LibreChat/api/server/controllers/AuthController.js
Marco Beretta 471abaa64d 🔑 feat: Passkey Authentication with WebAuthn Sign-In and Management (#14715)
* feat: passkey authentication with WebAuthn sign-in and management

* refactor: tighten passkey account protections

Require password confirmation before adding or removing a passkey, and rate
limit those confirmations per user in their own namespace. Restrict passkey
enrollment and sign-in to local accounts, and re-evaluate account status once
the credential owner is resolved. Require user verification on the sign-in
ceremony. Invalidate outstanding access tokens on password reset. Tighten
redirect target validation and sanitize ceremony failure logs.

Adds coverage across the passkey controller, the WebAuthn helpers, the step-up
limiter, both JWT strategies, the redirect utility and the passkey settings UI.

* fix: localize passkey default name and respect router basename

Send a localized default credential label at enrollment so non-English
locales no longer persist the server's English fallback, and route the
passkey post-login and 2FA navigations through the deployment base path
so subdirectory installs stay inside the router.

Also mock syncStaticTools in the server boot specs; without it the
post-listen MCP initialization calls undefined and exits the worker.

* fix: harden passkey counter checks and reach stranded credentials

Make the signature counter write a compare-and-swap so two assertions
that verified against the same stored counter cannot both commit, and
reject the losing one; a cloned authenticator is otherwise accepted
inside that window. Counterless authenticators keep restamping at 0.

Keep the passkey panel reachable for identity-provider accounts, which
already get passwordless removal server-side but had no way in, while
hiding the add control they cannot use. Cascade passkey deletion from
the admin user-deletion path so credential IDs are not stranded.

* fix: reject stale 2FA temp tokens and surface passkey load failures

A temporary 2FA token proves only the first factor, so honouring one
minted before a password reset let anyone holding the second factor
survive account recovery. Apply the same credentials-changed cutoff the
JWT strategy uses.

Also distinguish a failed passkey query from an empty list; the error
state previously rendered as "no passkeys yet", which misreports what
is protecting the account.

* fix: fail closed when the passkey counter write cannot commit

Returning success on a storage error bypassed the compare-and-swap it
exists to enforce, so a cloned authenticator could be accepted while the
stored counter stayed stale. A database that cannot take this write
cannot mint the session either, so little is gained by failing open.
Counterless credentials carry no clone signal and keep their old path.

* fix: keep the passkey 2FA handoff inside the router

A full-page navigation to the 2FA screen remounted AuthContextProvider,
which silent-refreshes on mount; no refresh session exists yet at that
point, so it bounced back to login before the code could be entered.
Route through the router like the password flow does.

Also reveal the removal step-up field when the server refuses a
passwordless attempt, so an account migrated to an identity provider
without its old hash cleared can still clear its credentials; drop the
staged password when the dialog closes; and revoke passkeys in the CLI
password reset, which bypassed the HTTP controller's cleanup.

* fix: apply one email-verification policy across login methods

Accounts predating mandatory verification are marked verified as they
sign in when no email is configured, but only the password strategy did
it, so the same legacy account was admitted by password and refused by
passkey. Extract the rule into a shared helper and call it from both.

* fix: refuse a passkey sign-in when the ban check cannot complete

checkBan defaults next to a no-op, so calling it bare discarded any
internal failure and left req.banned unset, letting the request fall
through and be issued tokens. Capture the error the middleware chain
would have propagated and reject instead.

* fix: refine passkey management dialogs

* test: stabilize passkey tooltip assertions

* test: reconcile passkey specs with the canary reset and deletion flows

The credentialsChangedAt stamp now lives in commitPasswordReset, so its
assertion moves to the passwordReset unit spec. Restores the describe
blocks the rebase merged together.

* test: mock passkey routes in the cross-site login suite

* refactor: move passkey handlers and credential checks into packages/api

The passkey controller, the credentialsChangedAt predicate and the legacy
email-verification grandfathering now live in TypeScript with injected
dependencies; /api keeps only the wiring that builds the handlers.

* style: align passkey UI with Tailwind v4 order and design-rule lint

* fix: revoke earlier access tokens on a CLI password reset

passwordVersion is not a user schema field, so the write was dropped and
tokens issued before the reset kept verifying.

