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Author SHA1 Message Date
Marco Beretta
4e0f242557
⚡ fix: Parallelize Setup Cancel Lookups and Keep Attachment Drafts on Reload (#17963)
* fix: Read the Account and Session Together and Test Cancel on a Real Database

- Start the setup user and refresh session lookups together in the cancel controller instead of one after the other, as the opt-in confirmation already does
- Run the cancel controller spec on mongodb-memory-server with the real data-schemas methods, so the session and compare-and-swap predicates under test are the production ones, and add a negative case for each
- Keep only a module wiring test in the CJS controller spec, since the database behavior is now covered where it can run for real

* test: Pin the Cancel Response When the Session Lookup Fails

Both lookups now run before any cookie or write, so a failed session lookup answers 500 with the browser and the stored state untouched. Cover that on the real database.

* fix: Keep the Saved Files Draft Until the File List Loads

After a reload the live file map is empty until the server's file list arrives, and the restore that rebuilds it needs that list. The save effect rewrote the stored draft from the empty map in between, so a pasted-text chip or any other attachment was gone before it could be restored. It now waits for the list. This is what turned the composer-attachments restore scenario red on dev.
2026-11-09 21:57:01 +01:00
Marco Beretta
7a927fb19e
🚪 fix: Let Users Sign Out of Required Two-Factor Enrollment (#17956) 2026-11-09 17:40:50 +01:00
Marco Beretta
76c25680ce
🔐 fix: Retire Credentials by Their Committing Write and on Opt-In 2FA (#17504)
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* fix: Retire Credentials by Their Committing Write and on Opt-In 2FA

Re-date password reset and enrollment cutoffs once the write that set them commits, so a credential minted while the write is in flight is retired. Opt-in 2FA confirmation now stamps twoFactorEnrolledAt and rotates the session like required enrollment. OpenID refresh ends a session established before a reset or enrollment instead of spending its IdP grant.

* fix: Bind Opt-In 2FA Rotation to the Caller's Refresh Session

Confirmation now requires the refresh session the request was issued with, rotates it in place and revokes only the others, so an access token on its own cannot trade enrollment for a long-lived session. The OpenID retirement check moves into the refresh recovery service and ends the session through the existing session-missing path, leaving the CJS controller unchanged.

* fix: Clear a Retired OpenID Session Against the User It Was Checked For

* refactor: Inject the Refresh Secret Into OpenID Recovery

* fix: Report a Reset Whose Cutoff Could Not Be Re-Dated

A failed re-stamp now propagates as RETIREMENT_RESTAMP_FAILED. The reset controller still revokes sessions and passkeys and answers CREDENTIAL_RETIREMENT_INCOMPLETE; the CLI re-stamps after its revocations and exits non-zero; enrollment revokes sessions before the re-stamp and mints nothing when it fails.

* fix: Re-Date the Reset Cutoff Only After the Link Is Consumed

The web reset re-stamps credentialsChangedAt in the controller once resetPassword has committed, consumed the token and sent the notice, so a failed re-stamp can no longer leave the link replayable. Revocations still run and the response reports CREDENTIAL_RETIREMENT_INCOMPLETE.

* fix: Retire Credentials on Every Exit Path After a Reset Commits

resetPasswordWithToken owns the post-commit steps: deleting the link and sending the notice no longer throw, and a link issued before the account's last credentialsChangedAt is refused, so it is spent even when its deletion fails. The reset write is conditioned on the cutoff it read, so one link commits once. The controller re-dates the cutoff and revokes sessions and passkeys whenever the password changed, and answers CREDENTIAL_RETIREMENT_INCOMPLETE if any of that fails.

* fix: Spend Undated Reset Links and Move the Reset Notice Into TypeScript

* fix: Tell the User When a Reset Could Not Sign Out Every Session

The reset page now recognizes CREDENTIAL_RETIREMENT_INCOMPLETE, shared from librechat-data-provider, and shows a localized warning that the new password is active with a sign-in action, instead of reporting the spent link as invalid.

* perf: Re-Date the Reset Cutoff From the Committed Write

The committed reset hands its credentialsChangedAt back through PasswordResetResult, so the controller re-stamps without a second user read.

* fix: Retire Every Superseded Credential Before Minting on 2FA Enrollment

Opt-in confirmation and setup finalization now revoke sessions, re-date twoFactorEnrolledAt and wait for the auth cache to drop the pre-enrollment document, running every step even when one fails. If any step fails they mint nothing and answer CREDENTIAL_RETIREMENT_INCOMPLETE; the settings dialog keeps 2FA on with a warning and the setup screen sends the user back to sign in with the new factor.

