LibreChat/api/server/services/ActionService.js
Danny Avila 4cce88be42
🪟 feat: Add allowedAddresses Exemption List For SSRF-Guarded Targets (#12933)
* 🪟 feat: Add allowedAddresses Exemption List For SSRF-Guarded Targets

LibreChat already blocks SSRF-prone targets (private IPs, loopback,
link-local, .internal/.local TLDs) at every server-side fetch site
that consumes user-controllable URLs — custom-endpoint baseURLs, MCP
servers, OpenAPI Actions, and OAuth endpoints. The only existing
escape hatch is `allowedDomains`, but that flips the field into a
strict whitelist: adding `127.0.0.1` to permit a self-hosted Ollama
also blocks every public destination that isn't in the list.

Introduce `allowedAddresses` as the orthogonal primitive: a private-
IP-space exemption list. When a hostname or its resolved IP appears
in the list, the SSRF block is bypassed for that target. Public
destinations remain reachable. Operators can now run self-hosted
LLMs / MCP servers / Action endpoints on private addresses without
weakening the default-deny posture for everything else.

Schema additions in `packages/data-provider/src/config.ts`:
- `endpoints.allowedAddresses` (new — gates `validateEndpointURL`)
- `mcpSettings.allowedAddresses` (parallel to `allowedDomains`)
- `actions.allowedAddresses` (parallel to `allowedDomains`)

Core changes in `packages/api/src/auth/`:
- New `isAddressAllowed(hostnameOrIP, allowedAddresses)` — pure,
  case-insensitive, bracket-stripped literal match.
- Threaded the list through `isSSRFTarget`, `resolveHostnameSSRF`,
  `isDomainAllowedCore`, `isActionDomainAllowed`, `isMCPDomainAllowed`,
  `isOAuthUrlAllowed`, and `validateEndpointURL`.
- Extended `createSSRFSafeAgents` and `createSSRFSafeUndiciConnect`
  to accept the list, building an SSRF-safe DNS lookup that exempts
  matching hostnames/IPs at TCP connect time (TOCTOU-safe).

Wiring:
- Custom and OpenAI endpoint initialize sites pass
  `endpoints.allowedAddresses` to `validateEndpointURL`.
- `MCPServersRegistry` stores `allowedAddresses` and exposes it via
  `getAllowedAddresses()`. The factory, connection class, manager,
  `UserConnectionManager`, and `ConnectionsRepository` all thread
  it through to the SSRF utilities.
- `MCPOAuthHandler.initiateOAuthFlow`, `refreshOAuthTokens`, and
  `validateOAuthUrl` accept the list and consult it on every URL
  validation along the OAuth chain.
- `ToolService`, `ActionService`, and the assistants/agents action
  routes pass `actions.allowedAddresses` to `isActionDomainAllowed`
  and to `createSSRFSafeAgents` for runtime action calls.
- `initializeMCPs.js` reads `mcpSettings.allowedAddresses` from the
  app config and forwards it to the registry constructor.

Documentation:
- `librechat.example.yaml` shows the new field next to each existing
  `allowedDomains` block, with a note clarifying that
  `allowedAddresses` is an exemption list (not a whitelist).

Tests:
- Unit tests for `isAddressAllowed` covering literal IPs, hostnames,
  IPv6 brackets, case insensitivity, and partial-match rejection.
- Exemption tests for every entry point: `isSSRFTarget`,
  `resolveHostnameSSRF`, `validateEndpointURL`, `isActionDomainAllowed`,
  `isMCPDomainAllowed`, `isOAuthUrlAllowed`.
- Existing tests updated to reflect the new optional parameter.

Default behavior is unchanged: omitted = empty list = no exemptions.

* 🩹 fix: Plumb allowedAddresses Through AppConfig endpoints Type

The initial PR added `endpoints.allowedAddresses` to the
data-provider config schema and consumed it in the endpoint
initialize sites, but the runtime `AppConfig.endpoints` shape in
`@librechat/data-schemas` was a hand-maintained subset that didn't
include the new field — so `tsc` rejected `appConfig.endpoints.allowedAddresses`.