* test: cover passkey sign-in and credential revocation end to end

* fix: hide passkey sign-in when email login is disabled

The passkey endpoints already refuse under ALLOW_EMAIL_LOGIN=false, so
advertising the button only led to a 403.

* fix: let only one concurrent verification consume a passkey challenge

Without a native getDel the challenge was read then deleted, so two
concurrent verifications could both use it. The delete now arbitrates:
only the caller whose delete removed the key gets the challenge.

* test: run passkey ceremonies on the localhost relying party

WebAuthn refuses an IP address as the RP ID, and the harness serves the
app on 127.0.0.1. The reset scenario runs once per project, so the mock
harness lifts the per-IP reset request limit as it does for forks.

* fix: keep passkey management when email login is disabled

Gate only the sign-in button on emailLoginEnabled, since only the sign-in
routes sit behind that gate; list, rename and remove stay reachable.

* fix: build the passkey credential index before the first registration

With MONGO_AUTO_INDEX=false the unique credentialId index was never
created, so concurrent registrations could store the same credential.

* test: enable password reset in the mock harness and cover email-login-off passkeys

* fix: stop re-exporting the passkey cap from data-schemas

The bundler left every import of methods/passkey.ts unlinked while that
module re-exported MAX_PASSKEYS_PER_USER from librechat-data-provider, so
the index build and the counter-failure log threw ReferenceError at
runtime. Consumers now import the cap from librechat-data-provider.

* test: close nested settings dialogs before logging out in passkey scenarios

* fix: reject cross-site passkey assertions

The verify route accepted a form posted from another site, which let an
attacker sign a victim into the attacker's account. It now runs the same
requireSameOrigin guard as password login and the 2FA step.

* fix: end refresh sessions on a CLI password reset

A surviving refresh session could mint an access token issued after the
credentialsChangedAt stamp, so the CLI now deletes sessions like the web
reset does.

* fix: keep the passkey button locked when it supersedes autofill

Starting the modal ceremony aborts the pending autofill one, and the
autofill error path cleared the shared lock and busy state while the
modal ceremony was still running.
2026-09-23 13:19:32 -04:00

