LibreChat/api/strategies/openidStrategy.spec.js
Danny Avila fa913148fb
🔒 fix: Refresh MCP OBO Tokens From the Live OpenID Session (#15334)
* 🧊 fix: Inline-refresh OpenID session tokens at MCP OBO call time

Resolves the walk-away failure mode where MCP tool calls using OBO auth
fail with "No valid OpenID access token is available for OBO exchange"
after a user idles past their access-token lifetime. The strategy-time
snapshot on `user.federatedTokens` could expire mid-stream before
`resolveOboToken` ran, while `req.session.openidTokens` carried a still-
valid (or refreshable) token that nothing read.

- New OpenIDSessionRefresh service: per-user single-flighted closure that
  reads `req.session.openidTokens` at OBO time and inline-refreshes via
  `openid-client.refreshTokenGrant` when expired (30s skew), persisting
  via `req.session.save()`. No cookie writes (headers already flushed).
- `resolveOboToken` gains a required UpstreamTokenProvider parameter
  (typed as `() => Promise<OIDCTokens | null>`, reusing the shared shape
  from @librechat/data-schemas). Compile-time guarantee that every call
  site is updated.
- New `session_refresh_failed` OboTokenResolutionReason distinguishes
  "session expired and IdP rejected refresh" from "no upstream token
  ever existed."
- `req` threaded through createMCPTool/createMCPTools/createToolInstance
  to construct the closure with captured request, plus fail-closed
  guards in MCPConnectionFactory.getOboTokens and MCPManager.callTool
  when the closure isn't plumbed.
- Startup warning in MCPServersInitializer when OBO is configured but
  OPENID_REUSE_TOKENS is unset (the strategy populating
  user.federatedTokens is only registered under reuse, so OBO would
  fail every call without it).

Tests: 16 new in OpenIDSessionRefresh.spec.js; obo.spec.ts extended
for the new param + error reason; wiring smoke tests in MCPManager,
MCPConnectionFactory, MCPServersInitializer, and MCP.spec.js.

* 🛡️ fix: Harden OBO inline-refresh against token type and session edge cases

- Token-preference asymmetry: live-token reuse and expires_at derivation
  now strictly gate on the access_token, not the id_token. Added a
  required `tokenPreference` parameter on isLiveSessionTokenStillValid,
  buildOIDCTokensFromSession, and createOpenIDSessionTokenProvider
  so every call site is explicit. Dropped the bogus id_token-exp
  fallback in performIdpRefresh — id_token TTL is governed by IdP
  session policy and would mark a short-lived access_token reusable
  past its real lifetime.
- Missing req in /reinitialize route: the manual reconnect
  endpoint now forwards req into reinitMCPServer, so OBO servers can
  build a session-aware upstream-token closure instead of failing with
  missing_upstream_token.
- Single-flight key collisions: composed key as
  tenantId:openidIssuer:openidId:sessionId via getSingleFlightKey.
  Concurrent calls in the same session still coalesce; separate sessions
  never share an in-flight refresh, preventing refresh-token rotation
  from breaking sibling sessions and preventing cross-tenant token
  crossover when distinct users share an IdP sub.
- Opaque access token reuse): persist accessTokenExpiresAt
  (unix seconds, from tokenset.expires_in) on each refresh AND on initial
  login / SPA refresh in setOpenIDAuthTokens. New getAccessTokenExp
  helper falls back to it when the access token isn't a JWT, avoiding
  redundant inline refreshes for Microsoft Graph and Auth0 default
  audiences.
- Log hygiene: the single-flight key (containing sessionId,
  openidId, openidIssuer, tenantId) is now SHA-256-hashed in the
  "Joining in-flight refresh" debug log. Preserves cross-line correlation
  via a 12-char prefix without leaking credential or PII material.

Documented req.session.openidTokens shape contract via JSDoc typedef so
the new accessTokenExpiresAt field has a discoverable home alongside the
existing accessToken/idToken/refreshToken/expiresAt/lastRefreshedAt.

Tests: OpenIDSessionRefresh.spec.js up to 30 passing (added coverage for
opaque-token reuse, JWT-access-token-exp fallback, no-id_token-fallback
regression, cross-session no-coalesce, persistence on refresh, and a
guard against stale accessTokenExpiresAt carryover). AuthService.spec.js
adds two cases covering accessTokenExpiresAt persistence on login.
mcp.spec.js (route) gains a regression test asserting req flows into
reinitMCPServer.

* 🔍 fix: Detect OBO-only MCP admin config overrides

Admin Config overlays for YAML-defined MCP servers compare only
ADMIN_CONFIGURABLE_FIELDS to decide whether to lazy-init a config-tier override.
The OBO config field was added after that fingerprint list, so an override that
only added or changed `obo` was treated as unchanged YAML and skipped.

Include `obo` in the admin-configurable field list and add a regression test for
an OBO-only override.

* 🔊 fix: Mock MCP OAuth timeout in SDK integration test

MCPConnectionFactory.attemptToConnect reads mcpConfig.OAUTH_HANDLING_TIMEOUT
when building the OAuth connection timeout. The SDK OAuth integration test
mocked mcpConfig without that field, which made the timeout calculation produce
NaN and caused the test to fail before the OAuth refresh/start path completed.

Add OAUTH_HANDLING_TIMEOUT to the test mock.

* ♻️ refactor: Pass OBO upstream-token closure into MCP instead of req

Build the OpenID upstream-token provider at the request boundary and thread
only the closure through MCP handling, so the MCP service layer no longer
receives the raw Express request. The closure still reads/refreshes the live
session at tool-call time, preserving the walk-away recovery.

- Drop `req`/`capturedReq` from createMCPTools, createMCPTool, reconnectServer,
  createToolInstance, and reinitMCPServer; forward `upstreamTokenProvider`
  instead. Closure is constructed in loadTools, loadToolDefinitionsWrapper, and
  the reinitialize route, where req/res are in scope.
- OBO: fall back to user.federatedTokens when the provider yields no live
  session, so OIDC remote-agent calls (verified bearer, no session) still work.
- Inline refresh: mirror a rotated refresh token to the refreshToken cookie via
  a shared setRefreshTokenCookie helper, guarded by !res.headersSent (no-op on
  the streaming path; session copy stays authoritative).
- Single-flight: hydrate a joining request's own session from the resolved
  tokens so a later OBO call doesn't replay a rotated-away refresh token.

Addresses owner feedback and three review findings.

* 🔒 fix: Recover OIDC refresh-token rotation after SSE OBO refresh

When an inline OBO refresh rotates the OpenID refresh token after SSE headers
have already been sent, the browser refreshToken cookie cannot be updated. Store
a short-lived encrypted bridge from the stale cookie token to the rotated token
so /api/auth/refresh can recover after express-session loss.

Use the signed openid_user_id cookie to load user context for bridge validation,
retry only on invalid_grant, and delete the bridge only after the bridged refresh
succeeds.

* 🔨 fix: hydrate joined OIDC refresh sessions with stable refresh tokens

Update single-flight OIDC refresh joiners whenever refreshed access token
state changes, even if the IdP keeps the refresh token unchanged.

This prevents joined requests from retaining stale accessToken or
accessTokenExpiresAt values and redundantly refreshing later in the same run.

* 🌉 Persist OIDC refresh-token recovery bridges in MongoDB

Store SSE OBO refresh-token recovery bridges in MongoDB instead of
process-local memory so /api/auth/refresh can recover after worker
restarts or cross-worker routing.

Derive bridge expiry from REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRY so the recovery window
matches the stale refreshToken cookie it repairs, and delete bridges
after successful recovery.

* 🤝 Coordinate OIDC inline refreshes across workers

Add a short-lived Mongo-backed refresh-flight record so concurrent
OBO refreshes for the same OpenID session do not redeem the same
rotating refresh token on different workers.

The winning worker performs the IdP refresh and stores an encrypted
result; joiners wait for that result, hydrate their request session,
and return without calling the IdP.

* ⚓ Keep OpenID marker cookies aligned on inline refresh

Refresh token_provider and openid_user_id with the same expiry as the
rotated refreshToken cookie when an inline OBO refresh can still write
headers.

Share the marker-cookie writer with the normal OpenID auth refresh path
so the fallback /api/auth/refresh branch continues to recognize valid
OpenID refresh tokens after session expiry.

* 🔑 fix: include refresh token in OIDC local refresh flight key

Key the process-local OIDC refresh coalescing by the current session
refresh token, matching the Mongo-backed flight key. This prevents a
request with a newly rotated token from joining an older pending refresh
and inheriting its failure/result.

* 🌉 fix: store OIDC refresh bridge without cookie response

Treat missing or non-cookie responses like headers-sent streaming
responses during inline OIDC refresh. When the IdP rotates the refresh
token and cookies cannot be written, persist a recovery bridge so a later
/auth/refresh can recover after session expiry.

* 🫙 fix: preserve stale OIDC cookie bridge key

Track the refresh token last written to the browser cookie separately
from the current session refresh token. When inline OIDC refreshes rotate
tokens without a writable response, keep bridging from the browser-stale
token directly to the latest session token.

* 🙌 fix: keep OIDC bridge recovery success on cleanup failure

Make refresh-token bridge cleanup best-effort after a bridged OIDC
refresh succeeds. A transient delete failure now logs a warning but does
not convert the already-refreshed session and cookies into a 403 response.

* 📦 test: Exclude RefreshTokenBridge from tenant-isolation coverage

Add RefreshTokenBridge to the tenant-isolation coverage allowlist because
refresh bridge lookups run during unauthenticated OpenID refresh recovery.
The controller first recovers user context from the signed OpenID marker
cookie, then the bridge methods apply explicit user and tenant filters.

Ambient tenant isolation would bind this recovery path to request-local
tenant context that is not available at the point the stale cookie is being
resolved

* ⚡ Fix OpenID refresh flight retry and marker hydration

Allow failed OpenID refresh flights to be reclaimed immediately instead of pinning transient errors.

Preserve the browser refresh-token marker when joined refreshes hydrate session tokens from a shared flight result.

Stabilize AuthService tests by isolating mocked module imports from prior suites.

* 🛠️ fix: centralize OBO identity scoping

Add shared auth identity helpers for app user ids, OpenID subjects,
tenant ids, and normalized OpenID issuers.

Thread a non-placeholder-visible OBO identity context from the real
request user through MCP connection, tool-call, reinit, and refresh
paths. Keep tenantId and openidIssuer out of createSafeUser so MCP
user placeholders do not expose those fields.

Scope OBO token cache and in-flight exchange keys by tenant, issuer,
OpenID subject, scopes, and a SHA-256 hash of the upstream assertion.
This prevents cross-tenant/cross-issuer collisions and avoids reusing
tokens minted from stale rotated assertions.

Use the shared identity helpers for OpenID refresh-flight keys and
refresh-token bridge recovery records so related OBO refresh paths share
the same identity normalization rules.

The helper is intended for auth-boundary and credential-cache code, not
as a blanket replacement for ordinary app user id ownership checks.

* 🛠️ fix: preserve OIDC refresh-token sync on save failures

Sync OpenID refresh-token cookie/bridge state before persisting the
session so a transient session-store failure cannot lose an IdP-rotated
refresh token.

Also trigger sync when the session refresh token differs from the
browser refresh-token marker, not only when the current grant rotates
the token. This lets later writable refreshes repair stale browser
cookies left behind by SSE refreshes.

Route refresh bridge identity through the shared identity helper with
the threaded OBO identity context, falling back to request/user context
when needed.

Add regression coverage for session-save failures, stale browser cookie
repair, non-writable bridge storage, and shared-helper identity fallback.

* 🛠️ fix: keep OIDC refresh bridge during recovery grace

After successful bridged refresh recovery, re-store the stale-cookie bridge
with a short grace TTL instead of deleting it immediately. This lets parallel
/api/auth/refresh requests that already sent the stale browser cookie recover
before they can observe the first response's Set-Cookie.

Retarget the bridge to the refresh token returned by the bridged retry so
B-to-C refresh-token rotation remains recoverable. The grace TTL is parsed with
math() and defaults to 60s, which shrinks the replay window from the original
REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRY bridge lifetime to the short recovery grace period.

Remove the now-unused explicit bridge delete path from the service and
data-schemas method surface. Add regression coverage for grace re-store,
identity symmetry, retry failure behavior, and same-key upsert replacement.

