to bypass reconnect throttling for request-scoped servers.
* @returns { Promise<Array<typeof tool | { _call: (toolInput: Object | string) => unknown}>> } An object with `_call` method to execute the tool input.
*/
async function reconnectServer({
res,
user,
index,
signal,
serverName,
serverConfig,
configServers,
userMCPAuthMap,
requestBody,
requestScopedConnections,
streamId = null,
jobCreatedAt,
}) {
logger.debug(
`[MCP][reconnectServer] serverName: ${serverName}, user: ${user?.id}, hasUserMCPAuthMap: ${!!userMCPAuthMap}`,
);
// Request-scoped servers reconnect on every message by design; throttling them
// would stub out healthy tools for messages sent within the throttle window.
const requestScoped = serverConfig ? requiresEphemeralUserConnection(serverConfig) : false;
if (!requestScoped) {
const throttleKey = `${user.id}:${serverName}`;
const now = Date.now();
const lastAttempt = lastReconnectAttempts.get(throttleKey) ?? 0;
if (now - lastAttempt < RECONNECT_THROTTLE_MS) {
logger.debug(`[MCP][reconnectServer] Throttled reconnect for ${serverName}`);
return null;
}
lastReconnectAttempts.set(throttleKey, now);
evictStale(lastReconnectAttempts, RECONNECT_THROTTLE_MS);
}
const runId = Constants.USE_PRELIM_RESPONSE_MESSAGE_ID;
const flowId = `${user.id}:${serverName}:${Date.now()}`;
const flowManager = getFlowStateManager(getLogStores(CacheKeys.FLOWS));
const stepId = buildMCPAuthStepId(serverName);
const toolCall = buildMCPAuthToolCall({
id: flowId,
serverName,
});
const runStepEmitter = createRunStepEmitter({
res,
index,
runId,
stepId,
toolCall,
streamId,
jobCreatedAt,
});
const runStepDeltaEmitter = createRunStepDeltaEmitter({
res,
stepId,
toolCall,
streamId,
jobCreatedAt,
});
const callback = createOAuthCallback({ runStepEmitter, runStepDeltaEmitter });
const oauthStart = createOAuthStart({
res,
flowId,
callback,
flowManager,
});
return await reinitMCPServer({
user,
signal,
serverName,
configServers,
oauthStart,
flowManager,
userMCPAuthMap,
requestBody,
requestScopedConnections,
forceNew: true,
returnOnOAuth: false,
connectionTimeout: Time.THIRTY_SECONDS,
});
}
/**
* Creates all tools from the specified MCP Server via `toolKey`.
*
* This function assumes tools could not be aggregated from the cache of tool definitions,
* i.e. `availableTools`, and will reinitialize the MCP server to ensure all tools are generated.
*
* @param {Object} params
* @param {ServerResponse} params.res - The Express response object for sending events.
* @param {{ canUseServers: (user?: IUser) => Promise<boolean> }} [params.mcpPermissionContext] - Request-scoped MCP permission context.
* @param {IUser} params.user - The user from the request object.
* @param {string} params.serverName
* @param {string} params.model
* @param {Providers | EModelEndpoint} params.provider - The provider for the tool.
* @param {number} [params.index]
* @param {AbortSignal} [params.signal]
* @param {string | null} [params.streamId] - The stream ID for resumable mode.
* @param {number} [params.jobCreatedAt] - The generation epoch that owns emitted events.
* @param {import('@librechat/api').ParsedServerConfig} [params.config]
* @param {import('@librechat/api').RequestBody} [params.requestBody]
* @param {import('@librechat/api').RequestScopedMCPConnectionStore} [params.requestScopedConnections]
* @param {Record<string, Record<string, string>>} [params.userMCPAuthMap]
* @returns { Promise<Array<typeof tool | { _call: (toolInput: Object | string) => unknown}>> } An object with `_call` method to execute the tool input.
