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1448 commits
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Ravi Kumar L
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9980b6221f
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🪢 feat: add Langfuse session links (#14776)
* feat: add Langfuse session links * fix: tighten Langfuse session link resolution * fix: clear stale Langfuse session links * test: verify tenant Langfuse session links * fix: align Langfuse link with client conventions |
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Marco Beretta
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5ff282f900
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🎙️ fix: Align Speech Engine Configuration With Runtime (#14736)
* fix: align speech engine configuration with runtime * fix: guard speech recording shortcuts * fix: reconcile speech engine availability --------- Co-authored-by: Danny Avila <danny@librechat.ai> |
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Marco Beretta
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92a8058f02
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🛟 fix: Isolate Invalid Skills During GitHub Sync (#14735)
* fix: treat unrecognized SKILL.md frontmatter keys as warnings An unknown key in one SKILL.md failed that skill outright, and because the GitHub sync runner marks a source failed on any validation error, a single stray key took down every other skill in the repository. Syncing github.com/cloudflare/skills failed entirely because 2 of its 13 skills carry a `references:` key. UNKNOWN_KEY is now a warning, so the skill is stored (unknown keys and all) and the issue is surfaced rather than fatal. `references` joins the allowed set with a shallow JSON-safety check instead of a strict kind match: real files use a string, a list of strings, a list of objects, and a map, and pinning one shape would reintroduce the same failure. Malformed frontmatter stays fatal: INVALID_TYPE, INVALID_SHAPE and the non-plain-object check are unchanged. * fix: skip individual skills instead of failing a whole sync source Any error inside the discovery or commit loop reached the outer catch and marked the entire source failed, so one unusable SKILL.md, one oversized blob, or one duplicate name cost every other skill in the repository. Each skill now runs inside its own boundary and a failure is recorded against that skill. Errors that mean nothing else in the run can succeed (lock loss, GitHub auth failures, rate limiting) still abort the source rather than being charged to whichever skill hit them first. Skills are marked seen before the attempt, so the reconcile pass cannot mirror-delete the previously synced copy of a skill a later run can repair, and duplicate names now drop the whole colliding group instead of letting tree order pick an arbitrary winner. Status gains `partial` (published some, skipped others) plus a capped sample of the skipped skills with the reason for each. A run that publishes nothing and skips something is still `failed`, carrying the first skip's error. The skipped entries name repository paths, so they follow the same visibility rule as owner/repo/paths; the bare count does not. Sync warnings are logged too: a background run has no user-facing surface, so the log is the only place a maintainer sees why an upstream SKILL.md looks off. * test: cover skill sync warnings reaching the log An unrecognized frontmatter key no longer fails the skill, so a background sync has nowhere to report it except the log. Every mock in this spec returned an empty warning list, which left that path unexercised. * fix: describe nested frontmatter values in the shared skill type `SkillFrontmatterValue` allowed only scalars and string arrays, while the server has always stored `hooks` and `metadata` as JSON-safe objects, and now `references` too. A skill carrying any of them could not be represented by `TSkill`, `TCreateSkill` or `TUpdateSkillPayload` without a cast. The type stays free of `any` and `unknown`: values remain JSON-safe by construction, and the server keeps bounding depth, string length and array size when it validates them. * fix: protect moved mirrors and rolled-back counts when a skill is skipped Continuing past a failed skill exposed two problems that aborting the whole source used to hide. A moved skill's mirror keeps its old upstream id until the update lands, and only the new path was marked as seen, so the reconcile pass read the mirror as stale and deleted the very copy the skip path exists to preserve. The old id is now marked as seen too. Deletion counters were incremented when a stale name-conflicting mirror was removed, but never undone when the following commit failed and the mirror was restored. The run no longer stops there, so the status persisted a deletion that did not happen and the reconcile pass counted the restored row again. Counters are now rolled back when the restore succeeds. * fix: bound unknown frontmatter values and keep moved mirrors through duplicates Tolerating an unrecognized key meant its value skipped the shared JSON-safety check, so a deeply nested or oversized payload was accepted and persisted under a key nobody validates. The key stays non-blocking; the value is now held to the same depth, array and string bounds as every structured key. A skill that moves into a name another discovered skill also claims is dropped with the rest of its duplicate group before the sync path can reuse its mirror, which left the still-published copy unmarked and reconciled away. Both paths now mark the moved mirror through one helper. * fix: end the source when a skipped skill fails to roll back A skill that fails and rolls back cleanly is just a skipped skill. One whose restore or delete also fails leaves a mirror with half-rewritten files or a half-created row, and the run now continues past it, so the source could report partial success while that mirror stayed inconsistent and its pre-marked upstream id kept reconciliation away from it. Failed rollbacks now raise a source-fatal error carrying the original failure, which stops the source the way a lost lock or a refused GitHub token does. * test: cover a skipped skill discovered at the repository root A repository-level SKILL.md is discovered with an empty path, so this pins that a skip recorded against it still persists with the rest of the partial status rather than taking the whole status row down with it. * docs: describe unknown skill frontmatter warnings * fix: preserve mirrors after partial skill sync * fix: preserve skill validation details during sync * fix: fail sync when mirror identity cannot be restored * fix: harden skill sync failure boundaries * fix: preserve skipped skills on fatal sync * fix: surface skill sync diagnostics and rollback failures * fix: preserve skill frontmatter extension keys * fix: reject skill frontmatter keys that collide when normalized Frontmatter keys are matched case-insensitively against the canonical key list, so "Name" and "name" both resolve to "name". Every call site normalized independently, and the last key in iteration order silently won, meaning the effective value depended on YAML ordering rather than on anything the author could see. Centralize the normalization in normalizeSkillFrontmatterKeys and have it fail when two recognized keys resolve to the same canonical key, rather than picking one. parse.ts, deployment.ts and the agent handler now surface that as a parse error; createSkill and updateSkill surface it as a blocking DUPLICATE_KEY validation issue. Unrecognized keys are still passed through untouched so extension frontmatter survives. deriveStructuredFrontmatterFields and both write paths now run on the normalized map, so a "Disable-Model-Invocation" key derives the same column a lowercase one does. * fix: harden github skill sync against dropped requests and failed cleanup Three failure paths in the GitHub sync could leave a source looking healthier than it was. githubJson only handled HTTP-level errors. A fetch that rejected before producing a response (DNS failure, socket reset, abort) escaped as a raw TypeError, so the sync reported a generic crash instead of a typed sync error. Wrap it as GITHUB_REQUEST_FAILED and add that code to the fatal set, since a source whose requests never complete cannot be partially synced. When a synced file failed to persist, the orphaned upload was cleaned up on a best-effort basis and the cleanup error was only logged. If the cleanup itself failed, the source still ended with the original error and left a real orphan behind. Promote that to a rollback failure so the source reports SYNC_ROLLBACK_FAILED with the triggering error. Skill warnings were logged inside commitRemoteSkill, before the file sync and viewer setup that can still roll the skill back. A skill that never survived publication therefore emitted warnings as though it had. Return the warnings from the commit and log them once the skill is fully published. * fix: report skipped github skills before credential errors serializeErrorMessage checked isCredentialError first, and that check matches on the error text. A skipped skill whose path happens to contain a credential-ish word, for example skills/credential-helper, was therefore redacted to "GitHub skill sync credentials are not available" for admins without credential-metadata access, hiding a parse failure behind a wrong diagnosis. Check the promoted skipped-skill case first, since it is identified by error code rather than by text and is the more specific match. The credential redaction still applies to everything else. |
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Danny Avila
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ee8c0abe2d
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🪝 feat: Execute Agent Plugin Command Hooks (#14755)
* 🪝 feat: Execute Agent Plugin Command Hooks Implement the missing PluginHookExecutor boundary so deployment plugins' ai.librechat/hooks/hooks.json documents execute instead of loading inert: - Command executor runs handlers as child processes outside the API process: Claude-shaped JSON payload on stdin, exit 0 + JSON stdout as sanitized hook output, exit 2 blocks with stderr as the reason, minimal allowlisted environment plus PLUGIN_ROOT/PLUGIN_DATA, abort-signal kill - Plugin loading carries the parsed hooks document on the contribution and threads hookCapabilities from startup, gated on the operator opt-in DEPLOYMENT_PLUGIN_HOOKS (off by default: parsed-but-inert with warning) - Runs register every ready plugin hook onto the per-run HookRegistry after internal policy hooks, with once-per-conversation SessionStart dedup Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MWXQZD2WzeAsvee4eRdWWc * 🪝 fix: Harden Plugin Hook Execution Boundary Address CI and Codex/Copilot review findings on #14755: - Break the agents -> plugins import cycle: the run seam now reads a PluginHookSource wired at startup (mirrors the tool-approval registry) - Tighten plugin ask decisions to deny unless the run has HITL wiring, so an un-resumable interrupt can never strand OpenAI-compatible callers - Scope cross-run dedup keys by authenticated user and handler identity: caller-supplied conversation ids cannot collide across principals, and sibling SessionStart handlers all fire; once handlers persist across runs - Replace a literal NUL byte in source with an escape (file diffed binary) - Kill the whole detached process group on abort, not just the shell - Map exit 2 on events without a decision channel to preventContinuation - Reserve PLUGIN_ROOT/PLUGIN_DATA against allowlist overrides, quote PowerShell args, cap captured output by bytes with one-pass decoding, and serialize payloads inside the executor's error boundary - Fix import ordering flagged by the static checks Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MWXQZD2WzeAsvee4eRdWWc * 🪝 fix: Close Plugin Hook Policy and Namespace Gaps Address the second Codex review round on #14755: - Drop updatedInput from plugin command outputs: hooks in one dispatch all receive the original arguments, so a plugin rewrite would reach the tool without the approval policy re-evaluating it (host-only now) - Translate Claude tool aliases (Bash/Write/Edit/Read) to LibreChat runtime names in matchers, with reverse payload mapping, so Claude-authored guards fire instead of planning ready and never matching - Key once-only state by declaration position as well as handler contents, so sibling declarations with identical handlers stay independent - Thread sessionStartSource through createRun and mark the HITL resume rebuild as 'resume', so SessionStart matchers see the real lifecycle Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MWXQZD2WzeAsvee4eRdWWc * 🪝 fix: Translate Regex-Form Claude Tool Aliases Address the third Codex review round on #14755: alias translation now substitutes word-bounded tokens, covering regex matchers like ^Bash$ and ^(Write|Edit)$ that the exact-token pass left registered against Claude names and silently never firing. A regex whose alias sits inside a character class or escape is rejected as unmapped so it fails loudly at plan time instead of never running. