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* Add OBO (On-Behalf-Of) token exchange support for MCP server connections Enables transparent authentication to Entra ID-backed MCP servers using the logged-in user's federated token via the OAuth 2.0 jwt-bearer grant. Configured via obo.scopes in librechat.yaml server config. - Extract generic OboTokenService from GraphTokenService (jwt-bearer grant + cache) - Refactor GraphTokenService to thin wrapper delegating to OboTokenService - Add obo schema field to BaseOptionsSchema in data-provider - Add resolveOboToken in packages/api/src/mcp/oauth/obo.ts (validates federated token, calls resolver, returns MCPOAuthTokens) - Wire oboTokenResolver through MCPConnectionFactory, MCPManager, UserConnectionManager - OBO tokens injected via request headers (not OAuth transport), refreshed on each tool call - Explicit error on OBO failure (no fallthrough to standard OAuth redirect) - Add unit tests for both resolveOboToken (9 tests) and exchangeOboToken (14 tests) * Add OBO authentication option to MCP server UI configuration Enable users to configure On-Behalf-Of (OBO) token exchange for MCP servers created via the UI (MongoDB-stored), in addition to the existing YAML-based configuration. - Add "On-Behalf-Of (OBO)" radio option to MCP server auth section with scopes input field - Remove obo from omitServerManagedFields so the field passes UI schema validation - Add OBO to AuthTypeEnum, obo_scopes to AuthConfig, and OBO handling in form defaults and submission - Add .min(1) validation on obo.scopes to reject empty strings - Add English localization keys: com_ui_obo, com_ui_obo_scopes, com_ui_obo_scopes_description - Add 5 schema validation tests for OBO field acceptance, transport compatibility, and edge cases * 🧊 fix: Add obo to safe properties in redactServerSecrets. Fixes the OBO configuration not showing up in the MCP UI after app restart * Address linter errors * 🧊 fix: fail closed on OBO refresh errors and retry transient token exchange failures - stop tool calls from falling back to stale Authorization headers when per-call OBO refresh fails - add one-time retry for transient Entra OBO exchange failures (network/429/5xx) - preserve structured OBO failure reasons and retryability in resolveOboToken - improve OBO auth error messaging for connection setup and tool execution - add tests for transient vs permanent OBO failure paths * Addressing linting errors / warnings * 🧊 fix: isolate OBO MCP auth to user-scoped connections - block OBO-enabled servers from app-level shared MCP connections - bypass shared connection lookup for OBO servers in MCPManager.getConnection - add regressions covering OBO connection scoping and preserve non-OBO app connection reuse * 🛠️ refactor: centralize MCP user-scoped connection policy - add shared requiresUserScopedConnection helper for OAuth, OBO, and customUserVars - use the shared predicate in MCPManager and ConnectionsRepository - add utils coverage for user-scoped connection policy * 🧊 fix: restrict MCP OBO config to header-capable transports - Move OBO configuration out of the shared MCP base options schema and allow it only on SSE and streamable-http transports, where request headers are applied. - Explicitly reject OBO on stdio and websocket configs to avoid accepted-but- nonfunctional server definitions. Add schema coverage for admin/config parsing and user-input websocket validation. * 🧊 fix: single-flight concurrent OBO token exchanges Concurrent tool calls that arrive on a cache miss were each issuing their own jwt-bearer request to the IdP. Under that fan-out, Entra intermittently returned errors that the retry classifier saw as non-retryable, surfacing as: "The identity provider rejected the OBO token exchange. Cannot execute tool <name>. Re-authenticate the user or verify the configured OBO scopes and retry." A user retry then hit the populated cache and succeeded, which matches the observed flakiness — the cache was empty at the moment of fan-out but populated by the time the user clicked retry. - Coalesce concurrent exchanges in `OboTokenService.exchangeOboToken` keyed by `${openidId}:${scopes}`. Callers that arrive while an exchange is in flight share the same upstream request and receive the same result. `fromCache=false` continues to force a fresh, independent exchange (and is not joined by `fromCache=true` callers). The IdP call, single-retry path, and cache write are unchanged — they were moved