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19 commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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Danny Avila
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fa913148fb
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🔒 fix: Refresh MCP OBO Tokens From the Live OpenID Session (#15334)
* 🧊 fix: Inline-refresh OpenID session tokens at MCP OBO call time Resolves the walk-away failure mode where MCP tool calls using OBO auth fail with "No valid OpenID access token is available for OBO exchange" after a user idles past their access-token lifetime. The strategy-time snapshot on `user.federatedTokens` could expire mid-stream before `resolveOboToken` ran, while `req.session.openidTokens` carried a still- valid (or refreshable) token that nothing read. - New OpenIDSessionRefresh service: per-user single-flighted closure that reads `req.session.openidTokens` at OBO time and inline-refreshes via `openid-client.refreshTokenGrant` when expired (30s skew), persisting via `req.session.save()`. No cookie writes (headers already flushed). - `resolveOboToken` gains a required UpstreamTokenProvider parameter (typed as `() => Promise<OIDCTokens | null>`, reusing the shared shape from @librechat/data-schemas). Compile-time guarantee that every call site is updated. - New `session_refresh_failed` OboTokenResolutionReason distinguishes "session expired and IdP rejected refresh" from "no upstream token ever existed." - `req` threaded through createMCPTool/createMCPTools/createToolInstance to construct the closure with captured request, plus fail-closed guards in MCPConnectionFactory.getOboTokens and MCPManager.callTool when the closure isn't plumbed. - Startup warning in MCPServersInitializer when OBO is configured but OPENID_REUSE_TOKENS is unset (the strategy populating user.federatedTokens is only registered under reuse, so OBO would fail every call without it). Tests: 16 new in OpenIDSessionRefresh.spec.js; obo.spec.ts extended for the new param + error reason; wiring smoke tests in MCPManager, MCPConnectionFactory, MCPServersInitializer, and MCP.spec.js. * 🛡️ fix: Harden OBO inline-refresh against token type and session edge cases - Token-preference asymmetry: live-token reuse and expires_at derivation now strictly gate on the access_token, not the id_token. Added a required `tokenPreference` parameter on isLiveSessionTokenStillValid, buildOIDCTokensFromSession, and createOpenIDSessionTokenProvider so every call site is explicit. Dropped the bogus id_token-exp fallback in performIdpRefresh — id_token TTL is governed by IdP session policy and would mark a short-lived access_token reusable past its real lifetime. - Missing req in /reinitialize route: the manual reconnect endpoint now forwards req into reinitMCPServer, so OBO servers can build a session-aware upstream-token closure instead of failing with missing_upstream_token. - Single-flight key collisions: composed key as tenantId:openidIssuer:openidId:sessionId via getSingleFlightKey. Concurrent calls in the same session still coalesce; separate sessions never share an in-flight refresh, preventing refresh-token rotation from breaking sibling sessions and preventing cross-tenant token crossover when distinct users share an IdP sub. - Opaque access token reuse): persist accessTokenExpiresAt (unix seconds, from tokenset.expires_in) on each refresh AND on initial login / SPA refresh in setOpenIDAuthTokens. New getAccessTokenExp helper falls back to it when the access token isn't a JWT, avoiding redundant inline refreshes for Microsoft Graph and Auth0 default audiences. - Log hygiene: the single-flight key (containing sessionId, openidId, openidIssuer, tenantId) is now SHA-256-hashed in the "Joining in-flight refresh" debug log. Preserves cross-line correlation via a 12-char prefix without leaking credential or PII material. Documented req.session.openidTokens shape contract via JSDoc typedef so the new accessTokenExpiresAt field has a discoverable home alongside the existing accessToken/idToken/refreshToken/expiresAt/lastRefreshedAt. Tests: OpenIDSessionRefresh.spec.js up to 30 passing (added coverage for opaque-token reuse, JWT-access-token-exp fallback, no-id_token-fallback regression, cross-session no-coalesce, persistence on refresh, and a guard against stale accessTokenExpiresAt carryover). AuthService.spec.js adds two cases covering accessTokenExpiresAt persistence on login. mcp.spec.js (route) gains a regression test asserting req flows into reinitMCPServer. * 🔍 fix: Detect OBO-only MCP admin config overrides Admin Config overlays for YAML-defined MCP servers compare only ADMIN_CONFIGURABLE_FIELDS to decide whether to lazy-init a config-tier override. The OBO config field was added after that fingerprint list, so an override that only added or changed `obo` was treated as unchanged YAML and skipped. Include `obo` in the admin-configurable field list and add a regression test for an OBO-only override. * 🔊 fix: Mock MCP OAuth timeout in SDK integration test MCPConnectionFactory.attemptToConnect reads mcpConfig.OAUTH_HANDLING_TIMEOUT when building the OAuth connection timeout. The SDK OAuth integration test mocked mcpConfig without that field, which made the timeout calculation produce NaN and caused the test to fail before the OAuth refresh/start path completed. Add OAUTH_HANDLING_TIMEOUT to the test mock. * ♻️ refactor: Pass OBO upstream-token closure into MCP instead of req Build the OpenID upstream-token provider at the request boundary and thread