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MWXQZD2WzeAsvee4eRdWWc * 🪝 fix: Scope Alias Translation and Reuse Load-Time Plans Address the fourth Codex review round on #14755: - Add the WebSearch -> web_search alias so Claude-authored web-search guards fire against the LibreChat built-in - Apply alias translation only to tool-name events; a StopFailure matcher like ^Bash failed$ stays untouched and keeps matching the error text - Reuse each plugin's load-time hook plan at run registration instead of re-planning up to 512 handlers on every chat turn Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MWXQZD2WzeAsvee4eRdWWc * 🪝 fix: Translate Aliased Tool Inputs and Harden Hook Domains - Present aliased tool inputs under Claude field names (file_path, old_string, new_string, including nested edits), so Write/Edit/Read guards see the fields they check instead of silently allowing - Derive the alias table from canonical tool-name definitions (BashExecutionToolDefinition, CREATE_FILE_TOOL_NAME, Tools.web_search) instead of a parallel hand-authored table - Reject matchers naming Claude built-ins with no runtime equivalent (Task, Glob, Grep, WebFetch, ...) as unmapped at plan time instead of registering guards that never fire - Replace per-event Sets and Stop special-cases with an exhaustive EVENT_TRAITS record over HookEvent, so new engine events demand explicit semantics at compile time - Move cross-run once-state behind a PluginHookOnceStore seam with a least-recently-marked memory default: active conversations refresh their keys each turn, so capacity eviction can no longer re-fire a conversation that is still in use; the seam admits a shared-cache store for multi-replica deployments - Gate portable-only command handlers at plan time on Windows via a new supportsHandler capability (commandWindows or shell powershell required) instead of spawning bash that cannot exist - Kill Windows hook process trees with taskkill /t on abort - Require declaration indices on execution requests, stamped from the plan instead of defaulted at execution time Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MWXQZD2WzeAsvee4eRdWWc * 🪝 fix: Keep Group SIGKILL Escalation Armed After Wrapper Exit An aborted hook whose descendant ignores SIGTERM could leak that descendant: the wrapper shell's exit fired close, which cancelled the scheduled group SIGKILL. The escalation timer is now never cancelled — it is unref'd and killTree already tolerates a vanished process group, so a redundant late sweep is harmless while a surviving descendant is reliably killed at the grace deadline. killGraceMs is configurable on CommandExecutorOptions, with a regression test driving a trap-protected descendant past the wrapper's exit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MWXQZD2WzeAsvee4eRdWWc * 🪝 fix: Scope Once Retention by Conversation and Reject Clear Source - Restructure the once store around conversation scopes: registration touches the scope every run, so rarely-matching once handlers keep their keys while the conversation is active; eviction removes whole idle conversations (capacity counts conversations, not keys) - Reject SessionStart matchers naming the clear lifecycle source at plan time — no LibreChat run-construction path emits clear, so the handler would plan ready and never fire; wildcard warning text now reflects the sources that actually occur - Make the SIGKILL-escalation regression test real: the surviving descendant redirects its stdio away from the captured pipes so the wrapper's close fires while it is still alive, exercising the window a close-time cancellation would leak Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MWXQZD2WzeAsvee4eRdWWc * 🪝 fix: Bound Alias Tokens by Tool-Name Characters and Host Shells - Translate Claude aliases (and reject unsupported built-ins) only when delimited by characters that cannot appear in a runtime tool name: action tool names preserve hyphens, so an alias embedded in a longer name like deploy-Bash-v2_action_example_com stays the literal tool name instead of being rewritten into a matcher that never fires - Reject PowerShell-only command handlers on POSIX hosts at plan time (and skip them at runtime): bash cannot run PowerShell syntax, so the guard would fail open; a handler with both variants still runs its portable command - Handle rejected asynchronous once-store calls: a failed touch logs instead of raising an unhandled rejection during run construction, and a failed markOnce lookup fails open per the store's documented over-fire direction Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MWXQZD2WzeAsvee4eRdWWc * 🪝 fix: Probe Group Liveness Before Cancelled or Delivered SIGKILL The never-cancelled escalation timer could signal a recycled process-group id when an aborted hook's whole tree exits early in the grace window. Escalation now probes the group with signal 0: close cancels the timer only when the group is verifiably empty, and the deadline re-probes before delivering the group SIGKILL, so surviving descendants are still reaped while a fully-dead group never receives a blind late signal. The residual probe-to-signal race is documented as irreducible without pidfd support. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MWXQZD2WzeAsvee4eRdWWc * 🪝 fix: Gate Windows Escalation on Root-Process Liveness Windows taskkill /t walks the tree from the root process, so once Node observes the root's exit an escalation pass can reap nothing and a late forced taskkill could only hit a recycled PID. The liveness gate is now platform-aware in one helper: POSIX probes the process group with signal 0, Windows checks the root's observed exit state, and both the close-time cancellation and the deadline delivery consult it — no platform retains a blind late signal. Orphaned SIGTERM-ignoring descendants on Windows are documented as the platform limitation they are without Job Objects. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MWXQZD2WzeAsvee4eRdWWc * 🪝 fix: Scope Payload Namespace to Declarations and Reap Stray Workers - Reverse name/input translation now applies only to declarations whose matcher actually required Claude-alias translation: the plan records requiresToolNameTranslation per entry, so a native-authored matcher like ^create_file$ receives native tool names and fields instead of Claude-shaped payloads its guard never expected - Coordinate the two dedup layers via a shouldExecute gate on the executor: a declaration suppressed by spent once-state declines before claiming the per-input dedup slot, so an identical handler under an overlapping matcher can still claim it and fire its own independent once-key instead of being permanently shadowed - Reap process groups that outlive a successful hook: a backgrounded worker left running after normal wrapper exit gets the same term-then-escalate sequence an abort uses, since unsupported async handlers mean no lifecycle owns such processes Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MWXQZD2WzeAsvee4eRdWWc * 🧰 chore: Vendor Pocock Codebase-Design and Architecture Skills Adds mattpocock/skills engineering/codebase-design and engineering/improve-codebase-architecture (MIT, license included) under .claude/skills so future sessions share the deep-module vocabulary (module, interface, depth, seam, adapter, leverage, locality) and the architecture-review process. Force-added past the /.claude/ gitignore deliberately; relocate if project skills should live elsewhere. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MWXQZD2WzeAsvee4eRdWWc * 🪝 refactor: Extract Process-Tree Reaping Into a Reaper Module Tree lifecycle — five of the last seven review findings — lived as event-handler wiring inside runCommand with its invariants in comments. It now sits behind a two-method seam: createReaper(child, graceMs) exposes reap() and onClose(), hiding the term-grace-escalate state machine, the per-platform liveness gates, the recycled-id guards, and the clean-exit sweep. The executor shrinks to capture-and-parse, and the reaper is unit-tested directly with real process trees through its own interface instead of only via whole-executor integration runs. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MWXQZD2WzeAsvee4eRdWWc * 🪝 fix: Scope Translation Per Alternative and Sweep at Root Exit - Track which runtime tool names alias translation produced, so a mixed-namespace matcher like Bash|create_file presents Claude-shaped payloads only for bash_tool invocations while the natively-authored create_file alternative keeps native names and fields; a capability omitting the produced-names list keeps declaration-wide translation - Sweep the process tree at root exit as well as close: a backgrounded descendant holding the captured pipes delays close until it dies, so the exit-time sweep terminates it promptly instead of stalling the hook until its timeout aborts - Pass the primary agent's resolved model and identity into the plugin hook context, so SessionStart payloads carry model and agent_type instead of always omitting them Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MWXQZD2WzeAsvee4eRdWWc * 🪝 fix: Default Wildcard Declarations to the Document Namespace - Matcherless (or wildcard) tool-payload declarations now inherit the hook document's Claude namespace: with no alternatives to carry namespace evidence, the plan marks them for declaration-wide reverse translation, so a wildcard guard inspecting standard Claude names and fields sees Write/file_path instead of silently failing open on native payloads; PostToolBatch entries translate the same way - Recognize aliases delimited by regex metacharacters: dots leave the tool-name boundary class (runtime names never contain them — action ids underscore domain dots), so ^Bash.*$ translates to ^bash_tool.*$ instead of registering a guard that never fires - Expand Claude's ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT} spelling in hook commands and export it in the child environment alongside PLUGIN_ROOT - Scope SessionStart once-keys by lifecycle source, so a startup firing no longer suppresses the conversation's resume rebuild Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MWXQZD2WzeAsvee4eRdWWc * 🪝 fix: Normalize Claude Structured Hook Output Stock Claude hooks return decisions under hookSpecificOutput (permissionDecision/permissionDecisionReason), surface context there, and use continue:false plus the legacy approve/block decisions — none of which the sanitizer's native field names recognized, so a guard that works in Claude silently allowed in LibreChat. Parsed JSON now passes through a dialect normalizer first: hookSpecificOutput fields map to decision/reason/additionalContext, continue:false becomes preventContinuation, approve becomes allow, and block becomes deny on events that block by denying. Native fields win when both dialects appear, and the ask-to-deny gate applies to the Claude dialect too. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MWXQZD2WzeAsvee4eRdWWc * 🪝 fix: Validate Native Decisions and Slim Once Keys - Strip malformed native output fields before the dialect merge, so a placeholder like {"decision":null} can no longer suppress a valid Claude permissionDecision into a silent allow; only recognized decision tokens take precedence - Preserve the caller's working directory in hook payloads: cwd now reports the run's session context instead of the plugin installation path, which commands already receive as PLUGIN_ROOT and which the executor still uses as each process's working directory - Store a compact sha256 digest instead of the full serialized handler in once keys: declarations may carry 32 KB commands and 256 args, and the previous key embedded them in every retained conversation scope Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MWXQZD2WzeAsvee4eRdWWc * 🪝 fix: Validate Decisions Per Event Channel and Control Post-Tool Blocks - Accept native decision tokens only from the target event's own vocabulary: "continue" is valid on Stop but malformed on a tool event, where it previously survived validation, blocked the Claude dialect merge, and was then dropped by sanitization into a silent allow - Translate a structured "block" on events with no deny channel (PostToolUse, PostToolUseFailure, and the other prevent-trait events) into preventContinuation with the block reason as stopReason, instead of discarding it and returning a reason that controls nothing - Document why LibreChat runs supply no payload cwd: tool paths address a remote code-execution sandbox rather than the API host where hook commands run, so no host directory describes the run Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MWXQZD2WzeAsvee4eRdWWc --------- Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Danny Avila
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88e08c91e8
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🧷 fix: Preserve Elicitation Answers Across Aborts (#14745)
* fix: preserve elicitation answers across aborts * chore: sort stream type imports * fix: guard malformed resolved answers * fix: close abort answer race gaps * fix: retain exact answers across pauses * fix: retain answers across resumed pauses * test: satisfy HITL fixture types * fix: retain legacy answers through approvals * fix: preserve answers in reconnect snapshots * test: type legacy answer fixture * fix: bind legacy answers to paused content * test: guard optional resume content * fix: resume questions without streamed content * fix: Preserve legacy answers through abort filtering * test: Narrow reconstructed abort fixture * test: Type abort transform fixture explicitly * fix: Isolate answers with missing ask content * test: Type missing-content ask fixture |
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Danny Avila
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236ee6c1ab
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🧭 fix: Re-Anchor Parent Activity Phase Bounds (#14741)
* test: cover parent activity phase finalization * test(e2e): stabilize parent phase coverage * fix(agents): reanchor parent activity phase bounds * fix(agents): preserve delayed tools in activity phases * test(agents): keep phase slice bounds typed * fix(agents): preserve sparse activity phase bounds * test(e2e): read structured phase replies |
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Danny Avila
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7347cfc195
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🍡 feat: Batched User Questions With A Single Bounded Answer Form (#14737)
* feat: support batched user questions * test: align batched question fixtures * fix: harden batched question lifecycle * test: submit batched HITL answers in e2e * fix: address batched question review findings * fix: preserve invoke return typing |
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Danny Avila
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09cbd54f48
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🪆 fix: Rebase Activity Phase Bounds over Sparse Content (#14729)
The aggregator writes content parts at provider-source indexes, which can skip slots and leave holes in contentParts. Array.prototype.map preserves those holes and the Map constructor iterates them as undefined, so rebaseActivityPhaseBounds threw "Iterator value undefined is not an entry object" at the end of every run with sparse content — deterministic with parent phase summaries enabled, on both the completion and resume paths. Build the identity map with an index loop that skips nullish slots. Holes must stay out of the map: one undefined key would falsely match every hole in previousParts as a retained part and corrupt the rebased bound. |
