mirror of
https://github.com/danny-avila/LibreChat.git
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* 🪟 feat: Add allowedAddresses Exemption List For SSRF-Guarded Targets LibreChat already blocks SSRF-prone targets (private IPs, loopback, link-local, .internal/.local TLDs) at every server-side fetch site that consumes user-controllable URLs — custom-endpoint baseURLs, MCP servers, OpenAPI Actions, and OAuth endpoints. The only existing escape hatch is `allowedDomains`, but that flips the field into a strict whitelist: adding `127.0.0.1` to permit a self-hosted Ollama also blocks every public destination that isn't in the list. Introduce `allowedAddresses` as the orthogonal primitive: a private- IP-space exemption list. When a hostname or its resolved IP appears in the list, the SSRF block is bypassed for that target. Public destinations remain reachable. Operators can now run self-hosted LLMs / MCP servers / Action endpoints on private addresses without weakening the default-deny posture for everything else. Schema additions in `packages/data-provider/src/config.ts`: - `endpoints.allowedAddresses` (new — gates `validateEndpointURL`) - `mcpSettings.allowedAddresses` (parallel to `allowedDomains`) - `actions.allowedAddresses` (parallel to `allowedDomains`) Core changes in `packages/api/src/auth/`: - New `isAddressAllowed(hostnameOrIP, allowedAddresses)` — pure, case-insensitive, bracket-stripped literal match. - Threaded the list through `isSSRFTarget`, `resolveHostnameSSRF`, `isDomainAllowedCore`, `isActionDomainAllowed`, `isMCPDomainAllowed`, `isOAuthUrlAllowed`, and `validateEndpointURL`. - Extended `createSSRFSafeAgents` and `createSSRFSafeUndiciConnect` to accept the list, building an SSRF-safe DNS lookup that exempts matching hostnames/IPs at TCP connect time (TOCTOU-safe). Wiring: - Custom and OpenAI endpoint initialize sites pass `endpoints.allowedAddresses` to `validateEndpointURL`. - `MCPServersRegistry` stores `allowedAddresses` and exposes it via `getAllowedAddresses()`. The factory, connection class, manager, `UserConnectionManager`, and `ConnectionsRepository` all thread it through to the SSRF utilities. - `MCPOAuthHandler.initiateOAuthFlow`, `refreshOAuthTokens`, and `validateOAuthUrl` accept the list and consult it on every URL validation along the OAuth chain. - `ToolService`, `ActionService`, and the assistants/agents action routes pass `actions.allowedAddresses` to `isActionDomainAllowed` and to `createSSRFSafeAgents` for runtime action calls. - `initializeMCPs.js` reads `mcpSettings.allowedAddresses` from the app config and forwards it to the registry constructor. Documentation: - `librechat.example.yaml` shows the new field next to each existing `allowedDomains` block, with a note clarifying that `allowedAddresses` is an exemption list (not a whitelist). Tests: - Unit tests for `isAddressAllowed` covering literal IPs, hostnames, IPv6 brackets, case insensitivity, and partial-match rejection. - Exemption tests for every entry point: `isSSRFTarget`, `resolveHostnameSSRF`, `validateEndpointURL`, `isActionDomainAllowed`, `isMCPDomainAllowed`, `isOAuthUrlAllowed`. - Existing tests updated to reflect the new optional parameter. Default behavior is unchanged: omitted = empty list = no exemptions. * 🩹 fix: Plumb allowedAddresses Through AppConfig endpoints Type The initial PR added `endpoints.allowedAddresses` to the data-provider config schema and consumed it in the endpoint initialize sites, but the runtime `AppConfig.endpoints` shape in `@librechat/data-schemas` was a hand-maintained subset that didn't include the new field — so `tsc` rejected `appConfig.endpoints.allowedAddresses`. Add the field to `AppConfig['endpoints']` in `packages/data-schemas/src/types/app.ts` and forward it from the loaded config in `packages/data-schemas/src/app/endpoints.ts` so the runtime config carries the value. Update `initializeMCPs.spec.js` to expect the third positional argument (`allowedAddresses`) on the `createMCPServersRegistry` call. * 🩹 fix: Enforce allowedDomains Before allowedAddresses In isOAuthUrlAllowed The initial implementation checked the address exemption first, so a URL whose hostname appeared in `allowedAddresses` would return true even when the admin had configured `allowedDomains` as a strict bound on OAuth endpoints. A malicious MCP server could advertise OAuth metadata, token, or revocation URLs at any address the admin had permitted for an unrelated reason (a self-hosted LLM at `127.0.0.1`, for example) and pass validation, expanding SSRF reach beyond the