only the closure through MCP handling, so the MCP service layer no longer receives the raw Express request. The closure still reads/refreshes the live session at tool-call time, preserving the walk-away recovery. - Drop `req`/`capturedReq` from createMCPTools, createMCPTool, reconnectServer, createToolInstance, and reinitMCPServer; forward `upstreamTokenProvider` instead. Closure is constructed in loadTools, loadToolDefinitionsWrapper, and the reinitialize route, where req/res are in scope. - OBO: fall back to user.federatedTokens when the provider yields no live session, so OIDC remote-agent calls (verified bearer, no session) still work. - Inline refresh: mirror a rotated refresh token to the refreshToken cookie via a shared setRefreshTokenCookie helper, guarded by !res.headersSent (no-op on the streaming path; session copy stays authoritative). - Single-flight: hydrate a joining request's own session from the resolved tokens so a later OBO call doesn't replay a rotated-away refresh token. Addresses owner feedback and three review findings. * 🔒 fix: Recover OIDC refresh-token rotation after SSE OBO refresh When an inline OBO refresh rotates the OpenID refresh token after SSE headers have already been sent, the browser refreshToken cookie cannot be updated. Store a short-lived encrypted bridge from the stale cookie token to the rotated token so /api/auth/refresh can recover after express-session loss. Use the signed openid_user_id cookie to load user context for bridge validation, retry only on invalid_grant, and delete the bridge only after the bridged refresh succeeds. * 🔨 fix: hydrate joined OIDC refresh sessions with stable refresh tokens Update single-flight OIDC refresh joiners whenever refreshed access token state changes, even if the IdP keeps the refresh token unchanged. This prevents joined requests from retaining stale accessToken or accessTokenExpiresAt values and redundantly refreshing later in the same run. * 🌉 Persist OIDC refresh-token recovery bridges in MongoDB Store SSE OBO refresh-token recovery bridges in MongoDB instead of process-local memory so /api/auth/refresh can recover after worker restarts or cross-worker routing. Derive bridge expiry from REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRY so the recovery window matches the stale refreshToken cookie it repairs, and delete bridges after successful recovery. * 🤝 Coordinate OIDC inline refreshes across workers Add a short-lived Mongo-backed refresh-flight record so concurrent OBO refreshes for the same OpenID session do not redeem the same rotating refresh token on different workers. The winning worker performs the IdP refresh and stores an encrypted result; joiners wait for that result, hydrate their request session, and return without calling the IdP. * ⚓ Keep OpenID marker cookies aligned on inline refresh Refresh token_provider and openid_user_id with the same expiry as the rotated refreshToken cookie when an inline OBO refresh can still write headers. Share the marker-cookie writer with the normal OpenID auth refresh path so the fallback /api/auth/refresh branch continues to recognize valid OpenID refresh tokens after session expiry. * 🔑 fix: include refresh token in OIDC local refresh flight key Key the process-local OIDC refresh coalescing by the current session refresh token, matching the Mongo-backed flight key. This prevents a request with a newly rotated token from joining an older pending refresh and inheriting its failure/result. * 🌉 fix: store OIDC refresh bridge without cookie response Treat missing or non-cookie responses like headers-sent streaming responses during inline OIDC refresh. When the IdP rotates the refresh token and cookies cannot be written, persist a recovery bridge so a later /auth/refresh can recover after session expiry. * 🫙 fix: preserve stale OIDC cookie bridge key Track the refresh token last written to the browser cookie separately from the current session refresh token. When inline OIDC refreshes rotate tokens without a writable response, keep bridging from the browser-stale token directly to the latest session token. * 🙌 fix: keep OIDC bridge recovery success on cleanup failure Make refresh-token bridge cleanup best-effort after a bridged OIDC refresh succeeds. A transient delete failure now logs a warning but does not convert the already-refreshed session and cookies into a 403 response. * 📦 test: Exclude RefreshTokenBridge from tenant-isolation coverage Add RefreshTokenBridge to the tenant-isolation coverage allowlist because refresh bridge lookups run during unauthenticated OpenID refresh recovery. The controller first recovers user context from the signed OpenID marker cookie, then the bridge methods apply explicit user and tenant filters. Ambient tenant isolation would bind this recovery path to request-local tenant context that is not available at the point the stale cookie is being resolved * ⚡ Fix OpenID refresh flight retry and marker hydration Allow failed OpenID refresh flights to be reclaimed immediately instead of pinning transient errors. Preserve the browser refresh-token marker when joined refreshes hydrate session tokens from a shared flight result. Stabilize AuthService tests by isolating mocked module imports from prior suites. * 🛠️ fix: centralize OBO identity scoping Add shared auth identity helpers for app user ids, OpenID subjects, tenant ids, and normalized OpenID issuers. Thread a non-placeholder-visible OBO identity context from the real request user through MCP connection, tool-call, reinit, and refresh