mirror of
https://github.com/danny-avila/LibreChat.git
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* 🪟 feat: Add allowedAddresses Exemption List For SSRF-Guarded Targets LibreChat already blocks SSRF-prone targets (private IPs, loopback, link-local, .internal/.local TLDs) at every server-side fetch site that consumes user-controllable URLs — custom-endpoint baseURLs, MCP servers, OpenAPI Actions, and OAuth endpoints. The only existing escape hatch is `allowedDomains`, but that flips the field into a strict whitelist: adding `127.0.0.1` to permit a self-hosted Ollama also blocks every public destination that isn't in the list. Introduce `allowedAddresses` as the orthogonal primitive: a private- IP-space exemption list. When a hostname or its resolved IP appears in the list, the SSRF block is bypassed for that target. Public destinations remain reachable. Operators can now run self-hosted LLMs / MCP servers / Action endpoints on private addresses without weakening the default-deny posture for everything else. Schema additions in `packages/data-provider/src/config.ts`: - `endpoints.allowedAddresses` (new — gates `validateEndpointURL`) - `mcpSettings.allowedAddresses` (parallel to `allowedDomains`) - `actions.allowedAddresses` (parallel to `allowedDomains`) Core changes in `packages/api/src/auth/`: - New `isAddressAllowed(hostnameOrIP, allowedAddresses)` — pure, case-insensitive, bracket-stripped literal match. - Threaded the list through `isSSRFTarget`, `resolveHostnameSSRF`, `isDomainAllowedCore`, `isActionDomainAllowed`, `isMCPDomainAllowed`, `isOAuthUrlAllowed`, and `validateEndpointURL`. - Extended `createSSRFSafeAgents` and `createSSRFSafeUndiciConnect` to accept the list, building an SSRF-safe DNS lookup that exempts matching hostnames/IPs at TCP connect time (TOCTOU-safe). Wiring: - Custom and OpenAI endpoint initialize sites pass `endpoints.allowedAddresses` to `validateEndpointURL`. - `MCPServersRegistry` stores `allowedAddresses` and exposes it via `getAllowedAddresses()`. The factory, connection class, manager, `UserConnectionManager`, and `ConnectionsRepository` all thread it through to the SSRF utilities. - `MCPOAuthHandler.initiateOAuthFlow`, `refreshOAuthTokens`, and `validateOAuthUrl` accept the list and consult it on every URL validation along the OAuth chain. - `ToolService`, `ActionService`, and the assistants/agents action routes pass `actions.allowedAddresses` to `isActionDomainAllowed` and to `createSSRFSafeAgents` for runtime action calls. - `initializeMCPs.js` reads `mcpSettings.allowedAddresses` from the app config and forwards it to the registry constructor. Documentation: - `librechat.example.yaml` shows the new field next to each existing `allowedDomains` block, with a note clarifying that `allowedAddresses` is an exemption list (not a whitelist). Tests: - Unit tests for `isAddressAllowed` covering literal IPs, hostnames, IPv6 brackets, case insensitivity, and partial-match rejection. - Exemption tests for every entry point: `isSSRFTarget`, `resolveHostnameSSRF`, `validateEndpointURL`, `isActionDomainAllowed`, `isMCPDomainAllowed`, `isOAuthUrlAllowed`. - Existing tests updated to reflect the new optional parameter. Default behavior is unchanged: omitted = empty list = no exemptions. * 🩹 fix: Plumb allowedAddresses Through AppConfig endpoints Type The initial PR added `endpoints.allowedAddresses` to the data-provider config schema and consumed it in the endpoint initialize sites, but the runtime `AppConfig.endpoints` shape in `@librechat/data-schemas` was a hand-maintained subset that didn't include the new field — so `tsc` rejected `appConfig.endpoints.allowedAddresses`. Add the field to `AppConfig['endpoints']` in `packages/data-schemas/src/types/app.ts` and forward it from the loaded config in `packages/data-schemas/src/app/endpoints.ts` so the runtime config carries the value. Update `initializeMCPs.spec.js` to expect the third positional argument (`allowedAddresses`) on the `createMCPServersRegistry` call. * 🩹 fix: Enforce allowedDomains Before allowedAddresses In isOAuthUrlAllowed The initial implementation checked the address exemption first, so a URL whose hostname appeared in `allowedAddresses` would return true even when the admin had configured `allowedDomains` as a strict bound on OAuth endpoints. A malicious MCP server could advertise OAuth metadata, token, or revocation URLs at any address the admin had permitted for an unrelated reason (a self-hosted LLM at `127.0.0.1`, for example) and pass validation, expanding SSRF reach beyond the configured domain whitelist. Reorder: when `allowedDomains` is set, treat it as authoritative — return true only if the URL matches a domain entry, otherwise fall through to false. The address exemption only applies when no `allowedDomains` is configured (mirrors how the downstream SSRF check in `validateOAuthUrl` consults `allowedAddresses`). Add a regression test asserting that an `allowedAddresses` entry does not broaden a configured `allowedDomains` list. Reported by chatgpt-codex-connector on PR #12933. * 🩹 fix: Forward allowedAddresses To Remaining OAuth Callers Two `MCPOAuthHandler` callers still used the pre-feature signatures and were silently dropping the new `allowedAddresses` argument: - `api/server/routes/mcp.js` invoked `initiateOAuthFlow` with the old 5-argument shape, so OAuth flows initiated through the route handler ignored the registry's `getAllowedAddresses()` and would reject any metadata/authorization/token URL on a permitted private host. - `api/server/controllers/UserController.js#maybeUninstallOAuthMCP` invoked `revokeOAuthToken` without the address exemption, so uninstalling an OAuth-backed MCP server on a permitted private host would fail at the revocation step even though the rest of the MCP connection path now permits it. Both sites now read `allowedAddresses` from the registry alongside `allowedDomains` and forward it. Reported by Copilot on PR #12933. * 🩹 fix: Update Test Mocks And Assertions For OAuth allowedAddresses The previous commit started passing `allowedAddresses` to `MCPOAuthHandler.initiateOAuthFlow` from `api/server/routes/mcp.js` and to `MCPOAuthHandler.revokeOAuthToken` from `api/server/controllers/UserController.js`, but the corresponding test files mocked the registry without `getAllowedAddresses` (causing `TypeError`s) and asserted the old positional shape on `toHaveBeenCalledWith`. Update the mocks and assertions to match the new arity: - `api/server/routes/__tests__/mcp.spec.js`: add `getAllowedDomains`/`getAllowedAddresses` to the registry mock and expect the additional positional args on `initiateOAuthFlow`. - `api/server/controllers/__tests__/maybeUninstallOAuthMCP.spec.js`: add a `getAllowedAddresses` mock alongside the existing `getAllowedDomains` and seed it in `setupOAuthServerFound`. - `api/server/controllers/__tests__/UserController.mcpOAuth.spec.js`: add `getAllowedAddresses` to the registry mock and expect the trailing `null` arg on the three `revokeOAuthToken` assertions. * 🛡️ fix: Address Comprehensive Review — Scope allowedAddresses To Private IP Space Major findings from the comprehensive PR review (severity → fix): **CRITICAL — `validateOAuthUrl` SSRF fallback bypass.** When `allowedDomains` is configured and a URL fails the whitelist, the SSRF fallback in `validateOAuthUrl` was still passing `allowedAddresses` to `isSSRFTarget` / `resolveHostnameSSRF`, letting a malicious MCP server advertise OAuth endpoints at any address the admin had permitted for an unrelated reason. Suppress `allowedAddresses` in the fallback when `allowedDomains` is active — the address exemption is opt-in for the no-whitelist mode only. **MAJOR — WebSocket transport SSRF check ignored exemptions.