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* 🪵 fix: Aggregate Audit Findings and Rate Limit Shared Link Reads Audit-mode content filter rules wrote one `logger.info` per matching fragment, and inspection deliberately continues past every finding. A shared conversation full of distinct matching strings therefore produced one log write per fragment, regenerated on every retrieval of `GET /api/share/:shareId` — a public, unauthenticated route with no limiter. The 4,096-entry inspection dedupe set is a memory bound, not an event budget: once full, further values are inspected and logged again. Audit metadata carries no inspected text — only rule, source, field and provenance — so thousands of those writes were byte-identical lines. Findings are now counted inside an aggregation scope and reported once per distinct key with an `occurrences` count when the scope ends: - `assertModelBoundContent` opens a scope when audit rules are configured, bounding one inspection pass (a single message's fragments). - `assertConversationImportContentAllowed` opens the outer scope for import and shared-link snapshots, so per-message inspections nest into one report instead of one per message. - `createShareContentPreflight` spans the shared-file metadata pass too. Nested scopes reuse the outermost aggregation, and outside any scope the previous immediate write is kept. `GET /api/share/:shareId` re-inspects the whole snapshot on every request, so it now carries IP and user limiters like the neighbouring fork route (`SHARE_IP_MAX`/`SHARE_IP_WINDOW`, `SHARE_USER_MAX`/`SHARE_USER_WINDOW`, `SHARE_VIOLATION_SCORE`); the user limiter skips anonymous viewers. * 🔒 fix: Address Codex Findings on Share Audit Aggregation - The aggregation key joined rule fields with a space, but the filter schema allows spaces in custom pattern ids and labels, so `{id: 'a', label: 'b c'}` and `{id: 'a b', label: 'c'}` collided on the same source/field/provenance and merged two rules' counts under one identity. Serialize the tuple instead. - `SHARE_VIOLATION_SCORE` left unset reached `logViolation` as `undefined`, which selects that function's default score of 1 rather than the documented zero. With default ban settings a viewer refreshing a rate-limited shared link would be banned after 20 rejections. Default the score to 0 in code, not only in `.env.example`. - `removePorts` returns a full IPv6 address, so an attacker holding a prefix could rotate the host portion for a fresh bucket on every request — and for anonymous viewers the IP limiter is the only bound. Derive the key through `ipKeyGenerator` so IPv6 clients group by /56.
36 lines
1.3 KiB
JavaScript
36 lines
1.3 KiB
JavaScript
const createTTSLimiters = require('./ttsLimiters');
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const createSTTLimiters = require('./sttLimiters');
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const loginLimiter = require('./loginLimiter');
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const importLimiters = require('./importLimiters');
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const uploadLimiters = require('./uploadLimiters');
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const forkLimiters = require('./forkLimiters');
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const shareLimiters = require('./shareLimiters');
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const registerLimiter = require('./registerLimiter');
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const toolCallLimiter = require('./toolCallLimiter');
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const messageLimiters = require('./messageLimiters');
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const promptUsageLimiter = require('./promptUsageLimiter');
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const verifyEmailLimiter = require('./verifyEmailLimiter');
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const resetPasswordLimiter = require('./resetPasswordLimiter');
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const twoFactorTempLimiter = require('./twoFactorTempLimiter');
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const verifyEmailSubmissionLimiter = require('./verifyEmailSubmissionLimiter');
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const resetPasswordSubmissionLimiter = require('./resetPasswordSubmissionLimiter');
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module.exports = {
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...uploadLimiters,
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...importLimiters,
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...messageLimiters,
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...forkLimiters,
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...shareLimiters,
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...promptUsageLimiter,
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loginLimiter,
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registerLimiter,
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toolCallLimiter,
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createTTSLimiters,
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createSTTLimiters,
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verifyEmailLimiter,
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resetPasswordLimiter,
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verifyEmailSubmissionLimiter,
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resetPasswordSubmissionLimiter,
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twoFactorTempLimiter,
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};
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