LibreChat/api/server/services/Tools/mcp.js
jcbartle 268f095c1a
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🔒 feat: Add On-Behalf-Of (OBO) token exchange support for MCP Servers (#13429)
* Add OBO (On-Behalf-Of) token exchange support for MCP server connections

Enables transparent authentication to Entra ID-backed MCP servers using the logged-in user's federated token via the OAuth 2.0 jwt-bearer grant. Configured via obo.scopes in librechat.yaml server config.

- Extract generic OboTokenService from GraphTokenService (jwt-bearer grant + cache)
- Refactor GraphTokenService to thin wrapper delegating to OboTokenService
- Add obo schema field to BaseOptionsSchema in data-provider
- Add resolveOboToken in packages/api/src/mcp/oauth/obo.ts (validates federated token, calls resolver, returns MCPOAuthTokens)
- Wire oboTokenResolver through MCPConnectionFactory, MCPManager, UserConnectionManager
- OBO tokens injected via request headers (not OAuth transport), refreshed on each tool call
- Explicit error on OBO failure (no fallthrough to standard OAuth redirect)
- Add unit tests for both resolveOboToken (9 tests) and exchangeOboToken (14 tests)

* Add OBO authentication option to MCP server UI configuration

  Enable users to configure On-Behalf-Of (OBO) token exchange for MCP servers created via the UI (MongoDB-stored), in addition to the existing YAML-based configuration.

  - Add "On-Behalf-Of (OBO)" radio option to MCP server auth section with scopes input field
  - Remove obo from omitServerManagedFields so the field passes UI schema validation
  - Add OBO to AuthTypeEnum, obo_scopes to AuthConfig, and OBO handling in form defaults and submission
  - Add .min(1) validation on obo.scopes to reject empty strings
  - Add English localization keys: com_ui_obo, com_ui_obo_scopes, com_ui_obo_scopes_description
  - Add 5 schema validation tests for OBO field acceptance, transport compatibility, and edge cases

* 🧊 fix: Add obo to safe properties in redactServerSecrets. Fixes the OBO configuration not showing up in the MCP UI after app restart

* Address linter errors

* 🧊 fix: fail closed on OBO refresh errors and retry transient token exchange failures

- stop tool calls from falling back to stale Authorization headers when per-call OBO refresh fails
- add one-time retry for transient Entra OBO exchange failures (network/429/5xx)
- preserve structured OBO failure reasons and retryability in resolveOboToken
- improve OBO auth error messaging for connection setup and tool execution
- add tests for transient vs permanent OBO failure paths

* Addressing linting errors / warnings

* 🧊 fix: isolate OBO MCP auth to user-scoped connections

- block OBO-enabled servers from app-level shared MCP connections
- bypass shared connection lookup for OBO servers in MCPManager.getConnection
- add regressions covering OBO connection scoping and preserve non-OBO app connection reuse

* 🛠️ refactor: centralize MCP user-scoped connection policy

- add shared requiresUserScopedConnection helper for OAuth, OBO, and customUserVars
- use the shared predicate in MCPManager and ConnectionsRepository
- add utils coverage for user-scoped connection policy

* 🧊 fix: restrict MCP OBO config to header-capable transports

- Move OBO configuration out of the shared MCP base options schema and allow it
only on SSE and streamable-http transports, where request headers are applied.
- Explicitly reject OBO on stdio and websocket configs to avoid accepted-but-
nonfunctional server definitions. Add schema coverage for admin/config parsing
and user-input websocket validation.

* 🧊 fix: single-flight concurrent OBO token exchanges

Concurrent tool calls that arrive on a cache miss were each issuing
their own jwt-bearer request to the IdP. Under that fan-out, Entra
intermittently returned errors that the retry classifier saw as
non-retryable, surfacing as:

  "The identity provider rejected the OBO token exchange.
   Cannot execute tool <name>. Re-authenticate the user or
   verify the configured OBO scopes and retry."

A user retry then hit the populated cache and succeeded, which matches
the observed flakiness — the cache was empty at the moment of fan-out
but populated by the time the user clicked retry.

