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* Add OBO (On-Behalf-Of) token exchange support for MCP server connections Enables transparent authentication to Entra ID-backed MCP servers using the logged-in user's federated token via the OAuth 2.0 jwt-bearer grant. Configured via obo.scopes in librechat.yaml server config. - Extract generic OboTokenService from GraphTokenService (jwt-bearer grant + cache) - Refactor GraphTokenService to thin wrapper delegating to OboTokenService - Add obo schema field to BaseOptionsSchema in data-provider - Add resolveOboToken in packages/api/src/mcp/oauth/obo.ts (validates federated token, calls resolver, returns MCPOAuthTokens) - Wire oboTokenResolver through MCPConnectionFactory, MCPManager, UserConnectionManager - OBO tokens injected via request headers (not OAuth transport), refreshed on each tool call - Explicit error on OBO failure (no fallthrough to standard OAuth redirect) - Add unit tests for both resolveOboToken (9 tests) and exchangeOboToken (14 tests) * Add OBO authentication option to MCP server UI configuration Enable users to configure On-Behalf-Of (OBO) token exchange for MCP servers created via the UI (MongoDB-stored), in addition to the existing YAML-based configuration. - Add "On-Behalf-Of (OBO)" radio option to MCP server auth section with scopes input field - Remove obo from omitServerManagedFields so the field passes UI schema validation - Add OBO to AuthTypeEnum, obo_scopes to AuthConfig, and OBO handling in form defaults and submission - Add .min(1) validation on obo.scopes to reject empty strings - Add English localization keys: com_ui_obo, com_ui_obo_scopes, com_ui_obo_scopes_description - Add 5 schema validation tests for OBO field acceptance, transport compatibility, and edge cases * 🧊 fix: Add obo to safe properties in redactServerSecrets. Fixes the OBO configuration not showing up in the MCP UI after app restart * Address linter errors * 🧊 fix: fail closed on OBO refresh errors and retry transient token exchange failures - stop tool calls from falling back to stale Authorization headers when per-call OBO refresh fails - add one-time retry for transient Entra OBO exchange failures (network/429/5xx) - preserve structured OBO failure reasons and retryability in resolveOboToken - improve OBO auth error messaging for connection setup and tool execution - add tests for transient vs permanent OBO failure paths * Addressing linting errors / warnings * 🧊 fix: isolate OBO MCP auth to user-scoped connections - block OBO-enabled servers from app-level shared MCP connections - bypass shared connection lookup for OBO servers in MCPManager.getConnection - add regressions covering OBO connection scoping and preserve non-OBO app connection reuse * 🛠️ refactor: centralize MCP user-scoped connection policy - add shared requiresUserScopedConnection helper for OAuth, OBO, and customUserVars - use the shared predicate in MCPManager and ConnectionsRepository - add utils coverage for user-scoped connection policy * 🧊 fix: restrict MCP OBO config to header-capable transports - Move OBO configuration out of the shared MCP base options schema and allow it only on SSE and streamable-http transports, where request headers are applied. - Explicitly reject OBO on stdio and websocket configs to avoid accepted-but- nonfunctional server definitions. Add schema coverage for admin/config parsing and user-input websocket validation. * 🧊 fix: single-flight concurrent OBO token exchanges Concurrent tool calls that arrive on a cache miss were each issuing their own jwt-bearer request to the IdP. Under that fan-out, Entra intermittently returned errors that the retry classifier saw as non-retryable, surfacing as: "The identity provider rejected the OBO token exchange. Cannot execute tool <name>. Re-authenticate the user or verify the configured OBO scopes and retry." A user retry then hit the populated cache and succeeded, which matches the observed flakiness — the cache was empty at the moment of fan-out but populated by the time the user clicked retry. - Coalesce concurrent exchanges in `OboTokenService.exchangeOboToken` keyed by `${openidId}:${scopes}`. Callers that arrive while an exchange is in flight share the same upstream request and receive the same result. `fromCache=false` continues to force a fresh, independent exchange (and is not joined by `fromCache=true` callers). The IdP call, single-retry path, and cache write are unchanged — they were moved