configured domain whitelist. Reorder: when `allowedDomains` is set, treat it as authoritative — return true only if the URL matches a domain entry, otherwise fall through to false. The address exemption only applies when no `allowedDomains` is configured (mirrors how the downstream SSRF check in `validateOAuthUrl` consults `allowedAddresses`). Add a regression test asserting that an `allowedAddresses` entry does not broaden a configured `allowedDomains` list. Reported by chatgpt-codex-connector on PR #12933. * 🩹 fix: Forward allowedAddresses To Remaining OAuth Callers Two `MCPOAuthHandler` callers still used the pre-feature signatures and were silently dropping the new `allowedAddresses` argument: - `api/server/routes/mcp.js` invoked `initiateOAuthFlow` with the old 5-argument shape, so OAuth flows initiated through the route handler ignored the registry's `getAllowedAddresses()` and would reject any metadata/authorization/token URL on a permitted private host. - `api/server/controllers/UserController.js#maybeUninstallOAuthMCP` invoked `revokeOAuthToken` without the address exemption, so uninstalling an OAuth-backed MCP server on a permitted private host would fail at the revocation step even though the rest of the MCP connection path now permits it. Both sites now read `allowedAddresses` from the registry alongside `allowedDomains` and forward it. Reported by Copilot on PR #12933. * 🩹 fix: Update Test Mocks And Assertions For OAuth allowedAddresses The previous commit started passing `allowedAddresses` to `MCPOAuthHandler.initiateOAuthFlow` from `api/server/routes/mcp.js` and to `MCPOAuthHandler.revokeOAuthToken` from `api/server/controllers/UserController.js`, but the corresponding test files mocked the registry without `getAllowedAddresses` (causing `TypeError`s) and asserted the old positional shape on `toHaveBeenCalledWith`. Update the mocks and assertions to match the new arity: - `api/server/routes/__tests__/mcp.spec.js`: add `getAllowedDomains`/`getAllowedAddresses` to the registry mock and expect the additional positional args on `initiateOAuthFlow`. - `api/server/controllers/__tests__/maybeUninstallOAuthMCP.spec.js`: add a `getAllowedAddresses` mock alongside the existing `getAllowedDomains` and seed it in `setupOAuthServerFound`. - `api/server/controllers/__tests__/UserController.mcpOAuth.spec.js`: add `getAllowedAddresses` to the registry mock and expect the trailing `null` arg on the three `revokeOAuthToken` assertions. * 🛡️ fix: Address Comprehensive Review — Scope allowedAddresses To Private IP Space Major findings from the comprehensive PR review (severity → fix): **CRITICAL — `validateOAuthUrl` SSRF fallback bypass.** When `allowedDomains` is configured and a URL fails the whitelist, the SSRF fallback in `validateOAuthUrl` was still passing `allowedAddresses` to `isSSRFTarget` / `resolveHostnameSSRF`, letting a malicious MCP server advertise OAuth endpoints at any address the admin had permitted for an unrelated reason. Suppress `allowedAddresses` in the fallback when `allowedDomains` is active — the address exemption is opt-in for the no-whitelist mode only. **MAJOR — WebSocket transport SSRF check ignored exemptions.** The `constructTransport` WebSocket branch called `resolveHostnameSSRF(wsHostname)` without `this.allowedAddresses`, so a permitted private MCP server would pass `isMCPDomainAllowed` but be blocked at transport creation. Forward the exemption. **Scope `allowedAddresses` to private IP space only (operator directive).** The exemption list is for permitting private/internal targets; it must not be a back-door to broaden trust to public destinations. - Schema (`packages/data-provider/src/config.ts`): new `allowedAddressesSchema` rejects URLs (`://`), paths/CIDR (`/`), whitespace, and public IPv4/IPv6 literals at config-load time. Wired into `endpoints`, `mcpSettings`, and `actions`. - Runtime (`packages/api/src/auth/domain.ts`): `isAddressAllowed` now drops public-IP candidates and public-IP entries on the match path — defense in depth so a misconfigured runtime list never grants exemption. - Hot path (`packages/api/src/auth/agent.ts`): `buildSSRFSafeLookup` pre-normalizes the list into a `Set<string>` once at construction and applies the same scoping filter, so the connect-time DNS lookup is an O(1) Set membership check instead of a full re-iterate-and-normalize on every outbound request. **Test coverage for the connect-time and OAuth-fallback paths.