** The `constructTransport` WebSocket branch called `resolveHostnameSSRF(wsHostname)` without `this.allowedAddresses`, so a permitted private MCP server would pass `isMCPDomainAllowed` but be blocked at transport creation. Forward the exemption. **Scope `allowedAddresses` to private IP space only (operator directive).** The exemption list is for permitting private/internal targets; it must not be a back-door to broaden trust to public destinations. - Schema (`packages/data-provider/src/config.ts`): new `allowedAddressesSchema` rejects URLs (`://`), paths/CIDR (`/`), whitespace, and public IPv4/IPv6 literals at config-load time. Wired into `endpoints`, `mcpSettings`, and `actions`. - Runtime (`packages/api/src/auth/domain.ts`): `isAddressAllowed` now drops public-IP candidates and public-IP entries on the match path — defense in depth so a misconfigured runtime list never grants exemption. - Hot path (`packages/api/src/auth/agent.ts`): `buildSSRFSafeLookup` pre-normalizes the list into a `Set<string>` once at construction and applies the same scoping filter, so the connect-time DNS lookup is an O(1) Set membership check instead of a full re-iterate-and-normalize on every outbound request. **Test coverage for the connect-time and OAuth-fallback paths.** - `agent.spec.ts`: new describe block exercising `buildSSRFSafeLookup` and `createSSRFSafe*` with `allowedAddresses` — hostname-literal exemption, resolved-IP exemption, public-IP scoping, URL/CIDR/whitespace rejection, and the default no-list block. - `handler.allowedAddresses.test.ts` (new): integration tests for `validateOAuthUrl` — covers both the no-domains-set "permit private" path and the strict-bound regression where `allowedAddresses` must NOT bypass `allowedDomains`. **Documentation & cleanup.** - `connection.ts` redirect SSRF check: explicit comment that `allowedAddresses` is intentionally NOT consulted for redirect targets (server-controlled, must not inherit the admin's exemption). - `MCPConnectionFactory.test.ts`: replaced an `eslint-disable` with a proper `import { getTenantId } from '@librechat/data-schemas'`. The disable was added to make a pre-existing `require()` quiet — the cleaner fix is to use the existing top-level import. Updated `MCPConnectionSSRF.test.ts` WebSocket SSRF assertions to match the new two-argument call shape (`hostname, allowedAddresses`). * 🩹 fix: Require Absolute URL Before allowedAddresses Trust Bypass In isOAuthUrlAllowed `parseDomainSpec` is lenient — it silently prepends `https://` to schemeless inputs so it can match patterns like bare `example.com`. That leniency leaked into `isOAuthUrlAllowed`'s new `allowedAddresses` short-circuit: a value like `10.0.0.5/oauth` (no scheme) would parse successfully via the prepended default, hit the address-exemption path, return `true`, and skip `validateOAuthUrl`'s strict `new URL(url)` parse-or-throw — only to fail later in OAuth discovery with a less clear runtime error. Add a strict `new URL(url)` gate at the top of `isOAuthUrlAllowed`. Schemeless inputs now fall through to `validateOAuthUrl`'s explicit "Invalid OAuth <field>" rejection. Tests added in both `auth/domain.spec.ts` (unit) and the OAuth handler integration spec (end-to-end). Reported by chatgpt-codex-connector (P2) on PR #12933. * 🛡️ fix: Address Follow-Up Comprehensive Review — Schema Tests, Shared Normalization, host:port Auditing the second comprehensive review: **F1 MAJOR — schema validation untested.** `allowedAddressesSchema` had zero coverage, so a regression in the three refinement stages or the three wiring locations (`endpoints` / `mcpSettings` / `actions`) would silently let invalid entries reach the runtime. Added a dedicated `describe('allowedAddressesSchema')` block in `config.spec.ts` covering: valid private IPs (v4 + v6, including the previously-missed 192.0.0.0/24 range), accepted hostnames, all rejection categories (URLs, CIDR, paths, whitespace tabs/newlines, host:port, public IP literals), and full `configSchema.parse()` integration at each of the three nesting points. **F2 MINOR — `isPrivateIPv4Literal` divergence.