into a `performOboExchange` helper so the coalescing wrapper stays small. - Tests cover: coalescing on the same key, isolation between different keys, cleanup on success, cleanup on failure, and the `fromCache=false` bypass. * 🔒 feat: gate MCP OBO config behind MCP_SERVERS.CONFIGURE_OBO permission OBO silently mints per-user delegated tokens from the caller's federated access token and forwards them to whatever URL the server config points at. Previously, anyone with MCP_SERVERS.CREATE could configure obo.scopes — so if server creation is ever delegated beyond admins, a user could stand up an attacker-controlled server, attach it to a shared agent, and exfiltrate other users' downstream tokens on tool invocation. Add a dedicated MCP_SERVERS.CONFIGURE_OBO permission (ADMIN: true, USER: false by default) and enforce it at three layers so the safety property no longer depends on CREATE staying admin-only: - Create/update: POST/PATCH /api/mcp/servers returns 403 when the body carries `obo` and the caller's role lacks the permission. - Runtime fail-closed: for DB-sourced configs, MCPConnectionFactory and MCPManager.callTool re-check the original author's role before each OBO exchange. If the author has been downgraded, the exchange is skipped (factory) or refused (callTool) — retained configs lose their privileges automatically. - UI: the OBO option is hidden in the MCP server dialog for users without the permission; a CONFIGURE_OBO toggle is exposed in the MCP admin role editor. Existing role docs receive the new sub-key via the permission backfill in updateInterfacePermissions on next startup, preserving any operator-set values. YAML/Config-sourced server configs are unaffected since they're admin-controlled at the deployment level. * 🧊 fix: wire OBO machinery for servers with requiresOAuth: false The discovery and user-connection paths gated OAuth wiring (flow manager, token methods, oboTokenResolver, oboTrustChecker) behind isOAuthServer(), which only considers requiresOAuth/oauth fields. A DB-stored OBO server with requiresOAuth: false therefore landed in the non-OAuth branch, never received an oboTokenResolver, and the factory's usesObo getter evaluated to false — sending a bare request that the upstream rejected with invalid_token. Add requiresOAuthMachinery() (OAuth OR OBO) and use it at those two gates. isOAuthServer remains for the OAuth-handshake-only check (shouldInitiateOAuthBeforeConnect), where OBO must not initiate a handshake. Plumb the OBO resolver/trust-checker through ToolDiscoveryOptions so reinitMCPServer can pass them on the discovery path. * 🧊 fix: lock all OBO-target fields (URL, proxy, headers, auth) without CONFIGURE_OBO The CONFIGURE_OBO permission was meant to gate control of the endpoint that receives OBO-minted per-user delegated tokens and the scopes that are requested. The previous frontend lock + backend gate only covered obo.scopes and the auth section, leaving url/proxy/headers/etc. editable by anyone with UPDATE — meaning a non-permission user could still redirect an existing OBO server's token flow to an attacker endpoint. Switch to an allowlist policy: when editing an OBO server without CONFIGURE_OBO, only title/description/iconPath are mutable. Backend rejects any other field change with 403; frontend disables the non-allowlist sections (URL, transport, auth, trust) via fieldset. The comparison surface (MCP_USER_INPUT_FIELDS) is derived from MCPServerUserInputSchema's union members so it stays in sync with the schema. New schema fields land in the locked set by default — adding to the allowlist is the only way to unlock them, which preserves the security-review boundary. * 🧊 fix: skip unauthenticated MCP inspection for OBO-only servers MCPServerInspector.inspectServer() ran an unauthenticated temp connection unless the config had requiresOAuth or customUserVars set. For OBO-only servers without standard MCP OAuth advertisement, this caused MCPConnectionFactory.create to attempt the connection without a user or oboTokenResolver — failing on servers that reject the MCP initialize handshake without a valid bearer token, which surfaced as MCP_INSPECTION_FAILED on create/update. Add `obo` to the skip list alongside requiresOAuth and customUserVars, matching the existing pattern for user-scoped auth modes. * Addressed linting error: watchedTitle is declared but never referenced (the auto-fill logic at line 156 uses getValues('title') instead). Deleted constant.
