LibreChat/api/server/services/MCP.js
Danny Avila 4cce88be42
🪟 feat: Add allowedAddresses Exemption List For SSRF-Guarded Targets (#12933)
* 🪟 feat: Add allowedAddresses Exemption List For SSRF-Guarded Targets

LibreChat already blocks SSRF-prone targets (private IPs, loopback,
link-local, .internal/.local TLDs) at every server-side fetch site
that consumes user-controllable URLs — custom-endpoint baseURLs, MCP
servers, OpenAPI Actions, and OAuth endpoints. The only existing
escape hatch is `allowedDomains`, but that flips the field into a
strict whitelist: adding `127.0.0.1` to permit a self-hosted Ollama
also blocks every public destination that isn't in the list.

Introduce `allowedAddresses` as the orthogonal primitive: a private-
IP-space exemption list. When a hostname or its resolved IP appears
in the list, the SSRF block is bypassed for that target. Public
destinations remain reachable. Operators can now run self-hosted
LLMs / MCP servers / Action endpoints on private addresses without
weakening the default-deny posture for everything else.

Schema additions in `packages/data-provider/src/config.ts`:
- `endpoints.allowedAddresses` (new — gates `validateEndpointURL`)
- `mcpSettings.allowedAddresses` (parallel to `allowedDomains`)
- `actions.allowedAddresses` (parallel to `allowedDomains`)

Core changes in `packages/api/src/auth/`:
- New `isAddressAllowed(hostnameOrIP, allowedAddresses)` — pure,
  case-insensitive, bracket-stripped literal match.
- Threaded the list through `isSSRFTarget`, `resolveHostnameSSRF`,
  `isDomainAllowedCore`, `isActionDomainAllowed`, `isMCPDomainAllowed`,
  `isOAuthUrlAllowed`, and `validateEndpointURL`.
- Extended `createSSRFSafeAgents` and `createSSRFSafeUndiciConnect`
  to accept the list, building an SSRF-safe DNS lookup that exempts
  matching hostnames/IPs at TCP connect time (TOCTOU-safe).

Wiring:
- Custom and OpenAI endpoint initialize sites pass
  `endpoints.allowedAddresses` to `validateEndpointURL`.
- `MCPServersRegistry` stores `allowedAddresses` and exposes it via
  `getAllowedAddresses()`. The factory, connection class, manager,
  `UserConnectionManager`, and `ConnectionsRepository` all thread
  it through to the SSRF utilities.
- `MCPOAuthHandler.initiateOAuthFlow`, `refreshOAuthTokens`, and
  `validateOAuthUrl` accept the list and consult it on every URL
  validation along the OAuth chain.
- `ToolService`, `ActionService`, and the assistants/agents action
  routes pass `actions.allowedAddresses` to `isActionDomainAllowed`
  and to `createSSRFSafeAgents` for runtime action calls.
- `initializeMCPs.js` reads `mcpSettings.allowedAddresses` from the
  app config and forwards it to the registry constructor.

Documentation:
- `librechat.example.yaml` shows the new field next to each existing
  `allowedDomains` block, with a note clarifying that
  `allowedAddresses` is an exemption list (not a whitelist).

Tests:
- Unit tests for `isAddressAllowed` covering literal IPs, hostnames,
  IPv6 brackets, case insensitivity, and partial-match rejection.
- Exemption tests for every entry point: `isSSRFTarget`,
  `resolveHostnameSSRF`, `validateEndpointURL`, `isActionDomainAllowed`,
  `isMCPDomainAllowed`, `isOAuthUrlAllowed`.
- Existing tests updated to reflect the new optional parameter.

Default behavior is unchanged: omitted = empty list = no exemptions.

* 🩹 fix: Plumb allowedAddresses Through AppConfig endpoints Type

The initial PR added `endpoints.allowedAddresses` to the
data-provider config schema and consumed it in the endpoint
initialize sites, but the runtime `AppConfig.endpoints` shape in
`@librechat/data-schemas` was a hand-maintained subset that didn't
include the new field — so `tsc` rejected `appConfig.endpoints.allowedAddresses`.

Add the field to `AppConfig['endpoints']` in
`packages/data-schemas/src/types/app.ts` and forward it from the
loaded config in `packages/data-schemas/src/app/endpoints.ts` so the
runtime config carries the value.

Update `initializeMCPs.spec.js` to expect the third positional
argument (`allowedAddresses`) on the `createMCPServersRegistry` call.

* 🩹 fix: Enforce allowedDomains Before allowedAddresses In isOAuthUrlAllowed

The initial implementation checked the address exemption first, so a
URL whose hostname appeared in `allowedAddresses` would return true
even when the admin had configured `allowedDomains` as a strict bound
on OAuth endpoints. A malicious MCP server could advertise OAuth
metadata, token, or revocation URLs at any address the admin had
permitted for an unrelated reason (a self-hosted LLM at `127.0.0.1`,
for example) and pass validation, expanding SSRF reach beyond the
configured domain whitelist.

Reorder: when `allowedDomains` is set, treat it as authoritative —
return true only if the URL matches a domain entry, otherwise fall
through to false. The address exemption only applies when no
`allowedDomains` is configured (mirrors how the downstream SSRF check
in `validateOAuthUrl` consults `allowedAddresses`).

Add a regression test asserting that an `allowedAddresses` entry does
not broaden a configured `allowedDomains` list.

Reported by chatgpt-codex-connector on PR #12933.