735 lines
26 KiB
JavaScript

const cookies = require('cookie');
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
const crypto = require('node:crypto');
const { logger, runAsSystem, tenantStorage } = require('@librechat/data-schemas');
const {
math,
isEnabled,
createAuthIdentityContext,
createOpenIDRefreshOwnershipError,
isOpenIDRefreshOwnershipError,
isOpenIDSessionMissingError,
isOpenIDSessionIdentityMatch,
OPENID_EXPIRY_BUFFER_SECONDS,
} = require('@librechat/api');
const {
requestPasswordReset,
clearOpenIDAuthTokens,
setCloudFrontAuthCookies,
resetPassword,
setAuthTokens,
registerUser,
} = require('~/server/services/AuthService');
const {
deleteAllUserSessions,
deletePasskeysByUser,
getUserById,
findSession,
updateUser,
deleteTokens,
} = require('~/models');
const { getGraphApiToken } = require('~/server/services/GraphTokenService');
const { getRefreshTokenBridge } = require('~/server/services/RefreshTokenBridge');
const {
recoverOpenIDRefreshBridge,
refreshOpenIDUser,
sendOpenIDAuthResponse,
} = require('~/server/services/OpenIDRefreshRecovery');
const {
assertOpenIDRefreshFlightDeliveryAvailable,
assertOpenIDRefreshSessionGenerationAvailable,
claimOpenIDRefreshFlightDelivery,
releaseOpenIDRefreshFlightDelivery,
} = require('~/server/services/OpenIDRefreshFlight');
const AUTH_REFRESH_USER_PROJECTION = '-password -__v -totpSecret -backupCodes -federatedTokens';
/**
* Max age (ms) LibreChat reuses a cached OpenID session token before forcing an IdP refresh.
* Env-overridable (accepts an arithmetic expression, e.g. `60 * 60 * 24 * 1000`, like
* `SESSION_EXPIRY`): deployments whose IdP revokes the previous access token on refresh can
* widen this to the access-token lifetime so a still-valid token is not rotated/revoked out
* from under downstream consumers (e.g. MCP servers that introspect the bearer). Defaults to
* 15 minutes.
*/
const OPENID_REUSE_MAX_SESSION_AGE_MS = math(
process.env.OPENID_REUSE_MAX_SESSION_AGE_MS,
15 * 60 * 1000,
);
const registrationController = async (req, res) => {
try {
const response = await registerUser(req.body);
const { status, message } = response;
/** Consume the invite only once the account exists. `registerUser` returns the same
* 200 whether it created a user or found the email already in use, so the decision
* rests on `userCreated` rather than the status. A failure to delete leaves a
* usable invite, which is recoverable; failing the response here would tell a user
* whose account was just created that registration failed, which is not. */
if (response.userCreated === true && req.invite?.token != null) {
try {
await deleteTokens({ token: req.invite.token });
} catch (error) {
logger.error('[registrationController] Failed to consume invite after registration', error);
}
}
res.status(status).send({ message });
} catch (err) {
logger.error('[registrationController]', err);
return res.status(500).json({ message: err.message });
}
};
const sanitizeUserForAuthResponse = (user) => {
const source = (typeof user?.toObject === 'function' ? user.toObject() : user) || {};
const {
password: _pw,
__v: _v,
totpSecret: _ts,
backupCodes: _bc,
federatedTokens: _ft,
...safeUser
} = source;
return safeUser;
};
const runInUserTenant = (user, fn) =>
user.tenantId
? tenantStorage.run(
{ tenantId: user.tenantId, userId: user._id.toString() },
async () => await fn(),
)
: runAsSystem(fn);
const getValidOpenIDReuseUserId = (parsedCookies, refreshToken) => {
const openidUserId = parsedCookies.openid_user_id;
if (!openidUserId || !process.env.JWT_REFRESH_SECRET) {
return null;
}
try {
const payload = jwt.verify(openidUserId, process.env.JWT_REFRESH_SECRET);
if (typeof payload !== 'object' || payload == null || typeof payload.id !== 'string') {
return null;
}
if (refreshToken == null) {
return payload.id;
}
if (typeof payload.refreshTokenHash !== 'string') {
return null;
}
const refreshTokenHash = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(refreshToken).digest('base64url');
return payload.refreshTokenHash === refreshTokenHash ? payload.id : null;
} catch {
return null;
}
};
const selectOpenIDRefreshToken = (openidTokens, parsedCookies) => {
const sessionRefreshToken = openidTokens?.refreshToken;
const browserRefreshToken = parsedCookies.refreshToken;
const lastSyncedBrowserRefreshToken = openidTokens?.browserRefreshToken;
const hasKnownBrowserRefreshTokenMarker =