paths. Keep tenantId and openidIssuer out of createSafeUser so MCP user placeholders do not expose those fields. Scope OBO token cache and in-flight exchange keys by tenant, issuer, OpenID subject, scopes, and a SHA-256 hash of the upstream assertion. This prevents cross-tenant/cross-issuer collisions and avoids reusing tokens minted from stale rotated assertions. Use the shared identity helpers for OpenID refresh-flight keys and refresh-token bridge recovery records so related OBO refresh paths share the same identity normalization rules. The helper is intended for auth-boundary and credential-cache code, not as a blanket replacement for ordinary app user id ownership checks. * 🛠️ fix: preserve OIDC refresh-token sync on save failures Sync OpenID refresh-token cookie/bridge state before persisting the session so a transient session-store failure cannot lose an IdP-rotated refresh token. Also trigger sync when the session refresh token differs from the browser refresh-token marker, not only when the current grant rotates the token. This lets later writable refreshes repair stale browser cookies left behind by SSE refreshes. Route refresh bridge identity through the shared identity helper with the threaded OBO identity context, falling back to request/user context when needed. Add regression coverage for session-save failures, stale browser cookie repair, non-writable bridge storage, and shared-helper identity fallback. * 🛠️ fix: keep OIDC refresh bridge during recovery grace After successful bridged refresh recovery, re-store the stale-cookie bridge with a short grace TTL instead of deleting it immediately. This lets parallel /api/auth/refresh requests that already sent the stale browser cookie recover before they can observe the first response's Set-Cookie. Retarget the bridge to the refresh token returned by the bridged retry so B-to-C refresh-token rotation remains recoverable. The grace TTL is parsed with math() and defaults to 60s, which shrinks the replay window from the original REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRY bridge lifetime to the short recovery grace period. Remove the now-unused explicit bridge delete path from the service and data-schemas method surface. Add regression coverage for grace re-store, identity symmetry, retry failure behavior, and same-key upsert replacement. * 🛠️ fix: fail closed on OBO MCP user identity mismatch Add an OBO-specific guard before MCP tool execution that requires the effective invocation user and captured request user to both have ids and to match. This prevents OBO tool calls from falling back to a separate configurable.user_id identity after request-bound OBO context has already been captured. Keep the existing user id fallback behavior for non-OBO MCP calls. Tests cover mismatched OBO users, missing user ids, and the matching-user path ignoring a conflicting configurable.user_id. * 🛠️ fix: Guard OpenID bridge retry user identity Extract the shared OpenID refresh/user-resolution flow in AuthController so the normal refresh path and bridge-recovery retry use the same grant, claims, issuer, user lookup, and diagnostic logging code. Preserve the existing path-specific behavior: the normal path still owns migration updates and 401 login redirects, while the bridge retry still falls through to the existing 403 invalid-token response. Add a bridge-recovery guard that rejects retry results whose resolved user id differs from the signed openid_user_id cookie before issuing tokens or re-storing the grace bridge. Cover both the successful matching-user recovery and the mismatched-user rejection. * 🛠️ fix: type-safety polish on OBO data layer Replace refresh token bridge query/update Record<string, unknown> usage with typed Mongoose FilterQuery and UpdateQuery definitions. Harden OpenID marker cookie JWT expiry handling by converting refresh expiry milliseconds to integer seconds and rejecting invalid or non-positive durations. Add focused CSRF tests for fractional refresh expiry values and invalid expiry configuration. * 🛠️ fix: Bind OpenID session tokens to authenticated identity Stamp OpenID session token state with the LibreChat user id, OpenID subject, tenant id, and normalized issuer when tokens are stored. Fail closed before OBO inline token reuse/refresh when the session token identity does not match the current authenticated identity, preventing a stale or mixed Express session from supplying another user's upstream assertion. Also validate the normal /api/auth/refresh session-token reuse shortcut against the signed marker-cookie user before returning cached session tokens. Note: sessions created before this change carry no identity stamp and are treated as a mismatch. This is self-healing — the reuse path forces a full IdP refresh (which re-stamps the session) and the OBO path throws, surfacing as a one-time re-authentication for active OBO users at deploy time. The session re-stamps within one session lifetime (SESSION_EXPIRY, default 15 min). * 🛠️ fix: Recover OpenID refresh token drift Prefer the browser refresh-token cookie when it differs from the server-side OpenID session state, and force a real IdP refresh in that case instead of reusing stale session tokens. Store a short-lived refresh-token bridge when inline OBO refresh writes a rotated browser cookie but session persistence fails, so follow-up refreshes can still recover from the old token. Keep the bridge grace TTL centralized in RefreshTokenBridge so both recovery paths use the same env-backed value. Note: drift is measured against the