Add the field to `AppConfig['endpoints']` in
`packages/data-schemas/src/types/app.ts` and forward it from the
loaded config in `packages/data-schemas/src/app/endpoints.ts` so the
runtime config carries the value.

Update `initializeMCPs.spec.js` to expect the third positional
argument (`allowedAddresses`) on the `createMCPServersRegistry` call.

* 🩹 fix: Enforce allowedDomains Before allowedAddresses In isOAuthUrlAllowed

The initial implementation checked the address exemption first, so a
URL whose hostname appeared in `allowedAddresses` would return true
even when the admin had configured `allowedDomains` as a strict bound
on OAuth endpoints. A malicious MCP server could advertise OAuth
metadata, token, or revocation URLs at any address the admin had
permitted for an unrelated reason (a self-hosted LLM at `127.0.0.1`,
for example) and pass validation, expanding SSRF reach beyond the
configured domain whitelist.

Reorder: when `allowedDomains` is set, treat it as authoritative —
return true only if the URL matches a domain entry, otherwise fall
through to false. The address exemption only applies when no
`allowedDomains` is configured (mirrors how the downstream SSRF check
in `validateOAuthUrl` consults `allowedAddresses`).

Add a regression test asserting that an `allowedAddresses` entry does
not broaden a configured `allowedDomains` list.

Reported by chatgpt-codex-connector on PR #12933.

* 🩹 fix: Forward allowedAddresses To Remaining OAuth Callers

Two `MCPOAuthHandler` callers still used the pre-feature signatures and
were silently dropping the new `allowedAddresses` argument:

- `api/server/routes/mcp.js` invoked `initiateOAuthFlow` with the old
  5-argument shape, so OAuth flows initiated through the route handler
  ignored the registry's `getAllowedAddresses()` and would reject any
  metadata/authorization/token URL on a permitted private host.
- `api/server/controllers/UserController.js#maybeUninstallOAuthMCP`
  invoked `revokeOAuthToken` without the address exemption, so
  uninstalling an OAuth-backed MCP server on a permitted private host
  would fail at the revocation step even though the rest of the MCP
  connection path now permits it.

Both sites now read `allowedAddresses` from the registry alongside
`allowedDomains` and forward it. Reported by Copilot on PR #12933.

* 🩹 fix: Update Test Mocks And Assertions For OAuth allowedAddresses

The previous commit started passing `allowedAddresses` to
`MCPOAuthHandler.initiateOAuthFlow` from `api/server/routes/mcp.js`
and to `MCPOAuthHandler.revokeOAuthToken` from
`api/server/controllers/UserController.js`, but the corresponding
test files mocked the registry without `getAllowedAddresses` (causing
`TypeError`s) and asserted the old positional shape on
`toHaveBeenCalledWith`.

Update the mocks and assertions to match the new arity:

- `api/server/routes/__tests__/mcp.spec.js`: add
  `getAllowedDomains`/`getAllowedAddresses` to the registry mock and
  expect the additional positional args on `initiateOAuthFlow`.
- `api/server/controllers/__tests__/maybeUninstallOAuthMCP.spec.js`:
  add a `getAllowedAddresses` mock alongside the existing
  `getAllowedDomains` and seed it in `setupOAuthServerFound`.
- `api/server/controllers/__tests__/UserController.mcpOAuth.spec.js`:
  add `getAllowedAddresses` to the registry mock and expect the
  trailing `null` arg on the three `revokeOAuthToken` assertions.

* 🛡️ fix: Address Comprehensive Review — Scope allowedAddresses To Private IP Space

Major findings from the comprehensive PR review (severity → fix):

**CRITICAL — `validateOAuthUrl` SSRF fallback bypass.** When `allowedDomains`
is configured and a URL fails the whitelist, the SSRF fallback in
`validateOAuthUrl` was still passing `allowedAddresses` to `isSSRFTarget` /
`resolveHostnameSSRF`, letting a malicious MCP server advertise OAuth
endpoints at any address the admin had permitted for an unrelated reason.
Suppress `allowedAddresses` in the fallback when `allowedDomains` is active —
the address exemption is opt-in for the no-whitelist mode only.

