LibreChat/api/server/controllers/agents/openai.js
Danny Avila 520af663bc
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🧵 feat: Background Tool Calls for Agents & Model Specs (#14197)
* 🧵 feat: Background Tool Calls for Agents & Model Specs

Opt-in, poll-based background tool execution. The model marks an eligible tool
call with `run_in_background: true`; the host executor registers a task, returns
a handle immediately (so the graph turn resolves), runs the tool as a detached
promise, and the model retrieves the result via a new `check_background_task`
poll tool. Host-side only — no `@librechat/agents` change.

- Opt-in mirrors `deferred_tools`: admin capability `run_in_background`
  (off by default) + per-tool `tool_options.run_in_background`.
- Model specs / ephemeral agents: `TModelSpec.runInBackground` /
  `TEphemeralAgent.run_in_background` synthesize per-tool options; both paths
  converge at `initializeAgent`.
- In-process task registry: scoped per user+conversation, idempotent by
  toolCallId (safe across resume/replay), capped, TTL-swept.
- Excludes direct-path / host-special / code-session tools. Subagents and push
  notifications are deferred follow-ups.

* 🩹 fix: Harden background tool calls (Codex review)

- Reliable per-agent execution gate: thread the injected `run_in_background`
  tool names from `initializeAgent` through `configurable.backgroundToolNames`
  (`toolRegistry` only reaches the executor for PTC/tool_search), fixing the
  silent no-op + unstripped-arg leak for ordinary event-driven tools.
- Enforce the per-tool opt-in at execution (`backgroundToolSet.has(name)`) so a
  non-opted-in tool can't be backgrounded via an extra arg.
- Gate the `check_background_task` interception on the run actually enabling
  background, so a user tool sharing that name still executes.
- Forward `backgroundToolsAvailable` to added-convo (multi-convo) agents.
- Exclude `web_search`/`file_search` from eligibility — their results are turned
  into user-visible attachments/citations only by the foreground toolEndCallback.

* 🩹 fix: Address Codex round 2 on background tool calls

- Idempotency scoped to run+turn: provider tool-call ids repeat across turns
  (e.g. `call_0`), so key the dedupe map by `runId::toolCallId` and sweep
  orphaned mappings — a later turn no longer collides with a retained task.
- Artifacts preserved: a backgrounded tool's artifact is processed through the
  same `toolEndCallback` as the foreground path (images/files/citations no
  longer silently dropped), best-effort/guarded.
- Forward the `run_in_background` capability to connected-agent discovery and
  subagent `processAgent` init, so a child agent's own event-driven tools work
  the same as when it runs as primary.
- Strip the injected flag on foreground calls of background-capable tools
  (the model may emit it as `false`) so strict MCP/action schemas don't reject.
- `check_background_task` list path returns metadata only (result_available /
  result_chars), never full results — prevents context overflow; the full
  result is returned only when a specific id is requested.

* 🩹 fix: Address Codex round 3 on background tool calls

- Exclude background-capable tools from eager execution (run.ts): a speculative
  eager dispatch of a `run_in_background` call could launch the detached task
  with partial/stale args, and that side effect can't be canceled.
- Reserve the `check_background_task` name: overwrite a colliding user/MCP tool
  with the host poll schema (with a warning) so the advertised schema matches
  the executor's interception instead of hijacking a mismatched tool.
- Don't inject background schemas into pure subagents (spawn-tool child graphs)
  whose tools don't reach the host interceptor; keep it for primary/added/
  connected agents. Subagent background is the durable follow-up.
- Thread `backgroundToolsAvailable` + `backgroundToolNames` through the
  OpenAI-compatible and Responses agent routes (was chat-only), so the same
  agent/model spec behaves consistently across surfaces.
- Exclude image-generation built-ins (dalle/flux/gemini_image_gen/image_gen_oai/
  image_edit_oai) — artifact-first tools whose files can't reliably attach to an
  already-saved turn when backgrounded.

* 🩹 fix: Address Codex round 4 on background tool calls

- Sanitize self-spawn subagent inputs: strip `run_in_background` + the
  `check_background_task` def from the parent AgentInputs reused for self-spawn,
  so the isolated child (direct/child-graph path) doesn't advertise a background
  schema it can't honor. The SDK resolver keeps a provided `agentInputs` even
  with `self: true`.
- Exclude `check_background_task` from PTC (`run_tools_with_code`) tool
  definitions — it's host-only and not callable from generated code.
- Parse stringified JSON args before deciding background dispatch and before
  stripping the flag, so string-delivered `run_in_background` is honored and
  never leaks to strict object-schema tools.
- Skip injection for tools that already declare their own `run_in_background`
  param (would otherwise hijack/strip it), and for non-object (string-input)
  schemas (would otherwise rewrite the input contract).

* 🩹 fix: Address Codex round 5 on background tool calls

- check_background_task now parses stringified JSON args, so providers that
  deliver args as a string can retrieve a specific task by id (not just list).
- Include agentId in the background dedupe key (`agentId::runId::toolCallId`):
  two agents in the same run emitting the same provider id (e.g. `call_0`) now
  launch independent tasks instead of colliding.
- Self-spawn sanitization also strips the background entries from the reused
  toolRegistry (not just toolDefinitions), so a child using tool_search/deferred
  loading can't rediscover the host-only run_in_background / check_background_task.