last-synced browserRefreshToken marker, so the SSE path (intentionally stale cookie, authoritative session) does not false-positive. Sessions predating the marker have no browserRefreshToken; for those, drift falls back to comparing the cookie against the session refresh token and prefers the cookie on difference. This is the same self-healing pre-change-session window as the identity binding fix and re-syncs within one session lifetime. Tests cover cookie/session drift selection, reusable-session bypass on drift, bridge storage after session-save failure, and the shared bridge constant wiring. * 🛠️ fix: Harden OBO token caching and expiry handling Reject malformed OBO grant responses before writing them to the exchanged-token cache so a missing access_token cannot poison the cache. Store absolute expires_at values with cached OBO tokens and ignore legacy cache entries without usable expiry metadata. This keeps cached-token freshness based on the token’s real remaining lifetime instead of reusing the original relative expires_in on cache hits. Move OBO expiry normalization and skew helpers into packages/api and use them from both the JS exchange service and the TS MCP resolver. Apply a 30-second safety margin with a one- second floor for short-lived tokens, covered by direct helper tests and caller-level regression tests. Tests: - packages/api: npm run build - packages/api: npx jest src/mcp/oauth/expiry.spec.ts src/mcp/oauth/obo.spec.ts - api: npx jest server/services/OboTokenService.spec.js * 🛠️ fix: Harden OBO refresh-token bridge lookup and indexing Reuse getValidOpenIDReuseUserId for the bridge-recovery user lookup in refreshController instead of re-verifying openid_user_id inline. The shared helper enforces the JWT_REFRESH_SECRET presence check and a strict typeof payload.id === 'string' guard, rejecting tokens whose id claim is present but not a string (e.g. a numeric id) that the inline check accepted. Fail closed on issuer mismatch in getRefreshTokenBridge. Both the stored and the expected issuer are now normalized and compared for equality, so a bridge is recovered only when both sides agree (both absent, or both present and equal after normalization). Previously the check was skipped whenever the stored issuer was absent, allowing recovery across mismatched issuer context. Drop the unused {oldRefreshTokenHash, userId, tenantId, openidIssuer} index and the openidIssuer field on RefreshTokenBridgeQuery. The data-layer filter only queries the 3-field {oldRefreshTokenHash, userId, tenantId} index; the issuer is verified in application code, not the query. Hoist the repeated model accessor into getRefreshTokenBridgeModel. Note: issuer is now load-bearing for recovery. A bridge stored with an issuer recovers only when the lookup supplies a matching issuer; the recovery lookup reads user.openidIssuer via AUTH_REFRESH_USER_PROJECTION (an exclusion projection that retains the field). If a user's persisted openidIssuer is empty while the stored bridge has one, recovery fails closed (falls through to normal re-authentication) until the bridge TTLs out — no security regression. Tests cover invalid signed-cookie payloads bypassing the bridge, both asymmetric issuer-presence cases, issuer normalization before comparison, and an index-alignment assertion guarding against re-adding the dropped index. * 🛠️ fix: Degrade OBO discovery on token resolution failures Catch expected OboTokenResolutionError failures during MCP tool discovery and fall back to unauthenticated tool listing instead of aborting discovery. This keeps discovery aligned with the existing unauthenticated listing behavior while preserving unexpected errors as real failures. Also correct OBO tool-call freshness comment and tighten the OBO trust-check permissions type to the existing role permission shape. Tests: - npx jest src/mcp/__tests__/MCPConnectionFactory.test.ts --runInBand --coverage=false - npx jest src/mcp/oauth/obo.spec.ts --runInBand --coverage=false * 🛠️ fix: tighten OBO tool-call errors, bridge logging, and flight typing Move resolveToolCallUserId inside the tool-call try/catch so an OBO identity mismatch surfaces with serverName/toolName context and the standard tool-call-failed message instead of an opaque bare Error. Raise the refresh-token bridge lookup failure log from debug to warn so transient infrastructure failures on the unauthenticated /api/auth/refresh path are observable, and guard the message access against non-Error values. Replace the unknown+cast in isDuplicateKeyError with a hasErrorCode type predicate so the duplicate-key check reads error.code without an assertion. Preserve real math/isEnabled in the MCPConnectionFactory test mock (mock only processMCPEnv) so mcpConfig timeouts no longer resolve to NaN, fixing the TimeoutNaNWarning that masked slow OAuth retry behavior. * 🧪 fix: Restore the Flight Uniqueness Index and Buffer the Graph Cache TTL Two CI failures on the merge, both in suites this environment cannot run (their MongoDB binary download is blocked). `GraphApiService.spec.js` still asserted the unbuffered TTL. Graph tokens route through the same `getTokenCacheTtlMs` as the OBO and openidStrategy caches, so the entry now expires 30s before the credential does. `openidRefreshFlight.spec.ts` dropped the database between tests, which takes the indexes with it, and Mongoose builds them only once when the model is compiled. Whether the unique `key` index survived into a test was a race with that one-time build. Without it a second `create` inserts instead of raising a duplicate-key error, so every worker believes it won the flight — the mutual exclusion the file exists to prove. Indexes are now rebuilt after each drop, which also makes the reclaim and complete cases reach those paths for the right reason. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SxKWxwqxAGckYpRsYTqx3F * fix: address OBO review findings * 🔐 fix: Install Bridge Indexes and Carry OBO Through Assistant Recovery Two findings from the Codex pass on |
