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* 🔒 fix: Keep Secrets Out of Debug Logs and Spans * 🧯 fix: Derive Safe Exception Types * 🛡️ fix: Close Diagnostic Redaction Gaps * 🧼 fix: Redact Escaped JSON Secrets
87 lines
2.8 KiB
TypeScript
87 lines
2.8 KiB
TypeScript
const MASKED_VALUE = '***MASKED***';
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const SAFE_OPENID_HEADER_VALUES = new Set(['content-length', 'content-type']);
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function isSensitiveFieldName(key: string): boolean {
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const normalized = key.toLowerCase().replace(/[^a-z0-9]/g, '');
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return (
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normalized === 'code' ||
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normalized.includes('authorization') ||
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normalized.includes('assertion') ||
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normalized.includes('clientid') ||
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normalized.includes('connectionstring') ||
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normalized.includes('cookie') ||
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normalized.includes('credential') ||
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normalized.includes('password') ||
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normalized.includes('signature') ||
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normalized.includes('secret') ||
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normalized.includes('token') ||
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normalized.includes('verifier') ||
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normalized.includes('apikey')
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);
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}
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/**
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* Helper function to safely log sensitive data when debug mode is enabled
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* @param obj - Object to stringify
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* @param maxLength - Maximum length of the stringified output
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* @returns Stringified object with sensitive data masked
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*/
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export function safeStringify(obj: unknown, maxLength = 1000): string {
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try {
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const str = JSON.stringify(obj, (key, value) => {
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if (isSensitiveFieldName(key)) {
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return MASKED_VALUE;
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}
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return value;
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});
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const serialized = str ?? '[Unserializable value]';
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if (serialized.length > maxLength) {
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return `${serialized.substring(0, maxLength)}... (truncated)`;
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}
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return serialized;
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} catch {
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return '[Error stringifying object]';
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}
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}
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/**
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* Describes an OpenID request body without serializing any values. OAuth form
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* bodies routinely contain authorization codes, refresh tokens, PKCE verifiers,
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* and client secrets, so even partially masked values are unsafe to log.
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*/
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export function logOpenIdRequestBody(body: unknown): string {
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try {
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if (body instanceof URLSearchParams) {
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return safeStringify({ type: 'URLSearchParams', fieldCount: body.size });
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}
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if (typeof body === 'string') {
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return safeStringify({ type: 'string', length: body.length });
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}
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return safeStringify({ type: body == null ? typeof body : 'object' });
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} catch {
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return '[OpenID request body metadata unavailable]';
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}
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}
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/**
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* Helper to log headers without revealing sensitive information
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* @param headers - Headers object to log
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* @returns Stringified headers with sensitive data masked
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*/
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export function logHeaders(headers: Headers | undefined | null): string {
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try {
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const headerObj: Record<string, string> = {};
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if (!headers || typeof headers.entries !== 'function') {
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return 'No headers available';
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}
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for (const [key, value] of headers.entries()) {
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headerObj[key] = SAFE_OPENID_HEADER_VALUES.has(key.toLowerCase()) ? value : MASKED_VALUE;
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}
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return safeStringify(headerObj);
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} catch {
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return '[OpenID request headers unavailable]';
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}
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}
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