**MAJOR — WebSocket transport SSRF check ignored exemptions.** The
`constructTransport` WebSocket branch called `resolveHostnameSSRF(wsHostname)`
without `this.allowedAddresses`, so a permitted private MCP server would
pass `isMCPDomainAllowed` but be blocked at transport creation. Forward
the exemption.

**Scope `allowedAddresses` to private IP space only (operator directive).**
The exemption list is for permitting private/internal targets; it must not
be a back-door to broaden trust to public destinations.
- Schema (`packages/data-provider/src/config.ts`): new
  `allowedAddressesSchema` rejects URLs (`://`), paths/CIDR (`/`),
  whitespace, and public IPv4/IPv6 literals at config-load time. Wired
  into `endpoints`, `mcpSettings`, and `actions`.
- Runtime (`packages/api/src/auth/domain.ts`): `isAddressAllowed` now
  drops public-IP candidates and public-IP entries on the match path —
  defense in depth so a misconfigured runtime list never grants exemption.
- Hot path (`packages/api/src/auth/agent.ts`): `buildSSRFSafeLookup`
  pre-normalizes the list into a `Set<string>` once at construction and
  applies the same scoping filter, so the connect-time DNS lookup is an
  O(1) Set membership check instead of a full re-iterate-and-normalize on
  every outbound request.

**Test coverage for the connect-time and OAuth-fallback paths.**
- `agent.spec.ts`: new describe block exercising `buildSSRFSafeLookup` and
  `createSSRFSafe*` with `allowedAddresses` — hostname-literal exemption,
  resolved-IP exemption, public-IP scoping, URL/CIDR/whitespace rejection,
  and the default no-list block.
- `handler.allowedAddresses.test.ts` (new): integration tests for
  `validateOAuthUrl` — covers both the no-domains-set "permit private"
  path and the strict-bound regression where `allowedAddresses` must NOT
  bypass `allowedDomains`.

**Documentation & cleanup.**
- `connection.ts` redirect SSRF check: explicit comment that
  `allowedAddresses` is intentionally NOT consulted for redirect targets
  (server-controlled, must not inherit the admin's exemption).
- `MCPConnectionFactory.test.ts`: replaced an `eslint-disable` with a
  proper `import { getTenantId } from '@librechat/data-schemas'`. The
  disable was added to make a pre-existing `require()` quiet — the cleaner
  fix is to use the existing top-level import.

Updated `MCPConnectionSSRF.test.ts` WebSocket SSRF assertions to match the
new two-argument call shape (`hostname, allowedAddresses`).

* 🩹 fix: Require Absolute URL Before allowedAddresses Trust Bypass In isOAuthUrlAllowed

`parseDomainSpec` is lenient — it silently prepends `https://` to
schemeless inputs so it can match patterns like bare `example.com`.
That leniency leaked into `isOAuthUrlAllowed`'s new
`allowedAddresses` short-circuit: a value like `10.0.0.5/oauth` (no
scheme) would parse successfully via the prepended default, hit the
address-exemption path, return `true`, and skip `validateOAuthUrl`'s
strict `new URL(url)` parse-or-throw — only to fail later in OAuth
discovery with a less clear runtime error.

Add a strict `new URL(url)` gate at the top of `isOAuthUrlAllowed`.
Schemeless inputs now fall through to `validateOAuthUrl`'s explicit
"Invalid OAuth <field>" rejection. Tests added in both
`auth/domain.spec.ts` (unit) and the OAuth handler integration spec
(end-to-end).

Reported by chatgpt-codex-connector (P2) on PR #12933.

* 🛡️ fix: Address Follow-Up Comprehensive Review — Schema Tests, Shared Normalization, host:port

Auditing the second comprehensive review:

**F1 MAJOR — schema validation untested.** `allowedAddressesSchema` had
zero coverage, so a regression in the three refinement stages or the
three wiring locations (`endpoints` / `mcpSettings` / `actions`) would
silently let invalid entries reach the runtime. Added a dedicated
`describe('allowedAddressesSchema')` block in `config.spec.ts` covering:
valid private IPs (v4 + v6, including the previously-missed 192.0.0.0/24
range), accepted hostnames, all rejection categories (URLs, CIDR, paths,
whitespace tabs/newlines, host:port, public IP literals), and full
`configSchema.parse()` integration at each of the three nesting points.