typeof lastSyncedBrowserRefreshToken === 'string' && lastSyncedBrowserRefreshToken.length > 0;
const driftReference = hasKnownBrowserRefreshTokenMarker
? lastSyncedBrowserRefreshToken
: sessionRefreshToken;
if (browserRefreshToken && driftReference && browserRefreshToken !== driftReference) {
logger.info('[refreshController] OpenID refresh token cookie differs from session state');
return {
refreshToken: sessionRefreshToken || browserRefreshToken,
fallbackRefreshToken:
sessionRefreshToken && browserRefreshToken !== sessionRefreshToken
? browserRefreshToken
: null,
cookieDiffersFromSession: true,
};
}
return {
refreshToken: sessionRefreshToken || browserRefreshToken,
fallbackRefreshToken: null,
cookieDiffersFromSession: false,
};
};
const isRecentOpenIDSessionRefresh = (openidTokens) => {
const lastRefreshedAt = Number(openidTokens?.lastRefreshedAt);
const elapsed = Date.now() - lastRefreshedAt;
return (
Number.isFinite(lastRefreshedAt) && elapsed >= 0 && elapsed <= OPENID_REUSE_MAX_SESSION_AGE_MS
);
};
const isInvalidGrantError = (error) => {
const values = [
error?.message,
error?.error,
error?.code,
error?.response?.data?.error,
error?.response?.data?.error_description,
error?.body?.error,
error?.body?.error_description,
];
return values.some(
(value) => typeof value === 'string' && value.toLowerCase().includes('invalid_grant'),
);
};
const getAuthIdentitySource = (user) =>
typeof user?.toObject === 'function' ? user.toObject() : user;
const isReusableOpenIDSessionIdentity = (openidTokens, user) => {
const identitySource = getAuthIdentitySource(user);
const expectedIdentity = createAuthIdentityContext({ user: identitySource });
const matches = isOpenIDSessionIdentityMatch(openidTokens, expectedIdentity);
if (!matches) {
logger.warn('[refreshController] OpenID session token identity mismatch; forcing refresh', {
userId: expectedIdentity.appUserId,
has_session_user_id: Boolean(openidTokens?.appUserId),
has_session_subject: Boolean(openidTokens?.openidSubject),
has_session_issuer: Boolean(openidTokens?.openidIssuer),
});
}
return matches;
};
const getReusableOpenIDSessionToken = (openidTokens) => {
if (!isRecentOpenIDSessionRefresh(openidTokens)) {
return null;
}
const candidates = [
{ token: openidTokens?.idToken, type: 'id_token' },
{ token: openidTokens?.accessToken, type: 'access_token' },
];
const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
for (const candidate of candidates) {
if (!candidate.token) {
continue;
}
/** Decode only: tokens are from the trusted server-side session; expiry gates reuse. */
const decoded = jwt.decode(candidate.token);
if (
decoded &&
typeof decoded === 'object' &&
decoded.exp > now + OPENID_EXPIRY_BUFFER_SECONDS
) {
return candidate;
}
}
return null;
};
const assertReusableOpenIDSessionGeneration = async (openidTokens) =>
assertOpenIDRefreshSessionGenerationAvailable({
key: openidTokens?.publicationFlightKey,
ownerId: openidTokens?.publicationFlightOwnerId,
});
/**
* Serializes response delivery for one durable OpenID publication generation. A logout that
* reaches the same flight either tombstones it before this claim or waits for the response to
* finish before returning. The send callback keeps the final authorization check adjacent to the
* synchronous Express write while allowing callers to do slow preparation under the lease.
*/
const withOpenIDResponseDelivery = async ({ res, openidTokens, context }, operation) => {
let delivery;
let responseSent = false;
let releaseStarted = false;
let listenersArmed = false;
const releaseDelivery = async () => {
if (!delivery || releaseStarted) {
return;
}
releaseStarted = true;
for (let attempt = 1; attempt <= 3; attempt++) {
try {
await releaseOpenIDRefreshFlightDelivery(delivery);
return;
} catch (error) {
if (attempt === 3) {
logger.warn(`[${context}] Failed to release OpenID response delivery`, {
error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : error,
});
return;
}
await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 25));
}
}
};
try {
await assertReusableOpenIDSessionGeneration(openidTokens);
if (openidTokens?.publicationFlightKey && openidTokens?.publicationFlightOwnerId) {
const claimed = await claimOpenIDRefreshFlightDelivery({
key: openidTokens.publicationFlightKey,
ownerId: openidTokens.publicationFlightOwnerId,
createdAt: openidTokens.publicationFlightCreatedAt,
});
if (!claimed.deliveryId) {