*/
async function createMCPTools({
res,
mcpPermissionContext,
user,
index,
signal,
config,
provider,
serverName,
configServers,
userMCPAuthMap,
requestBody,
requestScopedConnections,
streamId = null,
jobCreatedAt,
}) {
const serverConfig =
config ?? (await getMCPServersRegistry().getServerConfig(serverName, user?.id, configServers));
if (serverConfig?.url) {
const appConfig = await getAppConfig({
role: user?.role,
tenantId: user?.tenantId,
userId: user?.id,
});
const allowedDomains = appConfig?.mcpSettings?.allowedDomains;
const allowedAddresses = appConfig?.mcpSettings?.allowedAddresses;
const isDomainAllowed = await isEarlyDomainAllowed({
serverConfig,
user,
requestBody,
userMCPAuthMap,
serverName,
allowedDomains,
allowedAddresses,
});
if (!isDomainAllowed) {
logger.warn(`[MCP][${serverName}] Domain not allowed, skipping all tools`);
return [];
}
}
const result = await reconnectServer({
res,
user,
index,
signal,
serverName,
serverConfig,
configServers,
userMCPAuthMap,
requestBody,
requestScopedConnections,
streamId,
jobCreatedAt,
});
if (result === null) {
logger.debug(`[MCP][${serverName}] Reconnect throttled, skipping tool creation.`);
return [];
}
if (!result || !result.tools) {
logger.warn(`[MCP][${serverName}] Failed to reinitialize MCP server.`);
return [];
}
const serverTools = [];
for (const tool of result.tools) {
const toolInstance = await createMCPTool({
res,
mcpPermissionContext,
user,
provider,
userMCPAuthMap,
configServers,
streamId,
jobCreatedAt,
availableTools: result.availableTools,
serverName,
/** Model-facing key: matches the normalized `availableTools` keys and
* the instance name `createToolInstance` will assign. */
toolKey: `${tool.name}${Constants.mcp_delimiter}${normalizeServerName(serverName)}`,
requestBody,
requestScopedConnections,
config: serverConfig,
});
if (toolInstance) {
serverTools.push(toolInstance);
}
}
return serverTools;
}
/**
* Creates a single tool from the specified MCP Server via `toolKey`.
* @param {Object} params
* @param {ServerResponse} params.res - The Express response object for sending events.
* @param {{ canUseServers: (user?: IUser) => Promise<boolean> }} [params.mcpPermissionContext] - Request-scoped MCP permission context.
* @param {IUser} params.user - The user from the request object.
* @param {string} params.toolKey - The toolKey for the tool.
* @param {string} params.model - The model for the tool.
* @param {number} [params.index]
* @param {AbortSignal} [params.signal]
* @param {string | null} [params.streamId] - The stream ID for resumable mode.
* @param {Providers | EModelEndpoint} params.provider - The provider for the tool.
* @param {LCAvailableTools} [params.availableTools]
* @param {import('@librechat/api').RequestBody} [params.requestBody]
* @param {import('@librechat/api').RequestScopedMCPConnectionStore} [params.requestScopedConnections]
* @param {Record<string, Record<string, string>>} [params.userMCPAuthMap]
* @param {import('@librechat/api').ParsedServerConfig} [params.config]
* @param {(availableTools: LCAvailableTools) => void} [params.onAvailableTools]
* @param {number} [params.jobCreatedAt] - The generation epoch that owns emitted events.
* @returns { Promise<typeof tool | { _call: (toolInput: Object | string) => unknown}> } An object with `_call` method to execute the tool input.