* 🩹 fix: Strip run_in_background from PTC target tool schemas (Codex round 6)

The PTC path already filtered out the host-only check_background_task poll tool
but still exposed target tool schemas with the injected `run_in_background` param
(the shared toolRegistry entries were mutated by applyBackgroundToolCalls). PTC
codegen doesn't go through the host background interceptor, so it could pass the
flag to an MCP/action tool (strict-schema rejection or silent foreground with no
poll). Sanitize the PTC toolDefs like the self-spawn path does.

* 🩹 fix: Sanitize background from explicit subagent inputs (Codex round 7)

A child agent reachable as a top-level/handoff agent is initialized WITH the
background capability, then reused as an explicit subagent via buildSubagentConfigs.
Round 4 only sanitized the self-spawn case; this now applies the same
stripBackgroundFromToolDefinitions/Registry to explicit child agentInputs when
`child.backgroundToolNames` is non-empty, so an isolated child graph doesn't
advertise a run_in_background / check_background_task contract it can't honor.

* 🩹 fix: Reap stuck/expired background tasks (Codex round 8)

- get() now sweeps before returning, so repeatedly polling a known
  background_task_id can't keep an expired completed task (and its retained
  result, up to 100k chars) alive past the one-hour completed TTL.
- sweep() now reaps `running` tasks older than a 30-min running TTL, marking
  them errored. Previously a detached call that never settled (hung network /
  lost MCP connection) held a running slot forever, exhausting the
  per-conversation cap and rejecting every later dispatch.

* 🩹 fix: Evict oldest settled tasks instead of blocking at the cap (Codex round 9)

Only the running-task cap gates dispatch now. The total-tasks cap
(MAX_TASKS_PER_BUCKET) bounds memory but no longer rejects new background calls:
when full, it evicts the oldest settled (completed/error) tasks to make room.
Previously 200 quick background calls in one conversation would block all new
dispatches for up to the completed-task TTL, since polling doesn't remove settled
tasks. Running is already capped, so room always frees.

* 📝 docs: Frame background tool calls as within-turn (Codex P1 contract)

Codex escalated the request-lifecycle findings to P1 on the grounds that the
advertised "poll later" contract can't be honored for genuinely long-running
calls (request-scoped MCP connections + the run abort signal are torn down at
turn end). Align the model-facing contract with what the same-run implementation
actually delivers: the run_in_background param, check_background_task, and the
dispatch handle now instruct the model to collect the result WITHIN THE SAME TURN
(backgrounded work isn't guaranteed to survive past the turn). This is
within-turn parallelism; cross-turn survival of long-running calls remains the
deliberate durable subagent follow-up. Copy/comment-only; no behavior change.

* ♻️ refactor: Cross-turn background tool calls, leak-free

Extend background tool calls from within-turn to cross-turn on a single
process, since the mechanism already supports it: the run's abort signal
never reaches the detached invoke (the graph forwards only configurable/
metadata to the tool-execute handler), so the floating promise keeps
running past turn completion and its result stays in the in-process
registry for a later turn to poll (get/list key only on
user::conversation + id, never the dispatch run/turn).

Guarantee no connection leak: ephemeral request-scoped MCP tools (runtime
{{LIBRECHAT_BODY_*}} placeholders) capture their request-scoped store at
creation and fall back to it, so config manipulation can't redirect them;
their connection is torn down at request end. Tag such tools in
createToolInstance and run them in the foreground instead of backgrounding
them. Pooled/app-level MCP and structured tools are unaffected and survive
cross-turn via their managed pools.

Reword the model-facing contract (run_in_background, check_background_task,
handle message, fileoverview) from within-turn to cross-turn on this server
(not across restart/replica, which stays the durable follow-up).

Tests: cross-turn poll retrieval; ephemeral MCP tool runs foreground.

* 🐛 fix: Guard ephemeral MCP tag against a null server config

createToolInstance can be reached with a null/stale capturedServerConfig
(cached availableTools + getServerConfig returns null, as several MCP unit
tests construct tools). The new unconditional requiresEphemeralUserConnection
call then dereferenced config.source and threw during tool construction
(CI: Tests api shard 2/3). Guard with the same serverConfig ? ... : false
pattern the other callers use; a missing config is not request-scoped.

* 🎨 fix: Deliver backgrounded tool artifacts on the poll turn

A slow backgrounded MCP/action tool resolves after its dispatch turn is
finalized: createToolEndCallback only appends to that turn's artifactPromises
(already awaited) and writes to a closed stream, so the artifact (file/citation/
UI resource) was silently dropped — check_background_task recorded only the
hasArtifact boolean. The cross-turn contract made this the common case.

Hold the artifact on the task and deliver it through the LIVE poll turn's
toolEndCallback the first time check_background_task collects that id (once,
then cleared to free memory), attributed to the original tool. Same-turn and
cross-turn now share this path since the model must poll to collect any result.

Tests: registry claim-once; artifact delivered on poll not dispatch, idempotent.

*  feat: Agent-builder toggle for background tool calls + cap tool descriptions

Add a per-MCP-tool "run in background" toggle in the agent builder, mirroring
the programmatic/deferred pattern: gated on the admin `run_in_background`
capability via useAgentCapabilities, read/written on tool_options[id]
.run_in_background through useMCPToolOptions (per-tool + bulk mark-all), and
rendered as a Zap toggle in MCPToolItem and McpSection with new locale keys.

Also cap the section tool/server descriptions (McpSection, ToolSection,
SkillSection) with max-h-40 overflow-y-auto so a long description scrolls
instead of overflowing the dialog, matching MCPToolItem's existing cap.

Tests: MCPToolItem renders/toggles the background button only when enabled.