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Danny Avila
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de59da9636
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🎟️ refactor: Require Credentials for Local Image Access by Default (#15252)
* 🔐 fix: Protect Local Image Access by Default * 🔐 fix: Scope Image Authorization to Active Sessions * 🧹 style: Format Image Authorization Checks * 🛡️ fix: Harden Image Avatar Authorization * 🧭 style: Sort Image Authorization Imports * 🔐 fix: Close Image Authorization Review Gaps * 🧭 fix: Normalize Stored Avatar Base Paths * 🏢 fix: Resolve Tenant Assistant Image Policy * 🛂 fix: Enforce Effective Image Access Policy * 🧹 style: Flatten Assistant Config Selection * 🧷 fix: Preserve Image Access Compatibility * 🪪 fix: Make Image Sessions Revocable * 🏗️ fix: Move Image Session Policy Into API |
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Danny Avila
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f829aca9fb
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🧩 fix: Align Tenant and MCP Configuration Resolution (#14904)
* fix: Align Tenant and MCP Configuration Resolution * fix: Preserve Operator-Owned MCP Entries * fix: Preserve Configuration Source Ownership * style: Normalize Middleware Import Order * fix: Preserve Process Server Precedence * test: Align Tenant-Aware E2E Setup |
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VictorEPlus
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9446f3278c
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🔡 fix: Normalize Email Case When Issuing Verification Tokens (#14172)
The user schema lowercases emails on save, but sendVerificationEmail stored the verification token with the raw registration email. For mixed-case registrations, verifyEmail's lookup by the lowercased DB email never matched the token, failing with 'No email verification data found'. Normalize once and use it for the link, recipient, and token. resendVerificationEmail already used the DB email and was unaffected. Co-authored-by: VictorEPlus <victor.ortega@eplusadvisor.com> |
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Danny Avila
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8c71dbcb32
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🛂 fix: Normalize Verification Flow Error Responses (#13558)
* fix: normalize verification flow responses * fix: keep verification responses consistent |
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Danny Avila
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3571dfcf22
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🏷️ fix: Categorize Auth Tokens by Flow Type (#13556)
* fix: Scope auth token lifecycle * fix: Preserve legacy auth token lookup * fix: Scope verification token cleanup |
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nangelovv
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6a04fb89e2
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📬 fix: Honor Admin-Panel allowedDomains Override at Registration (#13204)
* fix: honor admin-panel allowedDomains override at registration
registerUser called getAppConfig({ baseOnly: true }), which short-
circuits before any DB override merge. As a result, admin-panel edits to
registration.allowedDomains were silently ignored at signup, even though
they correctly apply to SSO callbacks via checkDomainAllowed (which
calls getAppConfig() with the full resolution).
The admin panel writes registration.allowedDomains to the __base__
principal in the configs collection. That principal is unconditionally
injected by getApplicableConfigs (no user identity required), so a
fully-resolved getAppConfig call picks up the override even before any
user exists. This aligns native signup with the SSO paths and lets
admins tighten or relax the allowed list without a backend restart.
Per review feedback: pass the ALS tenantId explicitly. /api/auth runs
through preAuthTenantMiddleware, which puts a tenantId into
AsyncLocalStorage. Mongoose queries inside getApplicableConfigs are
ALS-scoped, but the per-principal merged-config cache key uses the
*explicit* tenantId parameter (see overrideCacheKey in
packages/api/src/app/service.ts). If we leave tenantId undefined while
ALS holds tenant A, the merged result caches at `__default__` — and a
later request from tenant B would hit that entry, leaking tenant A's
allowedDomains (and balance) across tenants. Reading getTenantId() and
forwarding it makes the cache key match the DB scope, so __base__
overrides apply per-tenant correctly.
Behavior when no admin override exists is unchanged (the merged config
equals the YAML config; optional chaining handles missing fields).
Tests in AuthService.spec.js:
- Regression guard that getAppConfig is called with `{}` (no baseOnly)
when ALS has no tenant — protects against reintroduction of the
short-circuit.
- New tenant-context test verifying getAppConfig({ tenantId }) when
getTenantId() returns a tenant ID — protects against cross-tenant
cache bleed.
- Behavioral test confirming a disallowed domain returns 403 before any
DB user lookup.