** - `agent.spec.ts`: new describe block exercising `buildSSRFSafeLookup` and `createSSRFSafe*` with `allowedAddresses` — hostname-literal exemption, resolved-IP exemption, public-IP scoping, URL/CIDR/whitespace rejection, and the default no-list block. - `handler.allowedAddresses.test.ts` (new): integration tests for `validateOAuthUrl` — covers both the no-domains-set "permit private" path and the strict-bound regression where `allowedAddresses` must NOT bypass `allowedDomains`. **Documentation & cleanup.** - `connection.ts` redirect SSRF check: explicit comment that `allowedAddresses` is intentionally NOT consulted for redirect targets (server-controlled, must not inherit the admin's exemption). - `MCPConnectionFactory.test.ts`: replaced an `eslint-disable` with a proper `import { getTenantId } from '@librechat/data-schemas'`. The disable was added to make a pre-existing `require()` quiet — the cleaner fix is to use the existing top-level import. Updated `MCPConnectionSSRF.test.ts` WebSocket SSRF assertions to match the new two-argument call shape (`hostname, allowedAddresses`). * 🩹 fix: Require Absolute URL Before allowedAddresses Trust Bypass In isOAuthUrlAllowed `parseDomainSpec` is lenient — it silently prepends `https://` to schemeless inputs so it can match patterns like bare `example.com`. That leniency leaked into `isOAuthUrlAllowed`'s new `allowedAddresses` short-circuit: a value like `10.0.0.5/oauth` (no scheme) would parse successfully via the prepended default, hit the address-exemption path, return `true`, and skip `validateOAuthUrl`'s strict `new URL(url)` parse-or-throw — only to fail later in OAuth discovery with a less clear runtime error. Add a strict `new URL(url)` gate at the top of `isOAuthUrlAllowed`. Schemeless inputs now fall through to `validateOAuthUrl`'s explicit "Invalid OAuth <field>" rejection. Tests added in both `auth/domain.spec.ts` (unit) and the OAuth handler integration spec (end-to-end). Reported by chatgpt-codex-connector (P2) on PR #12933. * 🛡️ fix: Address Follow-Up Comprehensive Review — Schema Tests, Shared Normalization, host:port Auditing the second comprehensive review: **F1 MAJOR — schema validation untested.** `allowedAddressesSchema` had zero coverage, so a regression in the three refinement stages or the three wiring locations (`endpoints` / `mcpSettings` / `actions`) would silently let invalid entries reach the runtime. Added a dedicated `describe('allowedAddressesSchema')` block in `config.spec.ts` covering: valid private IPs (v4 + v6, including the previously-missed 192.0.0.0/24 range), accepted hostnames, all rejection categories (URLs, CIDR, paths, whitespace tabs/newlines, host:port, public IP literals), and full `configSchema.parse()` integration at each of the three nesting points. **F2 MINOR — `isPrivateIPv4Literal` divergence.** The schema reimpl in `packages/data-provider` was discarding the `c` octet, so the `192.0.0.0/24` (RFC 5736 IETF protocol assignments) range that the authoritative `isPrivateIPv4` accepts was being rejected with a misleading "public IP" error. Destructure `c` and add the missing range check; covered by the new schema tests. **F3 MINOR — DRY violation across `domain.ts` and `agent.ts`.** Both files had independent normalization implementations with a subtle whitespace-check divergence (`/\s/` vs `.includes(' ')`). Extracted the shared logic into a new `packages/api/src/auth/allowedAddresses.ts` module that both consumers import: - `normalizeAddressEntry(entry)` — single-entry shape check - `looksLikeHostPort(entry)` — host:port detector (used by F4) - `normalizeAllowedAddressesSet(list)` — pre-normalized Set for the connect-time hot path - `isAddressInAllowedSet(candidate, set)` — membership check that enforces private-IP scoping on the candidate Both `isAddressAllowed` (preflight) and `buildSSRFSafeLookup` (connect) now go through the same primitives; the whitespace divergence is gone. To break the import cycle (`allowedAddresses` needs `isPrivateIP`, `domain` previously owned it), extracted IP private-range detection into a leaf `auth/ip.ts` module. `domain.ts` re-exports `isPrivateIP` for backward compatibility with existing call sites. **F4 MINOR — `host:port` silently misclassified.** Entries like `localhost:8080` previously slipped through the URL/path guard, were mis-detected as IPv6, failed `isPrivateIP`, and were silently dropped with a misleading "public IP" schema error. Added an explicit `looksLikeHostPort` check with a clear error: "allowedAddresses entries must not include a port — list the bare hostname or IP only." Bare `::1`, `[::1]`, and other valid IPv6 literals are intentionally not matched (regex distinguishes by colon count and the bracketed `[ipv6]:port` form). **F5 MINOR — hostname-trust documentation gap.