** The schema reimpl in `packages/data-provider` was discarding the `c` octet, so the `192.0.0.0/24` (RFC 5736 IETF protocol assignments) range that the authoritative `isPrivateIPv4` accepts was being rejected with a misleading "public IP" error. Destructure `c` and add the missing range check; covered by the new schema tests. **F3 MINOR — DRY violation across `domain.ts` and `agent.ts`.** Both files had independent normalization implementations with a subtle whitespace-check divergence (`/\s/` vs `.includes(' ')`). Extracted the shared logic into a new `packages/api/src/auth/allowedAddresses.ts` module that both consumers import: - `normalizeAddressEntry(entry)` — single-entry shape check - `looksLikeHostPort(entry)` — host:port detector (used by F4) - `normalizeAllowedAddressesSet(list)` — pre-normalized Set for the connect-time hot path - `isAddressInAllowedSet(candidate, set)` — membership check that enforces private-IP scoping on the candidate Both `isAddressAllowed` (preflight) and `buildSSRFSafeLookup` (connect) now go through the same primitives; the whitespace divergence is gone. To break the import cycle (`allowedAddresses` needs `isPrivateIP`, `domain` previously owned it), extracted IP private-range detection into a leaf `auth/ip.ts` module. `domain.ts` re-exports `isPrivateIP` for backward compatibility with existing call sites. **F4 MINOR — `host:port` silently misclassified.** Entries like `localhost:8080` previously slipped through the URL/path guard, were mis-detected as IPv6, failed `isPrivateIP`, and were silently dropped with a misleading "public IP" schema error. Added an explicit `looksLikeHostPort` check with a clear error: "allowedAddresses entries must not include a port — list the bare hostname or IP only." Bare `::1`, `[::1]`, and other valid IPv6 literals are intentionally not matched (regex distinguishes by colon count and the bracketed `[ipv6]:port` form). **F5 MINOR — hostname-trust documentation gap.** Hostname entries short-circuit `resolveHostnameSSRF` before any DNS lookup — that's a deliberate design (admin trusts the name) but it means the exemption follows whatever the name resolves to at runtime. Added an explicit note in `librechat.example.yaml` for both `mcpSettings.allowedAddresses` and `endpoints.allowedAddresses`: "a hostname entry trusts whatever IP that name resolves to. Only list hostnames whose DNS you control. Prefer literal IPs when you can." **F6** (8 positional params) is flagged for follow-up; refactor to an options object is a breaking-API change deferred to a separate PR. **F7** (redirect/WebSocket asymmetry, NIT, conf 40) — skipping; the existing inline comment is sufficient. * 🧹 chore: Address Follow-Up NITs — Import Order And Mirror-Function Naming Three NITs from the latest comprehensive review: **NIT #1 (conf 85) — local import order.** AGENTS.md requires local imports sorted longest-to-shortest. Both `domain.ts` and `agent.ts` had `./ip` (shorter) before `./allowedAddresses` (longer). Swapped. **NIT #2 (conf 60) — missing cross-reference.** The schema-side `isHostPortShape` in `packages/data-provider/src/config.ts` had no note pointing at the canonical runtime mirror. Added a JSDoc paragraph explaining the mirror relationship and why a local copy exists (the data-provider package can't import from `@librechat/api` without creating a circular dependency). **NIT #3 (conf 50) — naming inconsistency.** Renamed `isHostPortShape` → `looksLikeHostPort` so the schema mirror matches the runtime helper exactly. Kept as a separate function (not a shared import) for the same circular-dependency reason; the matching name makes it obvious they should stay in lockstep.