throw new Error('OpenID response delivery claim returned no owner');
}
delivery = {
key: openidTokens.publicationFlightKey,
ownerId: openidTokens.publicationFlightOwnerId,
deliveryId: claimed.deliveryId,
};
}
const sendAuthorized = async (send) => {
if (delivery) {
await assertOpenIDRefreshFlightDeliveryAvailable(delivery);
if (!listenersArmed && typeof res.once === 'function') {
listenersArmed = true;
res.once('finish', () => void releaseDelivery());
res.once('close', () => void releaseDelivery());
}
} else {
await assertReusableOpenIDSessionGeneration(openidTokens);
}
const response = send();
responseSent = true;
if (delivery && typeof res.once !== 'function') {
await releaseDelivery();
}
return response;
};
return await operation(sendAuthorized);
} finally {
if (delivery && !responseSent) {
await releaseDelivery();
}
}
};
const resetPasswordRequestController = async (req, res) => {
try {
const resetService = await requestPasswordReset(req);
if (resetService instanceof Error) {
return res.status(400).json(resetService);
} else {
return res.status(200).json(resetService);
}
} catch (e) {
logger.error('[resetPasswordRequestController]', e);
return res.status(400).json({ message: e.message });
}
};
const resetPasswordController = async (req, res) => {
try {
const resetPasswordService = await resetPassword(
req.body.userId,
req.body.token,
req.body.password,
);
if (resetPasswordService instanceof Error) {
return res.status(400).json(resetPasswordService);
} else {
await deleteAllUserSessions({ userId: req.body.userId });
await deletePasskeysByUser(req.body.userId);
return res.status(200).json(resetPasswordService);
}
} catch (e) {
logger.error('[resetPasswordController]', e);
return res.status(400).json({ message: e.message });
}
};
const refreshController = async (req, res) => {
const parsedCookies = req.headers.cookie ? cookies.parse(req.headers.cookie) : {};
const token_provider = parsedCookies.token_provider;
if (token_provider === 'openid' && isEnabled(process.env.OPENID_REUSE_TOKENS)) {
/** Prefer session refresh tokens unless the browser cookie proves the session is stale. */
const { refreshToken, fallbackRefreshToken, cookieDiffersFromSession } =
selectOpenIDRefreshToken(req.session?.openidTokens, parsedCookies);
if (!refreshToken) {
return res.status(200).send('Refresh token not provided');
}
try {
/**
* Reuse skips an IdP refresh only for recently-refreshed server-side tokens.
* Stale, missing, or near-expiry tokens fall through to refreshTokenGrant so
* upstream revocations and cookie/session extension are checked regularly.
*/
const reusableSessionToken = cookieDiffersFromSession
? null
: getReusableOpenIDSessionToken(req.session?.openidTokens);
const reuseUserId = reusableSessionToken ? getValidOpenIDReuseUserId(parsedCookies) : null;
if (reuseUserId) {
const reuseSessionTokens = req.session?.openidTokens;
try {
const response = await withOpenIDResponseDelivery(
{
res,
openidTokens: reuseSessionTokens,
context: 'refreshController',
},
async (sendAuthorized) => {
const user = await runAsSystem(async () =>
getUserById(reuseUserId, AUTH_REFRESH_USER_PROJECTION),
);
if (!user || !isReusableOpenIDSessionIdentity(reuseSessionTokens, user)) {
return undefined;
}
return sendAuthorized(() => {
const cloudFrontCookiesSet = setCloudFrontAuthCookies(req, res, user);
logger.debug('[refreshController] OpenID session token reused', {
token_type: reusableSessionToken.type,
has_id_token: Boolean(reuseSessionTokens?.idToken),
has_access_token: Boolean(reuseSessionTokens?.accessToken),
cloudfront_cookies_set: cloudFrontCookiesSet,
});
return res.status(200).send({
token: reusableSessionToken.token,
user: sanitizeUserForAuthResponse(user),
});
});
},
);
if (response !== undefined) {
return response;
}
} catch (error) {
if (!isOpenIDRefreshOwnershipError(error)) {
throw error;
}
clearOpenIDAuthTokens(req, res, reuseUserId, reuseSessionTokens?.tenantId);
return res.status(403).send('Invalid OpenID refresh token');
}
}
const refreshUserId =
req.session?.openidTokens?.appUserId ?? getValidOpenIDReuseUserId(parsedCookies);
if (!refreshUserId) {
return res.status(403).send('Invalid OpenID refresh token');
}
const refreshUser = await runAsSystem(async () =>
getUserById(refreshUserId, AUTH_REFRESH_USER_PROJECTION),
);
if (!refreshUser) {
return res.status(403).send('Invalid OpenID refresh token');
}
return await runInUserTenant(refreshUser, async () => {