* 🩹 fix: Forward allowedAddresses To Remaining OAuth Callers

Two `MCPOAuthHandler` callers still used the pre-feature signatures and
were silently dropping the new `allowedAddresses` argument:

- `api/server/routes/mcp.js` invoked `initiateOAuthFlow` with the old
  5-argument shape, so OAuth flows initiated through the route handler
  ignored the registry's `getAllowedAddresses()` and would reject any
  metadata/authorization/token URL on a permitted private host.
- `api/server/controllers/UserController.js#maybeUninstallOAuthMCP`
  invoked `revokeOAuthToken` without the address exemption, so
  uninstalling an OAuth-backed MCP server on a permitted private host
  would fail at the revocation step even though the rest of the MCP
  connection path now permits it.

Both sites now read `allowedAddresses` from the registry alongside
`allowedDomains` and forward it. Reported by Copilot on PR #12933.

* 🩹 fix: Update Test Mocks And Assertions For OAuth allowedAddresses

The previous commit started passing `allowedAddresses` to
`MCPOAuthHandler.initiateOAuthFlow` from `api/server/routes/mcp.js`
and to `MCPOAuthHandler.revokeOAuthToken` from
`api/server/controllers/UserController.js`, but the corresponding
test files mocked the registry without `getAllowedAddresses` (causing
`TypeError`s) and asserted the old positional shape on
`toHaveBeenCalledWith`.

Update the mocks and assertions to match the new arity:

- `api/server/routes/__tests__/mcp.spec.js`: add
  `getAllowedDomains`/`getAllowedAddresses` to the registry mock and
  expect the additional positional args on `initiateOAuthFlow`.
- `api/server/controllers/__tests__/maybeUninstallOAuthMCP.spec.js`:
  add a `getAllowedAddresses` mock alongside the existing
  `getAllowedDomains` and seed it in `setupOAuthServerFound`.
- `api/server/controllers/__tests__/UserController.mcpOAuth.spec.js`:
  add `getAllowedAddresses` to the registry mock and expect the
  trailing `null` arg on the three `revokeOAuthToken` assertions.

* 🛡️ fix: Address Comprehensive Review — Scope allowedAddresses To Private IP Space

Major findings from the comprehensive PR review (severity → fix):

**CRITICAL — `validateOAuthUrl` SSRF fallback bypass.** When `allowedDomains`
is configured and a URL fails the whitelist, the SSRF fallback in
`validateOAuthUrl` was still passing `allowedAddresses` to `isSSRFTarget` /
`resolveHostnameSSRF`, letting a malicious MCP server advertise OAuth
endpoints at any address the admin had permitted for an unrelated reason.
Suppress `allowedAddresses` in the fallback when `allowedDomains` is active —
the address exemption is opt-in for the no-whitelist mode only.

**MAJOR — WebSocket transport SSRF check ignored exemptions.** The
`constructTransport` WebSocket branch called `resolveHostnameSSRF(wsHostname)`
without `this.allowedAddresses`, so a permitted private MCP server would
pass `isMCPDomainAllowed` but be blocked at transport creation. Forward
the exemption.

**Scope `allowedAddresses` to private IP space only (operator directive).**
The exemption list is for permitting private/internal targets; it must not
be a back-door to broaden trust to public destinations.
- Schema (`packages/data-provider/src/config.ts`): new
  `allowedAddressesSchema` rejects URLs (`://`), paths/CIDR (`/`),
  whitespace, and public IPv4/IPv6 literals at config-load time. Wired
  into `endpoints`, `mcpSettings`, and `actions`.
- Runtime (`packages/api/src/auth/domain.ts`): `isAddressAllowed` now
  drops public-IP candidates and public-IP entries on the match path —
  defense in depth so a misconfigured runtime list never grants exemption.
- Hot path (`packages/api/src/auth/agent.ts`): `buildSSRFSafeLookup`
  pre-normalizes the list into a `Set<string>` once at construction and
  applies the same scoping filter, so the connect-time DNS lookup is an
  O(1) Set membership check instead of a full re-iterate-and-normalize on
  every outbound request.

**Test coverage for the connect-time and OAuth-fallback paths.**
- `agent.spec.ts`: new describe block exercising `buildSSRFSafeLookup` and
  `createSSRFSafe*` with `allowedAddresses` — hostname-literal exemption,
  resolved-IP exemption, public-IP scoping, URL/CIDR/whitespace rejection,
  and the default no-list block.
- `handler.allowedAddresses.test.ts` (new): integration tests for
  `validateOAuthUrl` — covers both the no-domains-set "permit private"
  path and the strict-bound regression where `allowedAddresses` must NOT
  bypass `allowedDomains`.

**Documentation & cleanup.**
- `connection.ts` redirect SSRF check: explicit comment that
  `allowedAddresses` is intentionally NOT consulted for redirect targets
  (server-controlled, must not inherit the admin's exemption).
- `MCPConnectionFactory.test.ts`: replaced an `eslint-disable` with a
  proper `import { getTenantId } from '@librechat/data-schemas'`. The
  disable was added to make a pre-existing `require()` quiet — the cleaner
  fix is to use the existing top-level import.

Updated `MCPConnectionSSRF.test.ts` WebSocket SSRF assertions to match the
new two-argument call shape (`hostname, allowedAddresses`).

* 🩹 fix: Require Absolute URL Before allowedAddresses Trust Bypass In isOAuthUrlAllowed

`parseDomainSpec` is lenient — it silently prepends `https://` to
schemeless inputs so it can match patterns like bare `example.com`.
That leniency leaked into `isOAuthUrlAllowed`'s new
`allowedAddresses` short-circuit: a value like `10.0.0.5/oauth` (no
scheme) would parse successfully via the prepended default, hit the
address-exemption path, return `true`, and skip `validateOAuthUrl`'s
strict `new URL(url)` parse-or-throw — only to fail later in OAuth
discovery with a less clear runtime error.