- Coalesce concurrent exchanges in `OboTokenService.exchangeOboToken`
keyed by `${openidId}:${scopes}`. Callers that arrive while an exchange
is in flight share the same upstream request and receive the same
result. `fromCache=false` continues to force a fresh, independent
exchange (and is not joined by `fromCache=true` callers). The IdP
call, single-retry path, and cache write are unchanged — they were
moved into a `performOboExchange` helper so the coalescing wrapper
stays small.
- Tests cover: coalescing on the same key, isolation between different
keys, cleanup on success, cleanup on failure, and the
`fromCache=false` bypass.

* 🔒 feat: gate MCP OBO config behind MCP_SERVERS.CONFIGURE_OBO permission

OBO silently mints per-user delegated tokens from the caller's federated
access token and forwards them to whatever URL the server config points at.
Previously, anyone with MCP_SERVERS.CREATE could configure obo.scopes — so
if server creation is ever delegated beyond admins, a user could stand up
an attacker-controlled server, attach it to a shared agent, and exfiltrate
other users' downstream tokens on tool invocation.

Add a dedicated MCP_SERVERS.CONFIGURE_OBO permission (ADMIN: true, USER:
false by default) and enforce it at three layers so the safety property
no longer depends on CREATE staying admin-only:

- Create/update: POST/PATCH /api/mcp/servers returns 403 when the body
  carries `obo` and the caller's role lacks the permission.
- Runtime fail-closed: for DB-sourced configs, MCPConnectionFactory and
  MCPManager.callTool re-check the original author's role before each
  OBO exchange. If the author has been downgraded, the exchange is
  skipped (factory) or refused (callTool) — retained configs lose their
  privileges automatically.
- UI: the OBO option is hidden in the MCP server dialog for users
  without the permission; a CONFIGURE_OBO toggle is exposed in the MCP
  admin role editor.

Existing role docs receive the new sub-key via the permission backfill
in updateInterfacePermissions on next startup, preserving any
operator-set values. YAML/Config-sourced server configs are unaffected
since they're admin-controlled at the deployment level.

* 🧊 fix: wire OBO machinery for servers with requiresOAuth: false

The discovery and user-connection paths gated OAuth wiring (flow
manager, token methods, oboTokenResolver, oboTrustChecker) behind
isOAuthServer(), which only considers requiresOAuth/oauth fields.
A DB-stored OBO server with requiresOAuth: false therefore landed in
the non-OAuth branch, never received an oboTokenResolver, and the
factory's usesObo getter evaluated to false — sending a bare request
that the upstream rejected with invalid_token.

Add requiresOAuthMachinery() (OAuth OR OBO) and use it at those two
gates. isOAuthServer remains for the OAuth-handshake-only check
(shouldInitiateOAuthBeforeConnect), where OBO must not initiate a
handshake. Plumb the OBO resolver/trust-checker through
ToolDiscoveryOptions so reinitMCPServer can pass them on the
discovery path.

* 🧊 fix: lock all OBO-target fields (URL, proxy, headers, auth) without CONFIGURE_OBO

The CONFIGURE_OBO permission was meant to gate control of the endpoint
that receives OBO-minted per-user delegated tokens and the scopes that
are requested. The previous frontend lock + backend gate only covered
obo.scopes and the auth section, leaving url/proxy/headers/etc. editable
by anyone with UPDATE — meaning a non-permission user could still
redirect an existing OBO server's token flow to an attacker endpoint.

Switch to an allowlist policy: when editing an OBO server without
CONFIGURE_OBO, only title/description/iconPath are mutable. Backend
rejects any other field change with 403; frontend disables the
non-allowlist sections (URL, transport, auth, trust) via fieldset.
The comparison surface (MCP_USER_INPUT_FIELDS) is derived from
MCPServerUserInputSchema's union members so it stays in sync with the
schema. New schema fields land in the locked set by default — adding to
the allowlist is the only way to unlock them, which preserves the
security-review boundary.

* 🧊 fix: skip unauthenticated MCP inspection for OBO-only servers

MCPServerInspector.inspectServer() ran an unauthenticated temp connection
unless the config had requiresOAuth or customUserVars set. For OBO-only
servers without standard MCP OAuth advertisement, this caused
MCPConnectionFactory.create to attempt the connection without a user or
oboTokenResolver — failing on servers that reject the MCP initialize
handshake without a valid bearer token, which surfaced as
MCP_INSPECTION_FAILED on create/update.