* 🧪 fix: Mock new background hook functions in McpSection spec

* 🎨 fix: Restore background artifact when poll-turn delivery fails

* 🛡️ fix: Harden background tool call edges from review findings

- Error immediately (matching foreground) when a background-requested tool
  failed to load, instead of returning a success handle for a dead task
- Exclude ephemeral request-scoped MCP tools at injection time so the model
  never sees a run_in_background param the executor would silently downgrade;
  flip the execute-time tag to fail closed on a missing server config
- Source image-tool background exclusions from the shared imageGenTools set
  (adds missing stable-diffusion, an artifact-first live tool) instead of a
  hand-copied list
- Add check_background_task to the eager-execution exclusion list: artifact
  collection is a one-shot claim that must not fire from a speculative
  snapshot the SDK may discard
- Strip an imitated run_in_background arg on tools the executing agent never
  opted in (multi-agent history bleed), unless the tool's own schema declares
  the parameter
- Truncate oversized stored results with an explicit marker via the shared
  truncateMiddle (moved to utils/text) instead of a silent slice
- Document the at-most-once artifact delivery semantics honestly (the
  callback's downstream persistence is fire-and-forget, as in foreground)

* ♻️ refactor: Deduplicate background tool-call plumbing and tighten types

- Use the SDK's JsonSchemaType instead of a local duplicate; drop all
  as-unknown casts and type the poll-tool serializer explicitly
- Drop derivable BackgroundTask state (progress, hasArtifact) and the dead
  `enabled` param/return on applyBackgroundToolCalls (guarded at the call
  site), which also skips the defs pass when nothing opted in
- Fold the enable expression into synthesizeBackgroundToolOptions so the
  three load/added call sites can't drift
- Throttle the registry's all-buckets sweep and always sweep the accessed
  bucket, so a hot poll loop is no longer O(total tasks server-wide); bound
  retained artifact memory with a size cap
- Single-pass stripBackgroundFromToolDefinitions; pass metadata through to
  the poll-turn callback instead of a no-op reconstruction
- Collapse the client's copy-pasted boolean option families into a keyed
  factory (also removes the shared-object mutation in the bulk toggles) and
  the six toggle-button copies into one OptionToggle component

* 🧪 test: e2e coverage for cross-turn background tool calls

Proves the full contract through the real pipeline (mock harness): an agent
opts an MCP tool in via tool_options.run_in_background, the model dispatches
it detached and receives the synthetic handle while the tool is still running
(status=running in the rendered ack — the non-blocking guarantee without
timing assertions), the tool completes after its turn finalized, and a later
user turn recovers the task id from replayed history, polls
check_background_task, and renders the collected result.

- fake-mcp-server: slow_echo fixture tool (delayed echo)
- fake-model: E2E_BACKGROUND_DISPATCH / E2E_BACKGROUND_COLLECT markers
- e2e yaml: agents capabilities = defaults + run_in_background

* 🔧 fix: Close two background capability gaps from review

- Thread backgroundToolsAvailable through the OpenAI-compatible service
  (derived from app capabilities like codeEnvAvailable/statefulSessions),
  so agents with tool_options.run_in_background keep the feature on that
  route; fold the three capability derivations into one helper
- Index ephemeral MCP servers by normalizeServerName when excluding tools
  from background injection: tool names embed the normalized server name
  while mcpConfig keys the original, so exotic server names previously
  escaped the injection-time exclusion

* 🛂 fix: Fall back to configurable user identity for background task scoping

The in-repo routes merge req into the tool-execute configurable, but external
hosts of the exported OpenAI-compatible service inject their own loadTools and
may not — tasks would then register under an empty user id, collapsing
registry isolation to conversationId alone. Resolve the scoping id from
req.user.id, then configurable.user_id / user, and cover the isolation with a
foreign-user not_found test.

* 🧹 chore: Apply repo import sorter to PR-touched files
2026-07-13 12:51:36 -04:00