* 🛠️ fix: fail closed on OBO MCP user identity mismatch

Add an OBO-specific guard before MCP tool execution that requires the
effective invocation user and captured request user to both have ids and
to match. This prevents OBO tool calls from falling back to a separate
configurable.user_id identity after request-bound OBO context has already
been captured.

Keep the existing user id fallback behavior for non-OBO MCP calls.

Tests cover mismatched OBO users, missing user ids, and the matching-user
path ignoring a conflicting configurable.user_id.

* 🛠️ fix: Guard OpenID bridge retry user identity

Extract the shared OpenID refresh/user-resolution flow in AuthController
so the normal refresh path and bridge-recovery retry use the same grant,
claims, issuer, user lookup, and diagnostic logging code.

Preserve the existing path-specific behavior: the normal path still owns
migration updates and 401 login redirects, while the bridge retry still
falls through to the existing 403 invalid-token response.

Add a bridge-recovery guard that rejects retry results whose resolved
user id differs from the signed openid_user_id cookie before issuing
tokens or re-storing the grace bridge. Cover both the successful
matching-user recovery and the mismatched-user rejection.

* 🛠️ fix: type-safety polish on OBO data layer

Replace refresh token bridge query/update Record<string, unknown> usage
with typed Mongoose FilterQuery and UpdateQuery definitions.

Harden OpenID marker cookie JWT expiry handling by converting refresh
expiry milliseconds to integer seconds and rejecting invalid or
non-positive durations.

Add focused CSRF tests for fractional refresh expiry values and invalid
expiry configuration.

* 🛠️ fix: Bind OpenID session tokens to authenticated identity

Stamp OpenID session token state with the LibreChat user id, OpenID subject,
tenant id, and normalized issuer when tokens are stored.

Fail closed before OBO inline token reuse/refresh when the session token
identity does not match the current authenticated identity, preventing a stale
or mixed Express session from supplying another user's upstream assertion.

Also validate the normal /api/auth/refresh session-token reuse shortcut against
the signed marker-cookie user before returning cached session tokens.

Note: sessions created before this change carry no identity stamp and are
treated as a mismatch. This is self-healing — the reuse path forces a full IdP
refresh (which re-stamps the session) and the OBO path throws, surfacing as a
one-time re-authentication for active OBO users at deploy time. The session
re-stamps within one session lifetime (SESSION_EXPIRY, default 15 min).

* 🛠️ fix: Recover OpenID refresh token drift

Prefer the browser refresh-token cookie when it differs from the
server-side OpenID session state, and force a real IdP refresh in that
case instead of reusing stale session tokens.

Store a short-lived refresh-token bridge when inline OBO refresh writes
a rotated browser cookie but session persistence fails, so follow-up
refreshes can still recover from the old token.

Keep the bridge grace TTL centralized in RefreshTokenBridge so both
recovery paths use the same env-backed value.

Note: drift is measured against the last-synced browserRefreshToken
marker, so the SSE path (intentionally stale cookie, authoritative
session) does not false-positive. Sessions predating the marker have no
browserRefreshToken; for those, drift falls back to comparing the cookie
against the session refresh token and prefers the cookie on difference.
This is the same self-healing pre-change-session window as the identity
binding fix and re-syncs within one session lifetime.

Tests cover cookie/session drift selection, reusable-session bypass on
drift, bridge storage after session-save failure, and the shared bridge
constant wiring.

* 🛠️ fix: Harden OBO token caching and expiry handling

Reject malformed OBO grant responses before writing them to the exchanged-token cache so a missing access_token cannot poison the cache.

Store absolute expires_at values with cached OBO tokens and ignore legacy cache entries without usable expiry metadata. This keeps cached-token freshness based on the token’s real
remaining lifetime instead of reusing the original relative expires_in on cache hits.

Move OBO expiry normalization and skew helpers into packages/api and use them from both the JS exchange service and the TS MCP resolver. Apply a 30-second safety margin with a one-
second floor for short-lived tokens, covered by direct helper tests and caller-level regression tests.

Tests:
- packages/api: npm run build
- packages/api: npx jest src/mcp/oauth/expiry.spec.ts src/mcp/oauth/obo.spec.ts
- api: npx jest server/services/OboTokenService.spec.js

* 🛠️ fix: Harden OBO refresh-token bridge lookup and indexing

Reuse getValidOpenIDReuseUserId for the bridge-recovery user lookup in
refreshController instead of re-verifying openid_user_id inline. The shared
helper enforces the JWT_REFRESH_SECRET presence check and a strict
typeof payload.id === 'string' guard, rejecting tokens whose id claim is
present but not a string (e.g. a numeric id) that the inline check accepted.

Fail closed on issuer mismatch in getRefreshTokenBridge. Both the stored and
the expected issuer are now normalized and compared for equality, so a bridge
is recovered only when both sides agree (both absent, or both present and
equal after normalization). Previously the check was skipped whenever the
stored issuer was absent, allowing recovery across mismatched issuer context.

Drop the unused {oldRefreshTokenHash, userId, tenantId, openidIssuer} index
and the openidIssuer field on RefreshTokenBridgeQuery. The data-layer filter
only queries the 3-field {oldRefreshTokenHash, userId, tenantId} index; the
issuer is verified in application code, not the query. Hoist the repeated
model accessor into getRefreshTokenBridgeModel.

Note: issuer is now load-bearing for recovery. A bridge stored with an issuer
recovers only when the lookup supplies a matching issuer; the recovery lookup
reads user.openidIssuer via AUTH_REFRESH_USER_PROJECTION (an exclusion
projection that retains the field). If a user's persisted openidIssuer is
empty while the stored bridge has one, recovery fails closed (falls through to
normal re-authentication) until the bridge TTLs out — no security regression.

Tests cover invalid signed-cookie payloads bypassing the bridge, both
asymmetric issuer-presence cases, issuer normalization before comparison, and
an index-alignment assertion guarding against re-adding the dropped index.

* 🛠️ fix: Degrade OBO discovery on token resolution failures

Catch expected OboTokenResolutionError failures during MCP tool discovery and
fall back to unauthenticated tool listing instead of aborting discovery. This
keeps discovery aligned with the existing unauthenticated listing behavior while
preserving unexpected errors as real failures.

Also correct OBO tool-call freshness comment and tighten the OBO trust-check
permissions type to the existing role permission shape.

Tests:
- npx jest src/mcp/__tests__/MCPConnectionFactory.test.ts --runInBand --coverage=false
- npx jest src/mcp/oauth/obo.spec.ts --runInBand --coverage=false

* 🛠️ fix: tighten OBO tool-call errors, bridge logging, and flight typing

Move resolveToolCallUserId inside the tool-call try/catch so an OBO
identity mismatch surfaces with serverName/toolName context and the
standard tool-call-failed message instead of an opaque bare Error.

Raise the refresh-token bridge lookup failure log from debug to warn so
transient infrastructure failures on the unauthenticated /api/auth/refresh
path are observable, and guard the message access against non-Error values.

Replace the unknown+cast in isDuplicateKeyError with a hasErrorCode type
predicate so the duplicate-key check reads error.code without an assertion.

Preserve real math/isEnabled in the MCPConnectionFactory test mock (mock
only processMCPEnv) so mcpConfig timeouts no longer resolve to NaN, fixing
the TimeoutNaNWarning that masked slow OAuth retry behavior.

* 🧪 fix: Restore the Flight Uniqueness Index and Buffer the Graph Cache TTL

Two CI failures on the merge, both in suites this environment cannot run
(their MongoDB binary download is blocked).

`GraphApiService.spec.js` still asserted the unbuffered TTL. Graph tokens
route through the same `getTokenCacheTtlMs` as the OBO and openidStrategy
caches, so the entry now expires 30s before the credential does.

`openidRefreshFlight.spec.ts` dropped the database between tests, which takes
the indexes with it, and Mongoose builds them only once when the model is
compiled. Whether the unique `key` index survived into a test was a race with
that one-time build. Without it a second `create` inserts instead of raising a
duplicate-key error, so every worker believes it won the flight — the
mutual exclusion the file exists to prove. Indexes are now rebuilt after each
drop, which also makes the reclaim and complete cases reach those paths for
the right reason.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SxKWxwqxAGckYpRsYTqx3F

* fix: address OBO review findings

* 🔐 fix: Install Bridge Indexes and Carry OBO Through Assistant Recovery

Two findings from the Codex pass on d08c82f0d.

The refresh-token bridge relied on Mongoose auto-indexing for both of its
indexes, and `MONGO_AUTO_INDEX=false` is a supported deployment setting. A
bridge holds an encrypted refresh token and the TTL index is the only thing
that ever deletes one, so under that setting they would accumulate for the
life of the collection while concurrent upserts lost the compound uniqueness
the filter assumes. Installed before the first write, matching the flight
methods and the session and schedule methods before them.

`recoverServerTools`, the assistant create/update path that reruns
`reinitMCPServer` when a referenced server's catalog and connection snapshot
are both missing, was the last reinit site not carrying the upstream-token
closure. For an OBO server the factory rejects the connection outright, so the
assistant write failed with unavailable MCP definitions. It now builds the
provider at that request boundary like the other entry points; assistant
writes have no `res`, so a rotation there falls back to the recovery bridge.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SxKWxwqxAGckYpRsYTqx3F

* fix: harden OBO refresh coordination

* ⏳ fix: Keep Elapsed Expiries Elapsed and Revoke the Superseded Session

Two of the five findings from the Codex pass on fcdc15885 — the two that are
defects in code this branch introduced rather than design questions about the
bridge.

`getSkewedTokenExpiresAtMs` floored every result at a second in the future,
including an expiry the provider had already declared elapsed. An exchange
answering `expires_in: 0` or a past `expires_at` was handed to the MCP
connection stamped valid for another second, which only moves the failure
downstream. The floor now applies to a lifetime that is still live, which is
what it was for; an elapsed one stays elapsed so the caller rejects it. Same
for the cache TTL, which falls back to the elapsed-credential floor.

Bridge recovery left the stale token's durable Session behind. Only the token
it recovered through was passed as `existingRefreshToken`, so that one's
session was replaced while the token the browser actually presented kept its
record until its original expiry. That record, with the marker cookie still
bound to it, is what authorizes local image access for OpenID users — so a
copy of the stale cookie outlived the rotation it had lost. Revoked
explicitly on successful recovery.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SxKWxwqxAGckYpRsYTqx3F

* fix: close OBO refresh review findings

* 🎟️ fix: Carry the Bridged Token Through a Non-Rotating Recovery

Bridge recovery passes the browser's stale token as `existingRefreshToken` so
the durable Session naming it is the record replaced. That also makes the
stale token the fallback the installed session and the refresh cookie use when
a tokenset carries no `refresh_token` of its own, which holds only while the
recovery grant rotates.

An IdP that answers that grant without rotating sends the browser back to the
very token the bridge exists to retire: `storeOpenIDSession` installs and
deletes the same stale record in one call, and the cookie is rewritten to a
token the IdP already rejected — a sign-out on the next refresh. The grace
bridge one line above already guards this with `|| bridgedRefreshToken`; the
resolved tokenset now does the same, so leader and followers alike publish the
recovered token.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SxKWxwqxAGckYpRsYTqx3F

* 🚫 fix: Reject an OBO Exchange That Returns an Expired Credential

Preserving an elapsed expiry through the skew helper only helps if something
acts on it, and nothing did: `MCPManager.callTool` checks the access token and
nothing else before setting the Authorization header, so a credential the IdP
declared spent still went downstream to fail there. It is rejected at the
exchange now, where the reason is known, and retryably — the exchange itself
worked, so a fresh grant can succeed.

Completes the elapsed-expiry change in cb26a6f7d, which made the stamp honest
without giving anyone a reason to look at it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SxKWxwqxAGckYpRsYTqx3F

* fix: close OpenID refresh review findings

* fix: coordinate OpenID refresh entry points

* chore: sort OpenID flight imports

* fix: fence OpenID refreshes during logout

* fix: close OpenID logout publication races

* fix: narrow completed refresh flight

* test: cover bridge cleanup failure after ownership loss

The compensating delete in storeRefreshTokenBridgeWithLease swallows its own
failure so the lease error stays the one the caller sees. Nothing asserted
that, so removing the inner catch left every suite green while callers began
receiving the cleanup error instead.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SxKWxwqxAGckYpRsYTqx3F

* fix: compensate OpenID bridges only on proven ownership loss

The post-write lease assertion deletes the bridge it just published when it
throws, but it threw for two different reasons: a coordination record that is
no longer ours, and a coordination read that simply failed. Treating the second
as the first destroys the only mapping from the token the browser still holds
to the one the IdP already rotated to, so a transient Mongo error on the
headers-already-sent path signed the user out.