into a `performOboExchange` helper so the coalescing wrapper stays small. - Tests cover: coalescing on the same key, isolation between different keys, cleanup on success, cleanup on failure, and the `fromCache=false` bypass. * 🔒 feat: gate MCP OBO config behind MCP_SERVERS.CONFIGURE_OBO permission OBO silently mints per-user delegated tokens from the caller's federated access token and forwards them to whatever URL the server config points at. Previously, anyone with MCP_SERVERS.CREATE could configure obo.scopes — so if server creation is ever delegated beyond admins, a user could stand up an attacker-controlled server, attach it to a shared agent, and exfiltrate other users' downstream tokens on tool invocation. Add a dedicated MCP_SERVERS.CONFIGURE_OBO permission (ADMIN: true, USER: false by default) and enforce it at three layers so the safety property no longer depends on CREATE staying admin-only: - Create/update: POST/PATCH /api/mcp/servers returns 403 when the body carries `obo` and the caller's role lacks the permission. - Runtime fail-closed: for DB-sourced configs, MCPConnectionFactory and MCPManager.callTool re-check the original author's role before each OBO exchange. If the author has been downgraded, the exchange is skipped (factory) or refused (callTool) — retained configs lose their privileges automatically. - UI: the OBO option is hidden in the MCP server dialog for users without the permission; a CONFIGURE_OBO toggle is exposed in the MCP admin role editor. Existing role docs receive the new sub-key via the permission backfill in updateInterfacePermissions on next startup, preserving any operator-set values. YAML/Config-sourced server configs are unaffected since they're admin-controlled at the deployment level. * 🧊 fix: wire OBO machinery for servers with requiresOAuth: false The discovery and user-connection paths gated OAuth wiring (flow manager, token methods, oboTokenResolver, oboTrustChecker) behind isOAuthServer(), which only considers requiresOAuth/oauth fields. A DB-stored OBO server with requiresOAuth: false therefore landed in the non-OAuth branch, never received an oboTokenResolver, and the factory's usesObo getter evaluated to false — sending a bare request that the upstream rejected with invalid_token. Add requiresOAuthMachinery() (OAuth OR OBO) and use it at those two gates. isOAuthServer remains for the OAuth-handshake-only check (shouldInitiateOAuthBeforeConnect), where OBO must not initiate a handshake. Plumb the OBO resolver/trust-checker through ToolDiscoveryOptions so reinitMCPServer can pass them on the discovery path. * 🧊 fix: lock all OBO-target fields (URL, proxy, headers, auth) without CONFIGURE_OBO The CONFIGURE_OBO permission was meant to gate control of the endpoint that receives OBO-minted per-user delegated tokens and the scopes that are requested. The previous frontend lock + backend gate only covered obo.scopes and the auth section, leaving url/proxy/headers/etc. editable by anyone with UPDATE — meaning a non-permission user could still redirect an existing OBO server's token flow to an attacker endpoint. Switch to an allowlist policy: when editing an OBO server without CONFIGURE_OBO, only title/description/iconPath are mutable. Backend rejects any other field change with 403; frontend disables the non-allowlist sections (URL, transport, auth, trust) via fieldset. The comparison surface (MCP_USER_INPUT_FIELDS) is derived from MCPServerUserInputSchema's union members so it stays in sync with the schema. New schema fields land in the locked set by default — adding to the allowlist is the only way to unlock them, which preserves the security-review boundary. * 🧊 fix: skip unauthenticated MCP inspection for OBO-only servers MCPServerInspector.inspectServer() ran an unauthenticated temp connection unless the config had requiresOAuth or customUserVars set. For OBO-only servers without standard MCP OAuth advertisement, this caused MCPConnectionFactory.create to attempt the connection without a user or oboTokenResolver — failing on servers that reject the MCP initialize handshake without a valid bearer token, which surfaced as MCP_INSPECTION_FAILED on create/update. Add `obo` to the skip list alongside requiresOAuth and customUserVars, matching the existing pattern for user-scoped auth modes. * Addressed linting error: watchedTitle is declared but never referenced (the auto-fill logic at line 156 uses getValues('title') instead). Deleted constant.