1011 lines
32 KiB
JavaScript

const { nanoid } = require('nanoid');
const { logger } = require('@librechat/data-schemas');
const { Callback, ToolEndHandler, formatAgentMessages } = require('@librechat/agents');
const {
EModelEndpoint,
ResourceType,
PermissionBits,
hasPermissions,
AgentCapabilities,
} = require('librechat-data-provider');
const {
writeSSE,
createRun,
createChunk,
buildToolSet,
loadSkillStates,
sendFinalChunk,
createSafeUser,
validateRequest,
initializeAgent,
getBalanceConfig,
injectSkillPrimes,
extractManualSkills,
createErrorResponse,
recordCollectedUsage,
createSubagentUsageSink,
getTransactionsConfig,
resolveRecursionLimit,
findPiiMatchInMessages,
discoverConnectedAgents,
getRemoteAgentPermissions,
createToolExecuteHandler,
buildNonStreamingResponse,
createOpenAIStreamTracker,
resolveAgentScopedSkillIds,
createOpenAIContentAggregator,
isChatCompletionValidationFailure,
} = require('@librechat/api');
const {
buildSummarizationHandlers,
markSummarizationUsage,
createToolEndCallback,
agentLogHandlerObj,
} = require('~/server/controllers/agents/callbacks');
const { loadAgentTools, loadToolsForExecution } = require('~/server/services/ToolService');
const {
findAccessibleResources,
getEffectivePermissions,
} = require('~/server/services/PermissionService');
const {
getSkillToolDeps,
getSkillDbMethods,
canAuthorSkillFiles,
withDeploymentSkillIds,
buildAgentToolContext,
enrichLoadedToolsWithAgentContext,
} = require('~/server/services/Endpoints/agents/skillDeps');
const { getModelsConfig } = require('~/server/controllers/ModelController');
const { logViolation } = require('~/cache');
const db = require('~/models');
/**
* Creates a tool loader function for the agent.
* @param {AbortSignal} signal - The abort signal
* @param {boolean} [definitionsOnly=true] - When true, returns only serializable
* tool definitions without creating full tool instances (for event-driven mode)
*/
function createToolLoader(signal, definitionsOnly = true) {
return async function loadTools({
req,
res,
tools,
model,
agentId,
provider,
tool_options,
tool_resources,
}) {
const agent = { id: agentId, tools, provider, model, tool_options };
try {
return await loadAgentTools({
req,
res,
agent,
signal,
tool_resources,
definitionsOnly,
streamId: null, // No resumable stream for OpenAI compat
});
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Error loading tools for agent ' + agentId, error);
}
};
}
/**
* Convert content part to internal format
* @param {Object} part - Content part
* @returns {Object} Converted part
*/
function convertContentPart(part) {
if (part.type === 'text') {
return { type: 'text', text: part.text };
}
if (part.type === 'image_url') {
return { type: 'image_url', image_url: part.image_url };
}
return part;
}
/**
* Convert OpenAI messages to internal format
* @param {Array} messages - OpenAI format messages
* @returns {Array} Internal format messages
*/
function convertMessages(messages) {
return messages.map((msg) => {
let content;
if (typeof msg.content === 'string') {
content = msg.content;
} else if (msg.content) {
content = msg.content.map(convertContentPart);
} else {
content = '';
}
return {
role: msg.role,
content,
...(msg.name && { name: msg.name }),
...(msg.tool_calls && { tool_calls: msg.tool_calls }),
...(msg.tool_call_id && { tool_call_id: msg.tool_call_id }),
};
});
}
/**
* Send an error response in OpenAI format
*/
function sendErrorResponse(res, statusCode, message, type = 'invalid_request_error', code = null) {
res.status(statusCode).json(createErrorResponse(message, type, code));
}
/**
* OpenAI-compatible chat completions controller for agents.
*
* POST /v1/chat/completions
*
* Request format:
* {
* "model": "agent_id_here",
* "messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "Hello!"}],
* "stream": true,
* "conversation_id": "optional",
* "parent_message_id": "optional"
* }
*/
const OpenAIChatCompletionController = async (req, res) => {
const appConfig = req.config;
const requestStartTime = Date.now();
const validation = validateRequest(req.body);
if (isChatCompletionValidationFailure(validation)) {
return sendErrorResponse(res, 400, validation.error);
}
const request = validation.request;
const agentId = request.model;
// Look up the agent
const agent = await db.getAgent({ id: agentId });
if (!agent) {
return sendErrorResponse(
res,
404,
`Agent not found: ${agentId}`,
'invalid_request_error',
'model_not_found',
);
}
const piiHit = findPiiMatchInMessages(request.messages, appConfig?.messageFilter?.pii);
if (piiHit != null) {
return sendErrorResponse(
res,
400,
`Message contains a ${piiHit.label}. Remove it and try again.`,
'invalid_request_error',
'message_filter_pii_block',
);
}
const responseId = `chatcmpl-${nanoid()}`;
const created = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
/** @type {import('@librechat/api').OpenAIResponseContext} — key must be `requestId` to match the type used by createChunk/buildNonStreamingResponse */
const context = {
created,
requestId: responseId,
model: agentId,
};
logger.debug(
`[OpenAI API] Response ${responseId} started for agent ${agentId}, stream: ${request.stream}`,
);
// Set up abort controller
const abortController = new AbortController();
// Handle client disconnect
req.on('close', () => {
if (!abortController.signal.aborted) {
abortController.abort();
logger.debug('[OpenAI API] Client disconnected, aborting');
}
});
try {
if (request.conversation_id != null) {