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Danny Avila
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a3cec67e08
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🪆 feat: Add Parent Activity Phase Summaries (#14721)
* feat: add activity phase summaries * fix: preserve activity phase lifecycle semantics * fix: satisfy activity phase type checks * fix: simplify activity phase status mapping * style: format activity phase changes * fix: rebase activity phase bounds after shaping * fix: link activity phase trace ancestry * fix: reconcile activity phase bounds * style: format activity phase reconciliation test * style: align activity phase assertion * fix: retain reasoning across commentary * fix: preserve activity phase boundary state * fix: detect renderable phase children * test: type parallel phase assertion * chore: bump agents SDK for activity phases * fix: retain unphased lane reasoning * fix: preserve tool group expansion across phases * style: format phase expansion regression * fix: preserve phase interaction state efficiently * perf: skip sparse phase segment holes * perf: partition phase segments with offsets * fix: preserve phase boundaries and cursor state * test: align activity phase regressions with CI * test: keep phase context mock hoist-safe |
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Danny Avila
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7fc62023eb
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🧷 fix: Safely Recover Runtime MCP OAuth Rejections (#14684)
* fix runtime MCP OAuth recovery * style: sort LC-008 imports * fix: single-flight runtime OAuth handlers * fix: retain transport OAuth failures for recovery * fix(mcp): preserve OAuth recovery connections * test(mcp): type request-scoped config fixture * fix(mcp): harden shared OAuth recovery * fix(mcp): bound OAuth recovery escalation * style(mcp): sort OAuth integration imports * fix(mcp): harden OAuth recovery boundaries * fix(mcp): abort shared recovery waiters * fix(mcp): bound request OAuth recovery phases * fix(mcp): close OAuth recovery ownership gaps * fix(mcp): retry borrowers closed by OAuth recovery * fix(mcp): drain borrowers before OAuth reconnect * fix(mcp): preserve eviction across OAuth recovery * fix(mcp): unify OAuth recovery leases * fix(mcp): serialize cache reuse with recovery * fix(mcp): make recovery checkout atomic * test(mcp): use numeric config timestamp * fix(mcp): reacquire recovery checkouts * fix(mcp): retain shared recovery disposal * fix(mcp): restart checkout after recovery takeover * fix(mcp): close recovery lifecycle gaps * refactor(mcp): deepen OAuth recovery lifecycle * fix(mcp): harden OAuth lifecycle disposal * style(mcp): sort OAuth lifecycle imports * fix: lease MCP OAuth lifecycle edges * fix(mcp): isolate shared OAuth flows from aborts --------- Co-authored-by: Dennis Schenk <dennis@gridonic.ch> |
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Danny Avila
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54d7f04d71
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🪶 feat: Resolve Explicit Subagents Lazily (#14714)
* feat: resolve explicit subagents lazily * fix: satisfy lazy subagent type checks * test: persist lazy subagent mutation through model API * style: format lazy subagent persistence test * fix: log lazy subagent depth limit failures * fix: harden lazy subagent resolution * fix: Yield during lazy cancellation test * test: Synchronize lazy cancellation setup * style: Format lazy cancellation test |
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Marco Beretta
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152dcf4721
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🔗 feat: Shared Conversation Badge and Stable Share Links (#14712)
* feat: improve shared conversation links * test: Cover Shared Link Lifecycle * test: Cover Shared File Snapshots * fix: address review findings on shared links Stop double-decoding the conversation search term. Express already decodes req.query, so the route's extra decodeURIComponent threw URIError on any term containing a bare percent sign and mangled percent-escape-looking text. The sidebar already sent the term raw, so this failed there too. Advance a share's stored target to its branch tail when an update omits one. Updating from the conversation list could not resolve the tail and reused the stored target verbatim, silently republishing the same snapshot instead of the turns added since. Require revalidation on shared files. Updates now keep the shareId, so the file URL no longer changes and a cached response could outlive a revoked share-files choice; an ETag over the pinned snapshot fields keeps unchanged files on 304. * fix: keep the shared badge across conversation cache replacements isShared is derived per list request and absent from single-conversation payloads, so rename, pin, and the SSE conversation updates dropped it when they swapped a server response into the sidebar cache, hiding the badge until an unrelated list refetch. Carry the cached value forward in updateConvoInAllQueries so every replacing caller is covered, while an explicit value still wins. * test: mock syncStaticTools in server boot specs initializeMCPs now calls syncStaticTools when no MCP servers are configured, but the server boot specs stub ~/server/services/Config without it. Post-listen initialization threw, hit process.exit(1), and took the jest worker down until it exceeded the retry limit. * fix: address codex findings on the shared DataTable and file ETag Keep the published DataTable export bound to the legacy component and ship the design-system table as VirtualizedDataTable, so external consumers of @librechat/client keep the props they compile against. Fold the snapshot's stored location into the shared-file ETag, so a re-published output that keeps its size and revision but moves its object no longer revalidates to a stale 304. Auto-fill the table when a first page is too short to overflow its container, since pagination is otherwise only reachable through the scroll handler. * fix: re-scope share grants before publishing and retry stalled auto-fill Move the shared-link ACL expiration write ahead of the content update. The shareId survives an update, so a failed ACL write after the write-through left the new messages and file snapshot readable at the same URL while the owner saw a 500. Retry a rejected auto-fill fetch up to three times: an unscrollable table has no scroll event to fall back on, and the sentinel alone would strand it on the first page. * fix: follow regenerated branches and pin forks to the payload they saw advanceTargetToBranchTail only walked descendants, so a target replaced by a regeneration (a sibling, not a child) left the update parked on the obsolete branch and published none of the turns that followed. A childless target now hops once to the newest sibling the conversation continued under. A shareId survives an update, so an owner republishing between a viewer's load and their Continue click would resolve targetMessageIndex against different messages. The fork request now carries the payload's updatedAt and is rejected with 409 when it no longer matches; the viewer gets the current version pulled in and can retry. * fix: keep table sorting and legacy backfills from breaking share flows Restore the union formatting a local lint-staged prettier collapsed in data-provider types, which broke the CI lint run. Header clicks now toggle direction instead of cycling through an unsorted state, which the controlled tables translated straight back into the default and made one direction unreachable. Re-arm the auto-fill guard on a sort change: a re-sorted first page arrives with the same row count, and the guard would otherwise suppress paging on a container that still cannot scroll. Lazy fileSnapshots backfills no longer touch updatedAt. That timestamp is the revision a viewer's fork is validated against, so a legacy share's first read would have made the Continue click that followed it fail with a 409. * fix: break pagination ties by id and reset share state per conversation Both list cursors marked a page boundary with values that repeat: conversations by (sort field, updatedAt) and shared links by the sort field alone. Imported chats share a title and a timestamp, so every row tied with the boundary was skipped. Both now carry the boundary row's _id and sort by it last, and the shared-links cursor is an opaque composite the route still validates before querying. The share dialog outlives a switch between conversations, so a link with files disabled left the next conversation's dialog showing the switch off and quietly published without files. The stored choice now falls back to the enabled default, and a stale link no longer sits in the copy field. * fix: keep titleless shared links in the paginated list A share has no title default, and BSON orders a missing title before every string, so encoding the boundary as an empty string skipped the remaining untitled links when sorting Name ascending and re-admitted all of them descending. The cursor now carries the boundary's null rather than flattening it, and because $lt and $gt are type-bracketed against a string, descending adds an explicit clause for the untitled tail that a string comparison can never reach. * style: sort share method imports * fix: fail closed on orphaned share targets and guard snapshot backfills getMessagesUpToTarget walked levels from the roots and returned everything it had accumulated when the target was never reached. An imported or partially deleted branch whose parent is missing therefore published the whole conversation instead of the selected branch; the walk now returns nothing unless it actually reaches the target. A lazy backfill wrote fileSnapshots unconditionally, so a viewer's first read of a legacy link could land after a republish and restore the snapshot it replaced, re-authorizing the stable URL of a file the owner had just removed. The write is now conditional on the link still having no snapshot, and the stored one wins any race. Regenerating a message above the shared tail leaves the whole stored branch childless, so the target walk now climbs to the closest ancestor the conversation continued under instead of stopping at the stored tail's own siblings. Changing the search or sort also returns the table's viewport to the top, since the query holds the previous rows while it refetches. * fix: page through titleless rows on both sides of the cursor The route validator still required a string primary, so the composite cursor the data layer issues for a titleless boundary came back as a 400 and the shared-links table stopped at that page. Conversations had the same type-bracketing gap the shared links just closed: a name-sorted page could not reach conversations with no title, since a comparison against a string never matches a missing field. The cursor now carries the null and the filter spells out the titleless clauses for both directions. * fix: keep the share badge read-only and refresh rows on cell changes ensureLinkPermissions re-granted the owner ACL entry on every call, so rendering the header's shared badge turned ordinary navigation into a permission write. It now checks for the grant first and only migrates a link that still lacks one. A fork carrying a positional target but no revision falls back to the whole share, since nothing proves which payload the index was counted against. The memoized table row compared row data and selection only, so a cell rendering external state (the archived list's pending Restore, for one) kept its stale rendering until the row object itself moved; rows now also compare a marker that moves with the column definitions. * fix: keep the shared badge honest when a delete fails or a link remains A failed delete left the conversation looking unshared: the optimistic snapshot covered only the shared-link queries, not the conversation caches the badge reads. The cleared conversations are now restored with the rest. A conversation can hold one link per target message, so clearing the badge on delete is a guess. The conversation list is invalidated once the mutation settles, letting the server decide from the links that are actually left. * fix: refetch every cached conversation page after deleting a link The invalidation was pinned to page zero, so a conversation cached further down the sidebar kept the badge the optimistic update had already cleared even when another targeted link survived. * fix: treat a failed page fetch as a failed auto-fill React Query resolves fetchNextPage with an error result instead of rejecting, so the rejection handler never ran: the guard stayed armed on the unchanged row count and an unscrollable table could never reach the next page. * refactor: move the share request helpers into the typed backend Cursor validation, page-size clamping and the shared-file cache validator were plain backend logic sitting in the legacy JS route. They now live in packages/api with their own tests, and the route keeps only the Express-side wiring: reading query params, mapping domain error codes to status codes, and writing the response. Also carries the requested file choice into the cache entry the create and update mutations synthesize, since the response never echoes it and the dialog reads a resolved entry with no choice as the enabled default. * fix: hold auto-fill while the replacement page is in flight A search or sort swap keeps the previous rows and hasNextPage on screen while the new first page loads, so the re-armed auto-fill asked for page two against a query that was still fetching its first. An infinite query runs one fetch at a time, so that request could cancel or interfere with the one already out. Both tables now pass their fetching state and the guard waits for it. * fix: stop advertising links a deployment no longer serves The sidebar badge rendered from the derived flag alone, so a deployment that turned shared links off still told owners a link was live while the public routes were unregistered. The share dialog called the link a snapshot, but the payload populates the referenced message documents on every request: an edit to an already-shared message is visible immediately, and Update only adds newly referenced ones. The copy now says that. Scroll pagination inspects a resolved error the way auto-fill already does, since React Query reports a failed page that way instead of rejecting. * a11y: gate the shared conversation label on the feature flag The icon stopped rendering when a deployment turns shared links off, but the row still announced the conversation as shared to screen readers. Both now read the same condition. * fix: accept long title cursors and stop badge work the feature disables The cursor cap was tight enough that a Name-sorted page ending on a long title produced a nextCursor the next request rejected, stranding the rest of the list. It now sits well clear of anything the server can issue. The conversation list skipped straight into the shared-link lookup even where ALLOW_SHARED_LINKS is off, paying a round trip on the sidebar's first page for a badge that is never rendered. A regeneration is newer than what it replaced, so only a newer sibling counts: an older one that still has follow-ups is the branch the target was regenerated away from, and resuming there published turns the target had excluded. * fix: hold scroll pagination while a replacement page loads Resetting the viewport to the top after a search or sort change fires a scroll event, and the retained previous rows still report another page, so the handler asked for page two of a query that was still loading page one. * fix: keep the legacy share migration ahead of the owner-grant shortcut A legacy row keeps its marker until every grant it needs exists, so an owner grant on its own is not proof the migration finished. Reading the marker first means a half-migrated public link still gets its public grant, while a fully migrated one keeps the read-only settled path the badge lookup depends on. |