Add `obo` to the skip list alongside requiresOAuth and customUserVars,
matching the existing pattern for user-scoped auth modes.

* Addressed linting error: watchedTitle is declared but never referenced (the auto-fill logic at line 156 uses getValues('title') instead). Deleted constant.
2026-06-01 22:36:18 -04:00

257 lines
8.5 KiB
JavaScript

const { logger } = require('@librechat/data-schemas');
const { getMissingCustomUserVars } = require('@librechat/api');
const { CacheKeys, Constants } = require('librechat-data-provider');
const { getMCPManager, getMCPServersRegistry, getFlowStateManager } = require('~/config');
const { findToken, createToken, updateToken, deleteTokens } = require('~/models');
const { exchangeOboToken } = require('~/server/services/OboTokenService');
const { createOboTrustChecker } = require('~/server/services/OboPolicyService');
const { updateMCPServerTools } = require('~/server/services/Config');
const { getLogStores } = require('~/cache');
/**
* Reinitializes an MCP server connection and discovers available tools.
* When OAuth is required, uses discovery mode to list tools without full authentication
* (per MCP spec, tool listing should be possible without auth).
* @param {Object} params
* @param {IUser} params.user - The user from the request object.
* @param {string} params.serverName - The name of the MCP server
* @param {boolean} params.returnOnOAuth - Whether to initiate OAuth and return, or wait for OAuth flow to finish
* @param {AbortSignal} [params.signal] - The abort signal to handle cancellation.
* @param {boolean} [params.forceNew]
* @param {number} [params.connectionTimeout]
* @param {FlowStateManager<any>} [params.flowManager]
* @param {(authURL: string) => Promise<void>} [params.oauthStart]
* @param {Record<string, Record<string, string>>} [params.userMCPAuthMap]
*/
async function reinitMCPServer({
user,
signal,
forceNew,
serverName,
configServers,
userMCPAuthMap,
connectionTimeout,
returnOnOAuth = true,
oauthStart: _oauthStart,
flowManager: _flowManager,
serverConfig: providedConfig,
}) {
/** @type {MCPConnection | null} */
let connection = null;
/** @type {LCAvailableTools | null} */
let availableTools = null;
/** @type {ReturnType<MCPConnection['fetchTools']> | null} */
let tools = null;
let oauthRequired = false;
let oauthUrl = null;
try {
const registry = getMCPServersRegistry();
const serverConfig =
providedConfig ?? (await registry.getServerConfig(serverName, user?.id, configServers));
if (serverConfig?.inspectionFailed) {
if (serverConfig.source === 'config') {
logger.info(
`[MCP Reinitialize] Config-source server ${serverName} has inspectionFailed — retry handled by config cache`,
);
return {
availableTools: null,
success: false,
message: `MCP server '${serverName}' is still unreachable`,
oauthRequired: false,
serverName,
oauthUrl: null,
tools: null,
};
}
logger.info(
`[MCP Reinitialize] Server ${serverName} had failed inspection, attempting reinspection`,
);
try {
const storageLocation = serverConfig.source === 'user' ? 'DB' : 'CACHE';
await registry.reinspectServer(serverName, storageLocation, user?.id);
logger.info(`[MCP Reinitialize] Reinspection succeeded for server: ${serverName}`);
} catch (reinspectError) {
logger.error(
`[MCP Reinitialize] Reinspection failed for server ${serverName}:`,
reinspectError,
);
return {
availableTools: null,
success: false,
message: `MCP server '${serverName}' is still unreachable`,
oauthRequired: false,
serverName,
oauthUrl: null,
tools: null,
};
}
}
const customUserVars = userMCPAuthMap?.[`${Constants.mcp_prefix}${serverName}`];
const missingUserVars = getMissingCustomUserVars(serverConfig ?? {}, customUserVars);
if (missingUserVars.length > 0) {
logger.warn(
`[MCP Reinitialize] Skipping server '${serverName}': required user-provided variable(s) not set: ${missingUserVars.join(