300 lines
11 KiB
JavaScript
300 lines
11 KiB
JavaScript
const mockGetTokens = jest.fn();
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const mockDeleteUserTokens = jest.fn();
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const mockGetClientInfoAndMetadata = jest.fn();
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const mockRevokeOAuthToken = jest.fn();
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const mockGetServerConfig = jest.fn();
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const mockGetOAuthServers = jest.fn();
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const mockGetAllowedDomains = jest.fn();
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const mockGetAllowedAddresses = jest.fn();
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const mockDeleteFlow = jest.fn();
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const mockGetLogStores = jest.fn();
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const mockFindToken = jest.fn();
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const mockDeleteTokens = jest.fn();
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const mockLoggerInfo = jest.fn();
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const mockLoggerWarn = jest.fn();
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const mockLoggerError = jest.fn();
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jest.mock('@librechat/data-schemas', () => ({
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logger: { info: mockLoggerInfo, warn: mockLoggerWarn, error: mockLoggerError },
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webSearchKeys: [],
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}));
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jest.mock('@librechat/api', () => {
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return {
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MCPOAuthHandler: {
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revokeOAuthToken: (...args) => mockRevokeOAuthToken(...args),
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generateFlowId: (userId, serverName) => `${userId}:${serverName}`,
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},
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MCPTokenStorage: {
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getTokens: (...args) => mockGetTokens(...args),
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getClientInfoAndMetadata: (...args) => mockGetClientInfoAndMetadata(...args),
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deleteUserTokens: (...args) => mockDeleteUserTokens(...args),
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},
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normalizeHttpError: jest.fn(),
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extractWebSearchEnvVars: jest.fn(),
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needsRefresh: jest.fn(),
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getNewS3URL: jest.fn(),
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};
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});
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jest.mock('librechat-data-provider', () => ({
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Tools: {},
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CacheKeys: { FLOWS: 'flows' },
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Constants: { mcp_delimiter: '::', mcp_prefix: 'mcp_' },
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FileSources: {},
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ResourceType: {},
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}));
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jest.mock('~/config', () => ({
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getMCPManager: jest.fn(),
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getFlowStateManager: jest.fn(() => ({
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deleteFlow: (...args) => mockDeleteFlow(...args),
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})),
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getMCPServersRegistry: jest.fn(() => ({
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getServerConfig: (...args) => mockGetServerConfig(...args),
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getOAuthServers: (...args) => mockGetOAuthServers(...args),
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getAllowedDomains: (...args) => mockGetAllowedDomains(...args),
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getAllowedAddresses: (...args) => mockGetAllowedAddresses(...args),
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})),
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}));
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jest.mock('~/cache', () => ({
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getLogStores: (...args) => mockGetLogStores(...args),
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}));
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jest.mock('~/server/services/PluginService', () => ({
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updateUserPluginAuth: jest.fn(),
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deleteUserPluginAuth: jest.fn(),
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}));
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jest.mock('~/server/services/twoFactorService', () => ({
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verifyOTPOrBackupCode: jest.fn(),
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}));
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jest.mock('~/server/services/AuthService', () => ({
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verifyEmail: jest.fn(),
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resendVerificationEmail: jest.fn(),
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}));
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jest.mock('~/server/services/Config/getCachedTools', () => ({
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invalidateCachedTools: jest.fn(),
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}));
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jest.mock('~/server/services/Files/process', () => ({
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processDeleteRequest: jest.fn(),
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}));
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jest.mock('~/server/services/Config', () => ({
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getAppConfig: jest.fn(),
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}));
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jest.mock('~/models', () => ({
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findToken: (...args) => mockFindToken(...args),
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deleteTokens: (...args) => mockDeleteTokens(...args),
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updateUser: jest.fn(),
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deleteAllUserSessions: jest.fn(),
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deleteAllSharedLinks: jest.fn(),
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updateUserPlugins: jest.fn(),