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Danny Avila
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5c939d129b
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🔌 feat: Add Agent Plugins (Experimental) (#14704)
* 🔌 feat: Add Agent Plugins v1.0.0 Support Implements the Agent Plugins 1.0.0 specification so LibreChat can load portable plugin packages: a `plugin.json` manifest, `skills/` holding Agent Skills, `mcp.json` describing MCP servers, and reverse-domain extension directories. - Validate the closed `plugin.json` schema, selecting rules from `$schema` without retrieving it. Unknown top-level fields and a non-object `extensions` field are reported and ignored; every other violation rejects the plugin. - Enforce plugin-root containment through realpath, including for paths whose leaf does not exist, and apply the narrowest failure boundary per component. - Map `mcp.json` onto LibreChat MCP options across stdio, Streamable HTTP, and legacy HTTP+SSE, bypassing the config loader's `${VAR}` process-env expansion so plugin values never resolve against the server environment. - Expand only `${PLUGIN_ROOT}` and `${PLUGIN_DATA}`, once and non-recursively, in `args`, `env` values, and `cwd`; supply both variables to the subprocess after configured `env`, and reject entries that declare them. - Discover skills from the immediate children of `skills/` only, reusing the deployment skill loader so plugin skills are ordinary deployment skills with a distinct id namespace. - Read LibreChat's `ai.librechat` extension directory and hand `hooks/hooks.json` to the Claude hook compatibility layer. - Load operator-installed plugins from `DEPLOYMENT_PLUGINS_DIR` at startup, merging their skills into the deployment skill registry and their MCP servers into the app config. Plugins never displace a configured server or deployment skill. - Add `cwd` to the stdio MCP transport, which the specification requires and LibreChat did not previously support. Component failures stay isolated: a malformed `mcp.json`, an invalid skill, or a bad hooks document never prevents the rest of a plugin from loading. * 🔒 fix: Contain Agent Plugins config at the runtime boundary Review of #14704 surfaced that every real finding sat where the loader's output crosses into LibreChat's existing runtime, not in the specification logic. The loader deliberately left plugin placeholders literal, but downstream layers re-processed the same fields and undid it. - Mark plugin MCP configuration with `source: 'plugin'` and return it verbatim from `processMCPEnv`. Without this a remote plugin could declare `Authorization: Bearer ${OPENAI_API_KEY}` and receive host credentials at its own origin. The gate reads the configuration rather than a caller-supplied flag, so no future call site can reintroduce the leak by omitting it. - Skip `preProcessGraphTokens` for plugin configuration as well; it resolves placeholders into headers, url, and args on the same path. - Reject plugin server names that change under `normalizeServerName`. Tool keys embed the normalized name while request-time resolution uses the raw name, so an unstable name published tools that nothing could resolve. - Reject `__proto__`, `constructor`, and `prototype` as server names, and merge plugin servers with `Object.defineProperty` and an own-property conflict check, so a package cannot reach a prototype setter or collide with an inherited member. - Enforce manifest-name uniqueness before components are accepted; two packages sharing a name would share one `PLUGIN_DATA` directory. - Isolate a failed data-directory creation to the single plugin instead of rejecting the whole scan. - Prefix rejected-plugin diagnostics with the directory, which is the only identifier a package without a valid manifest has. - Type extension namespace contents as JSON rather than `unknown`, and correct the header field-value comment to name obs-text. Verified end to end from the built package: a plugin declaring an environment placeholder in a header reaches the transport with the placeholder intact while operator-authored configuration still resolves normally. * 🔇 fix: Report Agent Plugin hooks that will not run The loader reads `ai.librechat/hooks/hooks.json`, but nothing registers the resulting plan, and startup supplies no hook capabilities. A package declaring hooks was therefore accepted in silence, leaving an operator to believe the hooks ran. Detect the document when no capabilities are registered and report it as unsupported, so the limitation is visible in startup diagnostics rather than inferred from behavior that never happens. * 🧯 test: Restore MCP startup test mocks Carries the two mock additions from #14711 so this branch can prove itself green. `initializeMCPs` now calls `syncStaticTools`, which the server startup specs do not stub, so they fail on every branch that has not picked this up. Drops out of the rebase once #14711 lands. Co-authored-by: Danny Avila <danny@librechat.ai> |
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Danny Avila
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1bd4455c2d
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🧭 fix: Make MCP Catalog Redis Cluster-Safe (#14717)
* fix: make MCP catalog Redis startup cluster-safe * fix: stabilize Redis readiness gate * fix: type Redis readiness export * style: apply canonical import order |
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Danny Avila
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ccb43bf32b
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test(mcp): mock static tool startup sync (#14711) | ||
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Danny Avila
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1bccc2bc18
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📡 fix: Refresh MCP Tools After List-Changed Notifications (#14686)
* fix(mcp): handle dynamic tool list changes Co-authored-by: Pascal Garber <pascal@artandcode.studio> * test(mcp): fix CI validation * fix(mcp): keep dynamic tool catalogs live * fix(mcp): harden dynamic catalog lifecycle * test(mcp): use typed startup connection * test(mcp): isolate dynamic e2e fixtures * fix(mcp): refresh tools after reconnect * fix(mcp): close dynamic catalog cache gaps * test(mcp): update OAuth connection mocks * fix(mcp): preserve app snapshot ownership * style(mcp): sort connection imports * fix(mcp): close review race conditions * fix(mcp): preserve cache ownership edges * fix(mcp): harden recovery lifecycle * fix(mcp): guard tool-less app refresh * fix(mcp): fence distributed cache races * fix(mcp): retire stale connection state * fix(mcp): keep tool snapshots authoritative * fix(mcp): fence stale app tool publications * style(mcp): sort repository test imports * test(mcp): mock empty startup publication * fix(mcp): preserve app publication generations * fix(mcp): harden publication recovery races * fix(mcp): address tool catalogs by runtime config * fix(mcp): load scoped catalogs for assistant writes * fix(mcp): harden catalog publication recovery * fix(mcp): serialize forced connection replacement * fix(mcp): serialize ordinary creation with replacements * fix(mcp): harden catalog fallback boundaries * fix(mcp): close lifecycle fencing gaps * fix(mcp): preserve catalog authority on failures * fix(mcp): compensate failed catalog mutations * fix(mcp): fence catalog refresh ordering * style(mcp): sort agent loader imports * fix(mcp): cancel stale connection creation * fix(mcp): fence catalog coordination * fix(mcp): close catalog race windows * fix(mcp): harden cross-pod catalog fencing * fix(mcp): close catalog lifecycle edges * style(mcp): sort assistant imports * fix(mcp): reject stale recovery authority * fix(mcp): restore static catalog on every startup * fix(mcp): order app catalog publications * style(mcp): sort catalog revision imports * fix(mcp): separate catalog allocation and commit fences --------- Co-authored-by: Pascal Garber <pascal@artandcode.studio> |
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Marco Beretta
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39f5f9d846
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⚡ perf: Agent List and Model Selector at Scale (#14601)
* perf: cut serial round trips from the agent list query path
The agent list was the slowest path on first page load. Three separate
problems compounded:
- `getListAgentsHandler` chained its reads: two ACL lookups, the avatar
refresh cache probe and the viewer skill scope all resolved serially
ahead of the list query, and `attachOwnerContacts` added two more hops
after it. The four independent reads now resolve together, and the
avatar refresh runs alongside the list query instead of before it -
refreshed paths reach the response through `urlCache`, not through
whatever the list query happened to read. Serial hops per request drop
from 7 to 4 on a warm cache.
- The avatar refresh loaded the user's whole accessible agent set (up to
MAX_AVATAR_REFRESH_AGENTS) to discover which entries were S3-backed.
Scoping the query to `avatar.source` means deployments on any other
file strategy match nothing instead of walking the full set.
- `fetchAllAgentPages` walked cursor pages at the server's default size
of 100, and callers consume the flattened result, so every extra page
was a serial round trip for no benefit. It now requests the server
maximum. Measured over a 2,860 agent account: 29 requests / 1.65s
before, 3 requests / 0.29s after.
Also parallelizes the conversation file reads in `initializeAgent`. The
convo file refs and the execute_code thread walk share no inputs, and the
two code-file lookups depend only on `threadFileIds`, so the chain of six
serial reads on every turn collapses to two. This one is time to first
token the user waits through.
* perf: virtualize the model selector agent list
Opening the agents submenu with a large agent set froze the tab and could
kill it outright. With ~10k accessible agents the submenu blocked for over
15 seconds and took the heap from 96MB to 911MB. Four per-row costs were
being multiplied by the full list, which rendered unwindowed:
- `useIsActiveItem` allocated a MutationObserver per row (10,016 of them
for one dropdown). Replaced with an Ariakit store subscription, which
needs no observer at all and returns a boolean so a row only re-renders
when its own active state flips.
- `useFavorites` ran per row, opening a jotai subscription, a query
subscription and a mutation each time. Hoisted to one call per endpoint.
- Each row rescanned `endpoint.models` to recover `isGlobal`, a field the
parent had already discarded from the array it was mapping. The parent
now passes it down from a lookup map.
- The list itself is now windowed above 100 rows. Ariakit's composite only
knows about mounted rows, so arrow-keying to the window edge previously
found no next item and let focus escape the nested menu, closing it;
`handleBoundaryNavigation` scrolls the next index in, waits for it to
mount, then moves the composite onto it. Navigation inside the window is
left to Ariakit.
Open drops from >15s to 96ms, mounted rows from 10,028 to ~18, DOM nodes
from 123,346 to ~1,000, and the heap no longer grows. Verified in browser:
arrow keys track 1:1 to index 238 and back, and click selection works.
* perf: serve the model selector from the shared VIEW agent query
The model selector asked for EDIT-scoped agents whenever the marketplace
is enabled, while `useAgentsMap` and `useMentions` asked for VIEW. Since
the cache key includes the params, that was two distinct entries, so first
page load ran the paginated walk twice and held two copies of the whole
agent list in memory. Measured against a 10k agent account: 22 list handler
invocations per page load, now 11.
Collapsing the two by asking for the same permission everywhere would have
changed what the selector shows - under the marketplace the EDIT scope is
what makes it "My Agents", with discovery handled by the marketplace entry.
So the list endpoint now marks each row with `isEditable`, resolved from an
ACL read folded into the existing parallel batch (no extra serial hop), and
the selector filters the shared VIEW response instead of refetching. A
VIEW-scoped list for a user with 2861 visible / 361 editable agents returns
exactly 360 rows flagged editable, matching what the EDIT query returned.