* test: remove unused registerSchema import after merge resolution
---------
Co-authored-by: Danny Avila <danny@librechat.ai>
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Danny Avila
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b01d34abe2
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🪪 fix: Preserve Trusted Registration Provider Overrides (#13307) | ||
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Danny Avila
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7f58e4c2ed
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🧾 feat: Add Structured Logging Context (#13110)
* feat: add structured logging context * fix: reduce cloudfront disabled logging * fix: preserve strict reject logging context * chore: format auth middleware test * fix: omit system tenant from log context * fix: type parser spec formatter info * fix: normalize tenant guard before reject checks |
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Danny Avila
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7b9a57a467
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🛡️ fix: Harden OpenID Session Token Reuse (#13086)
* fix: Harden OpenID Session Token Reuse * fix: Preserve OpenID Session Token On Forced Refresh * fix: Gate Preserved OpenID Id Token By Expiry * test: Cover OpenID Id Token Expiry Buffer |
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Danny Avila
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17a08224e1
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🍪 fix: Refresh CloudFront Cookies On Auth Refresh (#13083)
* fix: Refresh CloudFront Cookies On Auth Refresh * fix: Exclude Federated Tokens From Refresh Lookup |
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Danny Avila
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4238dd4471
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🪪 fix: Preserve OIDC Logout ID Token Hint (#12999) | ||
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Danny Avila
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9c81792d25
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🔐 feat: Add Signed CloudFront File Downloads (#12970)
* feat: add signed CloudFront downloads * fix: preserve local IdP avatar paths * fix: address signed download review findings * fix: harden CloudFront cookie scope validation * fix: preserve URL save API compatibility * fix: store CDN SSO avatars under shared prefix * fix: Harden CloudFront tenant file access * fix: Preserve CloudFront download compatibility * fix: Address CloudFront review follow-ups * fix: Preserve file URL fallback user paths * fix: Address download review hardening * fix: Use file owner for S3 RAG cleanup * fix: Address final download review nits * fix: Clear stale avatar CloudFront cookies * fix: Align download filename helpers with dev * fix: Address final CloudFront review follow-ups * fix: Stream S3 URL uploads * fix: Set S3 stream upload length * fix: Preserve download metadata filepath * fix: Avoid remote content length for stream uploads * fix: Use bounded multipart URL uploads * fix: Harden S3 filename boundaries |
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Atef Bellaaj
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187ab787da
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🌩️ feat: CloudFront CDN File Strategy (#12193)
* 🌩️ feat: CloudFront CDN File Strategy + signed cookies Squashed from PR #12193: - feat(storage): add CloudFront CDN file strategy - feat(auth): add CloudFront signed cookie support Note: package.json/package-lock.json dependency additions are intentionally omitted from this commit and will be re-added via `npm install` after rebase to avoid lock-file merge conflicts. The two new peer deps that need to be re-installed are: - @aws-sdk/client-cloudfront@^3.1032.0 - @aws-sdk/cloudfront-signer@^3.1012.0 Also fixes 4 missing destructured names in AuthService.spec.js (getUserById, generateToken, generateRefreshToken, createSession) that were referenced in tests but not imported from the mocked '~/models'. * 📦 chore: install CloudFront SDK deps for PR #12193 Adds the two AWS CloudFront packages required by the rebased CloudFront CDN strategy: - @aws-sdk/client-cloudfront - @aws-sdk/cloudfront-signer Following the @aws-sdk/client-s3 pattern: - api/package.json: regular dependency (runtime resolution) - packages/api/package.json: peerDependency Generated by `npm install` against the freshly rebased lock file to avoid the merge conflicts that came from the original PR's lock-file edits being made against an older base of dev. * 🐛 fix: CI failures + review findings on CloudFront PR #12193 CI fixes - Rename packages/data-provider/src/__tests__/cloudfront-config.test.ts → src/cloudfront-config.spec.ts. Jest's default testMatch picks up __tests__/ directories even inside dist/, so the compiled .d.ts shell was being executed as an empty test suite. Moving to .spec.ts (matching the rest of the package) avoids the dist/ pickup. - Add cookieExpiry: 1800 to CloudFront crud.test makeConfig: the schema applies a default so CloudFrontFullConfig requires it. Review findings addressed - #1 (Codex + comprehensive): Normalize CloudFront domain with /\/+$/ regex (and key with /^\/+/ regex) in buildCloudFrontUrl, matching the cookie code so resource policy and file URLs stay aligned even when the configured domain has multiple trailing slashes. Added tests. - #2: Move DEFAULT_BASE_PATH out of s3Config into shared packages/api/src/storage/constants.ts. ImageService no longer imports S3-specific config. - #3: getCloudFrontConfig() returns Readonly<CloudFrontFullConfig> | null to discourage mutation of the cached signing config. - #4: Add cross-field refinement tests for cloudfrontConfigSchema (invalidateOnDelete-without-distributionId, imageSigning="cookies"-without-cookieDomain). - #6: Revert unrelated MCP comment re-indentation in librechat.example.yaml. - #7: Add azure_blob to the strategy list comment. Skipped - #5 (extractKeyFromS3Url with CloudFront URLs): existing deleteFileFromCloudFront tests already cover the path-equivalence assumption; renaming the helper is real refactor work beyond this PR's scope. - #8, #9 (NIT, low confidence): leaving for author judgement. * 🧹 chore: drop dead DEFAULT_BASE_PATH from s3Config test mock After moving DEFAULT_BASE_PATH to ~/storage/constants, crud.ts no longer reads it from s3Config — so the entry in the s3Config jest mock was misleading dead config. The tests still pass because the unmocked real constants module provides the value. --------- Co-authored-by: Danny Avila <danny@librechat.ai> |
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Danny Avila
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77712c825f
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🏢 feat: Tenant-Scoped App Config in Auth Login Flows (#12434)
* feat: add resolveAppConfigForUser utility for tenant-scoped auth config
TypeScript utility in packages/api that wraps getAppConfig in
tenantStorage.run() when the user has a tenantId, falling back to
baseOnly for new users or non-tenant deployments. Uses DI pattern
(getAppConfig passed as parameter) for testability.