Add a strict `new URL(url)` gate at the top of `isOAuthUrlAllowed`.
Schemeless inputs now fall through to `validateOAuthUrl`'s explicit
"Invalid OAuth <field>" rejection. Tests added in both
`auth/domain.spec.ts` (unit) and the OAuth handler integration spec
(end-to-end).

Reported by chatgpt-codex-connector (P2) on PR #12933.

* 🛡️ fix: Address Follow-Up Comprehensive Review — Schema Tests, Shared Normalization, host:port

Auditing the second comprehensive review:

**F1 MAJOR — schema validation untested.** `allowedAddressesSchema` had
zero coverage, so a regression in the three refinement stages or the
three wiring locations (`endpoints` / `mcpSettings` / `actions`) would
silently let invalid entries reach the runtime. Added a dedicated
`describe('allowedAddressesSchema')` block in `config.spec.ts` covering:
valid private IPs (v4 + v6, including the previously-missed 192.0.0.0/24
range), accepted hostnames, all rejection categories (URLs, CIDR, paths,
whitespace tabs/newlines, host:port, public IP literals), and full
`configSchema.parse()` integration at each of the three nesting points.

**F2 MINOR — `isPrivateIPv4Literal` divergence.** The schema reimpl in
`packages/data-provider` was discarding the `c` octet, so the
`192.0.0.0/24` (RFC 5736 IETF protocol assignments) range that the
authoritative `isPrivateIPv4` accepts was being rejected with a
misleading "public IP" error. Destructure `c` and add the missing range
check; covered by the new schema tests.

**F3 MINOR — DRY violation across `domain.ts` and `agent.ts`.** Both
files had independent normalization implementations with a subtle
whitespace-check divergence (`/\s/` vs `.includes(' ')`). Extracted the
shared logic into a new `packages/api/src/auth/allowedAddresses.ts`
module that both consumers import:
  - `normalizeAddressEntry(entry)` — single-entry shape check
  - `looksLikeHostPort(entry)` — host:port detector (used by F4)
  - `normalizeAllowedAddressesSet(list)` — pre-normalized Set for the
    connect-time hot path
  - `isAddressInAllowedSet(candidate, set)` — membership check that
    enforces private-IP scoping on the candidate

Both `isAddressAllowed` (preflight) and `buildSSRFSafeLookup` (connect)
now go through the same primitives; the whitespace divergence is gone.

To break the import cycle (`allowedAddresses` needs `isPrivateIP`,
`domain` previously owned it), extracted IP private-range detection
into a leaf `auth/ip.ts` module. `domain.ts` re-exports `isPrivateIP`
for backward compatibility with existing call sites.

**F4 MINOR — `host:port` silently misclassified.** Entries like
`localhost:8080` previously slipped through the URL/path guard, were
mis-detected as IPv6, failed `isPrivateIP`, and were silently dropped
with a misleading "public IP" schema error. Added an explicit
`looksLikeHostPort` check with a clear error: "allowedAddresses
entries must not include a port — list the bare hostname or IP only."
Bare `::1`, `[::1]`, and other valid IPv6 literals are intentionally
not matched (regex distinguishes by colon count and the bracketed
`[ipv6]:port` form).

**F5 MINOR — hostname-trust documentation gap.** Hostname entries
short-circuit `resolveHostnameSSRF` before any DNS lookup — that's a
deliberate design (admin trusts the name) but it means the exemption
follows whatever the name resolves to at runtime. Added an explicit
note in `librechat.example.yaml` for both `mcpSettings.allowedAddresses`
and `endpoints.allowedAddresses`: "a hostname entry trusts whatever IP
that name resolves to. Only list hostnames whose DNS you control.
Prefer literal IPs when you can."

**F6** (8 positional params) is flagged for follow-up; refactor to an
options object is a breaking-API change deferred to a separate PR.
**F7** (redirect/WebSocket asymmetry, NIT, conf 40) — skipping; the
existing inline comment is sufficient.

* 🧹 chore: Address Follow-Up NITs — Import Order And Mirror-Function Naming

Three NITs from the latest comprehensive review:

**NIT #1 (conf 85) — local import order.** AGENTS.md requires local
imports sorted longest-to-shortest. Both `domain.ts` and `agent.ts`
had `./ip` (shorter) before `./allowedAddresses` (longer). Swapped.

**NIT #2 (conf 60) — missing cross-reference.** The schema-side
`isHostPortShape` in `packages/data-provider/src/config.ts` had no
note pointing at the canonical runtime mirror. Added a JSDoc paragraph
explaining the mirror relationship and why a local copy exists (the
data-provider package can't import from `@librechat/api` without
creating a circular dependency).