`AgentSelect` deliberately keeps its own EDIT query: it reads `skills` and
`skills_enabled`, which `sanitizeViewerSkillScope` strips from VIEW-scoped
responses. It also only mounts when the builder panel is open, so it is not
part of the first-load cost.
The field is set unconditionally rather than omitted when false so that a
client talking to an older server sees `undefined`, keeps every agent, and
degrades to showing too many rather than none.
* fix: address review findings on the agent list at scale
Three issues from review, all confirmed against the code before fixing.
Avatar refresh no longer runs alongside the list query. `updateAgent` writes
through `findOneAndUpdate` on a `timestamps: true` schema, so refreshing an
avatar advances `updatedAt` — the field `getListAgentsByAccess` sorts and
cursors on. A write landing after the first page's snapshot moved that agent
ahead of the returned cursor, dropping it from every later page and silently
truncating the caller's flattened list. This was a regression introduced when
the two were parallelized; serializing them costs nothing on the common path,
because a cache hit returns without issuing any query, so only the
once-per-30-minutes miss pays for the ordering. The new test asserts the write
lands before the list snapshot and fails against the parallel version.
The virtualized list no longer inserts a focusable grid into the combobox.
`List` spreads its props onto `Grid`, whose defaults are `role="grid"`,
`containerRole="row"` and `tabIndex={0}`; inside Ariakit's listbox that added a
tab stop ahead of any row and put grid/row semantics between the listbox and its
options. All three are now neutralized so focus and ARIA stay with the combobox
items.
The list also resets to the top when the filter changes. `Grid` keeps its scroll
offset across prop changes and clamps an out-of-range offset to
`totalRowsHeight - height`, the end of the shorter list. Scrolling deep and then
searching landed on the tail: measured at row 626 of 667 matches, with only
those rows mounted and reachable by keyboard. Keying the list on the search
value restores row 0.
* fix: declare option position and set size for the virtualized model list
Once the model list is windowed, only the mounted slice exists in the listbox,
so a screen reader infers position and total from ~19 elements instead of the
real set — announcing "3 of 19" partway through 10,014 agents.
Model rows now carry aria-posinset and aria-setsize. The marketplace entry and
any model specs share the same numbering, because they are options in the same
listbox: declaring the values on some options while leaving others to be
inferred from the DOM would make the set internally inconsistent. Both are
omitted entirely when the list is short enough to render unwindowed, where the
DOM holds every option and the implicit values are already correct.
Verified against a 10,014 agent account: the marketplace entry reports 1 of
10015, the first models 2 and 3, and after scrolling to row 4999 the leading
mounted model reports 5001 of 10015 with 19 options in the DOM.
* 🩹 fix: Address Follow-Ups on the Agent List at Scale
Corrects residual issues in the agent-list perf work, all inside its own scope.
- Forward `idOnTheSource` through `PermissionService.findAccessibleResources`
so `getUserPrincipals` skips the user-document read. The list handler resolves
three permission sets per request and each was paying its own `User.findById`;
the auth strategies already normalize the field to a value or null.
- Gate the editable-set lookup on its own predicate instead of borrowing
`canReturnSkillConfig`. The two answer unrelated questions and only coincide
today, so redefining the skill flag would have marked every agent editable.
- Log mapping failures in the list response instead of swallowing them.
- Apply the walk page size after the caller's params in `fetchAllAgentPages`.
A caller limit only changed page size, never what the flattened walk returned,
so `defaultAgentParams`' `limit: 10` would have turned one request into 301.
- Carry `isEditable` on the agent rows the create and update mutations write
into the list cache. Mutation responses omit the field, so those rows lost it.
- Document `isEditable` as list-only, ACL-derived, and fail-open on absence.
- Restore the truthiness guard on the thread walk in `initializeAgent`. Widening
it to `!= null` made an empty `parentMessageId` issue a full-conversation read
against an anchor that can never match.
- Await `getConvoFiles` directly rather than calling `.then()` on it, restoring
tolerance for synchronous test doubles.
- Correct the avatar-refresh comment: the projection was never full documents,
and the real reason to filter is that an unfiltered budget is self-reinforcing.
Tests: both new `initialize` tests and both new backend tests are
mutation-verified; the concurrency test fails under either serialization order.
* fix: preserve ACL isEditable when merging agent mutation responses
Mutation responses omit list-only isEditable. Inferring true from write
success promoted VIEW-only rows into the editable subset for MANAGE_AGENTS
callers who can PATCH agents their ACL marks non-editable.
* fix: sort imports in agent mutations test
ESLint import-order check failed on the isEditable cache-preservation test.
* 🧷 fix: Carry isEditable Onto Duplicated Agent List Rows
`useDuplicateAgentMutation` prepended the raw duplicate response to the cached
list, and mutation responses omit the list-only `isEditable` field. The row
survived the "My Agents" filter only by failing open on `undefined`, so it would
disappear the moment a consumer read the flag strictly.
Duplicating grants the caller ownership, so the new row is editable outright;
this is the create case rather than the merge case `mergeAgentListRow` handles.
Last cache write on this path that did not carry the field.
---------
Co-authored-by: Danny Avila <danny@librechat.ai>
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Danny Avila
|
1596df724a
|
chore: Remove Published Credential Defaults (#14680) | ||
|
Danny Avila
|
5ff46d8c67
|
🛟 fix: Stop Agents When Code Resources Cannot Recover (#14651)
* fix: Block Agents When Code Resources Cannot Recover * fix: Preserve Resource Recovery Failures Across Agent Paths * fix: Centralize Fatal Agent Initialization * chore: sort agent imports |
||
Dustin Healy
|
6d2f29266c
|
🔑 feat: Refresh-Capable Google Admin OAuth Sessions (#13832)
* 🔑 feat: Refresh-Capable Google Admin OAuth Sessions Google admin sessions cannot be refreshed today. Three gaps add up to that: passport.authenticate('googleAdmin', ...) in api/server/routes/admin/auth.js never sets access_type=offline, so Google omits the refresh_token from its token response; createOAuthHandler in api/server/controllers/auth/oauth.js only forwards a refresh token into the admin exchange payload when the user's provider is 'openid' AND OPENID_REUSE_TOKENS is enabled; and /api/admin/oauth/refresh is openid-only, calling openid-client.refreshTokenGrant against the configured OIDC issuer. OpenID admins refresh transparently because all three are in place for them. This PR closes all three. The googleAdmin authenticate call now passes accessType: 'offline' and prompt: 'consent' so Google issues a refresh token on consent; the chat-side googleLogin is untouched. The shared socialLogin verify callback now passes the IdP refreshToken through as passport's third argument (info), landing on req.authInfo, with the two-argument call shape preserved when no refresh token is present so existing strategy tests stay valid. createOAuthHandler reads req.authInfo?.refreshToken for non-OpenID admin providers and forwards it into the exchange code; the OpenID branch and its OPENID_REUSE_TOKENS gate are unchanged. /api/admin/oauth/refresh now accepts an optional provider field ('openid' | 'google', default 'openid'). The new Google branch POSTs grant_type=refresh_token to https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token, decodes the returned id_token for the sub claim, looks up the admin user by googleId, enforces tenant scope and ACCESS_ADMIN, and mints a fresh LibreChat JWT in the same response shape /oauth/exchange returns. It is gated on GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID and GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET being set (returns 503 GOOGLE_NOT_CONFIGURED otherwise); unknown provider values return 400 INVALID_PROVIDER. * 🔁 fix: Harden Google admin refresh against bot review findings Five validated findings from the initial bot pass: socialLogin.js: mirror the OpenID migrate-or-reject pattern on the email fallback. When an existing user is found by email and the stored provider id is empty, persist the refreshed sub so the refresh path can later bind to it. When the stored id is present and differs, reject as AUTH_FAILED to prevent identity-swap, matching the existing OpenID behavior in packages/api/src/auth/openid.ts. oauth.js: scope the non-OpenID admin refresh-token forwarding to provider === 'google'. The previous else branch would have forwarded a Discord refresh token (passport-discord supplies one) into the admin exchange payload even though /api/admin/oauth/refresh only accepts openid or google, leaving the admin client with a token it could not refresh. admin/auth.js (refreshGoogleAdminSession): drop id_token from the mandatory-fields check. Google's OAuth refresh response is documented to include id_token only conditionally, so the previous mandatory check broke refresh whenever Google omitted it. Decode id_token when present (fast path); when absent, call Google's userinfo endpoint with the access token to read sub. Wrap tokenResponse.json() in try/catch and return IDP_INCOMPLETE on parse failure instead of a generic 500. Tighten access_token to a typeof string check. admin/auth.js (refreshGoogleAdminSession): reuse serializeUserForExchange for the response user so the Google refresh shape matches /oauth/exchange and the OpenID branch exactly (full _id, id, email, name, username, role, avatar, provider, openidId). The previous Google-specific subset dropped fields the admin client relies on for later provider-specific refreshes and disambiguation. Tests cover each fix: socialLogin's migration and rejection cases, the oauth.js Discord-gating case, the userinfo fallback path on missing id_token, CLAIMS_INCOMPLETE when both id_token and userinfo are absent, IDP_INCOMPLETE on a non-JSON token body, and the full response shape on the happy path. * 🧪 fix: Add updateUser to appleStrategy test mock for socialLogin migration The shared socialLogin verify callback now invokes `updateUser` when the email-fallback path discovers a same-provider user with an empty provider id, persisting the refreshed sub. The Apple strategy test's `~/models` mock did not stub `updateUser`, so the migration path hit `TypeError: updateUser is not a function` and failed the `should handle existing user and update avatarUrl` case in CI shard 1/3. * 🧹 refactor: Move Google admin refresh into TypeScript @librechat/api helper Per repo guidance (CLAUDE.md): all new backend code must be TypeScript in /packages/api, and /api is a thin JS wrapper. The previous commit landed the Google admin refresh flow as ~120 lines of new JS inside api/server/routes/admin/auth.js, which violates that. This commit extracts the flow into a new TS helper at packages/api/src/auth/googleRefresh.ts and reduces the route handler to a thin dep-wiring wrapper. The helper exports applyGoogleAdminRefresh(deps, options) with the same shape as the OpenID applyAdminRefresh: callers pass findUsers, getUserById, canAccessAdmin, and mintToken as deps so the package stays free of /api model imports and capability/session helpers. The route handler now builds those deps from the existing model + capability + token modules and calls the helper, mapping AdminRefreshError to the documented HTTP responses. While moving the code, the helper now guards getUserById with Types.ObjectId.isValid before the