** Hostname entries short-circuit `resolveHostnameSSRF` before any DNS lookup — that's a deliberate design (admin trusts the name) but it means the exemption follows whatever the name resolves to at runtime. Added an explicit note in `librechat.example.yaml` for both `mcpSettings.allowedAddresses` and `endpoints.allowedAddresses`: "a hostname entry trusts whatever IP that name resolves to. Only list hostnames whose DNS you control. Prefer literal IPs when you can." **F6** (8 positional params) is flagged for follow-up; refactor to an options object is a breaking-API change deferred to a separate PR. **F7** (redirect/WebSocket asymmetry, NIT, conf 40) — skipping; the existing inline comment is sufficient. * 🧹 chore: Address Follow-Up NITs — Import Order And Mirror-Function Naming Three NITs from the latest comprehensive review: **NIT #1 (conf 85) — local import order.** AGENTS.md requires local imports sorted longest-to-shortest. Both `domain.ts` and `agent.ts` had `./ip` (shorter) before `./allowedAddresses` (longer). Swapped. **NIT #2 (conf 60) — missing cross-reference.** The schema-side `isHostPortShape` in `packages/data-provider/src/config.ts` had no note pointing at the canonical runtime mirror. Added a JSDoc paragraph explaining the mirror relationship and why a local copy exists (the data-provider package can't import from `@librechat/api` without creating a circular dependency). **NIT #3 (conf 50) — naming inconsistency.** Renamed `isHostPortShape` → `looksLikeHostPort` so the schema mirror matches the runtime helper exactly. Kept as a separate function (not a shared import) for the same circular-dependency reason; the matching name makes it obvious they should stay in lockstep.
288 lines
9.4 KiB
JavaScript
288 lines
9.4 KiB
JavaScript
const express = require('express');
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const { nanoid } = require('nanoid');
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const { logger } = require('@librechat/data-schemas');
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const { generateCheckAccess, isActionDomainAllowed } = require('@librechat/api');
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const {
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Permissions,
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ResourceType,
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PermissionBits,
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PermissionTypes,
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actionDelimiter,
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removeNullishValues,
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validateActionDomain,
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validateAndParseOpenAPISpec,
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} = require('librechat-data-provider');
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const {
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legacyDomainEncode,
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encryptMetadata,
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domainParser,
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} = require('~/server/services/ActionService');
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const { findAccessibleResources } = require('~/server/services/PermissionService');
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const db = require('~/models');
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const { canAccessAgentResource } = require('~/server/middleware');
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const router = express.Router();
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const checkAgentCreate = generateCheckAccess({
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permissionType: PermissionTypes.AGENTS,
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permissions: [Permissions.USE, Permissions.CREATE],
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getRoleByName: db.getRoleByName,
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});
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/**
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* Retrieves all user's actions
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* @route GET /actions/
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* @param {string} req.params.id - Assistant identifier.