Auth flows apply role-level overrides only (userId not passed)
because user/group principal resolution is deferred to post-auth.
* feat: tenant-scoped app config in auth login flows
All auth strategies (LDAP, SAML, OpenID, social login) now use a
two-phase domain check consistent with requestPasswordReset:
1. Fast-fail with base config (memory-cached, zero DB queries)
2. DB user lookup
3. Tenant-scoped re-check via resolveAppConfigForUser (only when
user has a tenantId; otherwise reuse base config)
This preserves the original fast-fail protection against globally
blocked domains while enabling tenant-specific config overrides.
OpenID error ordering preserved: AUTH_FAILED checked before domain
re-check so users with wrong providers get the correct error type.
registerUser unchanged (baseOnly, no user identity yet).
* test: add tenant-scoped config tests for auth strategies
Add resolveAppConfig.spec.ts in packages/api with 8 tests:
- baseOnly fallback for null/undefined/no-tenant users
- tenant-scoped config with role and tenantId
- ALS context propagation verified inside getAppConfig callback
- undefined role with tenantId edge case
Update strategy and AuthService tests to mock resolveAppConfigForUser
via @librechat/api. Tests verify two-phase domain check behavior:
fast-fail before DB, tenant re-check after. Non-tenant users reuse
base config without calling resolveAppConfigForUser.
* refactor: skip redundant domain re-check for non-tenant users
Guard the second isEmailDomainAllowed call with appConfig !== baseConfig
in SAML, OpenID, and social strategies. For non-tenant users the tenant
config is the same base config object, so the second check is a no-op.
Narrow eslint-disable in resolveAppConfig.spec.ts to the specific
require line instead of blanket file-level suppression.
* fix: address review findings — consistency, tests, and ordering
- Consolidate duplicate require('@librechat/api') in AuthService.js
- Add two-phase domain check to LDAP (base fast-fail before findUser),
making all strategies consistent with PR description
- Add appConfig !== baseConfig guard to requestPasswordReset second
domain check, consistent with SAML/OpenID/social strategies
- Move SAML provider check before tenant config resolution to avoid
unnecessary resolveAppConfigForUser call for wrong-provider users
- Add tenant domain rejection tests to SAML, OpenID, and social specs
verifying that tenant config restrictions actually block login
- Add error propagation tests to resolveAppConfig.spec.ts
- Remove redundant mockTenantStorage alias in resolveAppConfig.spec.ts
- Narrow eslint-disable to specific require line
* test: add tenant domain rejection test for LDAP strategy
Covers the appConfig !== baseConfig && !isEmailDomainAllowed path,
consistent with SAML, OpenID, and social strategy specs.
* refactor: rename resolveAppConfig to app/resolve per AGENTS.md
Rename resolveAppConfig.ts → resolve.ts and
resolveAppConfig.spec.ts → resolve.spec.ts to align with
the project's concise naming convention.
* fix: remove fragile reference-equality guard, add logging and docs
Remove appConfig !== baseConfig guard from all strategies and
requestPasswordReset. The guard relied on implicit cache-backend
identity semantics (in-memory Keyv returns same object reference)
that would silently break with Redis or cloned configs. The second
isEmailDomainAllowed call is a cheap synchronous check — always
running it is clearer and eliminates the coupling.
Add audit logging to requestPasswordReset domain blocks (base and
tenant), consistent with all auth strategies.
Extract duplicated error construction into makeDomainDeniedError().
Wrap resolveAppConfigForUser in requestPasswordReset with try/catch
to prevent DB errors from leaking to the client via the controller's
generic catch handler.
Document the dual tenantId propagation (ALS for DB isolation,
explicit param for cache key) in resolveAppConfigForUser JSDoc.
Add comment documenting the LDAP error-type ordering change
(cross-provider users from blocked domains now get 'domain not
allowed' instead of AUTH_FAILED).