*/
async function createMCPTool({
res,
mcpPermissionContext,
user,
index,
signal,
toolKey,
provider,
userMCPAuthMap,
availableTools,
requestBody,
requestScopedConnections,
config,
configServers,
serverName: resolvedServerName,
onAvailableTools,
streamId = null,
jobCreatedAt,
}) {
/** `loadTools` already resolved the server for this key; parsing is the fallback. */
const [parsedToolName, parsedServerName] = splitMCPToolKey(
toolKey,
/** Current keys embed the NORMALIZED server name, legacy persisted keys
* the RAW one — the candidate list needs both spellings or a raw name
* that contains the delimiter mis-splits under the generic fallback. */
resolvedServerName
? [resolvedServerName, normalizeServerName(resolvedServerName)]
: Object.keys(configServers ?? {}).flatMap((name) => [name, normalizeServerName(name)]),
);
let serverName = resolvedServerName ?? parsedServerName;
const toolName = parsedToolName;
let serverConfig =
config ?? (await getMCPServersRegistry().getServerConfig(serverName, user?.id, configServers));
/** DIRECT-FIRST alias fallback: only when the parsed name resolves to no
* server is it treated as the normalized spelling of a raw config name —
* a user-DB server named like an operator server's normalized form must
* keep its own identity. */
if (!serverConfig && resolvedServerName == null && parsedServerName != null) {
const aliasedName = buildServerNameAliases(Object.keys(configServers ?? {})).get(
parsedServerName,
);
if (aliasedName != null && aliasedName !== parsedServerName) {
serverConfig = await getMCPServersRegistry().getServerConfig(
aliasedName,
user?.id,
configServers,
);
if (serverConfig) {
serverName = aliasedName;
}
}
}
const requestScopedTools = serverConfig ? requiresEphemeralUserConnection(serverConfig) : false;
const useMissingToolCache = !requestScopedTools;
if (serverConfig?.url) {
const appConfig = await getAppConfig({
role: user?.role,
tenantId: user?.tenantId,
userId: user?.id,
});
const allowedDomains = appConfig?.mcpSettings?.allowedDomains;
const allowedAddresses = appConfig?.mcpSettings?.allowedAddresses;
const isDomainAllowed = await isEarlyDomainAllowed({
serverConfig,
user,
requestBody,
userMCPAuthMap,
serverName,
allowedDomains,
allowedAddresses,
});
if (!isDomainAllowed) {
logger.warn(`[MCP][${serverName}] Domain no longer allowed, skipping tool: ${toolName}`);
return undefined;
}
}
/** Legacy keys persisted pre-normalization (assistants, direct tool
* calls) carry the RAW server name, while `availableTools` is keyed by
* the canonical normalized key — look up both spellings. */
const canonicalToolKey =
serverName != null
? `${toolName}${Constants.mcp_delimiter}${normalizeServerName(serverName)}`
: toolKey;
const findToolDefinition = (tools) =>
tools?.[toolKey]?.function ??
(canonicalToolKey !== toolKey ? tools?.[canonicalToolKey]?.function : undefined);
/** @type {LCTool | undefined} */
let toolDefinition = findToolDefinition(availableTools);
if (!toolDefinition) {
const cachedAt = useMissingToolCache ? missingToolCache.get(toolKey) : undefined;
if (cachedAt && Date.now() - cachedAt < MISSING_TOOL_TTL_MS) {
logger.debug(
`[MCP][${serverName}][${toolName}] Tool in negative cache, returning unavailable stub.`,
);
return createUnavailableToolStub(toolName, serverName);
}
logger.warn(
`[MCP][${serverName}][${toolName}] Requested tool not found in available tools, re-initializing MCP server.`,
);
const result = await reconnectServer({
res,
user,
index,
signal,
serverName,
serverConfig,
configServers,
userMCPAuthMap,
requestBody,
requestScopedConnections,
streamId,
jobCreatedAt,
});
if (result?.availableTools) {
onAvailableTools?.(result.availableTools);
}
toolDefinition = findToolDefinition(result?.availableTools);
if (!toolDefinition && useMissingToolCache) {
missingToolCache.set(toolKey, Date.now());
evictStale(missingToolCache, MISSING_TOOL_TTL_MS);
}
}
if (!toolDefinition) {
logger.warn(
`[MCP][${serverName}][${toolName}] Tool definition not found, returning unavailable stub.`,
);
return createUnavailableToolStub(toolName, serverName);
}
return createToolInstance({
res,
mcpPermissionContext,
user,
requestBody,
requestScopedConnections,
provider,
toolName,
serverName,
serverConfig,
toolDefinition,
streamId,
jobCreatedAt,
});
}
function createToolInstance({
res,
mcpPermissionContext,
user: capturedUser = null,
requestBody: capturedRequestBody,
requestScopedConnections: capturedRequestScopedConnections,
toolName,
serverName,
serverConfig: capturedServerConfig,
toolDefinition,
provider: capturedProvider,
streamId = null,
jobCreatedAt,
}) {
/** @type {LCTool} */
const { description, parameters } = toolDefinition;
const isGoogle = capturedProvider === Providers.VERTEXAI || capturedProvider === Providers.GOOGLE;
let schema = parameters ? normalizeJsonSchema(resolveJsonSchemaRefs(parameters)) : null;
if (schema && isGoogle) {
// Gemini/Vertex AI accept only a subset of JSON Schema; sanitize so MCP tools with
// unions, non-string enums, etc. don't 400 (they work as-is on OpenAI/Claude).