if (typeof request.conversation_id !== 'string') {
return sendErrorResponse(
res,
400,
'conversation_id must be a string',
'invalid_request_error',
);
}
if (!(await db.getConvo(req.user?.id, request.conversation_id))) {
return sendErrorResponse(res, 404, 'Conversation not found', 'invalid_request_error');
}
}
const conversationId = request.conversation_id ?? nanoid();
const parentMessageId = request.parent_message_id ?? null;
const agentsEConfig = appConfig?.endpoints?.[EModelEndpoint.agents];
const allowedProviders = new Set(agentsEConfig?.allowedProviders);
// Create tool loader
const loadTools = createToolLoader(abortController.signal);
// Initialize the agent first to check for disableStreaming
const endpointOption = {
endpoint: agent.provider,
model_parameters: agent.model_parameters ?? {},
};
const skillDbMethods = getSkillDbMethods();
// `filterFilesByAgentAccess` is intentionally omitted: it calls
// `checkPermission` with `resourceType: AGENT`, but this route
// authorizes callers through `REMOTE_AGENT` (via
// `getRemoteAgentPermissions`), so including it would silently drop
// owner-attached context files for any remote user who has
// `REMOTE_AGENT_VIEWER` but not direct `AGENT_VIEW`.
const dbMethods = {
getConvoFiles: db.getConvoFiles,
getFiles: db.getFiles,
getUserKey: db.getUserKey,
getMessages: db.getMessages,
updateFilesUsage: db.updateFilesUsage,
getUserKeyValues: db.getUserKeyValues,
getUserCodeFiles: db.getUserCodeFiles,
getToolFilesByIds: db.getToolFilesByIds,
getCodeGeneratedFiles: db.getCodeGeneratedFiles,
listSkillsByAccess: skillDbMethods.listSkillsByAccess,
listAlwaysApplySkills: skillDbMethods.listAlwaysApplySkills,
getSkillByName: skillDbMethods.getSkillByName,
};
const enabledCapabilities = new Set(agentsEConfig?.capabilities);
const skillsCapabilityEnabled = enabledCapabilities.has(AgentCapabilities.skills);
const ephemeralSkillsToggle = req.body?.ephemeralAgent?.skills === true;
const accessibleSkillIds = skillsCapabilityEnabled
? withDeploymentSkillIds(
await findAccessibleResources({
userId: req.user.id,
role: req.user.role,
resourceType: ResourceType.SKILL,
requiredPermissions: PermissionBits.VIEW,
}),
)
: [];
const editableSkillIds = skillsCapabilityEnabled
? await findAccessibleResources({
userId: req.user.id,
role: req.user.role,
resourceType: ResourceType.SKILL,
requiredPermissions: PermissionBits.EDIT,
})
: [];
const skillCreateAllowed = skillsCapabilityEnabled
? await getSkillToolDeps().canCreateSkill({ req })
: false;
const { skillStates, defaultActiveOnShare } = await loadSkillStates({
userId: req.user.id,
appConfig,
getUserById: db.getUserById,
accessibleSkillIds,
});
const manualSkills = extractManualSkills(req.body);
const primaryScopedSkillIds = resolveAgentScopedSkillIds({
agent,
accessibleSkillIds,
skillsCapabilityEnabled,
ephemeralSkillsToggle,
});
const primaryScopedEditableSkillIds = resolveAgentScopedSkillIds({
agent,
accessibleSkillIds: editableSkillIds,
skillsCapabilityEnabled,
ephemeralSkillsToggle,
});
const primaryConfig = await initializeAgent(
{
req,
res,
loadTools,
requestFiles: [],
conversationId,
parentMessageId,
agent,
endpointOption,
allowedProviders,
isInitialAgent: true,
accessibleSkillIds: primaryScopedSkillIds,
skillAuthoringAvailable: canAuthorSkillFiles({
agent,
scopedEditableSkillIds: primaryScopedEditableSkillIds,
skillCreateAllowed,
skillsCapabilityEnabled,
ephemeralSkillsToggle,
}),
codeEnvAvailable: enabledCapabilities.has(AgentCapabilities.execute_code),
backgroundToolsAvailable: enabledCapabilities.has(AgentCapabilities.run_in_background),
statefulSessionsAvailable: enabledCapabilities.has(
AgentCapabilities.stateful_code_sessions,
),
skillStates,
defaultActiveOnShare,
manualSkills,
},
dbMethods,
);
/**
* Per-agent tool-execution context map, keyed by agentId.
* Needed so the ON_TOOL_EXECUTE callback routes each sub-agent's tool calls
* to the correct toolRegistry / userMCPAuthMap / tool_resources.
* @type {Map<string, {
* agent: object,
* toolRegistry?: import('@librechat/agents').LCToolRegistry,
* requestScopedConnections?: import('@librechat/api').RequestScopedMCPConnectionStore,
* userMCPAuthMap?: Record<string, Record<string, string>>,
* tool_resources?: object,
* actionsEnabled?: boolean,
* }>}
*/
const agentToolContexts = new Map();
agentToolContexts.set(
primaryConfig.id,
buildAgentToolContext({ agent, config: primaryConfig }),
);
// Only run BFS discovery (and pay `getModelsConfig` upfront) when the
// primary has edges to follow — the common API case is single-agent.
let handoffAgentConfigs = new Map();
let discoveredEdges = [];
let discoveredMCPAuthMap;
if (primaryConfig.edges?.length) {
const modelsConfig = await getModelsConfig(req);
({
agentConfigs: handoffAgentConfigs,
edges: discoveredEdges,
userMCPAuthMap: discoveredMCPAuthMap,
} = await discoverConnectedAgents(
{
req,
res,
primaryConfig,
endpointOption,
allowedProviders,
modelsConfig,
loadTools,
requestFiles: [],
conversationId,
parentMessageId,
// The route enforces REMOTE_AGENT on the primary; every discovered
// sub-agent must clear the same sharing boundary, not the looser
// in-app AGENT one.
resourceType: ResourceType.REMOTE_AGENT,
computeAccessibleSkillIds: (handoffAgent) =>
resolveAgentScopedSkillIds({
agent: handoffAgent,
accessibleSkillIds,
skillsCapabilityEnabled,
ephemeralSkillsToggle,
}),
computeSkillAuthoringAvailable: (handoffAgent) =>
canAuthorSkillFiles({
agent: handoffAgent,