257 lines
8.5 KiB
JavaScript
257 lines
8.5 KiB
JavaScript
const { logger } = require('@librechat/data-schemas');
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const { getMissingCustomUserVars } = require('@librechat/api');
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const { CacheKeys, Constants } = require('librechat-data-provider');
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const { getMCPManager, getMCPServersRegistry, getFlowStateManager } = require('~/config');
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const { findToken, createToken, updateToken, deleteTokens } = require('~/models');
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const { exchangeOboToken } = require('~/server/services/OboTokenService');
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const { createOboTrustChecker } = require('~/server/services/OboPolicyService');
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const { updateMCPServerTools } = require('~/server/services/Config');
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const { getLogStores } = require('~/cache');
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/**
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* Reinitializes an MCP server connection and discovers available tools.
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* When OAuth is required, uses discovery mode to list tools without full authentication
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* (per MCP spec, tool listing should be possible without auth).
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* @param {Object} params
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* @param {IUser} params.user - The user from the request object.
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* @param {string} params.serverName - The name of the MCP server
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* @param {boolean} params.returnOnOAuth - Whether to initiate OAuth and return, or wait for OAuth flow to finish
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* @param {AbortSignal} [params.signal] - The abort signal to handle cancellation.
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* @param {boolean} [params.forceNew]
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* @param {number} [params.connectionTimeout]
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* @param {FlowStateManager<any>} [params.flowManager]
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* @param {(authURL: string) => Promise<void>} [params.oauthStart]
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* @param {Record<string, Record<string, string>>} [params.userMCPAuthMap]
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*/
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async function reinitMCPServer({
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user,
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signal,
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forceNew,
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serverName,
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configServers,
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userMCPAuthMap,
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connectionTimeout,
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returnOnOAuth = true,
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oauthStart: _oauthStart,
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flowManager: _flowManager,
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serverConfig: providedConfig,
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}) {
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/** @type {MCPConnection | null} */
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let connection = null;
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/** @type {LCAvailableTools | null} */
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let availableTools = null;
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/** @type {ReturnType<MCPConnection['fetchTools']> | null} */
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let tools = null;
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let oauthRequired = false;
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let oauthUrl = null;
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try {
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const registry = getMCPServersRegistry();
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const serverConfig =
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providedConfig ?? (await registry.getServerConfig(serverName, user?.id, configServers));
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if (serverConfig?.inspectionFailed) {
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if (serverConfig.source === 'config') {
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logger.info(
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`[MCP Reinitialize] Config-source server ${serverName} has inspectionFailed — retry handled by config cache`,
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);
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return {
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availableTools: null,
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success: false,
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message: `MCP server '${serverName}' is still unreachable`,
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oauthRequired: false,
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serverName,
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oauthUrl: null,
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tools: null,
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};
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}
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logger.info(
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`[MCP Reinitialize] Server ${serverName} had failed inspection, attempting reinspection`,
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);
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try {
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const storageLocation = serverConfig.source === 'user' ? 'DB' : 'CACHE';
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await registry.reinspectServer(serverName, storageLocation, user?.id);
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logger.info(`[MCP Reinitialize] Reinspection succeeded for server: ${serverName}`);
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} catch (reinspectError) {
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logger.error(
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`[MCP Reinitialize] Reinspection failed for server ${serverName}:`,
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reinspectError,
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);
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return {
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availableTools: null,
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success: false,
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message: `MCP server '${serverName}' is still unreachable`,
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oauthRequired: false,
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serverName,
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oauthUrl: null,
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tools: null,
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};
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}
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}
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const customUserVars = userMCPAuthMap?.[`${Constants.mcp_prefix}${serverName}`];
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const missingUserVars = getMissingCustomUserVars(serverConfig ?? {}, customUserVars);
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if (missingUserVars.length > 0) {
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logger.warn(
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`[MCP Reinitialize] Skipping server '${serverName}': required user-provided variable(s) not set: ${missingUserVars.join(
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', ',
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)}. Tools will not be exposed until the user configures them.`,
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);
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return {
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availableTools: null,
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success: false,
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message: `MCP server '${serverName}' requires user-provided variable(s) [${missingUserVars.join(
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', ',
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)}] which are not set`,
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oauthRequired: false,
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serverName,
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oauthUrl: null,
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tools: null,
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};
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}
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const flowManager = _flowManager ?? getFlowStateManager(getLogStores(CacheKeys.FLOWS));
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const mcpManager = getMCPManager();
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const tokenMethods = { findToken, updateToken, createToken, deleteTokens };
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const oauthStart =
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_oauthStart ??