**NIT #3 (conf 50) — naming inconsistency.** Renamed
`isHostPortShape` → `looksLikeHostPort` so the schema mirror matches
the runtime helper exactly. Kept as a separate function (not a shared
import) for the same circular-dependency reason; the matching name
makes it obvious they should stay in lockstep.
2026-05-03 21:43:59 -04:00

867 lines
28 KiB
JavaScript

const { tool } = require('@librechat/agents/langchain/tools');
const { logger, getTenantId } = require('@librechat/data-schemas');
const {
Providers,
StepTypes,
GraphEvents,
Constants: AgentConstants,
} = require('@librechat/agents');
const {
sendEvent,
MCPOAuthHandler,
isMCPDomainAllowed,
normalizeServerName,
normalizeJsonSchema,
GenerationJobManager,
resolveJsonSchemaRefs,
buildOAuthToolCallName,
} = require('@librechat/api');
const { Time, CacheKeys, Constants, isAssistantsEndpoint } = require('librechat-data-provider');
const {
getOAuthReconnectionManager,
getMCPServersRegistry,
getFlowStateManager,
getMCPManager,
} = require('~/config');
const { findToken, createToken, updateToken, deleteTokens } = require('~/models');
const { getGraphApiToken } = require('./GraphTokenService');
const { reinitMCPServer } = require('./Tools/mcp');
const { getAppConfig } = require('./Config');
const { getLogStores } = require('~/cache');
const MAX_CACHE_SIZE = 1000;
const lastReconnectAttempts = new Map();
const RECONNECT_THROTTLE_MS = 10_000;
const missingToolCache = new Map();
const MISSING_TOOL_TTL_MS = 10_000;
function evictStale(map, ttl) {
if (map.size <= MAX_CACHE_SIZE) {
return;
}
const now = Date.now();
for (const [key, timestamp] of map) {
if (now - timestamp >= ttl) {
map.delete(key);
}
if (map.size <= MAX_CACHE_SIZE) {
return;
}
}
}
const unavailableMsg =
"This tool's MCP server is temporarily unavailable. Please try again shortly.";
/**
* Resolves config-source MCP servers from admin Config overrides for the current
* request context. Returns the parsed configs keyed by server name.
* @param {import('express').Request} req - Express request with user context
* @returns {Promise<Record<string, import('@librechat/api').ParsedServerConfig>>}
*/
async function resolveConfigServers(req) {
try {
const registry = getMCPServersRegistry();
const user = req?.user;
const appConfig = await getAppConfig({
role: user?.role,
tenantId: getTenantId(),
userId: user?.id,
});
return await registry.ensureConfigServers(appConfig?.mcpConfig || {});
} catch (error) {
logger.warn(
'[resolveConfigServers] Failed to resolve config servers, degrading to empty:',
error,
);
return {};
}
}
/**
* Resolves config-source servers and merges all server configs (YAML + config + user DB)
* for the given user context. Shared helper for controllers needing the full merged config.
* @param {string} userId
* @param {{ id?: string, role?: string }} [user]
* @returns {Promise<Record<string, import('@librechat/api').ParsedServerConfig>>}
*/
async function resolveAllMcpConfigs(userId, user) {
const registry = getMCPServersRegistry();
const appConfig = await getAppConfig({ role: user?.role, tenantId: getTenantId(), userId });
let configServers = {};
try {
configServers = await registry.ensureConfigServers(appConfig?.mcpConfig || {});
} catch (error) {
logger.warn(
'[resolveAllMcpConfigs] Config server resolution failed, continuing without:',
error,
);
}
return await registry.getAllServerConfigs(userId, configServers);
}
/**
* @param {string} toolName
* @param {string} serverName
*/
function createUnavailableToolStub(toolName, serverName) {
const normalizedToolKey = `${toolName}${Constants.mcp_delimiter}${normalizeServerName(serverName)}`;
const _call = async () => [unavailableMsg, null];
const toolInstance = tool(_call, {
schema: {
type: 'object',
properties: {
input: { type: 'string', description: 'Input for the tool' },
},
required: [],
},
name: normalizedToolKey,
description: unavailableMsg,
responseFormat: AgentConstants.CONTENT_AND_ARTIFACT,
});
toolInstance.mcp = true;
toolInstance.mcpRawServerName = serverName;
return toolInstance;
}
function isEmptyObjectSchema(jsonSchema) {
return (
jsonSchema != null &&
typeof jsonSchema === 'object' &&
jsonSchema.type === 'object' &&
(jsonSchema.properties == null || Object.keys(jsonSchema.properties).length === 0) &&
!jsonSchema.additionalProperties
);
}
/**
* @param {object} params
* @param {ServerResponse} params.res - The Express response object for sending events.
* @param {string} params.stepId - The ID of the step in the flow.
* @param {ToolCallChunk} params.toolCall - The tool call object containing tool information.
* @param {string | null} [params.streamId] - The stream ID for resumable mode.
*/
function createRunStepDeltaEmitter({ res, stepId, toolCall, streamId = null }) {
/**
* @param {string} authURL - The URL to redirect the user for OAuth authentication.
* @returns {Promise<void>}
*/
return async function (authURL) {
/** @type {{ id: string; delta: AgentToolCallDelta }} */
const data = {
id: stepId,
delta: {
type: StepTypes.TOOL_CALLS,
tool_calls: [{ ...toolCall, args: '' }],
auth: authURL,
expires_at: Date.now() + Time.TWO_MINUTES,
},
};
const eventData = { event: GraphEvents.ON_RUN_STEP_DELTA, data };
if (streamId) {
await GenerationJobManager.emitChunk(streamId, eventData);