**F2 MINOR — `isPrivateIPv4Literal` divergence.** The schema reimpl in
`packages/data-provider` was discarding the `c` octet, so the
`192.0.0.0/24` (RFC 5736 IETF protocol assignments) range that the
authoritative `isPrivateIPv4` accepts was being rejected with a
misleading "public IP" error. Destructure `c` and add the missing range
check; covered by the new schema tests.

**F3 MINOR — DRY violation across `domain.ts` and `agent.ts`.** Both
files had independent normalization implementations with a subtle
whitespace-check divergence (`/\s/` vs `.includes(' ')`). Extracted the
shared logic into a new `packages/api/src/auth/allowedAddresses.ts`
module that both consumers import:
  - `normalizeAddressEntry(entry)` — single-entry shape check
  - `looksLikeHostPort(entry)` — host:port detector (used by F4)
  - `normalizeAllowedAddressesSet(list)` — pre-normalized Set for the
    connect-time hot path
  - `isAddressInAllowedSet(candidate, set)` — membership check that
    enforces private-IP scoping on the candidate

Both `isAddressAllowed` (preflight) and `buildSSRFSafeLookup` (connect)
now go through the same primitives; the whitespace divergence is gone.

To break the import cycle (`allowedAddresses` needs `isPrivateIP`,
`domain` previously owned it), extracted IP private-range detection
into a leaf `auth/ip.ts` module. `domain.ts` re-exports `isPrivateIP`
for backward compatibility with existing call sites.

**F4 MINOR — `host:port` silently misclassified.** Entries like
`localhost:8080` previously slipped through the URL/path guard, were
mis-detected as IPv6, failed `isPrivateIP`, and were silently dropped
with a misleading "public IP" schema error. Added an explicit
`looksLikeHostPort` check with a clear error: "allowedAddresses
entries must not include a port — list the bare hostname or IP only."
Bare `::1`, `[::1]`, and other valid IPv6 literals are intentionally
not matched (regex distinguishes by colon count and the bracketed
`[ipv6]:port` form).

**F5 MINOR — hostname-trust documentation gap.** Hostname entries
short-circuit `resolveHostnameSSRF` before any DNS lookup — that's a
deliberate design (admin trusts the name) but it means the exemption
follows whatever the name resolves to at runtime. Added an explicit
note in `librechat.example.yaml` for both `mcpSettings.allowedAddresses`
and `endpoints.allowedAddresses`: "a hostname entry trusts whatever IP
that name resolves to. Only list hostnames whose DNS you control.
Prefer literal IPs when you can."

**F6** (8 positional params) is flagged for follow-up; refactor to an
options object is a breaking-API change deferred to a separate PR.
**F7** (redirect/WebSocket asymmetry, NIT, conf 40) — skipping; the
existing inline comment is sufficient.

* 🧹 chore: Address Follow-Up NITs — Import Order And Mirror-Function Naming

Three NITs from the latest comprehensive review:

**NIT #1 (conf 85) — local import order.** AGENTS.md requires local
imports sorted longest-to-shortest. Both `domain.ts` and `agent.ts`
had `./ip` (shorter) before `./allowedAddresses` (longer). Swapped.

**NIT #2 (conf 60) — missing cross-reference.** The schema-side
`isHostPortShape` in `packages/data-provider/src/config.ts` had no
note pointing at the canonical runtime mirror. Added a JSDoc paragraph
explaining the mirror relationship and why a local copy exists (the
data-provider package can't import from `@librechat/api` without
creating a circular dependency).

