LibreChat/packages/api/src/mcp/UserConnectionManager.ts
jcbartle 268f095c1a
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🔒 feat: Add On-Behalf-Of (OBO) token exchange support for MCP Servers (#13429)
* Add OBO (On-Behalf-Of) token exchange support for MCP server connections

Enables transparent authentication to Entra ID-backed MCP servers using the logged-in user's federated token via the OAuth 2.0 jwt-bearer grant. Configured via obo.scopes in librechat.yaml server config.

- Extract generic OboTokenService from GraphTokenService (jwt-bearer grant + cache)
- Refactor GraphTokenService to thin wrapper delegating to OboTokenService
- Add obo schema field to BaseOptionsSchema in data-provider
- Add resolveOboToken in packages/api/src/mcp/oauth/obo.ts (validates federated token, calls resolver, returns MCPOAuthTokens)
- Wire oboTokenResolver through MCPConnectionFactory, MCPManager, UserConnectionManager
- OBO tokens injected via request headers (not OAuth transport), refreshed on each tool call
- Explicit error on OBO failure (no fallthrough to standard OAuth redirect)
- Add unit tests for both resolveOboToken (9 tests) and exchangeOboToken (14 tests)

* Add OBO authentication option to MCP server UI configuration

  Enable users to configure On-Behalf-Of (OBO) token exchange for MCP servers created via the UI (MongoDB-stored), in addition to the existing YAML-based configuration.

  - Add "On-Behalf-Of (OBO)" radio option to MCP server auth section with scopes input field
  - Remove obo from omitServerManagedFields so the field passes UI schema validation
  - Add OBO to AuthTypeEnum, obo_scopes to AuthConfig, and OBO handling in form defaults and submission
  - Add .min(1) validation on obo.scopes to reject empty strings
  - Add English localization keys: com_ui_obo, com_ui_obo_scopes, com_ui_obo_scopes_description
  - Add 5 schema validation tests for OBO field acceptance, transport compatibility, and edge cases

* 🧊 fix: Add obo to safe properties in redactServerSecrets. Fixes the OBO configuration not showing up in the MCP UI after app restart

* Address linter errors

* 🧊 fix: fail closed on OBO refresh errors and retry transient token exchange failures

- stop tool calls from falling back to stale Authorization headers when per-call OBO refresh fails
- add one-time retry for transient Entra OBO exchange failures (network/429/5xx)
- preserve structured OBO failure reasons and retryability in resolveOboToken
- improve OBO auth error messaging for connection setup and tool execution
- add tests for transient vs permanent OBO failure paths

* Addressing linting errors / warnings

* 🧊 fix: isolate OBO MCP auth to user-scoped connections

- block OBO-enabled servers from app-level shared MCP connections
- bypass shared connection lookup for OBO servers in MCPManager.getConnection
- add regressions covering OBO connection scoping and preserve non-OBO app connection reuse

* 🛠️ refactor: centralize MCP user-scoped connection policy

- add shared requiresUserScopedConnection helper for OAuth, OBO, and customUserVars
- use the shared predicate in MCPManager and ConnectionsRepository
- add utils coverage for user-scoped connection policy

* 🧊 fix: restrict MCP OBO config to header-capable transports

- Move OBO configuration out of the shared MCP base options schema and allow it
only on SSE and streamable-http transports, where request headers are applied.
- Explicitly reject OBO on stdio and websocket configs to avoid accepted-but-
nonfunctional server definitions. Add schema coverage for admin/config parsing
and user-input websocket validation.

* 🧊 fix: single-flight concurrent OBO token exchanges

Concurrent tool calls that arrive on a cache miss were each issuing
their own jwt-bearer request to the IdP. Under that fan-out, Entra
intermittently returned errors that the retry classifier saw as
non-retryable, surfacing as:

  "The identity provider rejected the OBO token exchange.
   Cannot execute tool <name>. Re-authenticate the user or
   verify the configured OBO scopes and retry."