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* @returns {Action[]} 200 - success response - application/json
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*/
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router.get('/', async (req, res) => {
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try {
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const userId = req.user.id;
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const editableAgentObjectIds = await findAccessibleResources({
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userId,
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role: req.user.role,
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resourceType: ResourceType.AGENT,
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requiredPermissions: PermissionBits.EDIT,
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});
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const agentsResponse = await db.getListAgentsByAccess({
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accessibleIds: editableAgentObjectIds,
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});
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const editableAgentIds = agentsResponse.data.map((agent) => agent.id);
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const actions =
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editableAgentIds.length > 0
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? await db.getActions({ agent_id: { $in: editableAgentIds } })
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: [];
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res.json(actions);
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} catch (error) {
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res.status(500).json({ error: error.message });
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}
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});
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/**
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* Adds or updates actions for a specific agent.
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* @route POST /actions/:agent_id
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* @param {string} req.params.agent_id - The ID of the agent.
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* @param {FunctionTool[]} req.body.functions - The functions to be added or updated.
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* @param {string} [req.body.action_id] - Optional ID for the action.
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* @param {ActionMetadata} req.body.metadata - Metadata for the action.
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* @returns {Object} 200 - success response - application/json
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*/
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router.post(
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'/:agent_id',
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canAccessAgentResource({
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requiredPermission: PermissionBits.EDIT,
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resourceIdParam: 'agent_id',
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}),
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checkAgentCreate,
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async (req, res) => {
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try {
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const { agent_id } = req.params;
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/** @type {{ functions: FunctionTool[], action_id: string, metadata: ActionMetadata }} */
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const { functions, action_id: _action_id, metadata: _metadata } = req.body;
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if (!functions.length) {
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return res.status(400).json({ message: 'No functions provided' });
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}
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let metadata = await encryptMetadata(removeNullishValues(_metadata, true));
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const appConfig = req.config;
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// SECURITY: Validate the OpenAPI spec and extract the server URL
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if (metadata.raw_spec) {
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const validationResult = validateAndParseOpenAPISpec(metadata.raw_spec);
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if (!validationResult.status || !validationResult.serverUrl) {
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return res.status(400).json({
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message: validationResult.message || 'Invalid OpenAPI specification',
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});
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}
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// SECURITY: Validate the client-provided domain matches the spec's server URL domain
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// This prevents SSRF attacks where an attacker provides a whitelisted domain
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// but uses a different (potentially internal) URL in the raw_spec
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const domainValidation = validateActionDomain(metadata.domain, validationResult.serverUrl);
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if (!domainValidation.isValid) {
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logger.warn(`Domain mismatch detected: ${domainValidation.message}`, {
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userId: req.user.id,
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agent_id,
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});
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return res.status(400).json({
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message:
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'Domain mismatch: The domain in the OpenAPI spec does not match the provided domain',
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});
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}
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}
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const isDomainAllowed = await isActionDomainAllowed(
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metadata.domain,
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appConfig?.actions?.allowedDomains,
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appConfig?.actions?.allowedAddresses,
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);
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if (!isDomainAllowed) {
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return res.status(400).json({ message: 'Domain not allowed' });
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}
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const encodedDomain = await domainParser(metadata.domain, true);
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if (!encodedDomain) {
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return res.status(400).json({ message: 'No domain provided' });
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}
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const legacyDomain = legacyDomainEncode(metadata.domain);
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const action_id = _action_id ?? nanoid();
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const initialPromises = [];
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// Permissions already validated by middleware - load agent directly
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initialPromises.push(db.getAgent({ id: agent_id }));
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if (_action_id) {
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initialPromises.push(db.getActions({ action_id }, true));
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}
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/** @type {[Agent, [Action|undefined]]} */
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const [agent, actions_result] = await Promise.all(initialPromises);
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if (!agent) {
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return res.status(404).json({ message: 'Agent not found for adding action' });
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}
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if (actions_result && actions_result.length) {
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const action = actions_result[0];
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if (action.agent_id !== agent_id) {