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deleteUserById: jest.fn(),
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deleteMessages: jest.fn(),
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deletePresets: jest.fn(),
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deleteUserKey: jest.fn(),
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getUserById: jest.fn(),
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deleteConvos: jest.fn(),
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deleteFiles: jest.fn(),
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getFiles: jest.fn(),
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deleteToolCalls: jest.fn(),
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deleteUserAgents: jest.fn(),
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deleteUserPrompts: jest.fn(),
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deleteTransactions: jest.fn(),
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deleteBalances: jest.fn(),
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deleteAllAgentApiKeys: jest.fn(),
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deleteAssistants: jest.fn(),
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deleteConversationTags: jest.fn(),
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deleteAllUserMemories: jest.fn(),
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deleteActions: jest.fn(),
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removeUserFromAllGroups: jest.fn(),
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deleteAclEntries: jest.fn(),
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getSoleOwnedResourceIds: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue([]),
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}));
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const { maybeUninstallOAuthMCP } = require('~/server/controllers/UserController');
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const userId = 'user-123';
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const pluginKey = 'mcp_acme';
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const serverName = 'acme';
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const serverConfig = {
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url: 'https://acme.example.com',
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oauth: {
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revocation_endpoint: 'https://acme.example.com/revoke',
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revocation_endpoint_auth_methods_supported: ['client_secret_basic'],
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},
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oauth_headers: { 'X-Tenant': 'acme' },
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};
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const appConfig = {
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mcpServers: { acme: serverConfig },
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};
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const clientInfo = { client_id: 'cid', client_secret: 'csec' };
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const clientMetadata = {};
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function setupOAuthServerFound() {
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mockGetServerConfig.mockResolvedValue(serverConfig);
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mockGetOAuthServers.mockResolvedValue(new Set([serverName]));
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mockGetAllowedDomains.mockReturnValue(['https://acme.example.com']);
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mockGetAllowedAddresses.mockReturnValue(null);
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mockGetClientInfoAndMetadata.mockResolvedValue({ clientInfo, clientMetadata });
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}
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describe('maybeUninstallOAuthMCP', () => {
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beforeEach(() => {
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jest.clearAllMocks();
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});
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test('is a no-op when pluginKey is not an MCP key', async () => {
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await maybeUninstallOAuthMCP(userId, 'plugin_google_calendar', appConfig);
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expect(mockGetServerConfig).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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expect(mockGetTokens).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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expect(mockDeleteUserTokens).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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expect(mockDeleteFlow).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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test('clears stored state when the MCP server is not an OAuth server', async () => {
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mockGetServerConfig.mockResolvedValue(serverConfig);
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mockGetOAuthServers.mockResolvedValue(new Set(['other']));
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await maybeUninstallOAuthMCP(userId, pluginKey, appConfig);
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expect(mockGetClientInfoAndMetadata).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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expect(mockGetTokens).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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expect(mockDeleteUserTokens).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
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expect(mockDeleteUserTokens.mock.calls[0][0]).toMatchObject({ userId, serverName });
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expect(mockDeleteFlow).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
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});
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test('clears stored state when client info is missing', async () => {
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setupOAuthServerFound();
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mockGetClientInfoAndMetadata.mockResolvedValue(null);
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await maybeUninstallOAuthMCP(userId, pluginKey, appConfig);
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expect(mockGetTokens).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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expect(mockDeleteUserTokens).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
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expect(mockDeleteUserTokens.mock.calls[0][0]).toMatchObject({ userId, serverName });
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expect(mockDeleteFlow).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
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});
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test('clears stored state when client info cannot be loaded', async () => {