Tag the ownership error where the lease raises it and compensate only for that,
preserving the bridge whenever ownership is merely undetermined. A preserved
bridge stays behind the logout revocation fence, so the safe default costs
nothing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SxKWxwqxAGckYpRsYTqx3F

* fix: reject spent OpenID refresh results

Two ways a refresh could report success while handing back a credential
nothing can use.

An inline refresh carries the previous id_token forward when the IdP omits
one on rotation, so tokenset.id_token is not necessarily freshly issued.
setOpenIDAuthTokens applied its freshness guard only to the session copy and
took tokenset.id_token unconditionally, so /refresh returned an expired
bearer even though the grant produced a usable access token. Skip it only
when it is provably expired: an id_token whose expiry cannot be read stays
preferred, since access_token may be opaque or scoped to another audience.

normalizeExpiresIn preserves a zero or negative lifetime rather than
discarding it, so a grant declaring an already-spent access token still
published, rotating the refresh token and returning a token every freshness
check rejects. Each OBO call then repeated the grant. Reject an elapsed
lifetime before publishing; an unknown lifetime still publishes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SxKWxwqxAGckYpRsYTqx3F

* fix: harden OpenID refresh publication

* fix: keep identity and results intact through OpenID refresh cleanup

Two follow-ons from the last round's fixes.

Stripping an expired carried-forward id_token from the refresh result removed
the only identity material a rotation without id_token leaves behind. The
result is rebuilt by buildOIDCTokensFromSession, so it carries no provider
claims() either, and getTokenClaims accepts only those two — bridge recovery
failed with "no usable identity claims" before setOpenIDAuthTokens could hand
back the fresh access token. The stripped token now travels in a
non-enumerable marker, alongside the existing browser and predecessor markers,
which identity resolution reads and the authentication response never sees.

The lease drained a pending renewal by awaiting it in finally, so a transient
coordination failure there threw from finally and replaced the operation's
result. The refresh had already settled and published, so the caller saw a
failure on credentials that had rotated. Proven ownership loss is recorded on
ownershipLost and checked before the return, so the drain has nothing to add
but noise; it now absorbs and logs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SxKWxwqxAGckYpRsYTqx3F

* refactor: fence OpenID recovery publication

* fix: close OpenID publication transaction

* refactor: make OpenID publication transactional

* fix: satisfy OpenID publication type checks

* fix: fence OpenID session publication

* fix: authorize OpenID refresh publication

* fix: bind OpenID replay generations

* fix: fence OpenID response generations

* fix: authorize OpenID token delivery

* fix: linearize OpenID publication delivery

* chore: sort OpenID refresh flight imports

---------

Co-authored-by: J.C. Bartle <jcbartle@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: jbartle <jbartle@rand.org>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: jcbartle <7274202+jcbartle@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-29 23:55:58 -04:00