let successfulRefreshToken = refreshToken;
let refreshResult;
try {
refreshResult = await refreshOpenIDUser({
req,
res,
user: refreshUser,
refreshToken,
browserRefreshToken: parsedCookies.refreshToken,
strategyName: 'refreshController',
deferPublication: true,
});
} catch (error) {
if (!fallbackRefreshToken || !isInvalidGrantError(error)) {
throw error;
}
logger.info(
'[refreshController] Session refresh token was rejected; retrying the distinct browser token',
);
successfulRefreshToken = fallbackRefreshToken;
refreshResult = await refreshOpenIDUser({
req,
res,
user: refreshUser,
refreshToken: fallbackRefreshToken,
browserRefreshToken: parsedCookies.refreshToken,
strategyName: 'refreshController (browser fallback)',
deferPublication: true,
});
}
const { tokenset, claims, openidIssuer, user, error, migration } = refreshResult;
if (error || !user) {
logger.warn(
`[refreshController] Redirecting to /login: error=${error ?? 'null'}, user=${user ? 'exists' : 'null'}`,
);
return res.status(401).redirect('/login');
}
if (user._id.toString() !== refreshUser._id.toString()) {
logger.warn(
'[refreshController] Refreshed identity resolved a different user; refusing token issuance',
{
refreshUserId: refreshUser._id.toString(),
resolvedUserId: user._id.toString(),
},
);
return res.status(401).redirect('/login');
}
// Handle migration: update user with openidId if found by email without openidId
// Also handle case where user has mismatched openidId (e.g., after database switch)
if (migration || user.openidId !== claims.sub) {
const reason = migration ? 'migration' : 'openidId mismatch';
await updateUser(user._id.toString(), {
provider: 'openid',
openidId: claims.sub,
...(openidIssuer ? { openidIssuer } : {}),
});
logger.info(
`[refreshController] Updated user ${user.email} openidId (${reason}): ${user.openidId ?? 'null'} -> ${claims.sub}`,
);
}
if (
successfulRefreshToken !== refreshToken &&
req.session?.openidTokens?.refreshToken === refreshToken
) {
delete req.session.openidTokens;
}
const token = await sendOpenIDAuthResponse({
tokenset,
user,
existingRefreshToken: successfulRefreshToken,
openidSubject: claims?.sub,
openidIssuer,
predecessorIdentity: {
userId: refreshUser._id.toString(),
tenantId: refreshUser.tenantId,
openidIssuer: refreshUser.openidIssuer,
},
rejectedRefreshTokens: successfulRefreshToken === refreshToken ? [] : [refreshToken],
req,
res,
});
return await withOpenIDResponseDelivery(
{
res,
openidTokens: req.session?.openidTokens,
context: 'refreshController',
},
(sendAuthorized) =>
sendAuthorized(() =>
res.status(200).send({ token, user: sanitizeUserForAuthResponse(user) }),
),
);
});
} catch (error) {
if (isOpenIDRefreshOwnershipError(error) || isOpenIDSessionMissingError(error)) {
clearOpenIDAuthTokens(
req,
res,
req.session?.openidTokens?.appUserId,
req.session?.openidTokens?.tenantId,
);
}
if (isOpenIDSessionMissingError(error)) {
logger.warn('[refreshController] OpenID session missing; sign-in required');
return res.status(401).send({ code: 'OPENID_SESSION_MISSING' });
}
logger.error('[refreshController] OpenID token refresh error', error);
/**
* Detect and recover from stale refresh-token cookie after SSE-triggered rotation.
* If the initial refresh with the cookie fails with invalid_grant, check if a
* recovery bridge exists. Bridges are stored when an OBO refresh rotates the token
* but cannot set the browser cookie (headers already sent during SSE streaming).
*/
const bridgeSourceToken = parsedCookies.refreshToken;
if (isInvalidGrantError(error) && bridgeSourceToken) {
// Bridge lookup uses the signed user-id cookie because /refresh is unauthenticated.
const userId = getValidOpenIDReuseUserId(parsedCookies, bridgeSourceToken);
if (userId) {
try {
const bridgeUser = await runAsSystem(async () =>
getUserById(userId, AUTH_REFRESH_USER_PROJECTION),
);
if (!bridgeUser) {
return res.status(403).send('Invalid OpenID refresh token');
}
const bridgeResponse = await runInUserTenant(bridgeUser, async () => {
const bridgedRefreshToken = await getRefreshTokenBridge({
oldRefreshToken: bridgeSourceToken,
userId,
tenantId: bridgeUser.tenantId,
openidIssuer: bridgeUser.openidIssuer,
});
if (bridgedRefreshToken) {
logger.info(
'[refreshController] Recovered via refresh-token bridge after invalid_grant',
{
userId,
},
);
try {
const { appAuthToken } = await recoverOpenIDRefreshBridge({
req,
res,