schema = sanitizeGeminiSchema(schema);
}
if (!schema || (isGoogle && isEmptyObjectSchema(schema))) {
schema = {
type: 'object',
properties: {
input: { type: 'string', description: 'Input for the tool' },
},
required: [],
};
}
const normalizedToolKey = `${toolName}${Constants.mcp_delimiter}${normalizeServerName(serverName)}`;
/** @type {(toolArguments: Object | string, config?: GraphRunnableConfig) => Promise<unknown>} */
const _call = async (toolArguments, config) => {
const effectiveUser = config?.configurable?.user ?? capturedUser;
const permissionUser = effectiveUser;
const userId = effectiveUser?.id || config?.configurable?.user_id || capturedUser?.id;
try {
const provider = (config?.metadata?.provider || capturedProvider)?.toLowerCase();
const canUseMCP = mcpPermissionContext
? await mcpPermissionContext.canUseServers(permissionUser)
: await userCanUseMCPServers(permissionUser);
if (!canUseMCP) {
throw new Error('Forbidden: Insufficient MCP server permissions');
}
const flowsCache = getLogStores(CacheKeys.FLOWS);
const flowManager = getFlowStateManager(flowsCache);
const derivedSignal = config?.signal ? AbortSignal.any([config.signal]) : undefined;
const mcpManager = getMCPManager(userId);
const { args: _args, stepId, ...toolCall } = config.toolCall ?? {};
const flowId = `${serverName}:oauth_login:${config.metadata.thread_id}:${config.metadata.run_id}`;
const runStepDeltaEmitter = createRunStepDeltaEmitter({
res,
stepId,
toolCall,
streamId,
jobCreatedAt,
});
const oauthStart = createOAuthStart({
flowId,
flowManager,
callback: runStepDeltaEmitter,
});
const oauthEnd = createOAuthEnd({
res,
stepId,
toolCall,
streamId,
jobCreatedAt,
});
const customUserVars =
config?.configurable?.userMCPAuthMap?.[`${Constants.mcp_prefix}${serverName}`];
const result = await mcpManager.callTool({
serverName,
serverConfig: capturedServerConfig,
toolName,
provider,
toolArguments,
options: {
signal: derivedSignal,
},
user: effectiveUser,
requestBody: config?.configurable?.requestBody ?? capturedRequestBody,
requestScopedConnections:
config?.configurable?.requestScopedConnections ?? capturedRequestScopedConnections,
customUserVars,
flowManager,
tokenMethods: {
findToken,
createToken,
updateToken,
deleteTokens,
},
oauthStart,
oauthEnd,
graphTokenResolver: getGraphApiToken,
oboTokenResolver: exchangeOboToken,
oboTrustChecker: createOboTrustChecker(),
});
if (isAssistantsEndpoint(provider) && Array.isArray(result)) {
return result[0];
}
return result;
} catch (error) {
logger.error(
`[MCP][${serverName}][${toolName}][User: ${userId}] Error calling MCP tool:`,
error,
);
/** Carries the actionable re-auth message; the substring heuristic below would misreport it as an OAuth configuration problem */
if (error instanceof OpenIDReauthRequiredError) {
throw error;
}
/** OAuth error, provide a helpful message */
const isOAuthError =
error.message?.includes('401') ||
error.message?.includes('OAuth') ||
error.message?.includes('authentication') ||
error.message?.includes('Non-200 status code (401)');
const isOAuthFlowSignal =
error.message === 'OAuth flow initiated - return early' ||
error.message === 'Pending OAuth flow reused - return early';
if (isOAuthError) {
if (
capturedServerConfig &&
!requiresOAuthMachinery(capturedServerConfig) &&