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const undici = require('undici');
const fetch = require('node-fetch');
const jwtDecode = require('jsonwebtoken/decode');
const { ErrorTypes, FileSources } = require('librechat-data-provider');
const { findUser, createUser, updateUser, findRolesByNames } = require('~/models');
const {
getOpenIdProxyDispatcher,
resolveAppConfigForUser,
getOpenIdIssuer,
isEnabled,
} = require('@librechat/api');
const { resizeAvatar } = require('~/server/services/Files/images/avatar');
const { getAppConfig } = require('~/server/services/Config');
const { setupOpenId } = require('./openidStrategy');
const mockCloudfrontFileSource = FileSources.cloudfront ?? 'cloudfront';
// --- Mocks ---
jest.mock('node-fetch');
jest.mock('jsonwebtoken/decode');
jest.mock('undici', () => ({
fetch: jest.fn(),
}));
jest.mock('~/server/services/Files/strategies', () => ({
getStrategyFunctions: jest.fn(() => ({
saveBuffer: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue('/fake/path/to/avatar.png'),
})),
}));
jest.mock('~/server/services/Files/images/avatar', () => ({
resizeAvatar: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(Buffer.from('safe avatar')),
}));
jest.mock('~/server/services/Config', () => ({
getAppConfig: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({}),
}));
jest.mock('@librechat/api', () => {
const actual = jest.requireActual('@librechat/api');
const getStringClaim = (claims, claim) => {
const value = claims[claim];
return typeof value === 'string' && value ? value : undefined;
};
return {
...actual,
isEnabled: jest.fn(() => false),
isEmailDomainAllowed: jest.fn(() => true),
findOpenIDUser: actual.findOpenIDUser,
getOpenIdEmail: jest.fn((claims, strategyName = 'openidStrategy') => {
if (claims == null) {
return undefined;
}
const claimKey = process.env.OPENID_EMAIL_CLAIM?.trim();
if (claimKey) {
const value = claims[claimKey];
if (typeof value === 'string' && value) {
return value;
}
const { logger } = require('@librechat/data-schemas');
if (value != null) {
logger.warn(
`[${strategyName}] OPENID_EMAIL_CLAIM="${claimKey}" resolved to a non-string value (type: ${typeof value}). Falling back to: email -> preferred_username -> upn.`,
);
} else {
logger.warn(
`[${strategyName}] OPENID_EMAIL_CLAIM="${claimKey}" not present in userinfo. Falling back to: email -> preferred_username -> upn.`,
);
}
}
return (
getStringClaim(claims, 'email') ??
getStringClaim(claims, 'preferred_username') ??
getStringClaim(claims, 'upn')
);
}),
getBalanceConfig: jest.fn(() => ({
enabled: false,
})),
getOpenIdIssuer: jest.fn(() => 'https://fake-issuer.com'),
getOpenIdProxyDispatcher: jest.fn(() => undefined),
getAvatarFileStrategy: jest.fn((config, fallbackStrategy) => {
const { FileSources } = jest.requireActual('librechat-data-provider');
if (config?.fileStrategies) {
return config.fileStrategies.avatar ?? config.fileStrategies.default ?? config.fileStrategy;
}
return config?.fileStrategy ?? fallbackStrategy ?? FileSources.local;
}),
getAvatarSaveParams: jest.fn((strategy, params) => {
const { FileSources } = jest.requireActual('librechat-data-provider');
return strategy === FileSources.s3 || strategy === mockCloudfrontFileSource
? { ...params, basePath: 'avatars' }
: params;
}),
resolveAppConfigForUser: jest.fn(async (_getAppConfig, _user) => ({})),
};
});
jest.mock('~/models', () => ({
findUser: jest.fn(),
createUser: jest.fn(),
updateUser: jest.fn(),
findRolesByNames: jest.fn(),
}));
jest.mock('@librechat/data-schemas', () => ({
...jest.requireActual('@librechat/api'),
logger: {
info: jest.fn(),
warn: jest.fn(),
debug: jest.fn(),
error: jest.fn(),
},
tenantStorage: {
run: jest.fn((_context, fn) => fn()),
},
hashToken: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue('hashed-token'),
}));
jest.mock('~/cache/getLogStores', () =>
jest.fn(() => ({
get: jest.fn(),
set: jest.fn(),
})),
);
// Mock the openid-client module and all its dependencies
jest.mock('openid-client', () => {
return {
discovery: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({
clientId: 'fake_client_id',
clientSecret: 'fake_client_secret',
issuer: 'https://fake-issuer.com',
// Add any other properties needed by the implementation
}),
fetchUserInfo: jest.fn().mockImplementation(() => {
// Only return additional properties, but don't override any claims
return Promise.resolve({});
}),
genericGrantRequest: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({
access_token: 'exchanged_graph_token',
expires_in: 3600,
}),
customFetch: Symbol('customFetch'),
};
});
jest.mock('openid-client/passport', () => {
/** Store callbacks by strategy name - 'openid' and 'openidAdmin' */
const verifyCallbacks = {};
const strategies = {};
let lastVerifyCallback;
const mockStrategy = jest.fn(function (options, verify) {
lastVerifyCallback = verify;
this.name = 'openid';
this.options = options;
this.verify = verify;
});
mockStrategy.prototype.authorizationRequestParams = jest.fn(() => new URLSearchParams());
return {
Strategy: mockStrategy,
/** Get the last registered callback (for backward compatibility) */
__getVerifyCallback: () => lastVerifyCallback,
__getStrategyByName: (name) => strategies[name],
/** Store callback by name when passport.use is called */
__setStrategy: (name, strategy) => {
strategies[name] = strategy;
if (strategy?.verify) {
verifyCallbacks[name] = strategy.verify;
}
},
/** Get callback by strategy name */
__getVerifyCallbackByName: (name) => verifyCallbacks[name],
};
});
// Mock passport - capture strategy name and callback
jest.mock('passport', () => ({
use: jest.fn((name, strategy) => {
const passportMock = require('openid-client/passport');
passportMock.__setStrategy(name, strategy);
}),
}));
describe('setupOpenId', () => {
// Store a reference to the verify callback once it's set up
let verifyCallback;
// Helper to wrap the verify callback in a promise
const validate = (tokenset) =>
new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
verifyCallback(tokenset, (err, user, details) => {
if (err) {
reject(err);
} else {
resolve({ user, details });
}
});
});
const tokenset = {
id_token: 'fake_id_token',
access_token: 'fake_access_token',
claims: () => ({
sub: '1234',
email: 'test@example.com',
email_verified: true,
given_name: 'First',
family_name: 'Last',
name: 'My Full',
preferred_username: 'testusername',
username: 'flast',
picture: 'https://example.com/avatar.png',
}),
};
beforeEach(async () => {
// Clear previous mock calls and reset implementations
jest.clearAllMocks();
isEnabled.mockImplementation(jest.requireActual('@librechat/api').isEnabled);
require('~/cache/getLogStores').mockImplementation(() => ({
get: jest.fn(),
set: jest.fn(),
}));
getOpenIdProxyDispatcher.mockReturnValue(undefined);
require('openid-client').genericGrantRequest.mockReset();
require('openid-client').genericGrantRequest.mockResolvedValue({
access_token: 'exchanged_graph_token',
expires_in: 3600,
});
// Reset environment variables needed by the strategy
process.env.OPENID_ISSUER = 'https://fake-issuer.com';
process.env.OPENID_CLIENT_ID = 'fake_client_id';
process.env.OPENID_CLIENT_SECRET = 'fake_client_secret';
process.env.DOMAIN_SERVER = 'https://example.com';
process.env.OPENID_CALLBACK_URL = '/callback';
process.env.OPENID_SCOPE = 'openid profile email';
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE = 'requiredRole';
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE_PARAMETER_PATH = 'roles';
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE_TOKEN_KIND = 'id';
process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE = 'admin';
process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE_PARAMETER_PATH = 'permissions';
process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE_TOKEN_KIND = 'id';
delete process.env.OPENID_USERNAME_CLAIM;
delete process.env.OPENID_NAME_CLAIM;
delete process.env.OPENID_EMAIL_CLAIM;
delete process.env.OPENID_AUDIENCE;
delete process.env.OPENID_AVATAR_AUTHORIZED_ORIGINS;
delete process.env.PROXY;
delete process.env.OPENID_USE_PKCE;
delete process.env.OPENID_GENERATE_NONCE;
delete process.env.OPENID_ROLE_SYNC_ENABLED;
delete process.env.OPENID_ROLE_SYNC_API_ENABLED;
delete process.env.OPENID_ROLE_SYNC_SOURCE;
delete process.env.OPENID_ROLE_SYNC_CLAIM;
delete process.env.OPENID_ROLE_SYNC_ROLE_PRIORITY;
delete process.env.OPENID_ROLE_SYNC_FALLBACK_ROLE;
delete process.env.OPENID_ON_BEHALF_FLOW_FOR_USERINFO_REQUIRED;
delete process.env.OPENID_ON_BEHALF_FLOW_USERINFO_SCOPE;
// Default jwtDecode mock returns a token that includes the required role.
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({
roles: ['requiredRole'],
permissions: ['admin'],
});
// By default, assume that no user is found, so createUser will be called
findUser.mockResolvedValue(null);
createUser.mockImplementation(async (userData) => {
// simulate created user with an _id property
return { _id: 'newUserId', ...userData };
});
updateUser.mockImplementation(async (id, userData) => {
return { _id: id, ...userData };
});
findRolesByNames.mockImplementation(async (roleNames) =>
roleNames.map((roleName) => ({ name: roleName })),
);
resizeAvatar.mockResolvedValue(Buffer.from('safe avatar'));
// Call the setup function and capture the verify callback for the regular 'openid' strategy
// (not 'openidAdmin' which requires existing users)
await setupOpenId();
verifyCallback = require('openid-client/passport').__getVerifyCallbackByName('openid');
});
describe('clientMetadata construction in setupOpenId', () => {
let openidClient;
beforeEach(() => {
openidClient = require('openid-client');
openidClient.discovery.mockClear();
});
it('sets token_endpoint_auth_method to none for PKCE without a client secret', async () => {
process.env.OPENID_USE_PKCE = 'true';
delete process.env.OPENID_CLIENT_SECRET;
await setupOpenId();
const [, , metadata] = openidClient.discovery.mock.calls.at(-1);
expect(metadata.token_endpoint_auth_method).toBe('none');
expect(metadata.client_secret).toBeUndefined();
});
it('leaves token_endpoint_auth_method unset for secret-based clients without nonce', async () => {
process.env.OPENID_USE_PKCE = 'false';
process.env.OPENID_CLIENT_SECRET = 'my-secret';
await setupOpenId();
const [, , metadata] = openidClient.discovery.mock.calls.at(-1);
expect(metadata.client_secret).toBe('my-secret');
expect(metadata.token_endpoint_auth_method).toBeUndefined();
});
it('sets client_secret and client_secret_post when nonce generation is enabled', async () => {
process.env.OPENID_USE_PKCE = 'false';
process.env.OPENID_GENERATE_NONCE = 'true';
process.env.OPENID_CLIENT_SECRET = 'my-secret';
await setupOpenId();
const [, , metadata] = openidClient.discovery.mock.calls.at(-1);
expect(metadata.client_secret).toBe('my-secret');
expect(metadata.token_endpoint_auth_method).toBe('client_secret_post');
});
it('treats whitespace-only secret as absent', async () => {
process.env.OPENID_USE_PKCE = 'true';
process.env.OPENID_CLIENT_SECRET = ' ';
await setupOpenId();
const [, , metadata] = openidClient.discovery.mock.calls.at(-1);
expect(metadata.client_secret).toBeUndefined();
expect(metadata.token_endpoint_auth_method).toBe('none');
});
it('does not force an auth method when PKCE and a client secret are both configured without nonce', async () => {
process.env.OPENID_USE_PKCE = 'true';
process.env.OPENID_CLIENT_SECRET = 'my-secret';
await setupOpenId();
const [, , metadata] = openidClient.discovery.mock.calls.at(-1);
expect(metadata.client_secret).toBe('my-secret');
expect(metadata.token_endpoint_auth_method).toBeUndefined();
});
it('uses the shared OpenID proxy dispatcher for custom fetch requests', async () => {
const dispatcher = { dispatch: jest.fn() };
const response = { status: 204, statusText: 'No Content', headers: new Headers() };
getOpenIdProxyDispatcher.mockReturnValue(dispatcher);
undici.fetch.mockResolvedValue(response);
await setupOpenId();
const [, , , , options] = openidClient.discovery.mock.calls.at(-1);
const openIdFetch = options[openidClient.customFetch];
await expect(
openIdFetch('https://issuer.example.com/.well-known/openid-configuration', {
method: 'GET',
}),
).resolves.toBe(response);
expect(getOpenIdProxyDispatcher).toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(undici.fetch).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'https://issuer.example.com/.well-known/openid-configuration',
{
method: 'GET',
dispatcher,
},
);
});
});
describe('authorizationRequestParams', () => {
const getLoginStrategy = () => require('openid-client/passport').__getStrategyByName('openid');
it('adds a single OpenID audience to authorization requests', () => {
process.env.OPENID_AUDIENCE = 'librechat';
const params = getLoginStrategy().authorizationRequestParams({}, { state: 'login-state' });
expect(params.get('audience')).toBe('librechat');
expect(params.get('state')).toBe('login-state');
});
it('uses the first non-empty audience when OPENID_AUDIENCE accepts multiple JWT audiences', () => {
process.env.OPENID_AUDIENCE = ' librechat , control-plane-web ';
const params = getLoginStrategy().authorizationRequestParams({}, {});
expect(params.get('audience')).toBe('librechat');
});
it('does not add an authorization audience when OPENID_AUDIENCE is empty', () => {
process.env.OPENID_AUDIENCE = ' , ';
const params = getLoginStrategy().authorizationRequestParams({}, {});
expect(params.has('audience')).toBe(false);
});
});
it('should create a new user with correct username when preferred_username claim exists', async () => {
// Arrange – our userinfo already has preferred_username 'testusername'
const userinfo = tokenset.claims();
// Act
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
// Assert
expect(user.username).toBe(userinfo.preferred_username);
expect(getOpenIdIssuer).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(getOpenIdIssuer.mock.calls[0]).toHaveLength(2);
expect(getOpenIdIssuer.mock.calls[0][0]).toEqual(userinfo);
expect(getOpenIdIssuer.mock.calls[0][1]).toEqual(
expect.objectContaining({ issuer: 'https://fake-issuer.com' }),
);
expect(createUser).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({
provider: 'openid',
openidId: userinfo.sub,
openidIssuer: 'https://fake-issuer.com',
username: userinfo.preferred_username,
email: userinfo.email,
name: `${userinfo.given_name} ${userinfo.family_name}`,
}),
{ enabled: false },
true,
true,
);
});
it('should use username as username when preferred_username claim is missing', async () => {
// Arrange – remove preferred_username from userinfo
const userinfo = { ...tokenset.claims() };
delete userinfo.preferred_username;
// Expect the username to be the "username"
const expectUsername = userinfo.username;
// Act
const { user } = await validate({ ...tokenset, claims: () => userinfo });
// Assert
expect(user.username).toBe(expectUsername);
expect(createUser).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({ username: expectUsername }),
{ enabled: false },
true,
true,
);
});
it('should use email as username when username and preferred_username are missing', async () => {
// Arrange – remove username and preferred_username
const userinfo = { ...tokenset.claims() };
delete userinfo.username;
delete userinfo.preferred_username;
const expectUsername = userinfo.email;
// Act
const { user } = await validate({ ...tokenset, claims: () => userinfo });
// Assert
expect(user.username).toBe(expectUsername);
expect(createUser).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({ username: expectUsername }),
{ enabled: false },
true,
true,
);
});
it('should override username with OPENID_USERNAME_CLAIM when set', async () => {
// Arrange – set OPENID_USERNAME_CLAIM so that the sub claim is used
process.env.OPENID_USERNAME_CLAIM = 'sub';
const userinfo = tokenset.claims();
// Act
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
// Assert – username should equal the sub (converted as-is)
expect(user.username).toBe(userinfo.sub);
expect(createUser).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({ username: userinfo.sub }),
{ enabled: false },
true,
true,
);
});
it('should set the full name correctly when given_name and family_name exist', async () => {
// Arrange
const userinfo = tokenset.claims();
const expectedFullName = `${userinfo.given_name} ${userinfo.family_name}`;
// Act
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
// Assert
expect(user.name).toBe(expectedFullName);
});
it('should override full name with OPENID_NAME_CLAIM when set', async () => {
// Arrange – use the name claim as the full name
process.env.OPENID_NAME_CLAIM = 'name';
const userinfo = { ...tokenset.claims(), name: 'Custom Name' };
// Act
const { user } = await validate({ ...tokenset, claims: () => userinfo });
// Assert
expect(user.name).toBe('Custom Name');
});
it('should update an existing user on login', async () => {
// Arrange – simulate that a user already exists with openid provider
const existingUser = {
