mirror of
https://github.com/danny-avila/LibreChat.git
synced 2026-09-07 15:09:41 +00:00
* 🕰️ fix: Guard `expires_in` So a Token Response Cannot Outlive Its Credential RFC 6749 §5.1 makes `expires_in` only RECOMMENDED, so a token response may legally omit it. Four sites derived a lifetime from the raw field, where `undefined * 1000` is `NaN`. `NaN` is not a short TTL, it is no TTL. `@keyv/redis` writes the key without `PX` because `NaN` is falsy, so the entry is stored in Redis with no expiration at all; the in-memory backend embeds `expires: NaN` and every check compares with `>`, always false against `NaN`. The namespace default does not stand in either, since Keyv applies it with `??=` and `NaN` is neither `null` nor `undefined`. The exchanged access token was therefore cached permanently at `openidStrategy.js` and `GraphApiService.js`, and once it genuinely expired the poisoned entry kept being served with no path to eviction. The same omission is sharper in `ActionService.js`, where `new Date(NaN).toISOString()` throws `RangeError: Invalid time value`. Both call sites are inside a `try`, so the failure surfaces as a generic "Failed to authenticate OAuth tool" that names nothing, and the refresh site falls through to `requestLogin()` on every attempt, looping with no exit. The rule had six hand-written homes and three of them were wrong, so it now has one. A new `packages/api/src/oauth/expiry.ts` normalizes `expires_in` to a positive finite number of seconds or nothing, and exposes the two shapes callers actually need: a cache TTL that falls back rather than returning `NaN`, and an absolute expiry that is absent rather than Invalid. The four unguarded sites adopt it, and the two ad-hoc guards in `openidStrategy.js` and `OboTokenService.js` are consolidated onto it. `createHandleOAuthToken` is folded in as well. Its guard already handled `null` and unparseable strings but admitted `NaN`, since `typeof NaN === 'number'` satisfied its first branch. The `mcp/oauth` sites are deliberately left alone: `tokens.ts` guards on truthiness and carries richer logic that reads a JWT access token's own expiry when the response omits one, and the file is being reworked in #13901. Closes #15318 Closes #15319 * 🕰️ fix: Address `expires_in` Guard Review Round 1 Preserve an explicitly elapsed lifetime instead of collapsing it into "unknown". `expires_in: 0` is the provider stating the credential is already dead, which is information; treating it as absent handed it the one-hour fallback in `createHandleOAuthToken` and dropped the expiry entirely in `ActionService`, so a credential declared expired could be used and retained for up to an hour. Both sites preserved that value before this branch, so the collapse was a regression introduced here. `normalizeExpiresIn` now returns any finite number, positive or not, and reports `undefined` only for a lifetime that is genuinely unusable. `getTokenExpiresAt` therefore yields a past timestamp for an elapsed lifetime, so callers refresh rather than guess. Cache TTLs cannot pass such a value through raw: Keyv reads a TTL of exactly `0` as "no expiry", turning a dead credential into the immortal entry this module exists to prevent. `getTokenCacheTtlMs` floors an elapsed lifetime at one millisecond, which expires immediately without ever writing an entry that outlives its credential. Parse numeric strings with `Number` rather than `parseInt`, which truncates a complete value such as `"3.6e3"` to `3` and would expire an hour-long credential after three seconds, re-exchanging against the identity provider on every request. An empty or blank string is rejected rather than read as zero, since `Number('')` is `0`. * 🕰️ fix: Bound `expires_in` to Lifetimes a Date Can Represent Parsing the complete numeric string last round made an overflow reachable that `parseInt` had been masking. `parseInt('1e13', 10)` was `1`; `Number('1e13')` is `1e13`, and `1e13` seconds is 1e16 ms, past the ECMAScript time value range of ±8.64e15. Every derived timestamp was therefore an Invalid Date whose `toISOString()` throws `RangeError: Invalid time value` — the exact failure this branch exists to remove, reintroduced by its own fix. The token model derives the same way at `packages/data-schemas/src/methods/token.ts:19`, so storage and authentication would fail with it. A lifetime is now reported as unusable unless it can still produce a valid `Date`. The bound is the time value range halved, leaving room for the `Date.now()` every derived timestamp adds. At roughly 137,000 years it rejects nothing a provider could mean: a one-year refresh token and even a hundred-year lifetime still pass through untouched, while `1e13`, `Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER` and `1e300` take the caller's fallback instead of poisoning a timestamp. The invariant tests now carry the overflow shapes rather than a fixed list of small ones, since a guard that only sees the inputs its author imagined is how the previous round's regression got in.