} else {
sendEvent(res, eventData);
}
};
}
/**
* @param {object} params
* @param {ServerResponse} params.res - The Express response object for sending events.
* @param {string} params.runId - The Run ID, i.e. message ID
* @param {string} params.stepId - The ID of the step in the flow.
* @param {ToolCallChunk} params.toolCall - The tool call object containing tool information.
* @param {number} [params.index]
* @param {string | null} [params.streamId] - The stream ID for resumable mode.
* @returns {() => Promise<void>}
*/
function createRunStepEmitter({ res, runId, stepId, toolCall, index, streamId = null }) {
return async function () {
/** @type {import('@librechat/agents').RunStep} */
const data = {
runId: runId ?? Constants.USE_PRELIM_RESPONSE_MESSAGE_ID,
id: stepId,
type: StepTypes.TOOL_CALLS,
index: index ?? 0,
stepDetails: {
type: StepTypes.TOOL_CALLS,
tool_calls: [toolCall],
},
};
const eventData = { event: GraphEvents.ON_RUN_STEP, data };
if (streamId) {
await GenerationJobManager.emitChunk(streamId, eventData);
} else {
sendEvent(res, eventData);
}
};
}
/**
* Creates a function used to ensure the flow handler is only invoked once
* @param {object} params
* @param {string} params.flowId - The ID of the login flow.
* @param {FlowStateManager<any>} params.flowManager - The flow manager instance.
* @param {(authURL: string) => void} [params.callback]
*/
function createOAuthStart({ flowId, flowManager, callback }) {
/**
* Creates a function to handle OAuth login requests.
* @param {string} authURL - The URL to redirect the user for OAuth authentication.
* @returns {Promise<boolean>} Returns true to indicate the event was sent successfully.
*/
return async function (authURL) {
await flowManager.createFlowWithHandler(flowId, 'oauth_login', async () => {
callback?.(authURL);
logger.debug('Sent OAuth login request to client');
return true;
});
};
}
/**
* @param {object} params
* @param {ServerResponse} params.res - The Express response object for sending events.
* @param {string} params.stepId - The ID of the step in the flow.
* @param {ToolCallChunk} params.toolCall - The tool call object containing tool information.
* @param {string | null} [params.streamId] - The stream ID for resumable mode.
*/
function createOAuthEnd({ res, stepId, toolCall, streamId = null }) {
return async function () {
/** @type {{ id: string; delta: AgentToolCallDelta }} */
const data = {
id: stepId,
delta: {
type: StepTypes.TOOL_CALLS,
tool_calls: [{ ...toolCall }],
},
};
const eventData = { event: GraphEvents.ON_RUN_STEP_DELTA, data };
if (streamId) {
await GenerationJobManager.emitChunk(streamId, eventData);
} else {
sendEvent(res, eventData);
}
logger.debug('Sent OAuth login success to client');
};
}
/**
* @param {object} params
* @param {string} params.userId - The ID of the user.
* @param {string} params.serverName - The name of the server.
* @param {string} params.toolName - The name of the tool.
* @param {FlowStateManager<any>} params.flowManager - The flow manager instance.
*/
function createAbortHandler({ userId, serverName, toolName, flowManager }) {
return function () {
logger.info(`[MCP][User: ${userId}][${serverName}][${toolName}] Tool call aborted`);
const flowId = MCPOAuthHandler.generateFlowId(userId, serverName);
// Clean up both mcp_oauth and mcp_get_tokens flows
flowManager.failFlow(flowId, 'mcp_oauth', new Error('Tool call aborted'));
flowManager.failFlow(flowId, 'mcp_get_tokens', new Error('Tool call aborted'));
};
}
/**
* @param {Object} params
* @param {() => void} params.runStepEmitter
* @param {(authURL: string) => void} params.runStepDeltaEmitter
* @returns {(authURL: string) => void}
*/
function createOAuthCallback({ runStepEmitter, runStepDeltaEmitter }) {
return function (authURL) {
runStepEmitter();
runStepDeltaEmitter(authURL);
};
}
/**
* @param {Object} params
* @param {ServerResponse} params.res - The Express response object for sending events.
* @param {IUser} params.user - The user from the request object.
* @param {string} params.serverName
* @param {AbortSignal} params.signal
* @param {string} params.model
* @param {number} [params.index]
* @param {string | null} [params.streamId] - The stream ID for resumable mode.
* @param {Record<string, Record<string, string>>} [params.userMCPAuthMap]
* @returns { Promise<Array<typeof tool | { _call: (toolInput: Object | string) => unknown}>> } An object with `_call` method to execute the tool input.
*/
async function reconnectServer({
res,
user,
index,
signal,
serverName,
configServers,
userMCPAuthMap,
streamId = null,
}) {
logger.debug(
`[MCP][reconnectServer] serverName: ${serverName}, user: ${user?.id}, hasUserMCPAuthMap: ${!!userMCPAuthMap}`,
);
const throttleKey = `${user.id}:${serverName}`;
const now = Date.now();
const lastAttempt = lastReconnectAttempts.get(throttleKey) ?? 0;
if (now - lastAttempt < RECONNECT_THROTTLE_MS) {
logger.debug(`[MCP][reconnectServer] Throttled reconnect for ${serverName}`);
return null;
}
lastReconnectAttempts.set(throttleKey, now);
evictStale(lastReconnectAttempts, RECONNECT_THROTTLE_MS);
const runId = Constants.USE_PRELIM_RESPONSE_MESSAGE_ID;
const flowId = `${user.id}:${serverName}:${Date.now()}`;
const flowManager = getFlowStateManager(getLogStores(CacheKeys.FLOWS));