A user retry then hit the populated cache and succeeded, which matches
the observed flakiness — the cache was empty at the moment of fan-out
but populated by the time the user clicked retry.

- Coalesce concurrent exchanges in `OboTokenService.exchangeOboToken`
keyed by `${openidId}:${scopes}`. Callers that arrive while an exchange
is in flight share the same upstream request and receive the same
result. `fromCache=false` continues to force a fresh, independent
exchange (and is not joined by `fromCache=true` callers). The IdP
call, single-retry path, and cache write are unchanged — they were
moved into a `performOboExchange` helper so the coalescing wrapper
stays small.
- Tests cover: coalescing on the same key, isolation between different
keys, cleanup on success, cleanup on failure, and the
`fromCache=false` bypass.

* 🔒 feat: gate MCP OBO config behind MCP_SERVERS.CONFIGURE_OBO permission

OBO silently mints per-user delegated tokens from the caller's federated
access token and forwards them to whatever URL the server config points at.
Previously, anyone with MCP_SERVERS.CREATE could configure obo.scopes — so
if server creation is ever delegated beyond admins, a user could stand up
an attacker-controlled server, attach it to a shared agent, and exfiltrate
other users' downstream tokens on tool invocation.

Add a dedicated MCP_SERVERS.CONFIGURE_OBO permission (ADMIN: true, USER:
false by default) and enforce it at three layers so the safety property
no longer depends on CREATE staying admin-only:

- Create/update: POST/PATCH /api/mcp/servers returns 403 when the body
  carries `obo` and the caller's role lacks the permission.
- Runtime fail-closed: for DB-sourced configs, MCPConnectionFactory and
  MCPManager.callTool re-check the original author's role before each
  OBO exchange. If the author has been downgraded, the exchange is
  skipped (factory) or refused (callTool) — retained configs lose their
  privileges automatically.
- UI: the OBO option is hidden in the MCP server dialog for users
  without the permission; a CONFIGURE_OBO toggle is exposed in the MCP
  admin role editor.

Existing role docs receive the new sub-key via the permission backfill
in updateInterfacePermissions on next startup, preserving any
operator-set values. YAML/Config-sourced server configs are unaffected
since they're admin-controlled at the deployment level.

* 🧊 fix: wire OBO machinery for servers with requiresOAuth: false

The discovery and user-connection paths gated OAuth wiring (flow
manager, token methods, oboTokenResolver, oboTrustChecker) behind
isOAuthServer(), which only considers requiresOAuth/oauth fields.
A DB-stored OBO server with requiresOAuth: false therefore landed in
the non-OAuth branch, never received an oboTokenResolver, and the
factory's usesObo getter evaluated to false — sending a bare request
that the upstream rejected with invalid_token.

Add requiresOAuthMachinery() (OAuth OR OBO) and use it at those two
gates. isOAuthServer remains for the OAuth-handshake-only check
(shouldInitiateOAuthBeforeConnect), where OBO must not initiate a
handshake. Plumb the OBO resolver/trust-checker through
ToolDiscoveryOptions so reinitMCPServer can pass them on the
discovery path.

* 🧊 fix: lock all OBO-target fields (URL, proxy, headers, auth) without CONFIGURE_OBO

The CONFIGURE_OBO permission was meant to gate control of the endpoint
that receives OBO-minted per-user delegated tokens and the scopes that
are requested. The previous frontend lock + backend gate only covered
obo.scopes and the auth section, leaving url/proxy/headers/etc. editable
by anyone with UPDATE — meaning a non-permission user could still
redirect an existing OBO server's token flow to an attacker endpoint.

Switch to an allowlist policy: when editing an OBO server without
CONFIGURE_OBO, only title/description/iconPath are mutable. Backend
rejects any other field change with 403; frontend disables the
non-allowlist sections (URL, transport, auth, trust) via fieldset.
The comparison surface (MCP_USER_INPUT_FIELDS) is derived from
MCPServerUserInputSchema's union members so it stays in sync with the
schema. New schema fields land in the locked set by default — adding to
the allowlist is the only way to unlock them, which preserves the
security-review boundary.