**NIT #3 (conf 50) — naming inconsistency.** Renamed
`isHostPortShape` → `looksLikeHostPort` so the schema mirror matches
the runtime helper exactly. Kept as a separate function (not a shared
import) for the same circular-dependency reason; the matching name
makes it obvious they should stay in lockstep.
2026-05-03 21:43:59 -04:00

507 lines
18 KiB
JavaScript

const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
const { nanoid } = require('nanoid');
const { GraphEvents, sleep } = require('@librechat/agents');
const { tool } = require('@librechat/agents/langchain/tools');
const { logger, encryptV2, decryptV2 } = require('@librechat/data-schemas');
const {
sendEvent,
logAxiosError,
refreshAccessToken,
GenerationJobManager,
createSSRFSafeAgents,
} = require('@librechat/api');
const {
Time,
CacheKeys,
StepTypes,
Constants,
AuthTypeEnum,
actionDelimiter,
isImageVisionTool,
actionDomainSeparator,
} = require('librechat-data-provider');
const {
findToken,
updateToken,
createToken,
getActions,
deleteActions,
deleteAssistant,
} = require('~/models');
const { getFlowStateManager } = require('~/config');
const { getLogStores } = require('~/cache');
const JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET;
const toolNameRegex = /^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$/;
const protocolRegex = /^https?:\/\//;
const replaceSeparatorRegex = new RegExp(actionDomainSeparator, 'g');
/**
* Validates tool name against regex pattern and updates if necessary.
* @param {object} params - The parameters for the function.
* @param {object} params.req - Express Request.
* @param {FunctionTool} params.tool - The tool object.
* @param {string} params.assistant_id - The assistant ID
* @returns {object|null} - Updated tool object or null if invalid and not an action.
*/
const validateAndUpdateTool = async ({ req, tool, assistant_id }) => {
let actions;
if (isImageVisionTool(tool)) {
return null;
}
if (!toolNameRegex.test(tool.function.name)) {
const [functionName, domain] = tool.function.name.split(actionDelimiter);
actions = await getActions({ assistant_id, user: req.user.id }, true);
const matchingActions = actions.filter((action) => {
const metadata = action.metadata;
if (!metadata) {
return false;
}
const strippedMetaDomain = stripProtocol(metadata.domain);
return strippedMetaDomain === domain || metadata.domain === domain;
});
const action = matchingActions[0];
if (!action) {
return null;
}
const parsedDomain = await domainParser(domain, true);
if (!parsedDomain) {
return null;
}
tool.function.name = `${functionName}${actionDelimiter}${parsedDomain}`;
}
return tool;
};
/** @param {string} domain */
function stripProtocol(domain) {
const stripped = domain.replace(protocolRegex, '');
const pathIdx = stripped.indexOf('/');
return pathIdx === -1 ? stripped : stripped.substring(0, pathIdx);
}
/**
* Encodes a domain using the legacy scheme (full URL including protocol).
* Used for backward-compatible matching against agents saved before the collision fix.
* @param {string} domain
* @returns {string}
*/
function legacyDomainEncode(domain) {
if (!domain) {
return '';
}
if (domain.length <= Constants.ENCODED_DOMAIN_LENGTH) {
return domain.replace(/\./g, actionDomainSeparator);
}
const modifiedDomain = Buffer.from(domain).toString('base64');
return modifiedDomain.substring(0, Constants.ENCODED_DOMAIN_LENGTH);
}
/**
* Encodes or decodes a domain name to/from base64, or replacing periods with a custom separator.
*
* Necessary due to `[a-zA-Z0-9_-]*` Regex Validation, limited to a 64-character maximum.
* Strips protocol prefix before encoding to prevent base64 collisions
* (all `https://` URLs share the same 10-char base64 prefix).
*
* @param {string} domain - The domain name to encode/decode.
* @param {boolean} inverse - False to decode from base64, true to encode to base64.
* @returns {Promise<string>} Encoded or decoded domain string.
*/
async function domainParser(domain, inverse = false) {
if (!domain) {
return;