519 lines
19 KiB
JavaScript
519 lines
19 KiB
JavaScript
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
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const { nanoid } = require('nanoid');
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const { GraphEvents, sleep } = require('@librechat/agents');
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const { tool } = require('@librechat/agents/langchain/tools');
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const { logger, encryptV2, decryptV2 } = require('@librechat/data-schemas');
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const {
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sendEvent,
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logAxiosError,
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getTokenExpiresAt,
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refreshAccessToken,
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GenerationJobManager,
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createSSRFSafeAgents,
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validateActionOAuthMetadata,
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} = require('@librechat/api');
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const {
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Time,
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CacheKeys,
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StepTypes,
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Constants,
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AuthTypeEnum,
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actionDelimiter,
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isImageVisionTool,
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actionDomainSeparator,
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} = require('librechat-data-provider');
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const {
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findToken,
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updateToken,
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createToken,
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getActions,
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deleteActions,
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deleteAssistant,
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} = require('~/models');
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const { getActionFlowStateManager } = require('~/config');
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const { getLogStores } = require('~/cache');
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const JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET;
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const toolNameRegex = /^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$/;
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const protocolRegex = /^https?:\/\//;
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const replaceSeparatorRegex = new RegExp(actionDomainSeparator, 'g');
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/**
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* Validates tool name against regex pattern and updates if necessary.
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* @param {object} params - The parameters for the function.
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* @param {object} params.req - Express Request.
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* @param {FunctionTool} params.tool - The tool object.
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* @param {string} params.assistant_id - The assistant ID
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* @returns {object|null} - Updated tool object or null if invalid and not an action.
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*/
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const validateAndUpdateTool = async ({ req, tool, assistant_id }) => {
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let actions;
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if (isImageVisionTool(tool)) {
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return null;
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}
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if (!toolNameRegex.test(tool.function.name)) {
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const [functionName, domain] = tool.function.name.split(actionDelimiter);
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actions = await getActions({ assistant_id, user: req.user.id }, true);
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const matchingActions = actions.filter((action) => {
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const metadata = action.metadata;
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if (!metadata) {
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return false;
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}
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const strippedMetaDomain = stripProtocol(metadata.domain);
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return strippedMetaDomain === domain || metadata.domain === domain;
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});
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const action = matchingActions[0];
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if (!action) {
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return null;
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}
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const parsedDomain = await domainParser(domain, true);
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if (!parsedDomain) {
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return null;
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}
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tool.function.name = `${functionName}${actionDelimiter}${parsedDomain}`;
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}
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return tool;
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};
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/** @param {string} domain */
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function stripProtocol(domain) {
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const stripped = domain.replace(protocolRegex, '');
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const pathIdx = stripped.indexOf('/');
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return pathIdx === -1 ? stripped : stripped.substring(0, pathIdx);
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}
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/**
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* Encodes a domain using the legacy scheme (full URL including protocol).
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* Used for backward-compatible matching against agents saved before the collision fix.
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* @param {string} domain
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* @returns {string}
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*/
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function legacyDomainEncode(domain) {
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if (!domain) {
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return '';
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}
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if (domain.length <= Constants.ENCODED_DOMAIN_LENGTH) {
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return domain.replace(/\./g, actionDomainSeparator);
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}
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const modifiedDomain = Buffer.from(domain).toString('base64');
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return modifiedDomain.substring(0, Constants.ENCODED_DOMAIN_LENGTH);
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}
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/**
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* Encodes or decodes a domain name to/from base64, or replacing periods with a custom separator.
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*
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* Necessary due to `[a-zA-Z0-9_-]*` Regex Validation, limited to a 64-character maximum.
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* Strips protocol prefix before encoding to prevent base64 collisions
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* (all `https://` URLs share the same 10-char base64 prefix).
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*
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* @param {string} domain - The domain name to encode/decode.
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* @param {boolean} inverse - False to decode from base64, true to encode to base64.
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* @returns {Promise<string>} Encoded or decoded domain string.
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*/
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async function domainParser(domain, inverse = false) {
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if (!domain) {
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return;
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}
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const domainsCache = getLogStores(CacheKeys.ENCODED_DOMAINS);
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if (inverse) {
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const hostname = stripProtocol(domain);
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const cachedDomain = await domainsCache.get(hostname);
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if (cachedDomain) {
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return hostname;
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}
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if (hostname.length <= Constants.ENCODED_DOMAIN_LENGTH) {
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return hostname.replace(/\./g, actionDomainSeparator);
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}
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const modifiedDomain = Buffer.from(hostname).toString('base64');
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const key = modifiedDomain.substring(0, Constants.ENCODED_DOMAIN_LENGTH);
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await domainsCache.set(key, modifiedDomain);
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return key;
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}
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const cachedDomain = await domainsCache.get(domain);
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if (!cachedDomain) {
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return domain.replace(replaceSeparatorRegex, '.');
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}
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try {
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return Buffer.from(cachedDomain, 'base64').toString('utf-8');
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} catch (error) {
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logger.error(`Failed to parse domain (possibly not base64): ${domain}`, error);
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return domain;
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}
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}
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/**
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* Loads action sets based on the user and assistant ID.