_id: 'existingUserId',
provider: 'openid',
email: tokenset.claims().email,
openidId: '',
username: '',
name: '',
};
findUser.mockImplementation(async (query) => {
if (query.openidId === tokenset.claims().sub || query.email === tokenset.claims().email) {
return existingUser;
}
return null;
});
const userinfo = tokenset.claims();
// Act
await validate(tokenset);
// Assert – updateUser should be called and the user object updated
expect(updateUser).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
existingUser._id,
expect.objectContaining({
provider: 'openid',
openidId: userinfo.sub,
openidIssuer: 'https://fake-issuer.com',
username: userinfo.preferred_username,
name: `${userinfo.given_name} ${userinfo.family_name}`,
}),
);
});
it('should block login when email exists with different provider', async () => {
// Arrange – simulate that a user exists with same email but different provider
const existingUser = {
_id: 'existingUserId',
provider: 'google',
email: tokenset.claims().email,
googleId: 'some-google-id',
username: 'existinguser',
name: 'Existing User',
};
findUser.mockImplementation(async (query) => {
if (query.email === tokenset.claims().email && !query.provider) {
return existingUser;
}
return null;
});
// Act
const result = await validate(tokenset);
// Assert – verify that the strategy rejects login
expect(result.user).toBe(false);
expect(result.details.message).toBe(ErrorTypes.AUTH_FAILED);
expect(createUser).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(updateUser).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('should block login when email fallback finds user with mismatched openidId', async () => {
const existingUser = {
_id: 'existingUserId',
provider: 'openid',
openidId: 'different-sub-claim',
email: tokenset.claims().email,
username: 'existinguser',
name: 'Existing User',
};
findUser.mockImplementation(async (query) => {
if (query.$or) {
return null;
}
if (query.email === tokenset.claims().email) {
return existingUser;
}
return null;
});
const result = await validate(tokenset);
expect(result.user).toBe(false);
expect(result.details.message).toBe(ErrorTypes.AUTH_FAILED);
expect(createUser).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(updateUser).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('should enforce the required role and reject login if missing', async () => {
// Arrange – simulate a token without the required role.
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({
roles: ['SomeOtherRole'],
});
// Act
const { user, details } = await validate(tokenset);
// Assert – verify that the strategy rejects login
expect(user).toBe(false);
expect(details.message).toBe('You must have "requiredRole" role to log in.');
});
it('should not treat substring matches in string roles as satisfying required role', async () => {
// Arrange – override required role to "read" then re-setup
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE = 'read';
await setupOpenId();
verifyCallback = require('openid-client/passport').__getVerifyCallbackByName('openid');
// Token contains "bread" which *contains* "read" as a substring
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({
roles: 'bread',
});
// Act
const { user, details } = await validate(tokenset);
// Assert – verify that substring match does not grant access
expect(user).toBe(false);
expect(details.message).toBe('You must have "read" role to log in.');
});
it('should allow login when roles claim is a space-separated string containing the required role', async () => {
// Arrange – IdP returns roles as a space-delimited string
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({
roles: 'role1 role2 requiredRole',
});
// Act
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
// Assert – login succeeds when required role is present after splitting
expect(user).toBeTruthy();
expect(createUser).toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('should allow login when roles claim is a comma-separated string containing the required role', async () => {
// Arrange – IdP returns roles as a comma-delimited string
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({
roles: 'role1,role2,requiredRole',
});
// Act
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
// Assert – login succeeds when required role is present after splitting
expect(user).toBeTruthy();
expect(createUser).toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('should allow login when roles claim is a mixed comma-and-space-separated string containing the required role', async () => {
// Arrange – IdP returns roles with comma-and-space delimiters
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({
roles: 'role1, role2, requiredRole',
});
// Act
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
// Assert – login succeeds when required role is present after splitting
expect(user).toBeTruthy();
expect(createUser).toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('should reject login when roles claim is a space-separated string that does not contain the required role', async () => {
// Arrange – IdP returns a delimited string but required role is absent
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({
roles: 'role1 role2 otherRole',
});
// Act
const { user, details } = await validate(tokenset);
// Assert – login is rejected with the correct error message
expect(user).toBe(false);
expect(details.message).toBe('You must have "requiredRole" role to log in.');
});
it('should allow login when single required role is present (backward compatibility)', async () => {
// Arrange – ensure single role configuration (as set in beforeEach)
// OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE = 'requiredRole'
// Default jwtDecode mock in beforeEach already returns this role
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({
roles: ['requiredRole', 'anotherRole'],
});
// Act
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
// Assert – verify that login succeeds with single role configuration
expect(user).toBeTruthy();
expect(user.email).toBe(tokenset.claims().email);
expect(user.username).toBe(tokenset.claims().preferred_username);
expect(createUser).toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('should allow login when required role is found in userinfo claims', async () => {
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE = 'requiredRole';
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE_PARAMETER_PATH = 'roles';
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE_TOKEN_KIND = 'userinfo';
// The role is intentionally absent from the id_token and only present in
// the userinfo response — exercises the userinfo branch of the switch.
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({});
require('openid-client').fetchUserInfo.mockResolvedValue({
roles: ['requiredRole'],
});
await setupOpenId();
verifyCallback = require('openid-client/passport').__getVerifyCallbackByName('openid');
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
expect(user).toBeTruthy();
expect(user.email).toBe(tokenset.claims().email);
});
it('should reject login when required role is missing from userinfo claims', async () => {
const { logger } = require('@librechat/data-schemas');
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE = 'requiredRole';
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE_PARAMETER_PATH = 'roles';
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE_TOKEN_KIND = 'userinfo';
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({});
require('openid-client').fetchUserInfo.mockResolvedValue({
other_claim: 'value',
});
await setupOpenId();
verifyCallback = require('openid-client/passport').__getVerifyCallbackByName('openid');
const { user, details } = await validate(tokenset);
expect(user).toBe(false);
expect(details.message).toBe('You must have "requiredRole" role to log in.');
expect(logger.error).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.stringContaining("Key 'roles' not found in userinfo token!"),
);
});
it('should reject login with invalid required role token kind', async () => {
const { logger } = require('@librechat/data-schemas');
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE = 'requiredRole';
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE_PARAMETER_PATH = 'roles';
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE_TOKEN_KIND = 'invalid';
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({
roles: ['requiredRole'],
});
await setupOpenId();
verifyCallback = require('openid-client/passport').__getVerifyCallbackByName('openid');
await expect(validate(tokenset)).rejects.toThrow('Invalid required role token kind');
expect(logger.error).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.stringContaining(
"Invalid required role token kind: invalid. Must be one of 'access', 'id', or 'userinfo'",
),
);
});
describe('group overage and groups handling', () => {
it.each([
['groups array contains required group', ['group-required', 'other-group'], true, undefined],
[
'groups array missing required group',
['other-group'],
false,
'You must have "group-required" role to log in.',
],
['groups string equals required group', 'group-required', true, undefined],
[
'groups string is other group',
'other-group',
false,
'You must have "group-required" role to log in.',
],
])(
'uses groups claim directly when %s (no overage)',
async (_label, groupsClaim, expectedAllowed, expectedMessage) => {
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE = 'group-required';
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE_PARAMETER_PATH = 'groups';
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE_TOKEN_KIND = 'id';
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({
groups: groupsClaim,
permissions: ['admin'],
});
await setupOpenId();
verifyCallback = require('openid-client/passport').__getVerifyCallbackByName('openid');
const { user, details } = await validate(tokenset);
expect(undici.fetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(Boolean(user)).toBe(expectedAllowed);
expect(details?.message).toBe(expectedMessage);
},
);
it.each([
['token kind is not id', { kind: 'access', path: 'groups', decoded: { hasgroups: true } }],
['parameter path is not groups', { kind: 'id', path: 'roles', decoded: { hasgroups: true } }],
['decoded token is falsy', { kind: 'id', path: 'groups', decoded: null }],
[
'no overage indicators in decoded token',
{
kind: 'id',
path: 'groups',
decoded: {
permissions: ['admin'],
},
},
],
[
'only _claim_names present (no _claim_sources)',
{
kind: 'id',
path: 'groups',
decoded: {
_claim_names: { groups: 'src1' },
permissions: ['admin'],
},
},
],
[
'only _claim_sources present (no _claim_names)',
{
kind: 'id',
path: 'groups',
decoded: {
_claim_sources: { src1: { endpoint: 'https://graph.windows.net/ignored' } },
permissions: ['admin'],
},
},
],
])('does not attempt overage resolution when %s', async (_label, cfg) => {
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE = 'group-required';
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE_PARAMETER_PATH = cfg.path;
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE_TOKEN_KIND = cfg.kind;
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue(cfg.decoded);
await setupOpenId();
verifyCallback = require('openid-client/passport').__getVerifyCallbackByName('openid');
const { user, details } = await validate(tokenset);
expect(undici.fetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(user).toBe(false);
expect(details.message).toBe('You must have "group-required" role to log in.');
const { logger } = require('@librechat/data-schemas');
const expectedTokenKind = cfg.kind === 'access' ? 'access token' : 'id token';
expect(logger.error).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.stringContaining(`Key '${cfg.path}' not found in ${expectedTokenKind}!`),
);
});
});
describe('resolving groups via Microsoft Graph', () => {
it('denies login and does not call Graph when access token is missing', async () => {
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE = 'group-required';
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE_PARAMETER_PATH = 'groups';
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE_TOKEN_KIND = 'id';
const { logger } = require('@librechat/data-schemas');
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({
hasgroups: true,
permissions: ['admin'],
});
await setupOpenId();
verifyCallback = require('openid-client/passport').__getVerifyCallbackByName('openid');
const tokensetWithoutAccess = {
...tokenset,
access_token: undefined,
};
const { user, details } = await validate(tokensetWithoutAccess);
expect(user).toBe(false);
expect(details.message).toBe('You must have "group-required" role to log in.');
expect(undici.fetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(logger.error).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.stringContaining('Access token missing; cannot resolve group overage'),
);
});
it.each([
[
'Graph returns HTTP error',
async () => ({
ok: false,
status: 403,
statusText: 'Forbidden',
json: async () => ({}),
}),
[
'[openidStrategy] Failed to resolve groups via Microsoft Graph getMemberObjects: HTTP 403 Forbidden',
],
],
[
'Graph network error',
async () => {
throw new Error('network error');
},
[
'[openidStrategy] Error resolving groups via Microsoft Graph getMemberObjects:',
expect.any(Error),
],
],
[
'Graph returns unexpected shape (no value)',
async () => ({
ok: true,
status: 200,
statusText: 'OK',
json: async () => ({}),
}),
[
'[openidStrategy] Unexpected response format when resolving groups via Microsoft Graph getMemberObjects',
],
],
[
'Graph returns invalid value type',
async () => ({
ok: true,
status: 200,
statusText: 'OK',
json: async () => ({ value: 'not-an-array' }),
}),
[
'[openidStrategy] Unexpected response format when resolving groups via Microsoft Graph getMemberObjects',
],
],
])(
'denies login when overage resolution fails because %s',
async (_label, setupFetch, expectedErrorArgs) => {
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE = 'group-required';
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE_PARAMETER_PATH = 'groups';
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE_TOKEN_KIND = 'id';
const { logger } = require('@librechat/data-schemas');
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({
hasgroups: true,
permissions: ['admin'],
});
await setupOpenId();
verifyCallback = require('openid-client/passport').__getVerifyCallbackByName('openid');
undici.fetch.mockImplementation(setupFetch);
const { user, details } = await validate(tokenset);
expect(undici.fetch).toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(user).toBe(false);
expect(details.message).toBe('You must have "group-required" role to log in.');
expect(logger.error).toHaveBeenCalledWith(...expectedErrorArgs);
},
);
it.each([
[
'hasgroups overage and Graph contains required group',
{
hasgroups: true,
},
['group-required', 'some-other-group'],
true,
],
[
'_claim_* overage and Graph contains required group',
{
_claim_names: { groups: 'src1' },
_claim_sources: { src1: { endpoint: 'https://graph.windows.net/ignored' } },
},
['group-required', 'some-other-group'],
true,
],
[
'hasgroups overage and Graph does NOT contain required group',
{
hasgroups: true,
},
['some-other-group'],
false,
],
[
'_claim_* overage and Graph does NOT contain required group',
{
_claim_names: { groups: 'src1' },
_claim_sources: { src1: { endpoint: 'https://graph.windows.net/ignored' } },
},
['some-other-group'],
false,
],
])(
'resolves groups via Microsoft Graph when %s',
async (_label, decodedTokenValue, graphGroups, expectedAllowed) => {
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE = 'group-required';
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE_PARAMETER_PATH = 'groups';
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE_TOKEN_KIND = 'id';
const { logger } = require('@librechat/data-schemas');
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue(decodedTokenValue);
await setupOpenId();
verifyCallback = require('openid-client/passport').__getVerifyCallbackByName('openid');
undici.fetch.mockResolvedValue({
ok: true,
status: 200,
statusText: 'OK',
json: async () => ({
value: graphGroups,
}),
});
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
expect(undici.fetch).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me/getMemberObjects',
expect.objectContaining({
method: 'POST',
headers: expect.objectContaining({
Authorization: 'Bearer exchanged_graph_token',
}),
}),
);
expect(Boolean(user)).toBe(expectedAllowed);
expect(logger.debug).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.stringContaining(
`Successfully resolved ${graphGroups.length} groups via Microsoft Graph getMemberObjects`,
),
);
},
);
});
describe('OBO token exchange for overage', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