}
const domainsCache = getLogStores(CacheKeys.ENCODED_DOMAINS);
if (inverse) {
const hostname = stripProtocol(domain);
const cachedDomain = await domainsCache.get(hostname);
if (cachedDomain) {
return hostname;
}
if (hostname.length <= Constants.ENCODED_DOMAIN_LENGTH) {
return hostname.replace(/\./g, actionDomainSeparator);
}
const modifiedDomain = Buffer.from(hostname).toString('base64');
const key = modifiedDomain.substring(0, Constants.ENCODED_DOMAIN_LENGTH);
await domainsCache.set(key, modifiedDomain);
return key;
}
const cachedDomain = await domainsCache.get(domain);
if (!cachedDomain) {
return domain.replace(replaceSeparatorRegex, '.');
}
try {
return Buffer.from(cachedDomain, 'base64').toString('utf-8');
} catch (error) {
logger.error(`Failed to parse domain (possibly not base64): ${domain}`, error);
return domain;
}
}
/**
* Loads action sets based on the user and assistant ID.
*
* @param {Object} searchParams - The parameters for loading action sets.
* @param {string} searchParams.user - The user identifier.
* @param {string} [searchParams.agent_id]- The agent identifier.
* @param {string} [searchParams.assistant_id]- The assistant identifier.
* @returns {Promise<Action[] | null>} A promise that resolves to an array of actions or `null` if no match.
*/
async function loadActionSets(searchParams) {
return await getActions(searchParams, true);
}
/**
* Creates a general tool for an entire action set.
*
* @param {Object} params - The parameters for loading action sets.
* @param {string} params.userId
* @param {ServerResponse} params.res
* @param {Action} params.action - The action set. Necessary for decrypting authentication values.
* @param {ActionRequest} params.requestBuilder - The ActionRequest builder class to execute the API call.
* @param {string | undefined} [params.name] - The name of the tool.
* @param {string | undefined} [params.description] - The description for the tool.
* @param {import('zod').ZodTypeAny | undefined} [params.zodSchema] - The Zod schema for tool input validation/definition
* @param {{ oauth_client_id?: string; oauth_client_secret?: string; }} params.encrypted - The encrypted values for the action.
* @param {string | null} [params.streamId] - The stream ID for resumable streams.
* @param {boolean} [params.useSSRFProtection] - When true, uses SSRF-safe HTTP agents that validate resolved IPs at connect time.
* @param {string[] | null} [params.allowedAddresses] - Optional admin exemption list of hostnames/IPs that bypass the SSRF private-IP block.
* @returns { Promise<typeof tool | { _call: (toolInput: Object | string) => unknown}> } An object with `_call` method to execute the tool input.
*/
async function createActionTool({
userId,
res,
action,
requestBuilder,
zodSchema,
name,
description,
encrypted,
streamId = null,
useSSRFProtection = false,
allowedAddresses,
}) {
const ssrfAgents = useSSRFProtection ? createSSRFSafeAgents(allowedAddresses) : undefined;
/** @type {(toolInput: Object | string, config: GraphRunnableConfig) => Promise<unknown>} */
const _call = async (toolInput, config) => {
try {
/** @type {import('librechat-data-provider').ActionMetadataRuntime} */
const metadata = action.metadata;
const executor = requestBuilder.createExecutor();
const preparedExecutor = executor.setParams(toolInput ?? {});
if (metadata.auth && metadata.auth.type !== AuthTypeEnum.None) {
try {
if (metadata.auth.type === AuthTypeEnum.OAuth && metadata.auth.authorization_url) {
const action_id = action.action_id;
const identifier = `${userId}:${action.action_id}`;
const requestLogin = async () => {
const { args: _args, stepId, ...toolCall } = config.toolCall ?? {};
if (!stepId) {
throw new Error('Tool call is missing stepId');
}
const statePayload = {
nonce: nanoid(),
user: userId,
action_id,
};
const stateToken = jwt.sign(statePayload, JWT_SECRET, { expiresIn: '10m' });
try {
const redirectUri = `${process.env.DOMAIN_CLIENT}/api/actions/${action_id}/oauth/callback`;
const params = new URLSearchParams({