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setupOAuthServerFound();
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mockGetClientInfoAndMetadata.mockRejectedValue(new Error('bad client data'));
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mockDeleteUserTokens.mockResolvedValue(undefined);
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mockDeleteFlow.mockResolvedValue(undefined);
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await maybeUninstallOAuthMCP(userId, pluginKey, appConfig);
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expect(mockGetTokens).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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expect(mockDeleteUserTokens).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
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expect(mockDeleteUserTokens.mock.calls[0][0]).toMatchObject({ userId, serverName });
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expect(mockDeleteFlow).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
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expect(mockLoggerWarn).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
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`[maybeUninstallOAuthMCP] Unable to load OAuth client metadata for ${serverName}; clearing local MCP OAuth state only.`,
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expect.any(Error),
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);
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});
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test('revokes both tokens and runs cleanup on happy path', async () => {
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setupOAuthServerFound();
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mockGetTokens.mockResolvedValue({
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access_token: 'access-abc',
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refresh_token: 'refresh-xyz',
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});
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mockRevokeOAuthToken.mockResolvedValue(undefined);
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mockDeleteUserTokens.mockResolvedValue(undefined);
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mockDeleteFlow.mockResolvedValue(undefined);
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await maybeUninstallOAuthMCP(userId, pluginKey, appConfig);
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expect(mockRevokeOAuthToken).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
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expect(mockRevokeOAuthToken.mock.calls[0][1]).toBe('access-abc');
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expect(mockRevokeOAuthToken.mock.calls[0][2]).toBe('access');
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expect(mockRevokeOAuthToken.mock.calls[1][1]).toBe('refresh-xyz');
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expect(mockRevokeOAuthToken.mock.calls[1][2]).toBe('refresh');
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expect(mockDeleteUserTokens).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
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expect(mockDeleteUserTokens.mock.calls[0][0]).toMatchObject({ userId, serverName });
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expect(mockDeleteFlow).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
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expect(mockDeleteFlow.mock.calls[0][1]).toBe('mcp_get_tokens');
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expect(mockDeleteFlow.mock.calls[1][1]).toBe('mcp_oauth');
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});
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test('skips revocation but still runs cleanup when token retrieval fails', async () => {
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setupOAuthServerFound();
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mockGetTokens.mockRejectedValue(new Error('missing'));
|
|
mockDeleteUserTokens.mockResolvedValue(undefined);
|
|
mockDeleteFlow.mockResolvedValue(undefined);
|
|
|
|
await expect(maybeUninstallOAuthMCP(userId, pluginKey, appConfig)).resolves.toBeUndefined();
|
|
|
|
expect(mockRevokeOAuthToken).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
|
|
expect(mockDeleteUserTokens).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
|
|
expect(mockDeleteFlow).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
|
|
expect(mockLoggerWarn).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
|
|
`[maybeUninstallOAuthMCP] Unable to load OAuth tokens for ${serverName}; clearing local token state.`,
|
|
expect.any(Error),
|
|
);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('skips revocation, logs warn, and still runs cleanup on unexpected token-retrieval error', async () => {
|
|
setupOAuthServerFound();
|
|
mockGetTokens.mockRejectedValue(new Error('boom: unreachable'));
|
|
mockDeleteUserTokens.mockResolvedValue(undefined);
|
|
mockDeleteFlow.mockResolvedValue(undefined);
|
|
|
|
await expect(maybeUninstallOAuthMCP(userId, pluginKey, appConfig)).resolves.toBeUndefined();
|
|
|
|
expect(mockRevokeOAuthToken).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
|
|
expect(mockDeleteUserTokens).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
|
|
expect(mockDeleteFlow).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
|
|
expect(mockLoggerWarn).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
|
|
`[maybeUninstallOAuthMCP] Unable to load OAuth tokens for ${serverName}; clearing local token state.`,
|
|
expect.any(Error),
|
|
);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('continues cleanup when only one token type is present', async () => {
|
|
setupOAuthServerFound();
|
|
mockGetTokens.mockResolvedValue({ access_token: 'only-access' });
|
|
mockRevokeOAuthToken.mockResolvedValue(undefined);
|
|
mockDeleteUserTokens.mockResolvedValue(undefined);
|
|
mockDeleteFlow.mockResolvedValue(undefined);
|
|
|
|
await maybeUninstallOAuthMCP(userId, pluginKey, appConfig);
|
|
|
|
expect(mockRevokeOAuthToken).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
|
|
expect(mockRevokeOAuthToken.mock.calls[0][2]).toBe('access');
|
|
expect(mockDeleteUserTokens).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
|
|
expect(mockDeleteFlow).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('still runs cleanup even when both revocation calls fail', async () => {
|
|
setupOAuthServerFound();
|
|
mockGetTokens.mockResolvedValue({
|
|
access_token: 'a',
|
|
refresh_token: 'r',
|
|
});
|
|
mockRevokeOAuthToken.mockRejectedValue(new Error('network down'));
|
|
mockDeleteUserTokens.mockResolvedValue(undefined);
|
|
mockDeleteFlow.mockResolvedValue(undefined);
|
|
|
|
await expect(maybeUninstallOAuthMCP(userId, pluginKey, appConfig)).resolves.toBeUndefined();
|
|
|
|
expect(mockRevokeOAuthToken).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
|
|
expect(mockDeleteUserTokens).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
|
|
expect(mockDeleteFlow).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
|
|
expect(mockLoggerError).toHaveBeenCalled();
|
|
});
|
|
});
|