* 🧊 fix: skip unauthenticated MCP inspection for OBO-only servers

MCPServerInspector.inspectServer() ran an unauthenticated temp connection
unless the config had requiresOAuth or customUserVars set. For OBO-only
servers without standard MCP OAuth advertisement, this caused
MCPConnectionFactory.create to attempt the connection without a user or
oboTokenResolver — failing on servers that reject the MCP initialize
handshake without a valid bearer token, which surfaced as
MCP_INSPECTION_FAILED on create/update.

Add `obo` to the skip list alongside requiresOAuth and customUserVars,
matching the existing pattern for user-scoped auth modes.

* Addressed linting error: watchedTitle is declared but never referenced (the auto-fill logic at line 156 uses getValues('title') instead). Deleted constant.
2026-06-01 22:36:18 -04:00

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12 KiB
TypeScript

import { logger } from '@librechat/data-schemas';
import { ErrorCode, McpError } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/types.js';
import type * as t from './types';
import { MCPServersRegistry } from '~/mcp/registry/MCPServersRegistry';
import { ConnectionsRepository } from '~/mcp/ConnectionsRepository';
import { MCPConnectionFactory } from '~/mcp/MCPConnectionFactory';
import { isUserSourced, requiresOAuthMachinery } from './utils';
import { MCPConnection } from './connection';
import { mcpConfig } from './mcpConfig';
/**
* Abstract base class for managing user-specific MCP connections with lifecycle management.
* Only meant to be extended by MCPManager.
* Much of the logic was move here from the old MCPManager to make it more manageable.
* User connections will soon be ephemeral and not cached anymore:
* https://github.com/danny-avila/LibreChat/discussions/8790
*/
export abstract class UserConnectionManager {
// Connections shared by all users.
public appConnections: ConnectionsRepository | null = null;
// Connections per userId -> serverName -> connection
protected userConnections: Map<string, Map<string, MCPConnection>> = new Map();
/** Last activity timestamp for users (not per server) */
protected userLastActivity: Map<string, number> = new Map();
/** In-flight connection promises keyed by `userId:serverName` — coalesces concurrent attempts */
protected pendingConnections: Map<string, Promise<MCPConnection>> = new Map();
/** Updates the last activity timestamp for a user */
protected updateUserLastActivity(userId: string): void {
const now = Date.now();
this.userLastActivity.set(userId, now);
logger.debug(
`[MCP][User: ${userId}] Updated last activity timestamp: ${new Date(now).toISOString()}`,
);
}
/** Gets or creates a connection for a specific user, coalescing concurrent attempts */
public async getUserConnection(opts: t.UserMCPConnectionOptions): Promise<MCPConnection> {
const { serverName, forceNew, user } = opts;
const userId = user?.id;
if (!userId) {
throw new McpError(ErrorCode.InvalidRequest, `[MCP] User object missing id property`);
}
const lockKey = `${userId}:${serverName}`;
if (!forceNew) {
const pending = this.pendingConnections.get(lockKey);
if (pending) {
logger.debug(`[MCP][User: ${userId}][${serverName}] Joining in-flight connection attempt`);
return pending;
}
}
const connectionPromise = this.createUserConnectionInternal(opts, userId);
if (!forceNew) {
this.pendingConnections.set(lockKey, connectionPromise);
}
try {
return await connectionPromise;
} finally {
if (!forceNew && this.pendingConnections.get(lockKey) === connectionPromise) {
this.pendingConnections.delete(lockKey);
}
}
}
private async createUserConnectionInternal(
{
serverName,
forceNew,
user,
flowManager,
customUserVars,
requestBody,
tokenMethods,
oauthStart,
oauthEnd,
oboTokenResolver,
oboTrustChecker,
signal,
returnOnOAuth = false,
connectionTimeout,
serverConfig: providedConfig,
}: t.UserMCPConnectionOptions,
userId: string,
): Promise<MCPConnection> {