client_id: metadata.oauth_client_id,
scope: metadata.auth.scope,
redirect_uri: redirectUri,
access_type: 'offline',
response_type: 'code',
state: stateToken,
});
const authURL = `${metadata.auth.authorization_url}?${params.toString()}`;
/** @type {{ id: string; delta: AgentToolCallDelta }} */
const data = {
id: stepId,
delta: {
type: StepTypes.TOOL_CALLS,
tool_calls: [{ ...toolCall, args: '' }],
auth: authURL,
expires_at: Date.now() + Time.TWO_MINUTES,
},
};
const flowsCache = getLogStores(CacheKeys.FLOWS);
const flowManager = getFlowStateManager(flowsCache);
await flowManager.createFlowWithHandler(
`${identifier}:oauth_login:${config.metadata.thread_id}:${config.metadata.run_id}`,
'oauth_login',
async () => {
const eventData = { event: GraphEvents.ON_RUN_STEP_DELTA, data };
if (streamId) {
await GenerationJobManager.emitChunk(streamId, eventData);
} else {
sendEvent(res, eventData);
}
logger.debug('Sent OAuth login request to client', { action_id, identifier });
return true;
},
config?.signal,
);
logger.debug('Waiting for OAuth Authorization response', { action_id, identifier });
const result = await flowManager.createFlow(
identifier,
'oauth',
{
state: stateToken,
userId: userId,
client_url: metadata.auth.client_url,
redirect_uri: `${process.env.DOMAIN_SERVER}/api/actions/${action_id}/oauth/callback`,
token_exchange_method: metadata.auth.token_exchange_method,
/** Encrypted values */
encrypted_oauth_client_id: encrypted.oauth_client_id,
encrypted_oauth_client_secret: encrypted.oauth_client_secret,
},
config?.signal,
);
logger.debug('Received OAuth Authorization response', { action_id, identifier });
data.delta.auth = undefined;
data.delta.expires_at = undefined;
const successEventData = { event: GraphEvents.ON_RUN_STEP_DELTA, data };
if (streamId) {
await GenerationJobManager.emitChunk(streamId, successEventData);
} else {
sendEvent(res, successEventData);
}
await sleep(3000);
metadata.oauth_access_token = result.access_token;
metadata.oauth_refresh_token = result.refresh_token;
const expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + result.expires_in * 1000);
metadata.oauth_token_expires_at = expiresAt.toISOString();
} catch (error) {
const errorMessage = 'Failed to authenticate OAuth tool';
logger.error(errorMessage, error);
throw new Error(errorMessage);
}
};
const tokenPromises = [];
tokenPromises.push(findToken({ userId, type: 'oauth', identifier }));
tokenPromises.push(
findToken({
userId,
type: 'oauth_refresh',
identifier: `${identifier}:refresh`,
}),
);
const [tokenData, refreshTokenData] = await Promise.all(tokenPromises);
if (tokenData) {
// Valid token exists, add it to metadata for setAuth
metadata.oauth_access_token = await decryptV2(tokenData.token);
if (refreshTokenData) {
metadata.oauth_refresh_token = await decryptV2(refreshTokenData.token);
}
metadata.oauth_token_expires_at = tokenData.expiresAt.toISOString();
} else if (!refreshTokenData) {
// No tokens exist, need to authenticate
await requestLogin();
} else if (refreshTokenData) {
// Refresh token is still valid, use it to get new access token
try {
const refresh_token = await decryptV2(refreshTokenData.token);
const refreshTokens = async () =>
await refreshAccessToken(
{
userId,
identifier,
refresh_token,
client_url: metadata.auth.client_url,
encrypted_oauth_client_id: encrypted.oauth_client_id,
token_exchange_method: metadata.auth.token_exchange_method,
encrypted_oauth_client_secret: encrypted.oauth_client_secret,
},
{
findToken,
updateToken,
createToken,
},
);
const flowsCache = getLogStores(CacheKeys.FLOWS);
const flowManager = getFlowStateManager(flowsCache);
const refreshData = await flowManager.createFlowWithHandler(
`${identifier}:refresh`,
'oauth_refresh',
refreshTokens,
config?.signal,
);
metadata.oauth_access_token = refreshData.access_token;
if (refreshData.refresh_token) {
metadata.oauth_refresh_token = refreshData.refresh_token;
}
const expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + refreshData.expires_in * 1000);