!isOAuthFlowSignal
) {
throw new Error(
`[MCP][${serverName}][${toolName}] upstream authentication failed; MCP OAuth is not configured for this server.`,
);
}
throw new Error(
`[MCP][${serverName}][${toolName}] OAuth authentication required. Please check the server logs for the authentication URL.`,
);
}
throw new Error(
`[MCP][${serverName}][${toolName}] tool call failed${error?.message ? `: ${error?.message}` : '.'}`,
);
}
};
const toolInstance = tool(_call, {
schema,
name: normalizedToolKey,
description: description || '',
responseFormat: AgentConstants.CONTENT_AND_ARTIFACT,
});
toolInstance.mcp = true;
toolInstance.mcpRawServerName = serverName;
// Ephemeral request-scoped servers (runtime body placeholders) tear their
// connection down at request end, so they must never be backgrounded. A
// missing/stale config means the server's lifetime is unknowable, so fail
// closed (foreground) rather than risk a detached call against a torn-down
// connection.
toolInstance.mcpRequiresEphemeralConnection = capturedServerConfig
? requiresEphemeralUserConnection(capturedServerConfig)
: true;
// On Google/Vertex, propagate the union-flattened schema so definitions extracted
// from this instance don't reach the Gemini converter with unsupported unions.
toolInstance.mcpJsonSchema = isGoogle ? schema : parameters;
return toolInstance;
}
/**
* Get MCP setup data including config, connections, and OAuth servers.
* Resolves config-source servers from admin Config overrides when tenant context is available.
* @param {string} userId - The user ID
* @param {{ role?: string, tenantId?: string }} [options] - Optional role/tenant context
* @returns {Object} Object containing mcpConfig, appConnections, userConnections, and oauthServers
*/
async function getMCPSetupData(userId, options = {}) {
const registry = getMCPServersRegistry();
const { role, tenantId } = options;
const appConfig = await getAppConfig({ role, tenantId, userId });
const configServers = await registry.ensureConfigServers(appConfig?.mcpConfig || {});
const mcpConfig = role
? await registry.getAllServerConfigs(userId, configServers, role)
: await registry.getAllServerConfigs(userId, configServers);
const mcpManager = getMCPManager(userId);
/** @type {Map<string, import('@librechat/api').MCPConnection>} */
let appConnections = new Map();
try {
// Use getLoaded() instead of getAll() to avoid forcing connection creation.
// getAll() creates connections for all servers, which is problematic for servers
// that require user context (e.g., those with {{LIBRECHAT_USER_ID}} placeholders).
appConnections = (await mcpManager.appConnections?.getLoaded()) || new Map();
} catch (error) {
logger.error(`[MCP][User: ${userId}] Error getting app connections:`, error);
}
const userConnections = mcpManager.getUserConnections(userId) || new Map();
const oauthServers = new Set(
Object.entries(mcpConfig)
.filter(([, config]) => isOAuthServer(config))
.map(([name]) => name),
);
return {
mcpConfig,
oauthServers,
appConnections,
userConnections,
};
}
/**
* Check OAuth flow status for a user and server
* @param {string} userId - The user ID
* @param {string} serverName - The server name
* @param {string} [tenantId] - The tenant ID for the current request.