342 lines
12 KiB
JavaScript
342 lines
12 KiB
JavaScript
jest.mock('~/strategies/openidStrategy');
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jest.mock('~/cache/getLogStores');
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jest.mock('@librechat/data-schemas', () => ({
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...jest.requireActual('@librechat/data-schemas'),
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logger: {
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error: jest.fn(),
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debug: jest.fn(),
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warn: jest.fn(),
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},
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}));
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const client = require('openid-client');
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const { getOpenIdConfig } = require('~/strategies/openidStrategy');
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const getLogStores = require('~/cache/getLogStores');
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const { exchangeOboToken } = require('./OboTokenService');
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describe('OboTokenService', () => {
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let mockTokensCache;
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let mockOpenIdConfig;
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const mockUser = {
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openidId: 'oidc-sub-123',
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email: 'test@example.com',
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name: 'Test User',
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};
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beforeEach(() => {
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jest.clearAllMocks();
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mockTokensCache = {
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get: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(null),
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set: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
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};
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getLogStores.mockReturnValue(mockTokensCache);
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mockOpenIdConfig = {
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client_id: 'test-client-id',
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issuer: 'https://login.microsoftonline.com/tenant-id/v2.0',
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};
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getOpenIdConfig.mockReturnValue(mockOpenIdConfig);
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client.genericGrantRequest.mockResolvedValue({
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access_token: 'exchanged-obo-token',
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expires_in: 3600,
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});
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});
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describe('input validation', () => {
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it('should throw when user has no openidId', async () => {
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await expect(
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exchangeOboToken({ email: 'test@example.com' }, 'access-token', 'api://scope'),
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).rejects.toThrow('User must be authenticated via OpenID to perform OBO token exchange');
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});
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it('should throw when accessToken is missing', async () => {
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await expect(exchangeOboToken(mockUser, '', 'api://scope')).rejects.toThrow(
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'Access token is required for OBO exchange',
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);
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});
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it('should throw when scopes are missing', async () => {
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await expect(exchangeOboToken(mockUser, 'access-token', '')).rejects.toThrow(
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'Scopes are required for OBO exchange',
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);
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});
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it('should throw when OpenID config is not available', async () => {
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getOpenIdConfig.mockReturnValue(null);
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await expect(exchangeOboToken(mockUser, 'access-token', 'api://scope')).rejects.toThrow(
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'OpenID configuration not available',
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);
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});
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});
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describe('cache behavior', () => {
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it('should return cached token when fromCache is true and cache hit', async () => {
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const cachedToken = {
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access_token: 'cached-obo-token',
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token_type: 'Bearer',
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expires_in: 1800,
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scope: 'api://mcp-server/Scope.Read',
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};
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mockTokensCache.get.mockResolvedValue(cachedToken);
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const result = await exchangeOboToken(
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mockUser,
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'access-token',
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'api://mcp-server/Scope.Read',
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true,
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);
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expect(result).toBe(cachedToken);
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expect(mockTokensCache.get).toHaveBeenCalledWith('oidc-sub-123:api://mcp-server/Scope.Read');
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expect(client.genericGrantRequest).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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it('should skip cache when fromCache is false', async () => {
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const cachedToken = { access_token: 'cached-obo-token' };
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mockTokensCache.get.mockResolvedValue(cachedToken);
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const result = await exchangeOboToken(
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mockUser,
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'access-token',
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'api://mcp-server/Scope.Read',
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false,
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);
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expect(mockTokensCache.get).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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expect(client.genericGrantRequest).toHaveBeenCalled();
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expect(result.access_token).toBe('exchanged-obo-token');
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});
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it('should default fromCache to true', async () => {
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mockTokensCache.get.mockResolvedValue(null);
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await exchangeOboToken(mockUser, 'access-token', 'api://scope');
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expect(mockTokensCache.get).toHaveBeenCalledWith('oidc-sub-123:api://scope');