* test: Cover the Settings Warning When 2FA Enrollment Leaves Sessions Behind

* fix: Send the User Back to Sign In After an Incomplete Opt-In Enrollment

Enrollment retires the confirming tab's bearer, and an incomplete retirement mints no replacement, so the settings dialog now shows the backup codes and then signs out to the login page, whether the user completes setup or closes the dialog.

* test: Run the Retirement Warning Scenarios Against Their Own Signed-Out or Fresh Accounts

* test: Open the Sidebar Drawer Before the Account Menu on Phones

* fix: Report a Committed Opt-In Enrollment When Rotating the Session Fails

Once 2FA is promoted, a later failure in confirm2FA withdraws whatever session it may have minted and answers CREDENTIAL_RETIREMENT_INCOMPLETE, so the settings dialog hands over the backup codes and signs the user in again instead of reporting an invalid code.

* test: Prove an Incomplete Reset Does Not Resume the Retired Session

The Sign in action sends a browser with a live session through /login for about 150 ms before it lands in chat, so the signed-in version of the warning scenario only passed when the URL check caught that window. The warning scenario runs signed out, and a new scenario holds a pre-reset session and asserts its refresh is refused and the user stays on the login page.

* fix: Settle the Auth Cache After the CLI Reset's Final Cutoff Write

* test: Require the Login Form After Signing In From a Signed-Out Reset

* fix: Explain an Incomplete Session Retirement Before Restarting Sign-In After Required 2FA Setup

* perf: Start the Opt-In Enrollment User and Session Reads Together
2026-11-05 22:53:11 +01:00
Marco Beretta
92432e95d5
🔐 feat: Enforce Required Two-Factor Authentication (#14731)
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* feat: enforce required two-factor authentication

Require local and LDAP accounts to enroll in TOTP before they can use the
app when ENFORCE_TWO_FACTOR_AUTHENTICATION is set. Sign-in, refresh, bearer
verification, optional share auth and image authorization all route an
unenrolled account into a staged setup flow, and every bearer credential
minted before enrollment or a password reset is retired.

Password reset retirement uses the existing credentialsChangedAt stamp, and
commitPasswordReset clears any staged enrollment in the same write. Passkey
sign-in follows the same enrollment gate as password sign-in.

* test: cover passkey sign-in handing off to required enrollment

* refactor: keep Mongoose user types out of two-factor auth contracts

* fix: withdraw a minted session when its retirement recheck fails

* fix: hold Agent API keys and the reset CLI to the required two-factor policy

* fix: adopt a setup token handed off after the setup screen mounted

* fix: move every tab that receives an enrollment hand-off into setup

* fix: read the enrollment gate's retirement cutoff in system scope

* fix: clear minted session cookies before the fallible session deletion

* fix: adopt a setup token persisted before the setup screen subscribed
2026-10-01 23:39:51 +02:00
Marco Beretta
4617302116 🔑 feat: Passkey Authentication with WebAuthn Sign-In and Management (#14715)
* feat: passkey authentication with WebAuthn sign-in and management

* refactor: tighten passkey account protections

Require password confirmation before adding or removing a passkey, and rate
limit those confirmations per user in their own namespace. Restrict passkey
enrollment and sign-in to local accounts, and re-evaluate account status once
the credential owner is resolved. Require user verification on the sign-in
ceremony. Invalidate outstanding access tokens on password reset. Tighten
redirect target validation and sanitize ceremony failure logs.

Adds coverage across the passkey controller, the WebAuthn helpers, the step-up
limiter, both JWT strategies, the redirect utility and the passkey settings UI.

* fix: localize passkey default name and respect router basename

Send a localized default credential label at enrollment so non-English
locales no longer persist the server's English fallback, and route the
passkey post-login and 2FA navigations through the deployment base path
so subdirectory installs stay inside the router.

Also mock syncStaticTools in the server boot specs; without it the
post-listen MCP initialization calls undefined and exits the worker.

* fix: harden passkey counter checks and reach stranded credentials

Make the signature counter write a compare-and-swap so two assertions
that verified against the same stored counter cannot both commit, and
reject the losing one; a cloned authenticator is otherwise accepted
inside that window. Counterless authenticators keep restamping at 0.

Keep the passkey panel reachable for identity-provider accounts, which
already get passwordless removal server-side but had no way in, while
hiding the add control they cannot use. Cascade passkey deletion from
the admin user-deletion path so credential IDs are not stranded.

* fix: reject stale 2FA temp tokens and surface passkey load failures

A temporary 2FA token proves only the first factor, so honouring one
minted before a password reset let anyone holding the second factor
survive account recovery. Apply the same credentials-changed cutoff the
JWT strategy uses.