metadata.oauth_token_expires_at = expiresAt.toISOString();
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Failed to refresh token, requesting new login:', error);
await requestLogin();
}
} else {
await requestLogin();
}
}
await preparedExecutor.setAuth(metadata);
} catch (error) {
if (
error.message.includes('No access token found') ||
error.message.includes('Access token is expired')
) {
throw error;
}
throw new Error(`Authentication failed: ${error.message}`);
}
}
const response = await preparedExecutor.execute(ssrfAgents);
if (typeof response.data === 'object') {
return JSON.stringify(response.data);
}
return response.data;
} catch (error) {
const message = `API call to ${action.metadata.domain} failed:`;
return logAxiosError({ message, error });
}
};
if (name) {
return tool(_call, {
name: name.replace(replaceSeparatorRegex, '_'),
description: description || '',
schema: zodSchema,
});
}
return {
_call,
};
}
/**
* Encrypts a sensitive value.
* @param {string} value
* @returns {Promise<string>}
*/
async function encryptSensitiveValue(value) {
// Encode API key to handle special characters like ":"
const encodedValue = encodeURIComponent(value);
return await encryptV2(encodedValue);
}
/**
* Decrypts a sensitive value.
* @param {string} value
* @returns {Promise<string>}
*/
async function decryptSensitiveValue(value) {
const decryptedValue = await decryptV2(value);
return decodeURIComponent(decryptedValue);
}
/**
* Encrypts sensitive metadata values for an action.
*
* @param {ActionMetadata} metadata - The action metadata to encrypt.
* @returns {Promise<ActionMetadata>} The updated action metadata with encrypted values.
*/
async function encryptMetadata(metadata) {
const encryptedMetadata = { ...metadata };
// ServiceHttp
if (metadata.auth && metadata.auth.type === AuthTypeEnum.ServiceHttp) {
if (metadata.api_key) {
encryptedMetadata.api_key = await encryptSensitiveValue(metadata.api_key);
}
}
// OAuth
else if (metadata.auth && metadata.auth.type === AuthTypeEnum.OAuth) {
if (metadata.oauth_client_id) {
encryptedMetadata.oauth_client_id = await encryptSensitiveValue(metadata.oauth_client_id);
}
if (metadata.oauth_client_secret) {
encryptedMetadata.oauth_client_secret = await encryptSensitiveValue(
metadata.oauth_client_secret,
);
}
}
return encryptedMetadata;
}
/**
* Decrypts sensitive metadata values for an action.
*
* @param {ActionMetadata} metadata - The action metadata to decrypt.
* @returns {Promise<ActionMetadata>} The updated action metadata with decrypted values.
*/
async function decryptMetadata(metadata) {
const decryptedMetadata = { ...metadata };
// ServiceHttp
if (metadata.auth && metadata.auth.type === AuthTypeEnum.ServiceHttp) {
if (metadata.api_key) {
decryptedMetadata.api_key = await decryptSensitiveValue(metadata.api_key);
}
}
// OAuth
else if (metadata.auth && metadata.auth.type === AuthTypeEnum.OAuth) {
if (metadata.oauth_client_id) {
decryptedMetadata.oauth_client_id = await decryptSensitiveValue(metadata.oauth_client_id);
}
if (metadata.oauth_client_secret) {
decryptedMetadata.oauth_client_secret = await decryptSensitiveValue(
metadata.oauth_client_secret,
);
}
}
return decryptedMetadata;
}
/**
* Deletes an action and its corresponding assistant.
* @param {Object} params - The parameters for the function.
* @param {OpenAIClient} params.req - The Express Request object.
* @param {string} params.assistant_id - The ID of the assistant.
*/
const deleteAssistantActions = async ({ req, assistant_id }) => {
try {
await deleteActions({ assistant_id, user: req.user.id });
await deleteAssistant({ assistant_id, user: req.user.id });
} catch (error) {
const message = 'Trouble deleting Assistant Actions for Assistant ID: ' + assistant_id;
logger.error(message, error);
throw new Error(message);
}
};
module.exports = {
deleteAssistantActions,
validateAndUpdateTool,
legacyDomainEncode,
createActionTool,
encryptMetadata,
decryptMetadata,
loadActionSets,
domainParser,
};