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});
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});
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describe('OBO token exchange', () => {
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it('should call genericGrantRequest with jwt-bearer grant type', async () => {
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await exchangeOboToken(mockUser, 'user-access-token', 'api://mcp-server/Tools.ReadWrite');
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expect(client.genericGrantRequest).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
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mockOpenIdConfig,
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'urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer',
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{
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scope: 'api://mcp-server/Tools.ReadWrite',
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assertion: 'user-access-token',
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requested_token_use: 'on_behalf_of',
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},
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);
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});
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it('should return token response with correct structure', async () => {
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const result = await exchangeOboToken(
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mockUser,
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'access-token',
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'api://mcp-server/Tools.ReadWrite',
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);
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expect(result).toEqual({
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access_token: 'exchanged-obo-token',
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token_type: 'Bearer',
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expires_in: 3600,
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scope: 'api://mcp-server/Tools.ReadWrite',
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});
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});
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it('should cache the exchanged token with correct TTL', async () => {
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client.genericGrantRequest.mockResolvedValue({
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access_token: 'new-obo-token',
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expires_in: 1800,
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});
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await exchangeOboToken(mockUser, 'access-token', 'api://scope');
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expect(mockTokensCache.set).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
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'oidc-sub-123:api://scope',
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{
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access_token: 'new-obo-token',
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token_type: 'Bearer',
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expires_in: 1800,
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scope: 'api://scope',
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},
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1800 * 1000,
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);
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});
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it('should default expires_in to 3600 when not in response', async () => {
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client.genericGrantRequest.mockResolvedValue({
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access_token: 'no-expiry-token',
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});
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const result = await exchangeOboToken(mockUser, 'access-token', 'api://scope');
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expect(result.expires_in).toBe(3600);
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expect(mockTokensCache.set).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
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'oidc-sub-123:api://scope',
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expect.objectContaining({ expires_in: 3600 }),
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3600 * 1000,
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);
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});
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it('should propagate errors from genericGrantRequest', async () => {
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client.genericGrantRequest.mockRejectedValue(
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new Error('invalid_grant: AADSTS50013: Assertion failed signature validation'),
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);
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await expect(exchangeOboToken(mockUser, 'bad-token', 'api://scope')).rejects.toThrow(
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'invalid_grant: AADSTS50013: Assertion failed signature validation',
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);
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});
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it('should retry once for transient Entra failures and succeed on the second attempt', async () => {
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const transientError = Object.assign(new Error('Service unavailable'), { status: 503 });
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const setTimeoutSpy = jest.spyOn(global, 'setTimeout').mockImplementation((callback) => {
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callback();
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return 0;
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});
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try {
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client.genericGrantRequest.mockRejectedValueOnce(transientError).mockResolvedValueOnce({
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access_token: 'retried-obo-token',
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expires_in: 1800,
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});
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const result = await exchangeOboToken(mockUser, 'access-token', 'api://scope');
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expect(client.genericGrantRequest).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
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expect(result).toEqual({
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access_token: 'retried-obo-token',
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token_type: 'Bearer',
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expires_in: 1800,
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scope: 'api://scope',
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});
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} finally {
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setTimeoutSpy.mockRestore();
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}
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});
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it('should not retry permanent OBO exchange failures', async () => {
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const permanentError = new Error(
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'invalid_grant: AADSTS50013: Assertion failed signature validation',
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);
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client.genericGrantRequest.mockRejectedValue(permanentError);
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await expect(exchangeOboToken(mockUser, 'bad-token', 'api://scope')).rejects.toThrow(
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'invalid_grant: AADSTS50013: Assertion failed signature validation',
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);
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expect(client.genericGrantRequest).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
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});