if (await this.appConnections!.has(serverName)) {
throw new McpError(
ErrorCode.InvalidRequest,
`[MCP][User: ${userId}] Trying to create user-specific connection for app-level server "${serverName}"`,
);
}
const config =
providedConfig ??
(await MCPServersRegistry.getInstance().getServerConfig(serverName, userId));
const userServerMap = this.userConnections.get(userId);
let connection = forceNew ? undefined : userServerMap?.get(serverName);
if (forceNew) {
MCPConnection.clearCooldown(serverName);
}
const now = Date.now();
// Check if user is idle
const lastActivity = this.userLastActivity.get(userId);
if (lastActivity && now - lastActivity > mcpConfig.USER_CONNECTION_IDLE_TIMEOUT) {
logger.info(`[MCP][User: ${userId}] User idle for too long. Disconnecting all connections.`);
// Disconnect all user connections
try {
await this.disconnectUserConnections(userId);
} catch (err) {
logger.error(`[MCP][User: ${userId}] Error disconnecting idle connections:`, err);
}
connection = undefined; // Force creation of a new connection
} else if (connection) {
if (!config || (config.updatedAt && connection.isStale(config.updatedAt))) {
if (config) {
logger.info(
`[MCP][User: ${userId}][${serverName}] Config was updated, disconnecting stale connection`,
);
}
await this.disconnectUserConnection(userId, serverName);
connection = undefined;
} else if (await connection.isConnected()) {
logger.debug(`[MCP][User: ${userId}][${serverName}] Reusing active connection`);
this.updateUserLastActivity(userId);
return connection;
} else {
// Connection exists but is not connected, attempt to remove potentially stale entry
logger.warn(
`[MCP][User: ${userId}][${serverName}] Found existing but disconnected connection object. Cleaning up.`,
);
this.removeUserConnection(userId, serverName); // Clean up maps
connection = undefined;
}
}
// Now check if config exists for new connection creation
if (!config) {
throw new McpError(
ErrorCode.InvalidRequest,
`[MCP][User: ${userId}] Configuration for server "${serverName}" not found.`,
);
}
// If no valid connection exists, create a new one
logger.info(`[MCP][User: ${userId}][${serverName}] Establishing new connection`);
try {
const registry = MCPServersRegistry.getInstance();
const basic: t.BasicConnectionOptions = {
serverConfig: config,
serverName: serverName,
dbSourced: isUserSourced(config),
useSSRFProtection: registry.shouldEnableSSRFProtection(),
allowedDomains: registry.getAllowedDomains(),
allowedAddresses: registry.getAllowedAddresses(),
};
const useOAuth = requiresOAuthMachinery(config);
let connectionOptions: t.OAuthConnectionOptions | t.UserConnectionContext;
if (useOAuth) {
if (!flowManager) {
throw new McpError(
ErrorCode.InvalidRequest,
`[MCP][User: ${userId}] OAuth server "${serverName}" requires a flowManager`,
);
}
connectionOptions = {
useOAuth: true,
user: user,
customUserVars: customUserVars,
flowManager: flowManager,
tokenMethods: tokenMethods,
signal: signal,
oauthStart: oauthStart,
oauthEnd: oauthEnd,
oboTokenResolver: oboTokenResolver,
oboTrustChecker: oboTrustChecker,
returnOnOAuth: returnOnOAuth,
requestBody: requestBody,
connectionTimeout: connectionTimeout,
};
} else {
connectionOptions = {
user,
customUserVars,
requestBody,
connectionTimeout,
};
}
connection = await MCPConnectionFactory.create(basic, connectionOptions);
if (!(await connection?.isConnected())) {
throw new Error('Failed to establish connection after initialization attempt.');
}
if (!this.userConnections.has(userId)) {
this.userConnections.set(userId, new Map());
}
this.userConnections.get(userId)?.set(serverName, connection);
logger.info(`[MCP][User: ${userId}][${serverName}] Connection successfully established`);
// Update timestamp on creation
this.updateUserLastActivity(userId);
return connection;
} catch (error) {
logger.error(`[MCP][User: ${userId}][${serverName}] Failed to establish connection`, error);
// Ensure partial connection state is cleaned up if initialization fails