Assert resolveAppConfigForUser is not called on LDAP provider
mismatch path.
* fix: return generic response for tenant domain block in password reset
Tenant-scoped domain rejection in requestPasswordReset now returns the
same generic "If an account with that email exists..." response instead
of an Error. This prevents user-enumeration: an attacker cannot
distinguish between "email not found" and "tenant blocks this domain"
by comparing HTTP responses.
The base-config fast-fail (pre-user-lookup) still returns an Error
since it fires before any user existence is revealed.
* docs: document phase 1 vs phase 2 domain check behavior in JSDoc
Phase 1 (base config, pre-findUser) intentionally returns Error/400
to reveal globally blocked domains without confirming user existence.
Phase 2 (tenant config, post-findUser) returns generic 200 to prevent
user-enumeration. This distinction is now explicit in the JSDoc.
|
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Danny Avila
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2e42378b16
|
🔒 fix: Secure Cookie Localhost Bypass and OpenID Token Selection in AuthService (#11782)
* 🔒 fix: Secure Cookie Localhost Bypass and OpenID Token Selection in AuthService Two independent bugs in `api/server/services/AuthService.js` cause complete authentication failure when using `OPENID_REUSE_TOKENS=true` with Microsoft Entra ID (or Auth0) on `http://localhost` with `NODE_ENV=production`: Bug 1: `secure: isProduction` prevents auth cookies on localhost PR #11518 introduced `shouldUseSecureCookie()` in `socialLogins.js` to handle the case where `NODE_ENV=production` but the server runs on `http://localhost`. However, `AuthService.js` was not updated — it still used `secure: isProduction` in 6 cookie locations across `setAuthTokens()` and `setOpenIDAuthTokens()`. The `token_provider` cookie being dropped is critical: without it, `requireJwtAuth` middleware defaults to the `jwt` strategy instead of `openidJwt`, causing all authenticated requests to return 401. Bug 2: `setOpenIDAuthTokens()` returns `access_token` instead of `id_token` The `openIdJwtStrategy` validates the Bearer token via JWKS. For Entra ID without `OPENID_AUDIENCE`, the `access_token` is a Microsoft Graph API token (opaque or signed for a different audience), which fails JWKS validation. The `id_token` is always a standard JWT signed by the IdP's JWKS keys with the app's `client_id` as audience — which is what the strategy expects. This is the same root cause as issue #8796 (Auth0 encrypted access tokens). Changes: - Consolidate `shouldUseSecureCookie()` into `packages/api/src/oauth/csrf.ts` as a shared, typed utility exported from `@librechat/api`, replacing the duplicate definitions in `AuthService.js` and `socialLogins.js` - Move `isProduction` check inside the function body so it is evaluated at call time rather than module load time - Fix `packages/api/src/oauth/csrf.ts` which also used bare `secure: isProduction` for CSRF and session cookies (same localhost bug) - Return `tokenset.id_token || tokenset.access_token` from `setOpenIDAuthTokens()` so JWKS validation works with standard OIDC providers; falls back to `access_token` for backward compatibility - Add 15 tests for `shouldUseSecureCookie()` covering production/dev modes, localhost variants, edge cases, and a documented IPv6 bracket limitation - Add 13 tests for `setOpenIDAuthTokens()` covering token selection, session storage, cookie secure flag delegation, and edge cases Refs: #8796, #11518, #11236, #9931 * chore: Adjust Import Order and Type Definitions in AgentPanel Component - Reordered imports in `AgentPanel.tsx` for better organization and clarity. - Updated type imports to ensure proper usage of `FieldNamesMarkedBoolean` and `TranslationKeys`. - Removed redundant imports to streamline the codebase. |
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Marco Beretta
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11d5e232b3
|
🧪 refactor(isDomainAllowed): change directory, add tests (#2539) | ||
Danny Avila
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ff057152e2
|
👤 feat: User ID in Model Query; chore: cleanup ModelService (#1753)
* feat: send the LibreChat user ID as a query param when fetching the list of models * chore: update bun * chore: change bun command for building data-provider * refactor: prefer use of `getCustomConfig` to access custom config, also move to `server/services/Config` * refactor: make endpoints/custom option for the config optional, add userIdQuery, and use modelQueries log store in ModelService * refactor(ModelService): use env variables at runtime, use default models from data-provider, and add tests * docs: add `userIdQuery` * fix(ci): import changed |
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Marco Beretta
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25da90657d
|
🔒✉️ feat: allow only certain domain (#1562)
* feat: allow only certain domain * Update dotenv.md * refactor( registrationController) & handle ALLOWED_REGISTRATION_DOMAINS not specified * cleanup and moved to AuthService for better error handling * refactor: replace environment variable with librechat config item, add typedef for custom config, update docs for new registration object and allowedDomains values * ci(AuthService): test for `isDomainAllowed` --------- Co-authored-by: Danny Avila <messagedaniel@protonmail.com> |