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*
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* @param {Object} searchParams - The parameters for loading action sets.
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* @param {string} searchParams.user - The user identifier.
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* @param {string} [searchParams.agent_id]- The agent identifier.
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* @param {string} [searchParams.assistant_id]- The assistant identifier.
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* @returns {Promise<Action[] | null>} A promise that resolves to an array of actions or `null` if no match.
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*/
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async function loadActionSets(searchParams) {
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return await getActions(searchParams, true);
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}
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/**
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* Creates a general tool for an entire action set.
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*
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* @param {Object} params - The parameters for loading action sets.
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* @param {string} params.userId
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* @param {ServerResponse} params.res
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* @param {Action} params.action - The action set. Necessary for decrypting authentication values.
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* @param {ActionRequest} params.requestBuilder - The ActionRequest builder class to execute the API call.
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* @param {string | undefined} [params.name] - The name of the tool.
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* @param {string | undefined} [params.description] - The description for the tool.
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* @param {import('zod').ZodTypeAny | undefined} [params.zodSchema] - The Zod schema for tool input validation/definition
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* @param {{ oauth_client_id?: string; oauth_client_secret?: string; }} params.encrypted - The encrypted values for the action.
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* @param {string | null} [params.streamId] - The stream ID for resumable streams.
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* @param {number} [params.jobCreatedAt] - The generation epoch that owns emitted events.
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* @param {boolean} [params.useSSRFProtection] - When true, uses SSRF-safe HTTP agents that validate resolved IPs at connect time.
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* @param {string[] | null} [params.allowedAddresses] - Optional admin exemption list of host:port pairs that bypass the SSRF private-IP block.
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* @returns { Promise<typeof tool | { _call: (toolInput: Object | string) => unknown}> } An object with `_call` method to execute the tool input.
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*/
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async function createActionTool({
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userId,
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res,
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action,
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requestBuilder,
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zodSchema,
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name,
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description,
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encrypted,
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streamId = null,
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jobCreatedAt,
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useSSRFProtection = false,
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allowedAddresses,
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}) {
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const ssrfAgents = useSSRFProtection ? createSSRFSafeAgents(allowedAddresses) : undefined;
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/** @type {(toolInput: Object | string, config: GraphRunnableConfig) => Promise<unknown>} */
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const _call = async (toolInput, config) => {
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try {
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/** @type {import('librechat-data-provider').ActionMetadataRuntime} */
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const metadata = action.metadata;
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const executor = requestBuilder.createExecutor();
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const preparedExecutor = executor.setParams(toolInput ?? {});
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if (metadata.auth && metadata.auth.type !== AuthTypeEnum.None) {
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try {
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if (metadata.auth.type === AuthTypeEnum.OAuth && metadata.auth.authorization_url) {
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await validateActionOAuthMetadata(metadata.auth, allowedAddresses);
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const action_id = action.action_id;
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const identifier = `${userId}:${action.action_id}`;
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const requestLogin = async () => {
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const { args: _args, stepId, ...toolCall } = config.toolCall ?? {};
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if (!stepId) {
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throw new Error('Tool call is missing stepId');
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}
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const statePayload = {
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nonce: nanoid(),
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user: userId,
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action_id,
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};
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const stateToken = jwt.sign(statePayload, JWT_SECRET, { expiresIn: '10m' });
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try {
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const redirectUri = `${process.env.DOMAIN_CLIENT}/api/actions/${action_id}/oauth/callback`;
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const params = new URLSearchParams({
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client_id: metadata.oauth_client_id,
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scope: metadata.auth.scope,
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redirect_uri: redirectUri,
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access_type: 'offline',
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response_type: 'code',
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state: stateToken,
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});
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const authURL = `${metadata.auth.authorization_url}?${params.toString()}`;
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/** @type {{ id: string; delta: AgentToolCallDelta }} */
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const data = {
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id: stepId,
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delta: {
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type: StepTypes.TOOL_CALLS,
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tool_calls: [{ ...toolCall, args: '' }],
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auth: authURL,
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expires_at: Date.now() + Time.TWO_MINUTES,
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},
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};
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const flowsCache = getLogStores(CacheKeys.FLOWS);
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const flowManager = getActionFlowStateManager(flowsCache);
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await flowManager.createFlowWithHandler(
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`${identifier}:oauth_login:${config.metadata.thread_id}:${config.metadata.run_id}`,
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'oauth_login',
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async () => {
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const eventData = { event: GraphEvents.ON_RUN_STEP_DELTA, data };
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if (streamId) {
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await GenerationJobManager.emitChunk(streamId, eventData, {
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expectedCreatedAt: jobCreatedAt,
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});
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} else {
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sendEvent(res, eventData);
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}
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logger.debug('Sent OAuth login request to client', { action_id, identifier });
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return true;
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},
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config?.signal,
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);
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logger.debug('Waiting for OAuth Authorization response', { action_id, identifier });
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const result = await flowManager.createFlow(
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identifier,
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'oauth',
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{
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state: stateToken,
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userId: userId,