await connection?.disconnect().catch((disconnectError) => {
logger.error(
`[MCP][User: ${userId}][${serverName}] Error during cleanup after failed connection`,
disconnectError,
);
});
// Ensure cleanup even if connection attempt fails
this.removeUserConnection(userId, serverName);
throw error; // Re-throw the error to the caller
}
}
/** Returns all connections for a specific user */
public getUserConnections(userId: string) {
return this.userConnections.get(userId);
}
/** Removes a specific user connection entry */
protected removeUserConnection(userId: string, serverName: string): void {
const userMap = this.userConnections.get(userId);
if (userMap) {
userMap.delete(serverName);
if (userMap.size === 0) {
this.userConnections.delete(userId);
// Only remove user activity timestamp if all connections are gone
this.userLastActivity.delete(userId);
}
}
logger.debug(`[MCP][User: ${userId}][${serverName}] Removed connection entry.`);
}
/** Disconnects and removes a specific user connection */
public async disconnectUserConnection(userId: string, serverName: string): Promise<void> {
this.pendingConnections.delete(`${userId}:${serverName}`);
const userMap = this.userConnections.get(userId);
const connection = userMap?.get(serverName);
if (connection) {
logger.info(`[MCP][User: ${userId}][${serverName}] Disconnecting...`);
await connection.disconnect();
this.removeUserConnection(userId, serverName);
}
}
/** Disconnects and removes all connections for a specific user */
public async disconnectUserConnections(userId: string): Promise<void> {
const userMap = this.userConnections.get(userId);
const disconnectPromises: Promise<void>[] = [];
if (userMap) {
logger.info(`[MCP][User: ${userId}] Disconnecting all servers...`);
const userServers = Array.from(userMap.keys());
for (const serverName of userServers) {
disconnectPromises.push(
this.disconnectUserConnection(userId, serverName).catch((error) => {
logger.error(
`[MCP][User: ${userId}][${serverName}] Error during disconnection:`,
error,
);
}),
);
}
await Promise.allSettled(disconnectPromises);
// Clean up any pending connection promises for this user
for (const key of this.pendingConnections.keys()) {
if (key.startsWith(`${userId}:`)) {
this.pendingConnections.delete(key);
}
}
logger.info(`[MCP][User: ${userId}] All connections processed for disconnection.`);
}
/**
* Always clear the activity timestamp, even when userMap was missing.
* `updateUserLastActivity` can be called before a connection is established
* (e.g. in MCPManager.callTool prior to getConnection); if that connection
* attempt fails, the activity entry would otherwise leak and trigger the
* idle check repeatedly for the same userId.
*/
this.userLastActivity.delete(userId);
}
/** Check for and disconnect idle connections */
protected checkIdleConnections(currentUserId?: string): void {
const now = Date.now();
// Iterate through all users to check for idle ones
for (const [userId, lastActivity] of this.userLastActivity.entries()) {
if (currentUserId && currentUserId === userId) {
continue;
}
if (now - lastActivity > mcpConfig.USER_CONNECTION_IDLE_TIMEOUT) {
logger.info(
`[MCP][User: ${userId}] User idle for too long. Disconnecting all connections...`,
);
// Disconnect all user connections asynchronously (fire and forget)
this.disconnectUserConnections(userId).catch((err) =>
logger.error(`[MCP][User: ${userId}] Error disconnecting idle connections:`, err),
);
}
}
}
/** Returns counts of tracked users and connections for diagnostics */
public getConnectionStats(): {
trackedUsers: number;
totalConnections: number;
activityEntries: number;
appConnectionCount: number;
} {
let totalConnections = 0;
for (const serverMap of this.userConnections.values()) {
totalConnections += serverMap.size;
}
return {
trackedUsers: this.userConnections.size,
totalConnections,
activityEntries: this.userLastActivity.size,
appConnectionCount: this.appConnections?.getConnectionCount() ?? 0,
};
}
}