Also distinguish a failed passkey query from an empty list; the error
state previously rendered as "no passkeys yet", which misreports what
is protecting the account.

* fix: fail closed when the passkey counter write cannot commit

Returning success on a storage error bypassed the compare-and-swap it
exists to enforce, so a cloned authenticator could be accepted while the
stored counter stayed stale. A database that cannot take this write
cannot mint the session either, so little is gained by failing open.
Counterless credentials carry no clone signal and keep their old path.

* fix: keep the passkey 2FA handoff inside the router

A full-page navigation to the 2FA screen remounted AuthContextProvider,
which silent-refreshes on mount; no refresh session exists yet at that
point, so it bounced back to login before the code could be entered.
Route through the router like the password flow does.

Also reveal the removal step-up field when the server refuses a
passwordless attempt, so an account migrated to an identity provider
without its old hash cleared can still clear its credentials; drop the
staged password when the dialog closes; and revoke passkeys in the CLI
password reset, which bypassed the HTTP controller's cleanup.

* fix: apply one email-verification policy across login methods

Accounts predating mandatory verification are marked verified as they
sign in when no email is configured, but only the password strategy did
it, so the same legacy account was admitted by password and refused by
passkey. Extract the rule into a shared helper and call it from both.

* fix: refuse a passkey sign-in when the ban check cannot complete

checkBan defaults next to a no-op, so calling it bare discarded any
internal failure and left req.banned unset, letting the request fall
through and be issued tokens. Capture the error the middleware chain
would have propagated and reject instead.

* fix: refine passkey management dialogs

* test: stabilize passkey tooltip assertions

* test: reconcile passkey specs with the canary reset and deletion flows

The credentialsChangedAt stamp now lives in commitPasswordReset, so its
assertion moves to the passwordReset unit spec. Restores the describe
blocks the rebase merged together.

* test: mock passkey routes in the cross-site login suite

* refactor: move passkey handlers and credential checks into packages/api

The passkey controller, the credentialsChangedAt predicate and the legacy
email-verification grandfathering now live in TypeScript with injected
dependencies; /api keeps only the wiring that builds the handlers.

* style: align passkey UI with Tailwind v4 order and design-rule lint

* fix: revoke earlier access tokens on a CLI password reset

passwordVersion is not a user schema field, so the write was dropped and
tokens issued before the reset kept verifying.

* test: cover passkey sign-in and credential revocation end to end

* fix: hide passkey sign-in when email login is disabled

The passkey endpoints already refuse under ALLOW_EMAIL_LOGIN=false, so
advertising the button only led to a 403.

* fix: let only one concurrent verification consume a passkey challenge

Without a native getDel the challenge was read then deleted, so two
concurrent verifications could both use it. The delete now arbitrates:
only the caller whose delete removed the key gets the challenge.

* test: run passkey ceremonies on the localhost relying party

WebAuthn refuses an IP address as the RP ID, and the harness serves the
app on 127.0.0.1. The reset scenario runs once per project, so the mock
harness lifts the per-IP reset request limit as it does for forks.

* fix: keep passkey management when email login is disabled

Gate only the sign-in button on emailLoginEnabled, since only the sign-in
routes sit behind that gate; list, rename and remove stay reachable.

* fix: build the passkey credential index before the first registration

With MONGO_AUTO_INDEX=false the unique credentialId index was never
created, so concurrent registrations could store the same credential.

* test: enable password reset in the mock harness and cover email-login-off passkeys

* fix: stop re-exporting the passkey cap from data-schemas

The bundler left every import of methods/passkey.ts unlinked while that
module re-exported MAX_PASSKEYS_PER_USER from librechat-data-provider, so
the index build and the counter-failure log threw ReferenceError at
runtime. Consumers now import the cap from librechat-data-provider.

* test: close nested settings dialogs before logging out in passkey scenarios

* fix: reject cross-site passkey assertions

The verify route accepted a form posted from another site, which let an
attacker sign a victim into the attacker's account. It now runs the same
requireSameOrigin guard as password login and the 2FA step.

* fix: end refresh sessions on a CLI password reset

A surviving refresh session could mint an access token issued after the
credentialsChangedAt stamp, so the CLI now deletes sessions like the web
reset does.

* fix: keep the passkey button locked when it supersedes autofill

Starting the modal ceremony aborts the pending autofill one, and the
autofill error path cleared the shared lock and busy state while the
modal ceremony was still running.

(cherry picked from commit 471abaa64d)

Original-PR: https://github.com/LibreChat-AI/LibreChat/pull/14715
2026-10-01 03:46:16 +00:00