', ',
)}. Tools will not be exposed until the user configures them.`,
);
return {
availableTools: null,
success: false,
message: `MCP server '${serverName}' requires user-provided variable(s) [${missingUserVars.join(
', ',
)}] which are not set`,
oauthRequired: false,
serverName,
oauthUrl: null,
tools: null,
};
}
const flowManager = _flowManager ?? getFlowStateManager(getLogStores(CacheKeys.FLOWS));
const mcpManager = getMCPManager();
const tokenMethods = { findToken, updateToken, createToken, deleteTokens };
const oauthStart =
_oauthStart ??
(async (authURL) => {
logger.info(`[MCP Reinitialize] OAuth URL received for ${serverName}`);
oauthUrl = authURL;
oauthRequired = true;
});
try {
connection = await mcpManager.getConnection({
user,
signal,
forceNew,
oauthStart,
serverName,
flowManager,
tokenMethods,
returnOnOAuth,
customUserVars,
connectionTimeout,
serverConfig,
oboTokenResolver: exchangeOboToken,
oboTrustChecker: createOboTrustChecker(),
});
logger.info(`[MCP Reinitialize] Successfully established connection for ${serverName}`);
} catch (err) {
logger.info(`[MCP Reinitialize] getConnection threw error: ${err.message}`);
logger.info(
`[MCP Reinitialize] OAuth state - oauthRequired: ${oauthRequired}, oauthUrl: ${oauthUrl ? 'present' : 'null'}`,
);
const isOAuthError =
err.message?.includes('OAuth') ||
err.message?.includes('authentication') ||
err.message?.includes('401');
const isOAuthFlowInitiated = err.message === 'OAuth flow initiated - return early';
if (isOAuthError || oauthRequired || isOAuthFlowInitiated) {
logger.info(
`[MCP Reinitialize] OAuth required for ${serverName}, attempting tool discovery without auth`,
);
oauthRequired = true;
try {
const discoveryResult = await mcpManager.discoverServerTools({
user,
signal,
serverName,
flowManager,
tokenMethods,
oauthStart,
customUserVars,
connectionTimeout,
configServers,
oboTokenResolver: exchangeOboToken,
oboTrustChecker: createOboTrustChecker(),
});
if (discoveryResult.tools && discoveryResult.tools.length > 0) {
tools = discoveryResult.tools;
logger.info(
`[MCP Reinitialize] Discovered ${tools.length} tools for ${serverName} without full auth`,
);
}
} catch (discoveryErr) {
logger.debug(
`[MCP Reinitialize] Tool discovery failed for ${serverName}: ${discoveryErr?.message ?? String(discoveryErr)}`,
);
}
} else {
logger.error(
`[MCP Reinitialize] Error initializing MCP server ${serverName} for user:`,
err,
);
}
}
if (connection && !oauthRequired) {
tools = await connection.fetchTools();
}
if (tools && tools.length > 0) {
availableTools = await updateMCPServerTools({
userId: user.id,
serverName,
tools,
});
}
logger.debug(
`[MCP Reinitialize] Sending response for ${serverName} - oauthRequired: ${oauthRequired}, oauthUrl: ${oauthUrl ? 'present' : 'null'}`,
);
const getResponseMessage = () => {
if (oauthRequired && tools && tools.length > 0) {
return `MCP server '${serverName}' tools discovered, OAuth required for execution`;
}
if (oauthRequired) {
return `MCP server '${serverName}' ready for OAuth authentication`;
}
if (connection) {
return `MCP server '${serverName}' reinitialized successfully`;
}
return `Failed to reinitialize MCP server '${serverName}'`;
};
const result = {
availableTools,
success: Boolean(
(connection && !oauthRequired) ||
(oauthRequired && oauthUrl) ||
(tools && tools.length > 0),
),
message: getResponseMessage(),
oauthRequired,
serverName,
oauthUrl,
tools,
};
logger.debug(`[MCP Reinitialize] Response for ${serverName}:`, {
success: result.success,
oauthRequired: result.oauthRequired,
oauthUrl: result.oauthUrl ? 'present' : null,
toolsCount: tools?.length ?? 0,
});
return result;
} catch (error) {
logger.error(
'[MCP Reinitialize] Error loading MCP Tools, servers may still be initializing:',
error,
);
}
}
module.exports = {
reinitMCPServer,
};