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(async (authURL) => {
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logger.info(`[MCP Reinitialize] OAuth URL received for ${serverName}`);
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oauthUrl = authURL;
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oauthRequired = true;
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});
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try {
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connection = await mcpManager.getConnection({
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user,
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signal,
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forceNew,
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oauthStart,
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serverName,
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flowManager,
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tokenMethods,
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returnOnOAuth,
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customUserVars,
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connectionTimeout,
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serverConfig,
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oboTokenResolver: exchangeOboToken,
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oboTrustChecker: createOboTrustChecker(),
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});
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logger.info(`[MCP Reinitialize] Successfully established connection for ${serverName}`);
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} catch (err) {
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logger.info(`[MCP Reinitialize] getConnection threw error: ${err.message}`);
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logger.info(
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`[MCP Reinitialize] OAuth state - oauthRequired: ${oauthRequired}, oauthUrl: ${oauthUrl ? 'present' : 'null'}`,
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);
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const isOAuthError =
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err.message?.includes('OAuth') ||
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err.message?.includes('authentication') ||
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err.message?.includes('401');
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const isOAuthFlowInitiated = err.message === 'OAuth flow initiated - return early';
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if (isOAuthError || oauthRequired || isOAuthFlowInitiated) {
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logger.info(
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`[MCP Reinitialize] OAuth required for ${serverName}, attempting tool discovery without auth`,
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);
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oauthRequired = true;
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try {
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const discoveryResult = await mcpManager.discoverServerTools({
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user,
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signal,
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serverName,
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flowManager,
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tokenMethods,
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oauthStart,
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customUserVars,
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connectionTimeout,
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configServers,
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oboTokenResolver: exchangeOboToken,
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oboTrustChecker: createOboTrustChecker(),
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});
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if (discoveryResult.tools && discoveryResult.tools.length > 0) {
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tools = discoveryResult.tools;
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logger.info(
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`[MCP Reinitialize] Discovered ${tools.length} tools for ${serverName} without full auth`,
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);
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}
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} catch (discoveryErr) {
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logger.debug(
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`[MCP Reinitialize] Tool discovery failed for ${serverName}: ${discoveryErr?.message ?? String(discoveryErr)}`,
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);
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}
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} else {
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logger.error(
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`[MCP Reinitialize] Error initializing MCP server ${serverName} for user:`,
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err,
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);
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}
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}
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if (connection && !oauthRequired) {
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tools = await connection.fetchTools();
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}
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if (tools && tools.length > 0) {
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availableTools = await updateMCPServerTools({
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userId: user.id,
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serverName,
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tools,
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});
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}
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logger.debug(
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`[MCP Reinitialize] Sending response for ${serverName} - oauthRequired: ${oauthRequired}, oauthUrl: ${oauthUrl ? 'present' : 'null'}`,
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);
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const getResponseMessage = () => {
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if (oauthRequired && tools && tools.length > 0) {
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return `MCP server '${serverName}' tools discovered, OAuth required for execution`;
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}
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if (oauthRequired) {
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return `MCP server '${serverName}' ready for OAuth authentication`;
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}
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if (connection) {
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return `MCP server '${serverName}' reinitialized successfully`;
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}
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return `Failed to reinitialize MCP server '${serverName}'`;
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};
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const result = {
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availableTools,
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success: Boolean(
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(connection && !oauthRequired) ||
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(oauthRequired && oauthUrl) ||
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(tools && tools.length > 0),
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),
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message: getResponseMessage(),
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oauthRequired,
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serverName,
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oauthUrl,
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tools,
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};
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logger.debug(`[MCP Reinitialize] Response for ${serverName}:`, {
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success: result.success,
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oauthRequired: result.oauthRequired,
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oauthUrl: result.oauthUrl ? 'present' : null,
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toolsCount: tools?.length ?? 0,
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});
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return result;
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} catch (error) {
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logger.error(
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'[MCP Reinitialize] Error loading MCP Tools, servers may still be initializing:',
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error,
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);
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}
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}
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module.exports = {
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reinitMCPServer,
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};
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