direct-lookup branch, matching the OpenID admin path at packages/api/src/auth/refresh.ts. Without this guard a malformed user_id from the admin client would hit Mongoose findById's CastError and surface as a 500 INTERNAL_ERROR instead of falling through to the documented sub-based lookup. Tests move with the code: packages/api/src/auth/googleRefresh.spec.ts now owns the helper's behavior (token endpoint, userinfo fallback, ObjectId guard, USER_ID_MISMATCH/TENANT_MISMATCH/USER_NOT_FOUND/FORBIDDEN, rotated refresh-token pass-through, GOOGLE_NOT_CONFIGURED, IDP_INCOMPLETE on non-JSON body, CLAIMS_INCOMPLETE when both id_token and userinfo miss). The route-level api/server/routes/admin/auth.refresh.test.js drops the duplicated end-to-end Google cases and keeps a smaller surface: route delegates to applyGoogleAdminRefresh with the right deps + options, maps AdminRefreshError to HTTP status/code, falls through to 500 for unknown errors, and rejects unknown providers with INVALID_PROVIDER. * 🔁 fix: Tighten Google admin refresh and limit social-login changes Brutal-review findings on top of the upstream feature work. socialLogin.js: the migrate-or-reject pattern from the previous commit applied to every provider's chat-side verify callback, not just the admin flow. Gate both branches on `options.existingUsersOnly` so the chat-side googleLogin / facebookLogin / etc. keep their pre-existing email-fallback behavior unchanged. Tests follow: restore the original `should fallback to finding user by email` chat-side case and re-add the migration and mismatch-reject cases as admin-only by passing `{ existingUsersOnly: true }` to socialLogin in those tests. googleRefresh.ts: add a defense-in-depth `isEmailAllowed(user)` dep that the helper invokes before `canAccessAdmin`. Mirrors the `isEmailDomainAllowed` check the initial Google admin login already runs, so a deployment that removes a domain from `registration.allowedDomains` after issuance can no longer mint fresh JWTs for that admin via refresh. The route handler wires it up with `resolveAppConfigForUser` + `isEmailDomainAllowed`, falling back to `baseOnly` config for users without a tenantId. googleRefresh.ts: drop the unreachable `?? ''` defensive coalescing in `fetchGoogleTokenset`. The `GOOGLE_NOT_CONFIGURED` guard upstream already narrows `clientId`/`clientSecret` to non-empty strings; the function takes a narrowed `GoogleAdminRefreshConfiguredOptions` shape and `applyGoogleAdminRefresh` constructs that shape after the guard. * 🔒 fix: Apply brutal-review hardening to Google admin refresh Tighten the Google OAuth refresh flow against all outstanding code review findings: enforce JWT aud claim verification against the configured clientId (ISSUER_MISMATCH on mismatch), reject ambiguous googleId matches (limit:2 in findUsers, USER_ID_MISMATCH when multiple rows match), scope the authInfo refresh-token carrier to the Google provider only, add TOCTOU re-read defense after the admin googleId migration write in socialLogin, deduplicate canAccessAdmin/mintToken closures via buildAdminRefreshClosures shared by both OpenID and Google refresh paths, document rotation semantics on AdminExchangeResponse.refreshToken, standardise all log prefixes to [admin/oauth/refresh], and expand test coverage for all new paths. * 🔒 fix: Reject refresh for users migrated off the Google provider The interactive Google admin login path in socialLogin.js already rejects a user whose provider field is not 'google', returning AUTH_FAILED. Without a matching guard in the refresh path, a user migrated to OpenID could use an unexpired Google refresh token to keep minting admin JWTs indefinitely. Add a PROVIDER_MISMATCH check after resolving the user in both the direct getUserById branch and the findUsers fallback branch of resolveAdminUser, mirroring the provider gate the interactive path enforces. * 🔒 fix: Add ban check and fix domain allowlist on admin OAuth refresh Two gaps in the /api/admin/oauth/refresh route: Add middleware.checkBan to the route chain before preAuthTenantMiddleware, matching the gate that /login/local and createOAuthHandler already apply. Without it a banned admin could keep minting JWTs until their IdP refresh token expired. Replace getAppConfig({ baseOnly: true }) in the non-tenant isEmailAllowed closure with getAppConfig({ role: user.role }), which includes DB-layer overrides from the admin panel. baseOnly returns only YAML-derived config, so any allowedDomains list maintained entirely through the admin panel was silently inert on this path. Extract isEmailAllowedForUser as a shared helper, move it into buildAdminRefreshClosures so both Google and OpenID refresh paths enforce domain policy consistently, and add isEmailAllowed to AdminRefreshDeps in the TS package so applyAdminRefresh can invoke it. * 🔒 fix: Harden admin OAuth refresh against user bans, tenant scope gaps, and cross-tenant migration Post-identity-resolution ban check: the initial checkBan middleware fires before the refresh token is exchanged and req.user is populated, so it can only evaluate IP bans. After applyGoogleAdminRefresh/applyAdminRefresh resolves the user identity, we now synthesize req.user and re-run checkBan against the resolved user's id before emitting the JWT, so a user-level ban is enforced even from a fresh IP. Domain allowlist now includes userId: the getAppConfig call in isEmailAllowedForUser was passing only role, missing user and group-level allowedDomains overrides that the initial OAuth callback's checkDomainAllowed enforces via userId. Both branches now pass userId so buildPrincipals takes the full user+group+role resolution path. The tenant branch is also inlined (replacing resolveAppConfigForUser) to accept userId, wrapped in tenantStorage.run for correct Mongoose scoping and cache-key resolution. Cross-tenant email-fallback migration: the Passport verify callback fires before tenantContextMiddleware, so findUser({email}) is unscoped and can return a same-email user from another tenant. Writing googleId onto that document permanently corrupts the other tenant's account. Migration is now blocked for users with a tenantId; single-tenant users are unaffected. --------- Co-authored-by: Danny Avila <danny@librechat.ai> |
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Dustin Healy
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c6bb77325a
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🔗 feat: Admin Panel Link in Settings for Admins (#14662)
Expose ADMIN_PANEL_URL through the startup config for users holding the access:admin capability, and render an Admin section in Settings > General with an external link to the admin panel. The URL is omitted server-side for unauthenticated requests and users without admin access. |
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Dustin Healy
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96404bfc73
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🛡️ fix: SSRF-Guard Speech (STT/TTS) and OCR Outbound Requests at Connect Time (#14560)
* fix: SSRF-guard speech (STT/TTS) and OCR outbound requests at connect time Speech (STT/TTS) and OCR issued outbound HTTP to operator-provided target URLs with only proxy config attached, so a target that resolves to a private, loopback, link-local, or cloud-metadata address was reachable by the server. This is the same class already guarded for the custom models fetch, Actions, avatar, MCP, and the OpenAI/Anthropic endpoint clients. Add one helper applySSRFSafeAgentIfDirect(config, url, allowedAddresses) that rejects non-http(s) or unparseable target URLs, sets maxRedirects to 0 so a redirect cannot bypass the connect-time check, and attaches createSSRFSafeAgents when no proxy or agent is already set (proxy precedence preserved). Wire it into the six speech/OCR call sites and thread each section's allowedAddresses exemption from pr-01. Scope is private/internal SSRF only. It does not restrict forwarding a credential to a public host, which is a separate egress-allowlist concern. Absent an allowedAddresses entry, private targets now fail closed, matching endpoints, actions, and MCP. Document the new fields in librechat.example.yaml with the operator warning that allowedAddresses hostnames are trusted before the private-IP check. * fix: block literal private-IP hosts and thread STT exemptions through generic uploads applySSRFSafeAgentIfDirect only attached the DNS-lookup agents, but Node skips the custom lookup for IP-literal hosts, so a literal private IP such as http://127.0.0.1 connected unchecked. Reject literal private IPs synchronously in the helper, reusing the same allowedAddresses exemption logic as the lookup path. The generic audio-upload path did not forward the section-level allowedAddresses to sttRequest, so a private STT endpoint permitted via speech.stt.allowedAddresses failed with ESSRF outside the speech route. Thread the exemption through files/audio.ts and widen the STTService type. * fix: derive effective SSRF port for literal IPs and validate OCR target before opening its stream The literal-IP precheck normalized an empty URL.port to '', so allowedAddresses exemptions on a default port (127.0.0.1:80, [::1]:443) never matched. Derive 80/443 from the scheme when the port is omitted. uploadDocumentToMistral opened the upload file stream before the SSRF check, so a blocked or malformed target threw with the descriptor still open. Run the proxy/SSRF setup before fs.createReadStream. Reword the librechat.example.yaml allowedAddresses guidance to prefer a private IP literal over a hostname, and reconcile the speech/OCR SSRF specs to assert the synchronous literal-IP block instead of driving the connect-time lookup that Node skips for IP literals. * fix: block literal private IPs before the proxy return, destroy OCR stream on failure, canonicalize IPv6 exemptions Move the literal-IP check above the proxy/agent early return so a literal private IP is rejected even when a proxy is configured; document that a forward proxy must be SSRF-enforcing. Wrap the Mistral upload post in try/finally and destroy the file stream, so an async connect-time block does not leak the descriptor. Canonicalize IP literals in normalizeAddressCandidate through the same URL serialization targets use, so IPv4-mapped and expanded IPv6 exemptions match. |
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Dustin Healy
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0e14d91ed9
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⏱️ fix: Compile admin file-config MIME patterns on a linear-time engine (ReDoS) (#14555)
* ⏱️ fix: Compile admin file-config MIME patterns on a linear-time engine convertStringsToRegex compiled admin-configured supportedMimeTypes with the native RegExp engine, and checkType runs those patterns against an uploaded file's Content-Type on the server event loop, so a catastrophic-backtracking pattern in fileConfig could ReDoS the whole process on upload. The MIME-pattern compiler is now swappable. It defaults to native RegExp, which browser builds keep so no engine is added to the client bundle, and the server injects a linear-time engine (RE2JS) at startup. Only test is ever called on these matchers, so the shared type widens to a structural RegexLike with no behavior change for valid patterns. The browser stays on native because a client-side stall would only affect that one tab. * ⏱️ fix: Wire the linear MIME compiler in the experimental entry point api/server/experimental.js mounts the same upload routes and calls mergeFileConfig but never set the linear-time compiler, so admin MIME patterns still compiled with native RegExp there. Mirror the setup, and widen the client-side supportedMimeTypes type to the shared RegexLike so the browser typechecks against the same structural matcher. * 🧹 refactor: Configure the file-config linear engine from a shared helper Move the RE2 wiring out of both JS server entry points into a single configureFileConfigRegexEngine helper exported from @librechat/api, so /api stays a thin caller and the setup no longer has to be kept in sync across index.js and experimental.js. Also warn loudly when compiling an endpoint's supportedMimeTypes drops every pattern (an empty allowlist would reject all uploads), and correct the isMimeTypeSupported docstring to say RegexLike rather than RegExp. * fix: fail closed when every MIME pattern fails to compile convertStringsToRegex returned [] when all configured patterns failed to compile, and filter.ts reads an empty allowlist as no restriction, so a restrictive config whose patterns all fail allowed every attachment. Return a single reject-all matcher instead so every consumer fails closed. |