const stepId = 'step_oauth_login_' + serverName;
const toolCall = {
id: flowId,
name: buildOAuthToolCallName(serverName),
type: 'tool_call_chunk',
};
// Set up abort handler to clean up OAuth flows if request is aborted
const oauthFlowId = MCPOAuthHandler.generateFlowId(user.id, serverName);
const abortHandler = () => {
logger.info(
`[MCP][User: ${user.id}][${serverName}] Tool loading aborted, cleaning up OAuth flows`,
);
// Clean up both mcp_oauth and mcp_get_tokens flows
flowManager.failFlow(oauthFlowId, 'mcp_oauth', new Error('Tool loading aborted'));
flowManager.failFlow(oauthFlowId, 'mcp_get_tokens', new Error('Tool loading aborted'));
};
if (signal) {
signal.addEventListener('abort', abortHandler, { once: true });
}
try {
const runStepEmitter = createRunStepEmitter({
res,
index,
runId,
stepId,
toolCall,
streamId,
});
const runStepDeltaEmitter = createRunStepDeltaEmitter({
res,
stepId,
toolCall,
streamId,
});
const callback = createOAuthCallback({ runStepEmitter, runStepDeltaEmitter });
const oauthStart = createOAuthStart({
res,
flowId,
callback,
flowManager,
});
return await reinitMCPServer({
user,
signal,
serverName,
configServers,
oauthStart,
flowManager,
userMCPAuthMap,
forceNew: true,
returnOnOAuth: false,
connectionTimeout: Time.THIRTY_SECONDS,
});
} finally {
// Clean up abort handler to prevent memory leaks
if (signal) {
signal.removeEventListener('abort', abortHandler);
}
}
}
/**
* Creates all tools from the specified MCP Server via `toolKey`.
*
* This function assumes tools could not be aggregated from the cache of tool definitions,
* i.e. `availableTools`, and will reinitialize the MCP server to ensure all tools are generated.
*
* @param {Object} params
* @param {ServerResponse} params.res - The Express response object for sending events.
* @param {IUser} params.user - The user from the request object.
* @param {string} params.serverName
* @param {string} params.model
* @param {Providers | EModelEndpoint} params.provider - The provider for the tool.
* @param {number} [params.index]
* @param {AbortSignal} [params.signal]
* @param {string | null} [params.streamId] - The stream ID for resumable mode.
* @param {import('@librechat/api').ParsedServerConfig} [params.config]
* @param {Record<string, Record<string, string>>} [params.userMCPAuthMap]
* @returns { Promise<Array<typeof tool | { _call: (toolInput: Object | string) => unknown}>> } An object with `_call` method to execute the tool input.
*/
async function createMCPTools({
res,
user,
index,
signal,
config,
provider,
serverName,
configServers,
userMCPAuthMap,
streamId = null,
}) {
const serverConfig =
config ?? (await getMCPServersRegistry().getServerConfig(serverName, user?.id, configServers));
if (serverConfig?.url) {
const appConfig = await getAppConfig({ role: user?.role, tenantId: user?.tenantId });
const allowedDomains = appConfig?.mcpSettings?.allowedDomains;
const allowedAddresses = appConfig?.mcpSettings?.allowedAddresses;
const isDomainAllowed = await isMCPDomainAllowed(
serverConfig,
allowedDomains,
allowedAddresses,
);
if (!isDomainAllowed) {
logger.warn(`[MCP][${serverName}] Domain not allowed, skipping all tools`);
return [];
}
}
const result = await reconnectServer({
res,
user,
index,
signal,
serverName,
configServers,
userMCPAuthMap,
streamId,
});
if (result === null) {
logger.debug(`[MCP][${serverName}] Reconnect throttled, skipping tool creation.`);
return [];
}
if (!result || !result.tools) {
logger.warn(`[MCP][${serverName}] Failed to reinitialize MCP server.`);
return [];
}
const serverTools = [];
for (const tool of result.tools) {
const toolInstance = await createMCPTool({
res,
user,
provider,
userMCPAuthMap,
configServers,
streamId,
availableTools: result.availableTools,
toolKey: `${tool.name}${Constants.mcp_delimiter}${serverName}`,
config: serverConfig,
});
if (toolInstance) {
serverTools.push(toolInstance);
}
}
return serverTools;
}
/**
* Creates a single tool from the specified MCP Server via `toolKey`.
* @param {Object} params
* @param {ServerResponse} params.res - The Express response object for sending events.
* @param {IUser} params.user - The user from the request object.
* @param {string} params.toolKey - The toolKey for the tool.
* @param {string} params.model - The model for the tool.
* @param {number} [params.index]
* @param {AbortSignal} [params.signal]
* @param {string | null} [params.streamId] - The stream ID for resumable mode.
* @param {Providers | EModelEndpoint} params.provider - The provider for the tool.
* @param {LCAvailableTools} [params.availableTools]
* @param {Record<string, Record<string, string>>} [params.userMCPAuthMap]
* @param {import('@librechat/api').ParsedServerConfig} [params.config]
* @returns { Promise<typeof tool | { _call: (toolInput: Object | string) => unknown}> } An object with `_call` method to execute the tool input.
*/
async function createMCPTool({
res,
user,
index,
signal,
toolKey,
provider,
userMCPAuthMap,
availableTools,
config,
configServers,
streamId = null,
}) {
const [toolName, serverName] = toolKey.split(Constants.mcp_delimiter);
const serverConfig =
config ?? (await getMCPServersRegistry().getServerConfig(serverName, user?.id, configServers));
if (serverConfig?.url) {