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});
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describe('cache key isolation', () => {
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it('should use different cache keys for different scopes', async () => {
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await exchangeOboToken(mockUser, 'access-token', 'api://server-a/Scope.A');
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await exchangeOboToken(mockUser, 'access-token', 'api://server-b/Scope.B');
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expect(mockTokensCache.get).toHaveBeenCalledWith('oidc-sub-123:api://server-a/Scope.A');
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expect(mockTokensCache.get).toHaveBeenCalledWith('oidc-sub-123:api://server-b/Scope.B');
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});
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it('should use different cache keys for different users', async () => {
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const otherUser = { openidId: 'oidc-sub-456', email: 'other@example.com' };
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await exchangeOboToken(mockUser, 'access-token', 'api://scope');
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await exchangeOboToken(otherUser, 'access-token', 'api://scope');
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expect(mockTokensCache.get).toHaveBeenCalledWith('oidc-sub-123:api://scope');
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expect(mockTokensCache.get).toHaveBeenCalledWith('oidc-sub-456:api://scope');
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});
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});
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describe('single-flight coalescing', () => {
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/** Yields long enough for both pending callers to advance past their cache lookup. */
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const flushMicrotasks = () => new Promise((resolve) => setImmediate(resolve));
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it('coalesces concurrent exchanges for the same key into one IdP call', async () => {
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let resolveGrant;
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client.genericGrantRequest.mockReturnValueOnce(
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new Promise((resolve) => {
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resolveGrant = resolve;
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}),
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);
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const callA = exchangeOboToken(mockUser, 'access-token', 'api://shared');
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const callB = exchangeOboToken(mockUser, 'access-token', 'api://shared');
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await flushMicrotasks();
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expect(client.genericGrantRequest).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
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resolveGrant({ access_token: 'shared-obo-token', expires_in: 3600 });
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const [resultA, resultB] = await Promise.all([callA, callB]);
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expect(resultA).toEqual(resultB);
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expect(resultA.access_token).toBe('shared-obo-token');
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expect(client.genericGrantRequest).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
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expect(mockTokensCache.set).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
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});
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it('does not coalesce exchanges for different keys', async () => {
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await Promise.all([
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exchangeOboToken(mockUser, 'access-token', 'api://scope-a'),
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exchangeOboToken(mockUser, 'access-token', 'api://scope-b'),
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]);
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expect(client.genericGrantRequest).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
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});
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it('clears the in-flight slot after a successful exchange', async () => {
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await exchangeOboToken(mockUser, 'access-token', 'api://scope');
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expect(client.genericGrantRequest).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
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await exchangeOboToken(mockUser, 'access-token', 'api://scope');
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expect(client.genericGrantRequest).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
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});
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it('clears the in-flight slot after a failed exchange', async () => {
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client.genericGrantRequest
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.mockRejectedValueOnce(
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new Error('invalid_grant: AADSTS50013: Assertion failed signature validation'),
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)
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.mockResolvedValueOnce({ access_token: 'fresh-token', expires_in: 3600 });
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await expect(exchangeOboToken(mockUser, 'access-token', 'api://scope')).rejects.toThrow(
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'invalid_grant',
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);
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const result = await exchangeOboToken(mockUser, 'access-token', 'api://scope');
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expect(result.access_token).toBe('fresh-token');
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expect(client.genericGrantRequest).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
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});
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it('bypasses in-flight coalescing when fromCache is false', async () => {
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let resolveFirst;
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client.genericGrantRequest
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.mockReturnValueOnce(
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new Promise((resolve) => {
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resolveFirst = resolve;
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}),
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)
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.mockResolvedValueOnce({ access_token: 'forced-fresh-token', expires_in: 3600 });
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const callA = exchangeOboToken(mockUser, 'access-token', 'api://scope', true);
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await flushMicrotasks();
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const callB = exchangeOboToken(mockUser, 'access-token', 'api://scope', false);
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expect(client.genericGrantRequest).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
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resolveFirst({ access_token: 'in-flight-token', expires_in: 3600 });
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const [resultA, resultB] = await Promise.all([callA, callB]);
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expect(resultA.access_token).toBe('in-flight-token');
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expect(resultB.access_token).toBe('forced-fresh-token');
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});
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});
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});
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