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Danny Avila
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dd159c4566
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🔐 fix: Preserve Structured JWT Auth Context (#14652)
* 🔐 fix: Preserve structured JWT auth context
* fix: Omit identity from auth correlation logs
* fix: Isolate pre-auth request context
* style: Sort auth context imports
* fix: Preserve structured auth metadata
* fix: Narrow structured log formatter types
* fix: Annotate structured log context keys
* test: Fix request fixture typing
* fix: Namespace request path log context
* fix: Namespace request method log context
* fix: Preserve captured tenant error paths
* style: Sort tenant error imports
* fix: Classify bulk tenant isolation failures
* fix: Enforce safe request correlation invariants
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Danny Avila
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56175af0b5
|
🎟️ fix: Reconcile MCP OAuth Readiness Across Pods (#14629)
* fix: stabilize MCP OAuth readiness across pods * fix: harden MCP readiness review findings * fix: resolve CI type check and terminal OAuth polling * fix: address MCP OAuth readiness review * fix: align MCP OAuth readiness state * test: stabilize MCP OAuth readiness assertion * fix: reject stale MCP OAuth callbacks * fix: close distributed MCP OAuth readiness gaps * style: sort Redis MCP test imports * fix: preserve MCP OAuth polling across rolling pods * fix: finalize distributed MCP OAuth readiness * fix: preserve runtime-detected MCP OAuth * fix: report runtime MCP OAuth readiness * fix: preserve live MCP OAuth classification * style: sort MCP connection imports |
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Danny Avila
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489bc02d4a
|
🧭 fix: Fail Closed When Expected MCP Tools Are Unavailable (#14646)
* fix: fail closed when expected mcp tools are unavailable * test: strengthen MCP handoff coverage * fix: clarify unavailable MCP tool guidance * fix: preserve MCP discovery for empty catalogs |
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Dustin Healy
|
4cec1a675f
|
🔒 feat: Add allowedAddresses Exemption to Speech (STT/TTS) and OCR Config Schemas (#14559)
* feat: add allowedAddresses exemption to speech (STT/TTS) and OCR config schemas Add the existing allowedAddressesSchema as an optional field on sttSchema, ttsSchema, and ocrSchema, reusing the schema already attached to endpoints, mcpSettings, and actions so port scoping and normalization stay identical. STT and TTS resolve a single provider by counting non-empty section keys, so exclude the allowedAddresses key from that scan. Without the exclusion a configured exemption list would be counted as a second provider and trip the "Multiple providers are set" guard. The field is inert on its own: nothing reads it for SSRF yet, and provider detection now ignores it. * fix: preserve allowedAddresses through the OCR config loaders loadOCRConfig rebuilt the ocr config with only apiKey, baseURL, mistralModel, and strategy, dropping allowedAddresses before it reached req.config.ocr. Pass it through in both the AppService loader (packages/data-schemas/src/app/ocr.ts) and the duplicate at packages/api/src/files/ocr.ts so the exemption survives config load. |
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Dustin Healy
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3f0a1ec8d9
|
🛡️ fix: Run message-filter PII patterns on a linear-time regex engine (ReDoS) (#14554)
* 🛡️ fix: Run message-filter PII patterns on a linear-time regex engine The messageFilter.pii middleware compiled admin-configured customPatterns with the native RegExp engine and ran them synchronously against every message on the shared event loop, so a catastrophic-backtracking pattern such as (a+)+$ could stall the entire process (native RegExp takes tens of seconds at roughly 32 characters) and take the instance down for every user. Compile these patterns with RE2JS, a linear-time RE2 port with no native addon, so catastrophic backtracking is impossible regardless of the pattern rather than something the code tries to detect. Patterns using features RE2 does not support, such as backreferences, fail to compile and are dropped and logged exactly as an invalid pattern already is. The filter only tests for a match, so this is a drop-in engine swap with no behavior change for valid patterns. * 🛡️ fix: Reject RE2-incompatible messageFilter patterns at config load The customPatterns regex was validated with native RegExp at config load, but the runtime now compiles it with a linear-time engine (RE2) that does not support backreferences or lookaround. Such a pattern passed validation, then failed to compile and was silently dropped at request time, quietly removing PII protection after upgrade. Reject backreferences and lookaround during config validation with an explicit message, and document RE2 syntax in the example config instead of "JavaScript-flavor". The runtime engine remains the authoritative boundary and still drops-and-logs anything this load-time check misses. * 🧹 test: Use direct MessageFilterPiiConfig annotations in the PII specs The added ReDoS cases satisfy the exported MessageFilterPiiConfig type directly, so the `as unknown as` assertions were unnecessary. Annotate the config objects directly, matching the repo's type-safety guidance. * 🧹 fix: Reject named backreferences in messageFilter patterns at config load Extend the config-load check to also reject named backreferences (\k<name>), which are valid JavaScript regex but unsupported by the linear-time runtime engine, so they surface at load rather than being dropped at request time. Together with the existing numeric-backreference and lookaround checks this covers the RE2-incompatible construct set; the runtime engine remains authoritative. * 🛡️ fix: Preserve Unicode whitespace matching in messageFilter starter patterns RE2's \s is ASCII-only, so after the engine swap the built-in api-key and Bearer starters no longer matched a secret separated by non-ASCII whitespace (e.g. a non-breaking space), which native RegExp did match. Broaden the whitespace classes to [\s\p{Zs}] so those patterns keep their original coverage, and add a regression test for a non-breaking-space separator. * 🛡️ fix: Validate messageFilter patterns with the RE2 engine at config load Replace the syntax blacklist (numeric/named backreferences, lookaround) with authoritative validation: config load now compiles each custom pattern with the same linear-time engine the runtime uses, so any RE2-incompatible construct (including control escapes like \cA) is rejected at load with a clear error instead of being silently dropped at request time. The validator is swappable and defaults to native RegExp so browser builds add no engine; the server wires the RE2-backed check at startup via configureMessageFilterRegexValidator in both entry points. * 🛡️ fix: Match the full whitespace set in messageFilter starter patterns RE2's `\s` omits the vertical tab and `\p{Zs}` omits U+2028, U+2029, and U+FEFF, so a separator built from one of those characters slipped past the `api-key` and `Bearer` starter patterns and reached the model. Broaden the starter whitespace class to the full JavaScript whitespace set so those separators are covered again. * fix: fail closed when messageFilter.pii compiles to zero patterns DB and admin config overrides bypass the RE2 schema validation (it only runs at YAML load), so an override whose only pattern is RE2-incompatible was dropped at compile time, left zero patterns, and let the request through. compile() now returns a failClosed flag when a config declared patterns but every one failed to compile; the middleware returns 400 and findPiiMatchInMessages returns a distinct misconfigured match that the OpenAI and Responses controllers surface with an admin-facing message. * 🛡️ fix: Fail closed when any messageFilter.pii custom pattern drops compile() previously set failClosed only when every pattern dropped (patterns.length === 0 && dropped > 0). With the default starters present, a single RE2-incompatible custom override incremented dropped but left patterns.length > 0, so the filter silently enforced only the surviving subset and text matching only the dropped rule passed. failClosed now keys off dropped > 0, so any dropped custom pattern blocks with the misconfigured 400. YAML patterns are RE2-validated at load, so dropped stays 0 for valid configs and only unvalidated DB or admin overrides can trip it. Reframed the two keeps-others-active specs to assert fail-closed and added a default-starters partial-drop regression. * 🧹 fix: Correct the misconfigured JSDoc and drop redundant casts in the PII specs The misconfigured flag now means any configured custom pattern failed to compile, not that every pattern failed, so its JSDoc on PiiMatch is updated to match. The partial-drop regressions now use direct MessageFilterPiiConfig annotations instead of as-unknown-as casts, keeping the specs type-checked, consistent with the rest of the suite. |
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Danny Avila
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22642df40c
|
🧹 fix: Exclude Mongo ID From Conversation Updates (#14631)
* fix: Exclude Mongo ID from conversation updates * fix: Limit conversation sync to conversation ID * fix: Preserve explicit conversation metadata |
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Danny Avila
|
b11978017d
|
🧱 fix: Enforce Agent Runtime File Trust Boundaries (#14577)
* fix: secure agent runtime file metadata * chore: sort agent resource test imports * fix: Align Agent Tool Resource Types * fix: Rehydrate Agent Image Resources * fix: preserve remote agent file authorization |
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Danny Avila
|
db6ba5392a
|
🪢 fix: Bind MCP OAuth Secrets to Trusted Endpoints (#14578)
* fix: bind MCP OAuth secrets to trusted endpoints * fix: bind stored MCP OAuth clients during refresh * fix: address MCP OAuth review findings * fix: bind stored MCP OAuth credentials * fix: make MCP OAuth credentials generation-safe * test: update MCP OAuth uninstall binding fixtures * fix: harden MCP OAuth credential persistence * fix: scope MCP OAuth refresh single-flight * style: sort MCP OAuth token imports |
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Danny Avila
|
7e74f8eb8c
|
🪪 fix: Strip Unresolved Header Placeholders at Final Resolution (#14595)
Unresolved {{LIBRECHAT_USER_*}} header templates leaked literally to
upstream providers when user context was missing at resolution time
(e.g. async title generation racing client disposal), letting a gateway
trust LibreChat's own template syntax as an account identity.
resolveHeaders now takes an opt-in stripUnresolved flag that blanks any
resolvable-but-unresolved LIBRECHAT_USER/BODY/OPENID placeholder, enabled
at every final resolution boundary (resolveConfigHeaders, model fetches,
Google init, summarization overrides, azureAssistants init). Staged
passes that resolve again later with more context are left untouched, as
is the async-resolved {{LIBRECHAT_GRAPH_ACCESS_TOKEN}} and unknown names.
titleConvo now resolves headers from the req captured at entry instead of
re-reading this.options.req, which disposeClient nulls concurrently.