* @returns {Object} Object containing active and failed flow flags
*/
async function checkOAuthFlowStatus(userId, serverName, tenantId = getTenantId()) {
const flowsCache = getLogStores(CacheKeys.FLOWS);
const flowManager = getFlowStateManager(flowsCache);
const flowId = getOAuthFlowId(userId, serverName, tenantId);
try {
const flowState = await flowManager.getFlowState(flowId, 'mcp_oauth');
if (!flowState) {
return { hasActiveFlow: false, hasFailedFlow: false };
}
const flowAge = Date.now() - flowState.createdAt;
// Report active only while the flow is still usable (the handling/reuse window),
// not for the full Keyv retention TTL — otherwise the UI shows "connecting" for a
// flow the initiate/callback paths already reject, hiding the connect button.
const flowTTL = flowState.ttl || PENDING_STALE_MS;
if (flowState.status === 'FAILED' || (flowState.status === 'PENDING' && flowAge > flowTTL)) {
const wasCancelled = /abort|cancel/i.test(flowState.error ?? '');
if (wasCancelled) {
logger.debug(`[MCP Connection Status] Found cancelled OAuth flow for ${serverName}`, {
flowId,
status: flowState.status,
error: flowState.error,
});
return { hasActiveFlow: false, hasFailedFlow: false };
} else {
logger.debug(`[MCP Connection Status] Found failed OAuth flow for ${serverName}`, {
flowId,
status: flowState.status,
flowAge,
flowTTL,
timedOut: flowAge > flowTTL,
error: flowState.error,
});
return { hasActiveFlow: false, hasFailedFlow: true };
}
}
if (flowState.status === 'PENDING') {
logger.debug(`[MCP Connection Status] Found active OAuth flow for ${serverName}`, {
flowId,
flowAge,
flowTTL,
});
return { hasActiveFlow: true, hasFailedFlow: false };
}
return { hasActiveFlow: false, hasFailedFlow: false };
} catch (error) {
logger.error(`[MCP Connection Status] Error checking OAuth flows for ${serverName}:`, error);
return { hasActiveFlow: false, hasFailedFlow: false };
}
}
async function hasDurableMCPAuthorization(userId, serverName, config, runtimeContext = {}) {
const userMCPAuthMap =
runtimeContext.userMCPAuthMap ?? (await runtimeContext.loadUserMCPAuthMap?.());
const customUserVars = getServerCustomUserVars(userMCPAuthMap, serverName);
if (getMissingCustomUserVars(config, customUserVars).length > 0) {
return false;
}
const dbSourced = isUserSourced(config);
const bindingConfig = {
...config,
args: undefined,
env: undefined,
headers: undefined,
oauth_headers: undefined,
};
const graphProcessedConfig = dbSourced
? bindingConfig
: await preProcessGraphTokens(bindingConfig, {
user: runtimeContext.user,
graphTokenResolver: getGraphApiToken,
scopes: process.env.GRAPH_API_SCOPES,
});
const runtimeConfig = processMCPEnv({
user: runtimeContext.user,
options: graphProcessedConfig,
dbSourced,
customUserVars,
});
const allowlists = await (runtimeContext.loadMCPAllowlists?.() ??