const appConfig = await getAppConfig({ role: user?.role, tenantId: user?.tenantId });
const allowedDomains = appConfig?.mcpSettings?.allowedDomains;
const allowedAddresses = appConfig?.mcpSettings?.allowedAddresses;
const isDomainAllowed = await isMCPDomainAllowed(
serverConfig,
allowedDomains,
allowedAddresses,
);
if (!isDomainAllowed) {
logger.warn(`[MCP][${serverName}] Domain no longer allowed, skipping tool: ${toolName}`);
return undefined;
}
}
/** @type {LCTool | undefined} */
let toolDefinition = availableTools?.[toolKey]?.function;
if (!toolDefinition) {
const cachedAt = missingToolCache.get(toolKey);
if (cachedAt && Date.now() - cachedAt < MISSING_TOOL_TTL_MS) {
logger.debug(
`[MCP][${serverName}][${toolName}] Tool in negative cache, returning unavailable stub.`,
);
return createUnavailableToolStub(toolName, serverName);
}
logger.warn(
`[MCP][${serverName}][${toolName}] Requested tool not found in available tools, re-initializing MCP server.`,
);
const result = await reconnectServer({
res,
user,
index,
signal,
serverName,
configServers,
userMCPAuthMap,
streamId,
});
toolDefinition = result?.availableTools?.[toolKey]?.function;
if (!toolDefinition) {
missingToolCache.set(toolKey, Date.now());
evictStale(missingToolCache, MISSING_TOOL_TTL_MS);
}
}
if (!toolDefinition) {
logger.warn(
`[MCP][${serverName}][${toolName}] Tool definition not found, returning unavailable stub.`,
);
return createUnavailableToolStub(toolName, serverName);
}
return createToolInstance({
res,
provider,
toolName,
serverName,
serverConfig,
toolDefinition,
streamId,
});
}
function createToolInstance({
res,
toolName,
serverName,
serverConfig: capturedServerConfig,
toolDefinition,
provider: capturedProvider,
streamId = null,
}) {
/** @type {LCTool} */
const { description, parameters } = toolDefinition;
const isGoogle = capturedProvider === Providers.VERTEXAI || capturedProvider === Providers.GOOGLE;
let schema = parameters ? normalizeJsonSchema(resolveJsonSchemaRefs(parameters)) : null;
if (!schema || (isGoogle && isEmptyObjectSchema(schema))) {
schema = {
type: 'object',
properties: {
input: { type: 'string', description: 'Input for the tool' },
},
required: [],
};
}
const normalizedToolKey = `${toolName}${Constants.mcp_delimiter}${normalizeServerName(serverName)}`;
/** @type {(toolArguments: Object | string, config?: GraphRunnableConfig) => Promise<unknown>} */
const _call = async (toolArguments, config) => {
const userId = config?.configurable?.user?.id || config?.configurable?.user_id;
/** @type {ReturnType<typeof createAbortHandler>} */
let abortHandler = null;
/** @type {AbortSignal} */
let derivedSignal = null;
try {
const flowsCache = getLogStores(CacheKeys.FLOWS);
const flowManager = getFlowStateManager(flowsCache);
derivedSignal = config?.signal ? AbortSignal.any([config.signal]) : undefined;
const mcpManager = getMCPManager(userId);
const provider = (config?.metadata?.provider || capturedProvider)?.toLowerCase();
const { args: _args, stepId, ...toolCall } = config.toolCall ?? {};
const flowId = `${serverName}:oauth_login:${config.metadata.thread_id}:${config.metadata.run_id}`;
const runStepDeltaEmitter = createRunStepDeltaEmitter({
res,
stepId,
toolCall,
streamId,
});
const oauthStart = createOAuthStart({
flowId,
flowManager,
callback: runStepDeltaEmitter,
});
const oauthEnd = createOAuthEnd({
res,
stepId,
toolCall,
streamId,
});
if (derivedSignal) {
abortHandler = createAbortHandler({ userId, serverName, toolName, flowManager });
derivedSignal.addEventListener('abort', abortHandler, { once: true });
}
const customUserVars =
config?.configurable?.userMCPAuthMap?.[`${Constants.mcp_prefix}${serverName}`];
const result = await mcpManager.callTool({
serverName,
serverConfig: capturedServerConfig,
toolName,
provider,
toolArguments,
options: {
signal: derivedSignal,
},
user: config?.configurable?.user,
requestBody: config?.configurable?.requestBody,
customUserVars,
flowManager,
tokenMethods: {
findToken,
createToken,
updateToken,
deleteTokens,
},
oauthStart,
oauthEnd,
graphTokenResolver: getGraphApiToken,
});
if (isAssistantsEndpoint(provider) && Array.isArray(result)) {
return result[0];
}
return result;
} catch (error) {
logger.error(
`[MCP][${serverName}][${toolName}][User: ${userId}] Error calling MCP tool:`,
error,
);
/** OAuth error, provide a helpful message */
const isOAuthError =
error.message?.includes('401') ||
error.message?.includes('OAuth') ||
error.message?.includes('authentication') ||
error.message?.includes('Non-200 status code (401)');
if (isOAuthError) {
throw new Error(
`[MCP][${serverName}][${toolName}] OAuth authentication required. Please check the server logs for the authentication URL.`,
);
}
throw new Error(
`[MCP][${serverName}][${toolName}] tool call failed${error?.message ? `: ${error?.message}` : '.'}`,
);
} finally {
// Clean up abort handler to prevent memory leaks
if (abortHandler && derivedSignal) {
derivedSignal.removeEventListener('abort', abortHandler);
}
}
};
const toolInstance = tool(_call, {
schema,
name: normalizedToolKey,
description: description || '',
responseFormat: AgentConstants.CONTENT_AND_ARTIFACT,
});
toolInstance.mcp = true;
toolInstance.mcpRawServerName = serverName;
toolInstance.mcpJsonSchema = parameters;
return toolInstance;
}
/**