refreshToken: bridgeSourceToken,
bridgedRefreshToken,
bridgeUser,
});
return await withOpenIDResponseDelivery(
{
res,
openidTokens: req.session?.openidTokens,
context: 'refreshController',
},
(sendAuthorized) =>
sendAuthorized(() =>
res.status(200).send({
token: appAuthToken,
user: sanitizeUserForAuthResponse(bridgeUser),
}),
),
);
} catch (retryError) {
logger.error('[refreshController] Bridge recovery retry failed', retryError);
// Fall through to generic error response
}
}
});
if (bridgeResponse !== undefined) {
return bridgeResponse;
}
} catch (bridgeError) {
logger.warn('[refreshController] Refresh-token bridge lookup failed', {
error: bridgeError instanceof Error ? bridgeError.message : bridgeError,
});
}
}
}
return res.status(403).send('Invalid OpenID refresh token');
}
}
/** For non-OpenID users, read refresh token from cookies */
const refreshToken = parsedCookies.refreshToken;
if (!refreshToken) {
return res.status(200).send('Refresh token not provided');
}
try {
const payload = jwt.verify(refreshToken, process.env.JWT_REFRESH_SECRET);
const user = await getUserById(payload.id, AUTH_REFRESH_USER_PROJECTION);
if (!user) {
return res.status(401).redirect('/login');
}
const userId = payload.id;
if (process.env.NODE_ENV === 'CI') {
const token = await setAuthTokens(userId, res, null, req);
return res.status(200).send({ token, user: sanitizeUserForAuthResponse(user) });
}
/** Session with the hashed refresh token */
const session = await findSession(
{
userId: userId,
refreshToken: refreshToken,
},
{ lean: false },
);
if (session && session.expiration > new Date()) {
const token = await setAuthTokens(userId, res, session, req);
res.status(200).send({ token, user: sanitizeUserForAuthResponse(user) });
} else if (req?.query?.retry) {
// Retrying from a refresh token request that failed (401)
res.status(403).send('No session found');
} else if (payload.exp < Date.now() / 1000) {
res.status(403).redirect('/login');
} else {
res.status(401).send('Refresh token expired or not found for this user');
}
} catch (err) {
logger.error(`[refreshController] Invalid refresh token:`, err);
res.status(403).send('Invalid refresh token');
}
};
const graphTokenController = async (req, res) => {
try {
// Validate user is authenticated via Entra ID
if (!req.user.openidId || req.user.provider !== 'openid') {
return res.status(403).json({
message: 'Microsoft Graph access requires Entra ID authentication',
});
}
// Check if OpenID token reuse is active (required for on-behalf-of flow)
if (!isEnabled(process.env.OPENID_REUSE_TOKENS)) {
return res.status(403).json({
message: 'SharePoint integration requires OpenID token reuse to be enabled',
});
}
const scopes = req.query.scopes;
if (!scopes) {
return res.status(400).json({
message: 'Graph API scopes are required as query parameter',
});
}
const accessToken = req.user.federatedTokens?.access_token;
if (!accessToken) {
return res.status(401).json({
message: 'No federated access token available for token exchange',
});
}
const sessionTokens = req.session?.openidTokens;
const usesSessionToken = Boolean(
sessionTokens?.accessToken && sessionTokens.accessToken === accessToken,
);
const requestBearer = req.headers?.authorization?.match(/^Bearer\s+(.+)$/i)?.[1];
if (req.session && !usesSessionToken && requestBearer !== accessToken) {
throw createOpenIDRefreshOwnershipError('OpenID session tokens are no longer available');
}
const exchangeAndSend = async (sendAuthorized) => {
const tokenResponse = await getGraphApiToken(req.user, accessToken, scopes);
return sendAuthorized(() => res.json(tokenResponse));
};
if (usesSessionToken) {
return await withOpenIDResponseDelivery(
{
res,
openidTokens: sessionTokens,
context: 'graphTokenController',
},
exchangeAndSend,
);
}
return await exchangeAndSend((send) => send());
} catch (error) {
if (isOpenIDRefreshOwnershipError(error)) {
const userId = req.user?.id ?? req.user?._id?.toString?.();
clearOpenIDAuthTokens(req, res, userId, req.session?.openidTokens?.tenantId);
return res.status(401).json({ message: 'OpenID session is no longer authorized' });
}
logger.error('[graphTokenController] Failed to obtain Graph API token:', error);
return res.status(500).json({
message: 'Failed to obtain Microsoft Graph token',
});
}
};
module.exports = {
refreshController,
registrationController,
resetPasswordController,
resetPasswordRequestController,
graphTokenController,
};