scopedEditableSkillIds: resolveAgentScopedSkillIds({
agent: handoffAgent,
accessibleSkillIds: editableSkillIds,
skillsCapabilityEnabled,
ephemeralSkillsToggle,
}),
skillCreateAllowed,
skillsCapabilityEnabled,
ephemeralSkillsToggle,
}),
skillStates,
defaultActiveOnShare,
/** @see DiscoverConnectedAgentsParams.codeEnvAvailable */
codeEnvAvailable: enabledCapabilities.has(AgentCapabilities.execute_code),
backgroundToolsAvailable: enabledCapabilities.has(AgentCapabilities.run_in_background),
statefulSessionsAvailable: enabledCapabilities.has(
AgentCapabilities.stateful_code_sessions,
),
},
{
getAgent: db.getAgent,
// Use `getRemoteAgentPermissions` so sub-agent authorization
// matches what the route's `createCheckRemoteAgentAccess`
// middleware does for the primary: AGENT owners with the SHARE
// bit are treated as remotely authorized even without an
// explicit REMOTE_AGENT grant.
checkPermission: async ({ userId, role, resourceId, requiredPermission }) => {
const permissions = await getRemoteAgentPermissions(
{ getEffectivePermissions },
userId,
role,
resourceId,
);
return hasPermissions(permissions, requiredPermission);
},
logViolation,
db: dbMethods,
onAgentInitialized: (agentId, handoffAgent, config) => {
agentToolContexts.set(agentId, buildAgentToolContext({ agent: handoffAgent, config }));
},
initializeAgent,
},
));
}
primaryConfig.edges = discoveredEdges;
// Determine if streaming is enabled (check both request and agent config)
const streamingDisabled = !!primaryConfig.model_parameters?.disableStreaming;
const isStreaming = request.stream === true && !streamingDisabled;
// Create tracker for streaming or aggregator for non-streaming
const tracker = isStreaming ? createOpenAIStreamTracker() : null;
const aggregator = isStreaming ? null : createOpenAIContentAggregator();
// Set up response for streaming
if (isStreaming) {
res.setHeader('Content-Type', 'text/event-stream');
res.setHeader('Cache-Control', 'no-cache');
res.setHeader('Connection', 'keep-alive');
res.setHeader('X-Accel-Buffering', 'no');
res.flushHeaders();
// Send initial chunk with role
const initialChunk = createChunk(context, { role: 'assistant' });
writeSSE(res, initialChunk);
}
// Create handler config for OpenAI streaming (only used when streaming)
const handlerConfig = isStreaming
? {
res,
context,
tracker,
}
: null;
const collectedUsage = [];
/** @type {Promise<import('librechat-data-provider').TAttachment | null>[]} */
const artifactPromises = [];
const toolEndCallback = createToolEndCallback({ req, res, artifactPromises, streamId: null });
/* Stable for the turn: the primary prime list is fixed once
`initializeAgent` resolves and is used as the fallback when a
specific agent context is unavailable. `codeEnvAvailable` is read
per-agent from the stored tool context (admin cap AND that
agent's `tools` list includes `execute_code`) — a skills-only
agent never gains sandbox access even if the admin enabled the
capability globally. */
const toolExecuteOptions = {
loadTools: async (toolNames, agentId) => {
const ctx = agentToolContexts.get(agentId) ?? agentToolContexts.get(primaryConfig.id) ?? {};
const result = await loadToolsForExecution({
req,
res,
toolNames,
agent: ctx.agent ?? agent,
signal: abortController.signal,
toolRegistry: ctx.toolRegistry,
backgroundToolNames: ctx.backgroundToolNames,
mcpAvailableTools: ctx.mcpAvailableTools,
requestScopedConnections: ctx.requestScopedConnections,
userMCPAuthMap: ctx.userMCPAuthMap,
tool_resources: ctx.tool_resources,
actionsEnabled: ctx.actionsEnabled,
});
return enrichLoadedToolsWithAgentContext({
result,
req,
ctx,
});
},
toolEndCallback,
...getSkillToolDeps(),
};
const summarizationConfig = appConfig?.summarization;
const openaiMessages = convertMessages(request.messages);
const toolSet = buildToolSet(primaryConfig);
const formatted = formatAgentMessages(openaiMessages, {}, toolSet);
const formattedMessages = formatted.messages;
const initialSummary = formatted.summary;
let indexTokenCountMap = formatted.indexTokenCountMap;
/**
* Inject manual + always-apply skill primes so the model sees SKILL.md
* bodies for this turn — parity with AgentClient's chat path. OpenAI-
* compatible streaming uses its own tracker/aggregator shape, so the
* LibreChat-style card SSE events don't apply here; only the
* message-context part carries over.
*/
const manualSkillPrimes = primaryConfig.manualSkillPrimes;
const alwaysApplySkillPrimes = primaryConfig.alwaysApplySkillPrimes;
if (
(manualSkillPrimes && manualSkillPrimes.length > 0) ||
(alwaysApplySkillPrimes && alwaysApplySkillPrimes.length > 0)
) {
const primeResult = injectSkillPrimes({
initialMessages: formattedMessages,
indexTokenCountMap,
manualSkillPrimes,
alwaysApplySkillPrimes,
});
indexTokenCountMap = primeResult.indexTokenCountMap;
/* Surface the cap-driven always-apply truncation at the controller
layer too — `injectSkillPrimes` already logs internally, but the
controller-level warn includes endpoint context so operators can
tell at a glance which path hit the cap. Mirrors AgentClient's
warn in `client.js`. */
if (primeResult.alwaysApplyDropped > 0) {
logger.warn(
`[OpenAI API] Dropped ${primeResult.alwaysApplyDropped} always-apply prime(s) to stay within MAX_PRIMED_SKILLS_PER_TURN.`,
);
}
}
/**
* Create a simple handler that processes data
*/
const createHandler = (processor) => ({
handle: (_event, data) => {
if (processor) {
processor(data);
}
},
});
/**