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client_url: metadata.auth.client_url,
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redirect_uri: `${process.env.DOMAIN_SERVER}/api/actions/${action_id}/oauth/callback`,
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token_exchange_method: metadata.auth.token_exchange_method,
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allowedAddresses,
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/** Encrypted values */
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encrypted_oauth_client_id: encrypted.oauth_client_id,
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encrypted_oauth_client_secret: encrypted.oauth_client_secret,
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},
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config?.signal,
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);
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logger.debug('Received OAuth Authorization response', { action_id, identifier });
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data.delta.auth = undefined;
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data.delta.expires_at = undefined;
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const successEventData = { event: GraphEvents.ON_RUN_STEP_DELTA, data };
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if (streamId) {
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await GenerationJobManager.emitChunk(streamId, successEventData, {
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expectedCreatedAt: jobCreatedAt,
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});
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} else {
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sendEvent(res, successEventData);
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}
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await sleep(3000);
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metadata.oauth_access_token = result.access_token;
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metadata.oauth_refresh_token = result.refresh_token;
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const expiresAt = getTokenExpiresAt(result.expires_in);
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metadata.oauth_token_expires_at = expiresAt?.toISOString();
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} catch (error) {
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const errorMessage = 'Failed to authenticate OAuth tool';
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logger.error(errorMessage, error);
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throw new Error(errorMessage);
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}
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};
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const tokenPromises = [];
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tokenPromises.push(findToken({ userId, type: 'oauth', identifier }));
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tokenPromises.push(
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findToken({
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userId,
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type: 'oauth_refresh',
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identifier: `${identifier}:refresh`,
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}),
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);
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const [tokenData, refreshTokenData] = await Promise.all(tokenPromises);
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if (tokenData) {
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// Valid token exists, add it to metadata for setAuth
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metadata.oauth_access_token = await decryptV2(tokenData.token);
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if (refreshTokenData) {
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metadata.oauth_refresh_token = await decryptV2(refreshTokenData.token);
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}
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metadata.oauth_token_expires_at = tokenData.expiresAt.toISOString();
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} else if (!refreshTokenData) {
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// No tokens exist, need to authenticate
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await requestLogin();
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} else if (refreshTokenData) {
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// Refresh token is still valid, use it to get new access token
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try {
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const refresh_token = await decryptV2(refreshTokenData.token);
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const refreshTokens = async () =>
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await refreshAccessToken(
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{
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userId,
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identifier,
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refresh_token,
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client_url: metadata.auth.client_url,
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encrypted_oauth_client_id: encrypted.oauth_client_id,
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token_exchange_method: metadata.auth.token_exchange_method,
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encrypted_oauth_client_secret: encrypted.oauth_client_secret,
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allowedAddresses,
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},
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{
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findToken,
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updateToken,
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createToken,
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},
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);
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const flowsCache = getLogStores(CacheKeys.FLOWS);
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const flowManager = getActionFlowStateManager(flowsCache);
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const refreshData = await flowManager.createFlowWithHandler(
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`${identifier}:refresh`,
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'oauth_refresh',
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refreshTokens,
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config?.signal,
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);
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metadata.oauth_access_token = refreshData.access_token;
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if (refreshData.refresh_token) {
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metadata.oauth_refresh_token = refreshData.refresh_token;
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}
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const expiresAt = getTokenExpiresAt(refreshData.expires_in);
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metadata.oauth_token_expires_at = expiresAt?.toISOString();
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} catch (error) {
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logger.error('Failed to refresh token, requesting new login:', error);
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await requestLogin();
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}
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} else {
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await requestLogin();
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}
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}
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await preparedExecutor.setAuth(metadata);
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} catch (error) {
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if (
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error.message.includes('No access token found') ||
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error.message.includes('Access token is expired')
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) {
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throw error;
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}
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throw new Error(`Authentication failed: ${error.message}`);
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}
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}
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const response = await preparedExecutor.execute(ssrfAgents);
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if (typeof response.data === 'object') {
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return JSON.stringify(response.data);
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}
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return response.data;
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} catch (error) {
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const message = `API call to ${action.metadata.domain} failed:`;
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return logAxiosError({ message, error });
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}
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};
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if (name) {
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return tool(_call, {
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name: name.replace(replaceSeparatorRegex, '_'),
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description: description || '',
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schema: zodSchema,
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});
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}
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return {
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_call,
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};
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}
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/**
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* Encrypts a sensitive value.