getMCPServersRegistry().resolveAllowlists({
userId,
role: runtimeContext.user?.role,
}));
if (
runtimeConfig.url &&
!(await isMCPDomainAllowed(
runtimeConfig,
allowlists.allowedDomains,
allowlists.allowedAddresses,
))
) {
return false;
}
return MCPTokenStorage.hasStoredAuthorization({
userId,
serverName,
findToken,
validateClientBinding: (clientInfo, storedMetadata) =>
MCPOAuthHandler.assertStoredClientBinding(
serverName,
runtimeConfig.url,
clientInfo,
storedMetadata,
runtimeConfig.oauth,
),
});
}
function canDetectMCPRuntimeOAuth(config) {
return config.requiresOAuth == null && config.apiKey == null && hasRuntimeUrlPlaceholders(config);
}
/**
* Get connection status for a specific MCP server
* @param {string} userId - The user ID
* @param {string} serverName - The server name
* @param {import('@librechat/api').ParsedServerConfig} config - The server configuration
* @param {Map<string, import('@librechat/api').MCPConnection>} appConnections - App-level connections
* @param {Map<string, import('@librechat/api').MCPConnection>} userConnections - User-level connections
* @param {Set} oauthServers - Set of OAuth servers
* @param {{ user?: Partial<IUser>, userMCPAuthMap?: Record<string, Record<string, string>>, loadUserMCPAuthMap?: () => Promise<Record<string, Record<string, string>> | undefined>, loadMCPAllowlists?: () => Promise<{ allowedDomains?: string[] | null, allowedAddresses?: string[] | null }> }} [runtimeContext]
* @returns {Object} Object containing requiresOAuth and connectionState
*/
async function getServerConnectionStatus(
userId,
serverName,
config,
appConnections,
userConnections,
oauthServers,
runtimeContext = {},
) {
const connection = appConnections.get(serverName) || userConnections.get(serverName);
const isStaleOrDoNotExist = connection ? connection?.isStale(config.updatedAt) : true;
const configuredOAuth = oauthServers.has(serverName);
const liveConnectionOAuth = connection?.usesOAuth?.() === true;
const runtimeOAuthCandidate = canDetectMCPRuntimeOAuth(config);
const effectiveOAuth = configuredOAuth || liveConnectionOAuth;
const baseConnectionState = isStaleOrDoNotExist
? 'disconnected'
: connection?.connectionState || 'disconnected';
let finalConnectionState = baseConnectionState;
let requiresOAuth = effectiveOAuth;
let authorizationState = effectiveOAuth ? 'needs_authorization' : 'not_required';
// connection state overrides specific to OAuth servers
if (effectiveOAuth && baseConnectionState === 'connected') {
authorizationState = 'authorized';
} else if (effectiveOAuth && baseConnectionState === 'connecting') {
authorizationState = 'authorizing';
} else if (effectiveOAuth && baseConnectionState === 'error') {
authorizationState = 'error';
} else if (baseConnectionState === 'disconnected' && (effectiveOAuth || runtimeOAuthCandidate)) {
// check if server is actively being reconnected
const oauthReconnectionManager = getOAuthReconnectionManager();
if (oauthReconnectionManager.isReconnecting(userId, serverName)) {
requiresOAuth = true;
finalConnectionState = 'connecting';
authorizationState = 'authorizing';
} else {
const { hasActiveFlow, hasFailedFlow } = await checkOAuthFlowStatus(userId, serverName);
if (hasFailedFlow) {
requiresOAuth = true;
finalConnectionState = 'error';
authorizationState = 'error';
} else if (hasActiveFlow) {
requiresOAuth = true;
finalConnectionState = 'connecting';
authorizationState = 'authorizing';
} else if (await hasDurableMCPAuthorization(userId, serverName, config, runtimeContext)) {
/** OAuth readiness is durable even when this pod has no live connection. */
requiresOAuth = true;
finalConnectionState = 'connected';
authorizationState = 'authorized';
}
}
}
return {
requiresOAuth,
connectionState: finalConnectionState,
authorizationState,
};
}
module.exports = {
createMCPTool,
createMCPTools,
createMCPPermissionContext,
userCanUseMCPServers,
getMCPSetupData,
resolveConfigServers,
resolveMcpServerNames,
resolveMcpServerContext,
getAccessibleMcpServerNames,
healMcpToolNames,
getAssistantToolDefinitions,
resolveCollisionAuditNames,
resolveMcpConfigNames,
resolveAllMcpConfigs,
createOAuthStart,
checkOAuthFlowStatus,
getServerConnectionStatus,
createUnavailableToolStub,
};