* Stream text content in OpenAI format
*/
const streamText = (text) => {
if (!text) {
return;
}
if (isStreaming) {
tracker.addText();
writeSSE(res, createChunk(context, { content: text }));
} else {
aggregator.addText(text);
}
};
/**
* Stream reasoning content in OpenAI format (OpenRouter convention)
*/
const streamReasoning = (text) => {
if (!text) {
return;
}
if (isStreaming) {
tracker.addReasoning();
writeSSE(res, createChunk(context, { reasoning: text }));
} else {
aggregator.addReasoning(text);
}
};
// Event handlers for OpenAI-compatible streaming
const handlers = {
// Text content streaming
on_message_delta: createHandler((data) => {
const content = data?.delta?.content;
if (Array.isArray(content)) {
for (const part of content) {
if (part.type === 'text' && part.text) {
streamText(part.text);
}
}
}
}),
// Reasoning/thinking content streaming
on_reasoning_delta: createHandler((data) => {
const content = data?.delta?.content;
if (Array.isArray(content)) {
for (const part of content) {
const text = part.think || part.text;
if (text) {
streamReasoning(text);
}
}
}
}),
// Tool call initiation - streams id and name (from on_run_step)
on_run_step: createHandler((data) => {
const stepDetails = data?.stepDetails;
if (stepDetails?.type === 'tool_calls' && stepDetails.tool_calls) {
for (const tc of stepDetails.tool_calls) {
const toolIndex = data.index ?? 0;
const toolId = tc.id ?? '';
const toolName = tc.name ?? '';
const toolCall = {
id: toolId,
type: 'function',
function: { name: toolName, arguments: '' },
};
// Track tool call in tracker or aggregator
if (isStreaming) {
if (!tracker.toolCalls.has(toolIndex)) {
tracker.toolCalls.set(toolIndex, toolCall);
}
// Stream initial tool call chunk (like OpenAI does)
writeSSE(
res,
createChunk(context, {
tool_calls: [{ index: toolIndex, ...toolCall }],
}),
);
} else {
if (!aggregator.toolCalls.has(toolIndex)) {
aggregator.toolCalls.set(toolIndex, toolCall);
}
}
}
}
}),
// Tool call argument streaming (from on_run_step_delta)
on_run_step_delta: createHandler((data) => {
const delta = data?.delta;
if (delta?.type === 'tool_calls' && delta.tool_calls) {
for (const tc of delta.tool_calls) {
const args = tc.args ?? '';
if (!args) {
continue;
}
const toolIndex = tc.index ?? 0;
// Update tool call arguments
const targetMap = isStreaming ? tracker.toolCalls : aggregator.toolCalls;
const tracked = targetMap.get(toolIndex);
if (tracked) {
tracked.function.arguments += args;
}
// Stream argument delta (only for streaming)
if (isStreaming) {
writeSSE(
res,
createChunk(context, {
tool_calls: [
{
index: toolIndex,
function: { arguments: args },
},
],
}),
);
}
}
}
}),
// Usage tracking
on_chat_model_end: {
handle: (_event, data, metadata) => {
const usage = data?.output?.usage_metadata;
if (usage) {
const taggedUsage = markSummarizationUsage(usage, metadata);
collectedUsage.push(taggedUsage);
const target = isStreaming ? tracker : aggregator;
target.usage.promptTokens += taggedUsage.input_tokens ?? 0;
target.usage.completionTokens += taggedUsage.output_tokens ?? 0;
}
},
},
on_run_step_completed: createHandler(),
// Use proper ToolEndHandler for processing artifacts (images, file citations, code output)
on_tool_end: new ToolEndHandler(toolEndCallback, logger),
on_chain_stream: createHandler(),
on_chain_end: createHandler(),
on_agent_update: createHandler(),
on_agent_log: agentLogHandlerObj,
on_custom_event: createHandler(),
on_tool_execute: createToolExecuteHandler(toolExecuteOptions),
...(summarizationConfig?.enabled !== false
? buildSummarizationHandlers({ isStreaming, res })
: {}),
};
// Create and run the agent
const userId = req.user?.id ?? 'api-user';
// Extract merged userMCPAuthMap (needed for MCP tool connections across
// the primary and any discovered handoff sub-agents)
const userMCPAuthMap = discoveredMCPAuthMap ?? primaryConfig.userMCPAuthMap;
const runAgents = [primaryConfig, ...handoffAgentConfigs.values()];
const run = await createRun({
agents: runAgents,
messages: formattedMessages,
indexTokenCountMap,
initialSummary,
runId: responseId,
summarizationConfig,
appConfig,
signal: abortController.signal,
customHandlers: handlers,
requestBody: {
messageId: responseId,
conversationId,
},
user: { id: userId },
tenantId: req.user?.tenantId,
/** Bills subagent child-run model calls (reported outside the
* streamEvents loop) into the same collectedUsage array. */
subagentUsageSink: createSubagentUsageSink(collectedUsage),
});
if (!run) {
throw new Error('Failed to create agent run');
}
const config = {
runName: 'AgentRun',
configurable: {
thread_id: conversationId,
user_id: userId,
user: createSafeUser(req.user),
requestBody: {
messageId: responseId,
conversationId,
},
...(userMCPAuthMap != null && { userMCPAuthMap }),
},
recursionLimit: resolveRecursionLimit(agentsEConfig, agent),
signal: abortController.signal,
streamMode: 'values',
version: 'v2',
};
await run.processStream({ messages: formattedMessages }, config, {
callbacks: {
[Callback.TOOL_ERROR]: (graph, error, toolId) => {
logger.error(`[OpenAI API] Tool Error "${toolId}"`, error);
},
},
});
// Record token usage against balance
const balanceConfig = getBalanceConfig(appConfig);
const transactionsConfig = getTransactionsConfig(appConfig);
recordCollectedUsage(
{
spendTokens: db.spendTokens,
spendStructuredTokens: db.spendStructuredTokens,
pricing: { getMultiplier: db.getMultiplier, getCacheMultiplier: db.getCacheMultiplier },