delete process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE;
});
it('exchanges access token via OBO before calling Graph API', async () => {
const openidClient = require('openid-client');
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE = 'group-required';
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE_PARAMETER_PATH = 'groups';
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE_TOKEN_KIND = 'id';
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({ hasgroups: true });
await setupOpenId();
verifyCallback = require('openid-client/passport').__getVerifyCallbackByName('openid');
undici.fetch.mockResolvedValue({
ok: true,
status: 200,
statusText: 'OK',
json: async () => ({ value: ['group-required'] }),
});
await validate(tokenset);
expect(openidClient.genericGrantRequest).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.anything(),
'urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer',
expect.objectContaining({
scope: 'https://graph.microsoft.com/User.Read',
assertion: tokenset.access_token,
requested_token_use: 'on_behalf_of',
}),
);
expect(undici.fetch).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me/getMemberObjects',
expect.objectContaining({
headers: expect.objectContaining({
Authorization: 'Bearer exchanged_graph_token',
}),
}),
);
});
it('caches the exchanged token and reuses it on subsequent calls', async () => {
const openidClient = require('openid-client');
const getLogStores = require('~/cache/getLogStores');
const mockSet = jest.fn();
const mockGet = jest
.fn()
.mockResolvedValueOnce(undefined)
.mockResolvedValueOnce({ access_token: 'exchanged_graph_token' });
getLogStores.mockReturnValue({ get: mockGet, set: mockSet });
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE = 'group-required';
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE_PARAMETER_PATH = 'groups';
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE_TOKEN_KIND = 'id';
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({ hasgroups: true });
await setupOpenId();
verifyCallback = require('openid-client/passport').__getVerifyCallbackByName('openid');
undici.fetch.mockResolvedValue({
ok: true,
status: 200,
statusText: 'OK',
json: async () => ({ value: ['group-required'] }),
});
// First call: cache miss → OBO exchange → cache set
await validate(tokenset);
/** The entry expires 30s (OPENID_EXPIRY_BUFFER_SECONDS) before the credential it holds, so a
* token served from cache cannot expire in transit and 401 downstream. */
expect(mockSet).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'1234:overage',
{ access_token: 'exchanged_graph_token' },
3570000,
);
expect(openidClient.genericGrantRequest).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
// Second call: cache hit → no new OBO exchange
openidClient.genericGrantRequest.mockClear();
await validate(tokenset);
expect(openidClient.genericGrantRequest).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
describe('admin role group overage', () => {
it('resolves admin groups via Graph when overage is detected for admin role', async () => {
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE = 'group-required';
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE_PARAMETER_PATH = 'groups';
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE_TOKEN_KIND = 'id';
process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE = 'admin-group-id';
process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE_PARAMETER_PATH = 'groups';
process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE_TOKEN_KIND = 'id';
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({ hasgroups: true });
await setupOpenId();
verifyCallback = require('openid-client/passport').__getVerifyCallbackByName('openid');
undici.fetch.mockResolvedValue({
ok: true,
status: 200,
statusText: 'OK',
json: async () => ({ value: ['group-required', 'admin-group-id'] }),
});
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
expect(user.role).toBe('ADMIN');
});
it('does not grant admin when overage groups do not contain admin role', async () => {
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE = 'group-required';
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE_PARAMETER_PATH = 'groups';
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE_TOKEN_KIND = 'id';
process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE = 'admin-group-id';
process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE_PARAMETER_PATH = 'groups';
process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE_TOKEN_KIND = 'id';
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({ hasgroups: true });
await setupOpenId();
verifyCallback = require('openid-client/passport').__getVerifyCallbackByName('openid');
undici.fetch.mockResolvedValue({
ok: true,
status: 200,
statusText: 'OK',
json: async () => ({ value: ['group-required', 'other-group'] }),
});
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
expect(user).toBeTruthy();
expect(user.role).toBeUndefined();
});
it('reuses already-resolved overage groups for admin role check (no duplicate Graph call)', async () => {
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE = 'group-required';
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE_PARAMETER_PATH = 'groups';
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE_TOKEN_KIND = 'id';
process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE = 'admin-group-id';
process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE_PARAMETER_PATH = 'groups';
process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE_TOKEN_KIND = 'id';
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({ hasgroups: true });
await setupOpenId();
verifyCallback = require('openid-client/passport').__getVerifyCallbackByName('openid');
undici.fetch.mockResolvedValue({
ok: true,
status: 200,
statusText: 'OK',
json: async () => ({ value: ['group-required', 'admin-group-id'] }),
});
await validate(tokenset);
// Graph API should be called only once (for required role), admin role reuses the result
expect(undici.fetch).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
});
it('demotes existing admin when overage groups no longer contain admin role', async () => {
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE = 'group-required';
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE_PARAMETER_PATH = 'groups';
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE_TOKEN_KIND = 'id';
process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE = 'admin-group-id';
process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE_PARAMETER_PATH = 'groups';
process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE_TOKEN_KIND = 'id';
const existingAdminUser = {
_id: 'existingAdminId',
provider: 'openid',
email: tokenset.claims().email,
openidId: tokenset.claims().sub,
username: 'adminuser',
name: 'Admin User',
role: 'ADMIN',
};
findUser.mockImplementation(async (query) => {
if (query.openidId === tokenset.claims().sub || query.email === tokenset.claims().email) {
return existingAdminUser;
}
return null;
});
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({ hasgroups: true });
await setupOpenId();
verifyCallback = require('openid-client/passport').__getVerifyCallbackByName('openid');
undici.fetch.mockResolvedValue({
ok: true,
status: 200,
statusText: 'OK',
json: async () => ({ value: ['group-required'] }),
});
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
expect(user.role).toBe('USER');
});
it('does not attempt overage for admin role when token kind is not id', async () => {
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE = 'requiredRole';
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE_PARAMETER_PATH = 'roles';
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE_TOKEN_KIND = 'id';
process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE = 'admin';
process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE_PARAMETER_PATH = 'groups';
process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE_TOKEN_KIND = 'access';
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({
roles: ['requiredRole'],
hasgroups: true,
});
await setupOpenId();
verifyCallback = require('openid-client/passport').__getVerifyCallbackByName('openid');
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
// No Graph call since admin uses access token (not id)
expect(undici.fetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(user.role).toBeUndefined();
});
it('resolves admin via Graph independently when OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE is not configured', async () => {
delete process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE;
process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE = 'admin-group-id';
process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE_PARAMETER_PATH = 'groups';
process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE_TOKEN_KIND = 'id';
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({ hasgroups: true });
await setupOpenId();
verifyCallback = require('openid-client/passport').__getVerifyCallbackByName('openid');
undici.fetch.mockResolvedValue({
ok: true,
status: 200,
statusText: 'OK',
json: async () => ({ value: ['admin-group-id'] }),
});
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
expect(user.role).toBe('ADMIN');
expect(undici.fetch).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
});
it('denies admin when OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE is absent and Graph does not contain admin group', async () => {
delete process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE;
process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE = 'admin-group-id';
process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE_PARAMETER_PATH = 'groups';
process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE_TOKEN_KIND = 'id';
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({ hasgroups: true });
await setupOpenId();
verifyCallback = require('openid-client/passport').__getVerifyCallbackByName('openid');
undici.fetch.mockResolvedValue({
ok: true,
status: 200,
statusText: 'OK',
json: async () => ({ value: ['other-group'] }),
});
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
expect(user).toBeTruthy();
expect(user.role).toBeUndefined();
});
it('denies login and logs error when OBO exchange throws', async () => {
const openidClient = require('openid-client');
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE = 'group-required';
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE_PARAMETER_PATH = 'groups';
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE_TOKEN_KIND = 'id';
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({ hasgroups: true });
openidClient.genericGrantRequest.mockRejectedValueOnce(new Error('OBO exchange rejected'));
await setupOpenId();
verifyCallback = require('openid-client/passport').__getVerifyCallbackByName('openid');
const { user, details } = await validate(tokenset);
expect(user).toBe(false);
expect(details.message).toBe('You must have "group-required" role to log in.');
expect(undici.fetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('denies login when OBO exchange returns no access_token', async () => {
const openidClient = require('openid-client');
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE = 'group-required';
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE_PARAMETER_PATH = 'groups';
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE_TOKEN_KIND = 'id';
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({ hasgroups: true });
openidClient.genericGrantRequest.mockResolvedValueOnce({ expires_in: 3600 });
await setupOpenId();
verifyCallback = require('openid-client/passport').__getVerifyCallbackByName('openid');
const { user, details } = await validate(tokenset);
expect(user).toBe(false);
expect(details.message).toBe('You must have "group-required" role to log in.');
expect(undici.fetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
it('should process and save the avatar through the shared avatar path if picture is provided', async () => {
const { getStrategyFunctions } = require('~/server/services/Files/strategies');
// Act
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
const strategyResult =
getStrategyFunctions.mock.results[getStrategyFunctions.mock.results.length - 1];
const { saveBuffer } = strategyResult.value;
const [saveParams] = saveBuffer.mock.calls[0];
expect(resizeAvatar).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
userId: 'newUserId',
input: 'https://example.com/avatar.png',
});
expect(fetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(saveParams).toEqual(
expect.objectContaining({
fileName: 'hashed-token.png',
userId: 'newUserId',
buffer: expect.any(Buffer),
}),
);
expect(saveParams).not.toHaveProperty('basePath');
// Our mock getStrategyFunctions.saveBuffer returns '/fake/path/to/avatar.png'
expect(user.avatar).toBe('/fake/path/to/avatar.png');
});
it('uses only the shared avatar processor for OpenID picture URLs', async () => {
await validate(tokenset);
expect(resizeAvatar).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
userId: 'newUserId',
input: 'https://example.com/avatar.png',
});
expect(fetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('adds auth headers for configured OpenID avatar origins', async () => {
process.env.OPENID_AVATAR_AUTHORIZED_ORIGINS = 'https://example.com';
await validate(tokenset);
expect(resizeAvatar).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
userId: 'newUserId',
input: 'https://example.com/avatar.png',
fetchOptions: {
headers: {
Authorization: 'Bearer fake_access_token',
},
},
});
expect(fetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('continues login when shared avatar processing rejects the picture URL', async () => {
const { getStrategyFunctions } = require('~/server/services/Files/strategies');
resizeAvatar.mockRejectedValueOnce(new Error('avatar processing failed'));
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
expect(user).toBeTruthy();
expect(user.avatar).toBeUndefined();
expect(getStrategyFunctions).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('should save CloudFront IdP avatars under the shared avatar prefix', async () => {
const { getStrategyFunctions } = require('~/server/services/Files/strategies');
getAppConfig.mockResolvedValueOnce({ fileStrategy: mockCloudfrontFileSource });
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
const strategyResult =
getStrategyFunctions.mock.results[getStrategyFunctions.mock.results.length - 1];
const { saveBuffer } = strategyResult.value;
const [saveParams] = saveBuffer.mock.calls[0];
expect(getStrategyFunctions).toHaveBeenLastCalledWith(mockCloudfrontFileSource);
expect(resizeAvatar).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
userId: 'newUserId',
input: 'https://example.com/avatar.png',
});
expect(fetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(saveParams).toEqual(
expect.objectContaining({
basePath: 'avatars',
fileName: 'hashed-token.png',
userId: 'newUserId',
}),
);
expect(user.avatar).toBe('/fake/path/to/avatar.png');
});
it('should not attempt to download avatar if picture is not provided', async () => {
// Arrange – remove picture
const userinfo = { ...tokenset.claims() };
delete userinfo.picture;
// Act
await validate({ ...tokenset, claims: () => userinfo });
// Assert – fetch should not be called and avatar should remain undefined or empty
expect(fetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(resizeAvatar).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
// Depending on your implementation, user.avatar may be undefined or an empty string.
});
it('should support comma-separated multiple roles', async () => {
// Arrange
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE = 'someRole,anotherRole,admin';
await setupOpenId(); // Re-initialize the strategy
verifyCallback = require('openid-client/passport').__getVerifyCallbackByName('openid');
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({
roles: ['anotherRole', 'aThirdRole'],
});
// Act
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
// Assert
expect(user).toBeTruthy();
expect(user.email).toBe(tokenset.claims().email);
});
it('should reject login when user has none of the required multiple roles', async () => {
// Arrange
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE = 'someRole,anotherRole,admin';
await setupOpenId(); // Re-initialize the strategy
verifyCallback = require('openid-client/passport').__getVerifyCallbackByName('openid');
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({
roles: ['aThirdRole', 'aFourthRole'],
});
// Act
const { user, details } = await validate(tokenset);
// Assert
expect(user).toBe(false);
expect(details.message).toBe(
'You must have one of: "someRole", "anotherRole", "admin" role to log in.',
);
});