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* @param {string} value
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* @returns {Promise<string>}
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*/
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async function encryptSensitiveValue(value) {
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// Encode API key to handle special characters like ":"
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const encodedValue = encodeURIComponent(value);
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return await encryptV2(encodedValue);
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}
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/**
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* Decrypts a sensitive value.
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* @param {string} value
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* @returns {Promise<string>}
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|
*/
|
|
async function decryptSensitiveValue(value) {
|
|
const decryptedValue = await decryptV2(value);
|
|
return decodeURIComponent(decryptedValue);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Encrypts sensitive metadata values for an action.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param {ActionMetadata} metadata - The action metadata to encrypt.
|
|
* @returns {Promise<ActionMetadata>} The updated action metadata with encrypted values.
|
|
*/
|
|
async function encryptMetadata(metadata) {
|
|
const encryptedMetadata = { ...metadata };
|
|
|
|
// ServiceHttp
|
|
if (metadata.auth && metadata.auth.type === AuthTypeEnum.ServiceHttp) {
|
|
if (metadata.api_key) {
|
|
encryptedMetadata.api_key = await encryptSensitiveValue(metadata.api_key);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// OAuth
|
|
else if (metadata.auth && metadata.auth.type === AuthTypeEnum.OAuth) {
|
|
if (metadata.oauth_client_id) {
|
|
encryptedMetadata.oauth_client_id = await encryptSensitiveValue(metadata.oauth_client_id);
|
|
}
|
|
if (metadata.oauth_client_secret) {
|
|
encryptedMetadata.oauth_client_secret = await encryptSensitiveValue(
|
|
metadata.oauth_client_secret,
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return encryptedMetadata;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Decrypts sensitive metadata values for an action.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param {ActionMetadata} metadata - The action metadata to decrypt.
|
|
* @returns {Promise<ActionMetadata>} The updated action metadata with decrypted values.
|
|
*/
|
|
async function decryptMetadata(metadata) {
|
|
const decryptedMetadata = { ...metadata };
|
|
|
|
// ServiceHttp
|
|
if (metadata.auth && metadata.auth.type === AuthTypeEnum.ServiceHttp) {
|
|
if (metadata.api_key) {
|
|
decryptedMetadata.api_key = await decryptSensitiveValue(metadata.api_key);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// OAuth
|
|
else if (metadata.auth && metadata.auth.type === AuthTypeEnum.OAuth) {
|
|
if (metadata.oauth_client_id) {
|
|
decryptedMetadata.oauth_client_id = await decryptSensitiveValue(metadata.oauth_client_id);
|
|
}
|
|
if (metadata.oauth_client_secret) {
|
|
decryptedMetadata.oauth_client_secret = await decryptSensitiveValue(
|
|
metadata.oauth_client_secret,
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return decryptedMetadata;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Deletes an action and its corresponding assistant.
|
|
* @param {Object} params - The parameters for the function.
|
|
* @param {OpenAIClient} params.req - The Express Request object.
|
|
* @param {string} params.assistant_id - The ID of the assistant.
|
|
*/
|
|
const deleteAssistantActions = async ({ req, assistant_id }) => {
|
|
try {
|
|
await deleteActions({ assistant_id, user: req.user.id });
|
|
await deleteAssistant({ assistant_id, user: req.user.id });
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
const message = 'Trouble deleting Assistant Actions for Assistant ID: ' + assistant_id;
|
|
logger.error(message, error);
|
|
throw new Error(message);
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
module.exports = {
|
|
deleteAssistantActions,
|
|
validateAndUpdateTool,
|
|
legacyDomainEncode,
|
|
createActionTool,
|
|
encryptMetadata,
|
|
decryptMetadata,
|
|
loadActionSets,
|
|
domainParser,
|
|
};
|