bulkWriteOps: { insertMany: db.bulkInsertTransactions, updateBalance: db.updateBalance },
},
{
user: userId,
conversationId,
collectedUsage,
context: 'message',
messageId: responseId,
balance: balanceConfig,
transactions: transactionsConfig,
model: primaryConfig.model || agent.model_parameters?.model,
},
).catch((err) => {
logger.error('[OpenAI API] Error recording usage:', err);
});
// Finalize response
const duration = Date.now() - requestStartTime;
if (isStreaming) {
sendFinalChunk(handlerConfig);
res.end();
logger.debug(`[OpenAI API] Response ${responseId} completed in ${duration}ms (streaming)`);
// Wait for artifact processing after response ends (non-blocking)
if (artifactPromises.length > 0) {
Promise.all(artifactPromises).catch((artifactError) => {
logger.warn('[OpenAI API] Error processing artifacts:', artifactError);
});
}
} else {
// For non-streaming, wait for artifacts before sending response
if (artifactPromises.length > 0) {
try {
await Promise.all(artifactPromises);
} catch (artifactError) {
logger.warn('[OpenAI API] Error processing artifacts:', artifactError);
}
}
// Build usage from aggregated data
const usage = {
prompt_tokens: aggregator.usage.promptTokens,
completion_tokens: aggregator.usage.completionTokens,
total_tokens: aggregator.usage.promptTokens + aggregator.usage.completionTokens,
};
if (aggregator.usage.reasoningTokens > 0) {
usage.completion_tokens_details = {
reasoning_tokens: aggregator.usage.reasoningTokens,
};
}
const response = buildNonStreamingResponse(
context,
aggregator.getText(),
aggregator.getReasoning(),
aggregator.toolCalls,
usage,
);
res.json(response);
logger.debug(
`[OpenAI API] Response ${responseId} completed in ${duration}ms (non-streaming)`,
);
}
} catch (error) {
const errorMessage = error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'An error occurred';
logger.error('[OpenAI API] Error:', error);
// Check if we already started streaming (headers sent)
if (res.headersSent) {
// Headers already sent, send error in stream
const errorChunk = createChunk(context, { content: `\n\nError: ${errorMessage}` }, 'stop');
writeSSE(res, errorChunk);
writeSSE(res, '[DONE]');
res.end();
} else {
// Forward upstream provider status codes (e.g., Anthropic 400s) instead of masking as 500
const statusCode =
typeof error?.status === 'number' && error.status >= 400 && error.status < 600
? error.status
: 500;
const errorType =
statusCode >= 400 && statusCode < 500 ? 'invalid_request_error' : 'server_error';
sendErrorResponse(res, statusCode, errorMessage, errorType);
}
}
};
/**
* List available agents as models (filtered by remote access permissions)
*
* GET /v1/models
*/
const ListModelsController = async (req, res) => {
try {
const userId = req.user?.id;
const userRole = req.user?.role;
if (!userId) {
return sendErrorResponse(res, 401, 'Authentication required', 'auth_error');
}
// Find agents the user has remote access to (VIEW permission on REMOTE_AGENT)
const accessibleAgentIds = await findAccessibleResources({
userId,
role: userRole,
resourceType: ResourceType.REMOTE_AGENT,
requiredPermissions: PermissionBits.VIEW,
});
// Get the accessible agents
let agents = [];
if (accessibleAgentIds.length > 0) {
agents = await db.getAgents({ _id: { $in: accessibleAgentIds } });
}
const models = agents.map((agent) => ({
id: agent.id,
object: 'model',
created: Math.floor(new Date(agent.createdAt || Date.now()).getTime() / 1000),
owned_by: 'librechat',
permission: [],
root: agent.id,
parent: null,
// LibreChat extensions
name: agent.name,
description: agent.description,
provider: agent.provider,
}));
res.json({
object: 'list',
data: models,
});
} catch (error) {
const errorMessage = error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Failed to list models';
logger.error('[OpenAI API] Error listing models:', error);
sendErrorResponse(res, 500, errorMessage, 'server_error');
}
};
/**
* Get a specific model/agent (with remote access permission check)
*
* GET /v1/models/:model
*/
const GetModelController = async (req, res) => {
try {
const { model } = req.params;
const userId = req.user?.id;
const userRole = req.user?.role;
if (!userId) {
return sendErrorResponse(res, 401, 'Authentication required', 'auth_error');
}
const agent = await db.getAgent({ id: model });
if (!agent) {
return sendErrorResponse(
res,
404,
`Model not found: ${model}`,
'invalid_request_error',
'model_not_found',
);
}
// Check if user has remote access to this agent
const accessibleAgentIds = await findAccessibleResources({
userId,
role: userRole,
resourceType: ResourceType.REMOTE_AGENT,
requiredPermissions: PermissionBits.VIEW,
});
const hasAccess = accessibleAgentIds.some((id) => id.toString() === agent._id.toString());
if (!hasAccess) {
return sendErrorResponse(
res,
403,
`No remote access to model: ${model}`,
'permission_error',
'access_denied',
);
}
res.json({
id: agent.id,
object: 'model',
created: Math.floor(new Date(agent.createdAt || Date.now()).getTime() / 1000),
owned_by: 'librechat',
permission: [],
root: agent.id,
parent: null,
// LibreChat extensions
name: agent.name,
description: agent.description,
provider: agent.provider,
});
} catch (error) {
const errorMessage = error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Failed to get model';
logger.error('[OpenAI API] Error getting model:', error);
sendErrorResponse(res, 500, errorMessage, 'server_error');
}
};
module.exports = {
OpenAIChatCompletionController,
ListModelsController,
GetModelController,
};