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return res.status(403).json({ message: 'Action does not belong to this agent' });
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}
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metadata = { ...action.metadata, ...metadata };
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}
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const { actions: _actions = [], author: agent_author } = agent ?? {};
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const actions = [];
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for (const action of _actions) {
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const [_action_domain, current_action_id] = action.split(actionDelimiter);
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if (current_action_id === action_id) {
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continue;
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}
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actions.push(action);
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}
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actions.push(`${encodedDomain}${actionDelimiter}${action_id}`);
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/** @type {string[]}} */
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const { tools: _tools = [] } = agent;
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const shouldRemoveAgentTool = (tool) => {
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if (!tool) {
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return false;
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}
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return (
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tool.includes(encodedDomain) || tool.includes(legacyDomain) || tool.includes(action_id)
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);
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};
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const tools = _tools
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.filter((tool) => !shouldRemoveAgentTool(tool))
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.concat(functions.map((tool) => `${tool.function.name}${actionDelimiter}${encodedDomain}`));
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// Force version update since actions are changing
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const updatedAgent = await db.updateAgent(
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{ id: agent_id },
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{ tools, actions },
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{
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updatingUserId: req.user.id,
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forceVersion: true,
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},
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);
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// Only update user field for new actions
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const actionUpdateData = { metadata, agent_id };
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if (!actions_result || !actions_result.length) {
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// For new actions, use the agent owner's user ID
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actionUpdateData.user = agent_author || req.user.id;
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}
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/** @type {[Action]} */
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const updatedAction = await db.updateAction({ action_id, agent_id }, actionUpdateData);
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const sensitiveFields = ['api_key', 'oauth_client_id', 'oauth_client_secret'];
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for (let field of sensitiveFields) {
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if (updatedAction.metadata[field]) {
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delete updatedAction.metadata[field];
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}
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}
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res.json([updatedAgent, updatedAction]);
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} catch (error) {
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const message = 'Trouble updating the Agent Action';
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logger.error(message, error);
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res.status(500).json({ message });
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}
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},
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);
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/**
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* Deletes an action for a specific agent.
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* @route DELETE /actions/:agent_id/:action_id
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* @param {string} req.params.agent_id - The ID of the agent.
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* @param {string} req.params.action_id - The ID of the action to delete.
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* @returns {Object} 200 - success response - application/json
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*/
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router.delete(
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'/:agent_id/:action_id',
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canAccessAgentResource({
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requiredPermission: PermissionBits.EDIT,
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resourceIdParam: 'agent_id',
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}),
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checkAgentCreate,
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async (req, res) => {
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try {
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const { agent_id, action_id } = req.params;
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// Permissions already validated by middleware - load agent directly
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const agent = await db.getAgent({ id: agent_id });
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if (!agent) {
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return res.status(404).json({ message: 'Agent not found for deleting action' });
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}
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const { tools = [], actions = [] } = agent;
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let storedDomain = '';
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const updatedActions = actions.filter((action) => {
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if (action.includes(action_id)) {
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[storedDomain] = action.split(actionDelimiter);
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return false;
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}
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return true;
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});
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if (!storedDomain) {
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return res.status(400).json({ message: 'No domain provided' });
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}
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const updatedTools = tools.filter(
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(tool) => !(tool && (tool.includes(storedDomain) || tool.includes(action_id))),
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);
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// Force version update since actions are being removed
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await db.updateAgent(
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{ id: agent_id },
|
|
{ tools: updatedTools, actions: updatedActions },
|
|
{ updatingUserId: req.user.id, forceVersion: true },
|
|
);
|
|
const deleted = await db.deleteAction({ action_id, agent_id });
|
|
if (!deleted) {
|
|
logger.warn('[Agent Action Delete] No matching action document found', {
|
|
action_id,
|
|
agent_id,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
res.status(200).json({ message: 'Action deleted successfully' });
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
const message = 'Trouble deleting the Agent Action';
|
|
logger.error(message, error);
|
|
res.status(500).json({ message });
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
module.exports = router;
|