it('should handle spaces in comma-separated roles', async () => {
// Arrange
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE = ' someRole , anotherRole , admin ';
await setupOpenId(); // Re-initialize the strategy
verifyCallback = require('openid-client/passport').__getVerifyCallbackByName('openid');
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({
roles: ['someRole'],
});
// Act
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
// Assert
expect(user).toBeTruthy();
});
it('should default to usePKCE false when OPENID_USE_PKCE is not defined', async () => {
const OpenIDStrategy = require('openid-client/passport').Strategy;
delete process.env.OPENID_USE_PKCE;
await setupOpenId();
const callOptions = OpenIDStrategy.mock.calls[OpenIDStrategy.mock.calls.length - 1][0];
expect(callOptions.usePKCE).toBe(false);
expect(callOptions.params?.code_challenge_method).toBeUndefined();
});
it('should attach federatedTokens to user object for token propagation', async () => {
// Arrange - setup tokenset with access token, id token, refresh token, and expiration
const tokensetWithTokens = {
...tokenset,
access_token: 'mock_access_token_abc123',
id_token: 'mock_id_token_def456',
refresh_token: 'mock_refresh_token_xyz789',
expires_at: 1234567890,
};
// Act - validate with the tokenset containing tokens
const { user } = await validate(tokensetWithTokens);
// Assert - verify federatedTokens object is attached with correct values
expect(user.federatedTokens).toBeDefined();
expect(user.federatedTokens).toEqual({
access_token: 'mock_access_token_abc123',
id_token: 'mock_id_token_def456',
refresh_token: 'mock_refresh_token_xyz789',
expires_at: 1234567890,
});
});
it('should include id_token in federatedTokens distinct from access_token', async () => {
// Arrange - use different values for access_token and id_token
const tokensetWithTokens = {
...tokenset,
access_token: 'the_access_token',
id_token: 'the_id_token',
refresh_token: 'the_refresh_token',
expires_at: 9999999999,
};
// Act
const { user } = await validate(tokensetWithTokens);
// Assert - id_token and access_token must be different values
expect(user.federatedTokens.access_token).toBe('the_access_token');
expect(user.federatedTokens.id_token).toBe('the_id_token');
expect(user.federatedTokens.id_token).not.toBe(user.federatedTokens.access_token);
});
it('should include tokenset along with federatedTokens', async () => {
// Arrange
const tokensetWithTokens = {
...tokenset,
access_token: 'test_access_token',
id_token: 'test_id_token',
refresh_token: 'test_refresh_token',
expires_at: 9999999999,
};
// Act
const { user } = await validate(tokensetWithTokens);
// Assert - both tokenset and federatedTokens should be present
expect(user.tokenset).toBeDefined();
expect(user.federatedTokens).toBeDefined();
expect(user.tokenset.access_token).toBe('test_access_token');
expect(user.tokenset.id_token).toBe('test_id_token');
expect(user.federatedTokens.access_token).toBe('test_access_token');
expect(user.federatedTokens.id_token).toBe('test_id_token');
});
it('should set role to "ADMIN" if OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE is set and user has that role', async () => {
// Act
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
// Assert – verify that the user role is set to "ADMIN"
expect(user.role).toBe('ADMIN');
});
it('should not set user role if OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE is set but the user does not have that role', async () => {
// Arrange – simulate a token without the admin permission
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({
roles: ['requiredRole'],
permissions: ['not-admin'],
});
// Act
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
// Assert – verify that the user role is not defined
expect(user.role).toBeUndefined();
});
describe('OpenID role sync', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
process.env.OPENID_ROLE_SYNC_ENABLED = 'true';
process.env.OPENID_ROLE_SYNC_SOURCE = 'id';
process.env.OPENID_ROLE_SYNC_CLAIM = 'roles';
process.env.OPENID_ROLE_SYNC_ROLE_PRIORITY = 'STANDARD-USER,BASIC-USER';
process.env.OPENID_ROLE_SYNC_FALLBACK_ROLE = 'USER';
});
it('selects the highest configured matching role from the OpenID token', async () => {
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({
roles: ['requiredRole', 'BASIC-USER', 'STANDARD-USER'],
permissions: ['not-admin'],
});
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
expect(user.role).toBe('STANDARD-USER');
expect(updateUser).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'newUserId',
expect.objectContaining({ role: 'STANDARD-USER' }),
);
});
it('does not run when disabled', async () => {
delete process.env.OPENID_ROLE_SYNC_ENABLED;
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({
roles: ['requiredRole', 'STANDARD-USER'],
permissions: ['not-admin'],
});
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
expect(user.role).toBeUndefined();
expect(findRolesByNames).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('leaves ADMIN authoritative when OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE grants admin', async () => {
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({
roles: ['requiredRole', 'STANDARD-USER'],
permissions: ['admin'],
});
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
expect(user.role).toBe('ADMIN');
});
it('preserves an existing ADMIN role when admin is manually assigned', async () => {
delete process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE;
delete process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE_PARAMETER_PATH;
delete process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE_TOKEN_KIND;
const existingAdminUser = {
_id: 'existingAdminId',
provider: 'openid',
email: tokenset.claims().email,
openidId: tokenset.claims().sub,
username: 'adminuser',
name: 'Admin User',
role: 'ADMIN',
};
findUser.mockImplementation(async (query) => {
if (query.openidId === tokenset.claims().sub || query.email === tokenset.claims().email) {
return existingAdminUser;
}
return null;
});
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({
roles: ['requiredRole', 'STANDARD-USER'],
permissions: ['not-admin'],
});
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
expect(user.role).toBe('ADMIN');
expect(findRolesByNames).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('uses fallback when a valid role claim has no configured role match', async () => {
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({
roles: ['requiredRole', 'external-role'],
permissions: ['not-admin'],
});
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
expect(user.role).toBe('USER');
});
it('uses fallback when the role claim is present but empty', async () => {
// The required-role gate reads the same `roles` claim this test empties, so
// disable it to model an IdP that authenticates the user yet emits no roles.
delete process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE;
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({
roles: '',
permissions: ['not-admin'],
});
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
expect(user.role).toBe('USER');
expect(updateUser).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'newUserId',
expect.objectContaining({ role: 'USER' }),
);
});
it('applies fallback when the role claim is absent from the token', async () => {
// Required-role gate reads the same `roles` claim; disable it to model an IdP
// that authenticates the user but stops emitting the role claim entirely.
delete process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE;
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({
permissions: ['not-admin'],
});
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
expect(user.role).toBe('USER');
expect(updateUser).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'newUserId',
expect.objectContaining({ role: 'USER' }),
);
});
it('rejects login when configured sync roles do not exist', async () => {
findRolesByNames.mockImplementation(async (roleNames) =>
roleNames
.filter((roleName) => roleName !== 'STANDARD-USER')
.map((roleName) => ({ name: roleName })),
);
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({
roles: ['requiredRole', 'STANDARD-USER'],
permissions: ['not-admin'],
});
await expect(validate(tokenset)).rejects.toThrow(
'OpenID role sync configured roles do not exist: STANDARD-USER',
);
});
it('can assign a non-admin role after the existing admin demotion path runs', async () => {
const existingAdminUser = {
_id: 'existingAdminId',
provider: 'openid',
email: tokenset.claims().email,
openidId: tokenset.claims().sub,
username: 'adminuser',
name: 'Admin User',
role: 'ADMIN',
};
findUser.mockImplementation(async (query) => {
if (query.openidId === tokenset.claims().sub || query.email === tokenset.claims().email) {
return existingAdminUser;
}
return null;
});
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({
roles: ['requiredRole', 'STANDARD-USER'],
permissions: ['not-admin'],
});
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
expect(user.role).toBe('STANDARD-USER');
expect(updateUser).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
existingAdminUser._id,
expect.objectContaining({ role: 'STANDARD-USER' }),
);
});
it('wraps role lookup in tenant context for tenant users', async () => {
const existingUser = {
_id: 'existingTenantUserId',
provider: 'openid',
email: tokenset.claims().email,
openidId: tokenset.claims().sub,
username: 'tenantuser',
name: 'Tenant User',
tenantId: 'tenant-a',
role: 'USER',
};
const { tenantStorage } = require('@librechat/data-schemas');
findUser.mockImplementation(async (query) => {
if (query.openidId === tokenset.claims().sub || query.email === tokenset.claims().email) {
return existingUser;
}
return null;
});
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({
roles: ['requiredRole', 'BASIC-USER'],
permissions: ['not-admin'],
});
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
expect(user.role).toBe('BASIC-USER');
expect(tenantStorage.run).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
{ tenantId: 'tenant-a' },
expect.any(Function),
);
});
it('re-enforces tenant login policy after role sync changes the role', async () => {
const existingUser = {
_id: 'existingTenantUserId',
provider: 'openid',
email: tokenset.claims().email,
openidId: tokenset.claims().sub,
username: 'tenantuser',
name: 'Tenant User',
tenantId: 'tenant-a',
role: 'USER',
};
const { isEmailDomainAllowed } = require('@librechat/api');
findUser.mockImplementation(async (query) => {
if (query.openidId === tokenset.claims().sub || query.email === tokenset.claims().email) {
return existingUser;
}
return null;
});
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({
roles: ['requiredRole', 'BASIC-USER'],
permissions: ['not-admin'],
});
// Pre-sync domain check passes; the post-sync re-resolved config rejects the domain.
isEmailDomainAllowed.mockReturnValueOnce(true).mockReturnValueOnce(false);
resolveAppConfigForUser.mockResolvedValue({
registration: { allowedDomains: ['restricted.com'] },
});
const { user, details } = await validate(tokenset);
expect(user).toBe(false);
expect(details).toEqual({ message: 'Email domain not allowed' });
});
it('reuses required-role overage groups for role sync', async () => {
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE = 'group-required';
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE_PARAMETER_PATH = 'groups';
process.env.OPENID_ROLE_SYNC_CLAIM = 'groups';
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({
hasgroups: true,
permissions: ['not-admin'],
});
undici.fetch.mockResolvedValue({
ok: true,
json: async () => ({ value: ['group-required', 'STANDARD-USER'] }),
});
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
expect(user.role).toBe('STANDARD-USER');
expect(undici.fetch).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
});
it('leaves the role unchanged when role-sync group overage cannot be resolved', async () => {
process.env.OPENID_ROLE_SYNC_CLAIM = 'groups';
const existingUser = {
_id: 'existingUserId',
provider: 'openid',
email: tokenset.claims().email,
openidId: tokenset.claims().sub,
username: 'existinguser',
name: 'Existing User',
role: 'BASIC-USER',
};
findUser.mockImplementation(async (query) => {
if (query.openidId === tokenset.claims().sub || query.email === tokenset.claims().email) {
return existingUser;
}
return null;
});
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({
roles: ['requiredRole'],
hasgroups: true,
permissions: ['not-admin'],
});
const { user } = await validate({ ...tokenset, access_token: undefined });
expect(user.role).toBe('BASIC-USER');
});
});
it('should demote existing admin user when admin role is removed from token', async () => {
// Arrange – simulate an existing user who is currently an admin
const existingAdminUser = {
_id: 'existingAdminId',
provider: 'openid',
email: tokenset.claims().email,
openidId: tokenset.claims().sub,
username: 'adminuser',
name: 'Admin User',
role: 'ADMIN',
};
findUser.mockImplementation(async (query) => {
if (query.openidId === tokenset.claims().sub || query.email === tokenset.claims().email) {
return existingAdminUser;
}
return null;
});
// Token without admin permission
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({
roles: ['requiredRole'],
permissions: ['not-admin'],
});
const { logger } = require('@librechat/data-schemas');
// Act
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
// Assert – verify that the user was demoted
expect(user.role).toBe('USER');
expect(updateUser).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
existingAdminUser._id,
expect.objectContaining({
role: 'USER',
}),
);
expect(logger.info).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.stringContaining('demoted from admin - role no longer present in token'),
);
});
it('should NOT demote admin user when admin role env vars are not configured', async () => {
// Arrange – remove admin role env vars
delete process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE;
delete process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE_PARAMETER_PATH;
delete process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE_TOKEN_KIND;
await setupOpenId();
verifyCallback = require('openid-client/passport').__getVerifyCallbackByName('openid');
// Simulate an existing admin user
const existingAdminUser = {
_id: 'existingAdminId',
provider: 'openid',
email: tokenset.claims().email,
openidId: tokenset.claims().sub,
username: 'adminuser',
name: 'Admin User',
role: 'ADMIN',
};
findUser.mockImplementation(async (query) => {
if (query.openidId === tokenset.claims().sub || query.email === tokenset.claims().email) {
return existingAdminUser;
}
return null;
});
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({
roles: ['requiredRole'],
});
// Act
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
// Assert – verify that the admin user was NOT demoted
expect(user.role).toBe('ADMIN');
expect(updateUser).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
existingAdminUser._id,
expect.objectContaining({
role: 'ADMIN',
}),
);
});
describe('lodash get - nested path extraction', () => {
it('should extract roles from deeply nested token path', async () => {
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE = 'app-user';
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE_PARAMETER_PATH = 'resource_access.my-client.roles';
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({
resource_access: {
'my-client': {
roles: ['app-user', 'viewer'],
},
},
});
await setupOpenId();
verifyCallback = require('openid-client/passport').__getVerifyCallbackByName('openid');
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
expect(user).toBeTruthy();
expect(user.email).toBe(tokenset.claims().email);
});
it('should extract roles from three-level nested path', async () => {
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE = 'editor';
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE_PARAMETER_PATH = 'data.access.permissions.roles';
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({
data: {
access: {
permissions: {
roles: ['editor', 'reader'],
},
},
},
});
await setupOpenId();
verifyCallback = require('openid-client/passport').__getVerifyCallbackByName('openid');
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
expect(user).toBeTruthy();
});
it('should log error and reject login when required role path does not exist in token', async () => {
const { logger } = require('@librechat/data-schemas');
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE = 'app-user';
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE_PARAMETER_PATH = 'resource_access.nonexistent.roles';
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({
resource_access: {
'my-client': {
roles: ['app-user'],
},
},
});
await setupOpenId();
verifyCallback = require('openid-client/passport').__getVerifyCallbackByName('openid');