* Get MCP setup data including config, connections, and OAuth servers.
* Resolves config-source servers from admin Config overrides when tenant context is available.
* @param {string} userId - The user ID
* @param {{ role?: string, tenantId?: string }} [options] - Optional role/tenant context
* @returns {Object} Object containing mcpConfig, appConnections, userConnections, and oauthServers
*/
async function getMCPSetupData(userId, options = {}) {
const registry = getMCPServersRegistry();
const { role, tenantId } = options;
const appConfig = await getAppConfig({ role, tenantId, userId });
const configServers = await registry.ensureConfigServers(appConfig?.mcpConfig || {});
const mcpConfig = await registry.getAllServerConfigs(userId, configServers);
const mcpManager = getMCPManager(userId);
/** @type {Map<string, import('@librechat/api').MCPConnection>} */
let appConnections = new Map();
try {
// Use getLoaded() instead of getAll() to avoid forcing connection creation.
// getAll() creates connections for all servers, which is problematic for servers
// that require user context (e.g., those with {{LIBRECHAT_USER_ID}} placeholders).
appConnections = (await mcpManager.appConnections?.getLoaded()) || new Map();
} catch (error) {
logger.error(`[MCP][User: ${userId}] Error getting app connections:`, error);
}
const userConnections = mcpManager.getUserConnections(userId) || new Map();
const oauthServers = new Set(
Object.entries(mcpConfig)
.filter(([, config]) => config.requiresOAuth)
.map(([name]) => name),
);
return {
mcpConfig,
oauthServers,
appConnections,
userConnections,
};
}
/**
* Check OAuth flow status for a user and server
* @param {string} userId - The user ID
* @param {string} serverName - The server name
* @returns {Object} Object containing hasActiveFlow and hasFailedFlow flags
*/
async function checkOAuthFlowStatus(userId, serverName) {
const flowsCache = getLogStores(CacheKeys.FLOWS);
const flowManager = getFlowStateManager(flowsCache);
const flowId = MCPOAuthHandler.generateFlowId(userId, serverName);
try {
const flowState = await flowManager.getFlowState(flowId, 'mcp_oauth');
if (!flowState) {
return { hasActiveFlow: false, hasFailedFlow: false };
}
const flowAge = Date.now() - flowState.createdAt;
const flowTTL = flowState.ttl || 180000; // Default 3 minutes
if (flowState.status === 'FAILED' || flowAge > flowTTL) {
const wasCancelled = flowState.error && flowState.error.includes('cancelled');
if (wasCancelled) {
logger.debug(`[MCP Connection Status] Found cancelled OAuth flow for ${serverName}`, {
flowId,
status: flowState.status,
error: flowState.error,
});
return { hasActiveFlow: false, hasFailedFlow: false };
} else {
logger.debug(`[MCP Connection Status] Found failed OAuth flow for ${serverName}`, {
flowId,
status: flowState.status,
flowAge,
flowTTL,
timedOut: flowAge > flowTTL,
error: flowState.error,
});
return { hasActiveFlow: false, hasFailedFlow: true };
}
}
if (flowState.status === 'PENDING') {
logger.debug(`[MCP Connection Status] Found active OAuth flow for ${serverName}`, {
flowId,
flowAge,
flowTTL,
});
return { hasActiveFlow: true, hasFailedFlow: false };
}
return { hasActiveFlow: false, hasFailedFlow: false };
} catch (error) {
logger.error(`[MCP Connection Status] Error checking OAuth flows for ${serverName}:`, error);
return { hasActiveFlow: false, hasFailedFlow: false };
}
}
/**
* Get connection status for a specific MCP server
* @param {string} userId - The user ID
* @param {string} serverName - The server name
* @param {import('@librechat/api').ParsedServerConfig} config - The server configuration
* @param {Map<string, import('@librechat/api').MCPConnection>} appConnections - App-level connections
* @param {Map<string, import('@librechat/api').MCPConnection>} userConnections - User-level connections
* @param {Set} oauthServers - Set of OAuth servers
* @returns {Object} Object containing requiresOAuth and connectionState
*/
async function getServerConnectionStatus(
userId,
serverName,
config,
appConnections,
userConnections,
oauthServers,
) {
const connection = appConnections.get(serverName) || userConnections.get(serverName);
const isStaleOrDoNotExist = connection ? connection?.isStale(config.updatedAt) : true;
const baseConnectionState = isStaleOrDoNotExist
? 'disconnected'
: connection?.connectionState || 'disconnected';
let finalConnectionState = baseConnectionState;
// connection state overrides specific to OAuth servers
if (baseConnectionState === 'disconnected' && oauthServers.has(serverName)) {
// check if server is actively being reconnected
const oauthReconnectionManager = getOAuthReconnectionManager();
if (oauthReconnectionManager.isReconnecting(userId, serverName)) {
finalConnectionState = 'connecting';
} else {
const { hasActiveFlow, hasFailedFlow } = await checkOAuthFlowStatus(userId, serverName);
if (hasFailedFlow) {
finalConnectionState = 'error';
} else if (hasActiveFlow) {
finalConnectionState = 'connecting';
}
}
}
return {
requiresOAuth: oauthServers.has(serverName),
connectionState: finalConnectionState,
};
}
module.exports = {
createMCPTool,
createMCPTools,
getMCPSetupData,
resolveConfigServers,
resolveAllMcpConfigs,
checkOAuthFlowStatus,
getServerConnectionStatus,
createUnavailableToolStub,
};