const { user, details } = await validate(tokenset);
expect(logger.error).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.stringContaining("Key 'resource_access.nonexistent.roles' not found in id token!"),
);
expect(user).toBe(false);
expect(details.message).toContain('role to log in');
});
it('should handle missing intermediate nested path gracefully', async () => {
const { logger } = require('@librechat/data-schemas');
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE = 'user';
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE_PARAMETER_PATH = 'org.team.roles';
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({
org: {
other: 'value',
},
});
await setupOpenId();
verifyCallback = require('openid-client/passport').__getVerifyCallbackByName('openid');
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
expect(logger.error).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.stringContaining("Key 'org.team.roles' not found in id token!"),
);
expect(user).toBe(false);
});
it('should extract admin role from nested path in access token', async () => {
process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE = 'admin';
process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE_PARAMETER_PATH = 'realm_access.roles';
process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE_TOKEN_KIND = 'access';
jwtDecode.mockImplementation((token) => {
if (token === 'fake_access_token') {
return {
realm_access: {
roles: ['admin', 'user'],
},
};
}
return {
roles: ['requiredRole'],
};
});
await setupOpenId();
verifyCallback = require('openid-client/passport').__getVerifyCallbackByName('openid');
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
expect(user.role).toBe('ADMIN');
});
it('should extract admin role from nested path in userinfo', async () => {
process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE = 'admin';
process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE_PARAMETER_PATH = 'organization.permissions';
process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE_TOKEN_KIND = 'userinfo';
const userinfoWithNestedGroups = {
...tokenset.claims(),
organization: {
permissions: ['admin', 'write'],
},
};
require('openid-client').fetchUserInfo.mockResolvedValue({
organization: {
permissions: ['admin', 'write'],
},
});
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({
roles: ['requiredRole'],
});
await setupOpenId();
verifyCallback = require('openid-client/passport').__getVerifyCallbackByName('openid');
const { user } = await validate({
...tokenset,
claims: () => userinfoWithNestedGroups,
});
expect(user.role).toBe('ADMIN');
});
it('should handle boolean admin role value', async () => {
process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE = 'admin';
process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE_PARAMETER_PATH = 'is_admin';
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({
roles: ['requiredRole'],
is_admin: true,
});
await setupOpenId();
verifyCallback = require('openid-client/passport').__getVerifyCallbackByName('openid');
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
expect(user.role).toBe('ADMIN');
});
it('should handle string admin role value matching exactly', async () => {
process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE = 'super-admin';
process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE_PARAMETER_PATH = 'role';
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({
roles: ['requiredRole'],
role: 'super-admin',
});
await setupOpenId();
verifyCallback = require('openid-client/passport').__getVerifyCallbackByName('openid');
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
expect(user.role).toBe('ADMIN');
});
it('should not set admin role when string value does not match', async () => {
process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE = 'super-admin';
process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE_PARAMETER_PATH = 'role';
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({
roles: ['requiredRole'],
role: 'regular-user',
});
await setupOpenId();
verifyCallback = require('openid-client/passport').__getVerifyCallbackByName('openid');
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
expect(user.role).toBeUndefined();
});
it('should handle array admin role value', async () => {
process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE = 'site-admin';
process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE_PARAMETER_PATH = 'app_roles';
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({
roles: ['requiredRole'],
app_roles: ['user', 'site-admin', 'moderator'],
});
await setupOpenId();
verifyCallback = require('openid-client/passport').__getVerifyCallbackByName('openid');
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
expect(user.role).toBe('ADMIN');
});
it('should not set admin when role is not in array', async () => {
process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE = 'site-admin';
process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE_PARAMETER_PATH = 'app_roles';
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({
roles: ['requiredRole'],
app_roles: ['user', 'moderator'],
});
await setupOpenId();
verifyCallback = require('openid-client/passport').__getVerifyCallbackByName('openid');
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
expect(user.role).toBeUndefined();
});
it('should grant admin when admin role claim is a space-separated string containing the admin role', async () => {
// Arrange – IdP returns admin roles as a space-delimited string
process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE = 'site-admin';
process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE_PARAMETER_PATH = 'app_roles';
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({
roles: ['requiredRole'],
app_roles: 'user site-admin moderator',
});
await setupOpenId();
verifyCallback = require('openid-client/passport').__getVerifyCallbackByName('openid');
// Act
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
// Assert – admin role is granted after splitting the delimited string
expect(user.role).toBe('ADMIN');
});
it('should not grant admin when admin role claim is a space-separated string that does not contain the admin role', async () => {
// Arrange – delimited string present but admin role is absent
process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE = 'site-admin';
process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE_PARAMETER_PATH = 'app_roles';
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({
roles: ['requiredRole'],
app_roles: 'user moderator',
});
await setupOpenId();
verifyCallback = require('openid-client/passport').__getVerifyCallbackByName('openid');
// Act
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
// Assert – admin role is not granted
expect(user.role).toBeUndefined();
});
it('should handle nested path with special characters in keys', async () => {
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE = 'app-user';
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE_PARAMETER_PATH = 'resource_access.my-app-123.roles';
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({
resource_access: {
'my-app-123': {
roles: ['app-user'],
},
},
});
await setupOpenId();
verifyCallback = require('openid-client/passport').__getVerifyCallbackByName('openid');
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
expect(user).toBeTruthy();
});
it('should handle empty object at nested path', async () => {
const { logger } = require('@librechat/data-schemas');
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE = 'user';
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE_PARAMETER_PATH = 'access.roles';
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({
access: {},
});
await setupOpenId();
verifyCallback = require('openid-client/passport').__getVerifyCallbackByName('openid');
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
expect(logger.error).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.stringContaining("Key 'access.roles' not found in id token!"),
);
expect(user).toBe(false);
});
it('should handle null value at intermediate path', async () => {
const { logger } = require('@librechat/data-schemas');
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE = 'user';
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE_PARAMETER_PATH = 'data.roles';
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({
data: null,
});
await setupOpenId();
verifyCallback = require('openid-client/passport').__getVerifyCallbackByName('openid');
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
expect(logger.error).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.stringContaining("Key 'data.roles' not found in id token!"),
);
expect(user).toBe(false);
});
it('should reject login with invalid admin role token kind', async () => {
process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE = 'admin';
process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE_PARAMETER_PATH = 'roles';
process.env.OPENID_ADMIN_ROLE_TOKEN_KIND = 'invalid';
const { logger } = require('@librechat/data-schemas');
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({
roles: ['requiredRole', 'admin'],
});
await setupOpenId();
verifyCallback = require('openid-client/passport').__getVerifyCallbackByName('openid');
await expect(validate(tokenset)).rejects.toThrow('Invalid admin role token kind');
expect(logger.error).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.stringContaining(
"Invalid admin role token kind: invalid. Must be one of 'access', 'id', or 'userinfo'",
),
);
});
it('should reject login when roles path returns invalid type (object)', async () => {
const { logger } = require('@librechat/data-schemas');
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE = 'app-user';
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE_PARAMETER_PATH = 'roles';
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({
roles: { admin: true, user: false },
});
await setupOpenId();
verifyCallback = require('openid-client/passport').__getVerifyCallbackByName('openid');
const { user, details } = await validate(tokenset);
expect(logger.error).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.stringContaining("Key 'roles' not found in id token!"),
);
expect(user).toBe(false);
expect(details.message).toContain('role to log in');
});
it('should reject login when roles path returns invalid type (number)', async () => {
const { logger } = require('@librechat/data-schemas');
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE = 'user';
process.env.OPENID_REQUIRED_ROLE_PARAMETER_PATH = 'roleCount';
jwtDecode.mockReturnValue({
roleCount: 5,
});
await setupOpenId();
verifyCallback = require('openid-client/passport').__getVerifyCallbackByName('openid');
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
expect(logger.error).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.stringContaining("Key 'roleCount' not found in id token!"),
);
expect(user).toBe(false);
});
});
describe('OPENID_EMAIL_CLAIM', () => {
it('should use the default email when OPENID_EMAIL_CLAIM is not set', async () => {
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
expect(user.email).toBe('test@example.com');
});
it('should use the configured claim when OPENID_EMAIL_CLAIM is set', async () => {
process.env.OPENID_EMAIL_CLAIM = 'upn';
const userinfo = { ...tokenset.claims(), upn: 'user@corp.example.com' };
const { user } = await validate({ ...tokenset, claims: () => userinfo });
expect(user.email).toBe('user@corp.example.com');
expect(createUser).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({ email: 'user@corp.example.com' }),
expect.anything(),
true,
true,
);
});
it('should fall back to preferred_username when email is missing and OPENID_EMAIL_CLAIM is not set', async () => {
const userinfo = { ...tokenset.claims() };
delete userinfo.email;
const { user } = await validate({ ...tokenset, claims: () => userinfo });
expect(user.email).toBe('testusername');
});
it('should fall back to upn when email and preferred_username are missing and OPENID_EMAIL_CLAIM is not set', async () => {
const userinfo = { ...tokenset.claims(), upn: 'user@corp.example.com' };
delete userinfo.email;
delete userinfo.preferred_username;
const { user } = await validate({ ...tokenset, claims: () => userinfo });
expect(user.email).toBe('user@corp.example.com');
});
it('should ignore empty string OPENID_EMAIL_CLAIM and use default fallback', async () => {
process.env.OPENID_EMAIL_CLAIM = '';
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
expect(user.email).toBe('test@example.com');
});
it('should trim whitespace from OPENID_EMAIL_CLAIM and resolve correctly', async () => {
process.env.OPENID_EMAIL_CLAIM = ' upn ';
const userinfo = { ...tokenset.claims(), upn: 'user@corp.example.com' };
const { user } = await validate({ ...tokenset, claims: () => userinfo });
expect(user.email).toBe('user@corp.example.com');
});
it('should ignore whitespace-only OPENID_EMAIL_CLAIM and use default fallback', async () => {
process.env.OPENID_EMAIL_CLAIM = ' ';
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
expect(user.email).toBe('test@example.com');
});
it('should fall back to default chain with warning when configured claim is missing from userinfo', async () => {
const { logger } = require('@librechat/data-schemas');
process.env.OPENID_EMAIL_CLAIM = 'nonexistent_claim';
const { user } = await validate(tokenset);
expect(user.email).toBe('test@example.com');
expect(logger.warn).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.stringContaining('OPENID_EMAIL_CLAIM="nonexistent_claim" not present in userinfo'),
);
});
});
describe('Tenant-scoped config', () => {
it('should call resolveAppConfigForUser for tenant user', async () => {
const existingUser = {
_id: 'openid-tenant-user',
provider: 'openid',
openidId: '1234',
email: 'test@example.com',
tenantId: 'tenant-d',
role: 'USER',
};
findUser.mockResolvedValue(existingUser);
await validate(tokenset);
expect(resolveAppConfigForUser).toHaveBeenCalledWith(getAppConfig, existingUser);
});
it('should use baseConfig for new user without calling resolveAppConfigForUser', async () => {
findUser.mockResolvedValue(null);
await validate(tokenset);
expect(resolveAppConfigForUser).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(getAppConfig).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ baseOnly: true });
});
it('should block login when tenant config restricts the domain', async () => {
const { isEmailDomainAllowed } = require('@librechat/api');
const existingUser = {
_id: 'openid-tenant-blocked',
provider: 'openid',
openidId: '1234',
email: 'test@example.com',
tenantId: 'tenant-restrict',
role: 'USER',
};
findUser.mockResolvedValue(existingUser);
resolveAppConfigForUser.mockResolvedValue({
registration: { allowedDomains: ['other.com'] },
});
isEmailDomainAllowed.mockReturnValueOnce(true).mockReturnValueOnce(false);
const { user, details } = await validate(tokenset);
expect(user).toBe(false);
expect(details).toEqual({ message: 'Email domain not allowed' });
});
});
});
describe('getRoleSource', () => {
const { getRoleSource } = require('./openidStrategy');
const { logger } = require('@librechat/data-schemas');
const accessClaims = { roles: ['from-access'] };
const idClaims = { roles: ['from-id'] };
const userinfo = { roles: ['from-userinfo'] };
const tokenset = { access_token: 'access.jwt', id_token: 'id.jwt' };
beforeEach(() => {
jest.clearAllMocks();
jwtDecode.mockImplementation((token) => {
if (token === 'access.jwt') return accessClaims;
if (token === 'id.jwt') return idClaims;
return {};
});
});
it.each([
['access', accessClaims],
['id', idClaims],
['userinfo', userinfo],
])('returns the expected source object for kind=%s', (kind, expected) => {
expect(getRoleSource(kind, 'required role', tokenset, userinfo)).toEqual(expected);
});
it.each([
['undefined', undefined],
['empty string', ''],
['unknown kind', 'bogus'],
])('throws and logs for invalid kind: %s', (_name, kind) => {
expect(() => getRoleSource(kind, 'required role', tokenset, userinfo)).toThrow(
'Invalid required role token kind',
);
expect(logger.error).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.stringContaining(`Invalid required role token kind: ${kind}`),
);
});
it('uses the provided label in the error message and thrown error', () => {
expect(() => getRoleSource('bogus', 'admin role', tokenset, userinfo)).toThrow(
'Invalid admin role token kind',
);
expect(logger.error).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.stringContaining('Invalid admin role token kind: bogus'),
);
});
it('propagates jwtDecode errors when the requested token is missing', () => {
jwtDecode.mockImplementation(() => {
throw new Error('Invalid token specified');
});
expect(() => getRoleSource('access', 'required role', {}, userinfo)).toThrow(
'Invalid token specified',
);
});
});