Fixes #14580
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Danny Avila
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59395a6bf0
|
🪢 refactor: Move Agent Execution Seam Before Initialization (#14581)
* refactor: move agent execution seam before initialization * refactor: type librechat agent request extensions * refactor: read envelope values from descriptors * fix: preserve envelope types and validation errors * fix: bound agent envelope traversal |
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Rayan Salhab
|
3551c1ba8e
|
🪧 fix: Guard Admin OAuth Routes When Providers Are Not Configured (#14507)
* fix: guard admin OpenID routes without config * fix: guard remaining admin SSO routes without registered strategy --------- Co-authored-by: cyphercodes <cyphercodes@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Danny Avila <danny@librechat.ai> |
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Danny Avila
|
3191f6975a
|
🏷️ fix: Skip Title Generation for Preempt-Incomplete Turns (#14571)
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Danny Avila
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3dc5532111
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🏢 fix: Preserve Tenant Context for Partial Response Saves on Disconnect (#14567) | ||
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Danny Avila
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6f45a9e32e
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🔗 fix: Normalize MCP Tool Keys at Every Producer, Resolve Raw Names via Aliases (#14553)
* 🔗 fix: Normalize MCP Tool Keys at Every Producer, Resolve Raw Names via Aliases Tool keys had two spellings that could diverge for any server whose name contains characters outside [a-zA-Z0-9_.-]: the tool cache (and registry inspector) built keys with the RAW server name, while runtime instances are named with normalizeServerName(serverName). Three code comments already asserted "tool keys embed the normalized server name" - no producer honored it. For a special-character server that meant: - definitions-only mode shipped raw def names the model echoed back, but the executor's tool map held the normalized instance name, so every call failed with "Tool not found"; - per-tool tool_options (defer_loading / allowed_callers / run_in_background / describe_intent) were persisted under raw keys that never matched the definition names the option passes resolve against, so builder settings were silently inert; - tool-key parsing against normalized candidate lists silently fell back to last-delimiter splitting, which mis-parses delimiter-bearing tool names. The reconciliation is one contract enforced in three moves: 1. PRODUCERS NORMALIZE. The tool cache (packages/api/src/mcp/tools.ts) and the registry inspector build keys with the normalized server name, matching the instance names MCP.js has always assigned. The builder's tool ids, agent.tools entries, tool_options keys, and definition names all flow from these keys, so every model-facing name now agrees. The cache STORE stays keyed by the raw config name. 2. CONFIG LOOKUPS RESOLVE ALIASES. New shared helpers in data-provider (buildServerNameAliases, normalizeMCPToolKey) map a parsed normalized name back to the raw config name that the registry, config maps, tool cache, and plugin-auth rows are keyed by. Applied in the definitions loader closure, handleTools grouping, createMCPTool's parsing fallback, getUserMCPAuthMap, and the MCP tools endpoint - matching both spellings so legacy raw keys keep resolving. 3. LEGACY DATA HEALS AT ONE BOUNDARY. initializeAgent rewrites raw-keyed agent.tools entries and tool_options keys to the normalized form (normalizeAgentToolKeys) before anything consumes them, so agents persisted under the old convention load their tools AND have all four per-tool options honored. Placeholder and server-pin tokens stay raw - they are config-identity references, not model-facing names. Servers whose names are already in the safe character set (the common case) produce byte-identical keys before and after; the fast path allocates nothing. Stale Redis-cached raw keys self-heal via the existing reconnect-on-missing path within one cache cycle. * 🧯 fix: Deterministic Alias Collisions + Raw Names in Definition Metadata Two review findings on the normalization contract: - Two configured server names that normalize to the same segment (e.g. 'Sales Force' and 'Sales:Force' -> 'Sales_Force') produce inherently ambiguous tool keys; the alias map silently resolved last-wins, so a tool selected from one server could execute against the other's config. buildServerNameAliases now resolves collisions to the FIRST configured name deterministically, and resolveMCPServerContext warns once per colliding pair per process so the operator can rename one server. A collision-resistant identifier would change every existing tool key, so detection + stable routing is the right treatment here; startup-time config validation can follow separately. - The definitions loader resolved parsed (normalized) server names to raw only inside the ToolService closure, while the definition metadata (serverName -> mcpRawServerName) kept the normalized value. Server instructions are keyed by raw config names, so a special-character server's instructions were silently omitted in definitions-only mode. loadToolDefinitions now takes rawServerNames, resolves the boundary against both spellings, and stores the RAW name in definition metadata - consistent with the instance path. * 🧯 fix: Heal Stale Caches, Skill Allowed-Tools, and Builder Selectors Three review findings on the normalization rollout, all in the transition class: - Stale cache entries (P1): the definitions-only loader treats the per-server tool map as authoritative and never reconnects on a per-key miss, so a pre-change raw-keyed Redis entry would make a special-character server's tools vanish for up to the cache TTL. getMCPServerTools now heals legacy raw-keyed entries to the normalized format at read time (keys and function names), covering every consumer with no coordinated invalidation; safe names return the map untouched. - Skill allowed-tools: a skill declaring a raw MCP key in allowed-tools bypassed the initialize-boundary heal (the union runs after it) and would neither dedupe against healed agent tools nor match the normalized tool map. The primes' allowedTools now pass through the same normalizeAgentToolKeys heal before unioning. - Builder selectors: matchesMcpServer and useVisibleTools parsed tool ids against raw server names only, so an attached special-character server rendered as an unselected orphan card. Both now accept the normalized spelling and resolve it back to the raw map key, keeping legacy raw ids working. * 🧯 fix: Fail Closed on Normalized Server-Name Collisions Escalation of the collision finding: a deterministic first-wins alias plus a warning still let the tools listing publish BOTH colliding servers, so a tool selected under the shadowed second server would silently execute against the first server's configuration (their model-facing keys are identical, so routing cannot ever distinguish them). - findShadowedServerNames identifies later-configured names whose normalized form an earlier different name claimed. - getMCPTools excludes shadowed servers from the published listing entirely (with a warn naming the collision), so their tools are never selectable - nothing ambiguous can be picked. - Server creation reserves both spellings: a generated slug may not collide with a raw config name OR the normalized form its tool keys would carry. Collision-resistant model-facing IDs remain out of scope: changing normalizeServerName's output would rewrite every existing tool key (agent documents, caches, instance names) for ALL servers to handle a misconfiguration that is now blocked from exposure instead. * ✅ fix: Dedupe Reserved Server-Name Spellings at Creation The reservation list appended normalized forms unconditionally, which duplicated every safe name (raw === normalized) and broke the route-level contract test pinning the exact list. Dedupe via a Set so safe names contribute one entry, while special-character names still reserve both spellings; adds the special-character reservation case. * 🧯 fix: Never Heal a Shadowed Server's Keys; Align Authorization Tie-Break Persisted references were the remaining collision vector: an agent or skill saved with the shadowed later server's raw key was HEALED into the shared normalized key, authorized through a last-wins map, and routed first-wins - authorized as one server, executed as another. - normalizeAgentToolKeys now refuses to rewrite keys of shadowed servers (findShadowedServerNames): rewriting would produce exactly the first server's key. Left raw, the key cannot match the normalized-keyed tool map and the tool fails visibly - broken beats misrouted. Covers agent.tools, tool_options, and skill allowed-tools through the shared heal. - filterAuthorizedTools (agents/v1.js) builds its normalized-to-raw map via the shared buildServerNameAliases instead of a last-wins Map constructor, so authorization resolves a colliding key to the SAME first server execution routes to. * 🧯 fix: Direct Identity Wins Over Aliases; Heal Client Forms and Degraded Contexts Four review findings on the normalization edges: - Alias hijack (P1): a user-DB server named exactly like an operator server's normalized form ('foo' vs YAML 'foo!') had its tools rerouted to the operator server by unconditional alias resolution. Resolution is now DIRECT-FIRST everywhere: the parsed name is tried as-is, and only when nothing resolves is it treated as a normalized spelling (definitions loader, handleTools grouping, createMCPTool fallback). buildServerNameAliases seats identity entries before derived ones so a literal name owns its slot regardless of config order, findShadowedServerNames and the collision warning derive from the same construction, and getUserMCPAuthMap fetches auth under both spellings so either owner finds its rows. - Builder double-match: a normalized name containing the delimiter ('foo mcp bar' -> 'foo_mcp_bar') also suffix-matched a server named 'bar', selecting both cards and making removal strip the wrong tool. matchesMcpServer now resolves the token ONCE against the full configured list (longest boundary, both spellings) when the caller supplies it; selection and removal share the resolution. - Builder legacy ids: an agent saved with raw-keyed ids showed its tools unchecked while the runtime heal kept them active, and selection updates never replaced the legacy entries. McpSection maps legacy raw ids to their current normalized ids when deriving and rewriting this server's selection. - Degraded context: a transient ensureConfigServers failure returned an entirely empty context, leaving normalized keys unresolvable for the request. resolveMCPServerContext now keeps the name lists (they derive from the config snapshot alone) and degrades only the lazy-init configs. * 🧯 fix: Collision Detection Sees Accessible Servers; Shadowed Refs Fail Closed End to End Round follow-ups on the collision design, all in the DB-server-visibility class: - The legacy-key heal detected collisions against operator-config names only, so healing could still produce a key that direct-first resolution routes to an invisible user-DB server. initializeAgent gains an optional getAccessibleMcpServerNames dep (wired through ToolService for controllers that mock it, directly elsewhere), consulted ONLY when a configured name needs normalization - zero cost for safe-name deployments. The heal then sees the full accessible set and skips shadowed servers' keys. - Wildcard and legacy raw tokens bypassed catalog filtering, letting a shadowed server's instances join a run under the same normalized names as the winner's. filterAuthorizedTools rejects tools of shadowed servers at authorization (its merged map sees DB + config), and handleTools skips them at execution. - The builder migrated only tool selection, not tool_options: legacy raw option keys showed disabled while the runtime honored them, and toggles could not clear them. McpSection now migrates option keys to the current normalized ids (existing normalized entries win). - A transient ensureConfigServers failure degraded to an EMPTY server context, leaving normalized keys unresolvable for the request. resolveMCPServerContext keeps the name lists (derived from the config snapshot alone) and degrades only the lazy-init configs. * 🧯 fix: Complete the Collision Audit at Every Gate; Safer Heal Semantics Round follow-ups hardening the collision audit: - Execution guards now consult the FULL accessible set: the caller's heal threads its already-fetched names through loadTools, and handleTools fetches them itself when a configured name needs normalization (never for safe-name deployments) - so a cross-tier collision (user-DB 'foo' vs operator 'foo!') fails closed at eager execution instead of joining the run under one normalized name. - Healing is SKIPPED when the collision audit cannot complete (transient lookup failure, or no dep): un-healed raw keys still resolve through the direct-first candidates, so skipping is safe while rewriting against an incomplete audit is not. - The audit lookup is gated on the agent actually carrying delimiter-bearing keys (tools, tool_options, or skill allowed-tools), so non-MCP agents never pay a registry round-trip even on specially named deployments. - normalizeAgentToolKeys gives the CURRENT (normalized) entry precedence when both spellings carry options, matching the builder's migration semantics instead of letting insertion order decide. - The builder's toCurrentToolId resolves entries boundary-exactly against every configured server (longest match, both spellings), so a raw suffix shared with a LONGER server name can no longer reassign that server's selection or options while another dialog is open. * 🧯 fix: Shared Collision Audit for Definitions Loading; Fail Closed on Audit Failure Round follow-ups closing the remaining audit gaps: - The definitions-only loader now consumes the same collision audit as eager loading: shadowed servers' entries (wildcards included) are dropped before definitions are emitted, so the default execution path can never resolve a shadowed server's normalized function name to another server. The audit names thread from initializeAgent's heal; the loader self-fetches only when a configured name needs normalization. - resolveCollisionAuditNames centralizes the audit-resolution policy (threaded set > self-fetch when needed > incomplete on failure), and BOTH loaders now fail closed under an incomplete audit: any normalization-sensitive reference (its own name needs normalizing, or it equals the normalized form of a configured special-character name) is skipped with a warning instead of being audited against operator names alone. isNormalizationSensitiveName lives in packages/api as a pure helper so test mocks use the real predicate. - normalizeAgentToolKeys collapses duplicate ids after healing (order-preserving): a document carrying both spellings converges on one key, never two instances with the same function name. * 🧯 fix: Thread the Audit Everywhere; Identity-Aware Alias Fallback Round follow-ups on audit plumbing: - The OpenAI-compatible and Responses tool loaders now forward the already-resolved accessibleMcpServerNames instead of discarding it, so the definitions loader neither repeats the registry lookup nor fails closed on a transient second lookup after the first succeeded. - The skill-only path threads its audit: when the baseline agent has no MCP keys but a primed skill's allowed-tools fetched the complete set, that set (not the operator-only list) reaches the loader, so the collision remains visible and the shadowed reference stays rejected end to end. - OAuth discovery iterates the collision-FILTERED tool list, so a request can no longer emit an OAuth prompt, wait out the connection timeout, and reconnect a server whose definitions were deliberately rejected. - The definitions loader's alias fallback is identity-aware: when the parsed name IS a known accessible server, a null tool fetch means temporarily unavailable (OAuth pending, missing user variables, disconnected) and no longer reroutes to the raw alias - previously the aliased operator server's definitions could be emitted under the unavailable DB server's names. * 🧯 fix: Legacy-Key Definition Lookup; Retain Audit for Deferred Execution - createMCPTool resolves tool definitions by BOTH spellings: the key as persisted plus the canonical normalized key built from the resolved server name. Assistants and direct tool calls persisted before the rollout bypass the agent-boundary heal and arrive with raw keys, while availableTools is now indexed canonically - previously every such call missed the index, burned a reconnect, and returned the unavailable stub permanently via the negative cache. - The initialized agent retains accessibleMcpServerNames (the COMPLETE collision audit this initialization resolved), buildAgentToolContext copies it into every per-agent tool context, and loadToolsForExecution threads it into the eager loader as bare options. Deferred/event-driven execution therefore reuses the snapshot instead of repeating the merged registry read - a transient failure there could fail-closed a tool the same turn already advertised from the successful first audit. - MCP.spec.js keeps @librechat/api pure helpers REAL (requireActual spread) so normalization paths are exercised rather than mirrored. * 🧯 fix: Parse Legacy Keys Against Both Server-Name Spellings createMCPTool's boundary candidates were normalized-only, so a legacy raw key whose server name contains the delimiter (foo_mcp_bar!) missed the suffix match and fell to the generic last-delimiter split - the canonical rebuild then produced a key that could never hit the index and the persisted call stubbed out. The candidate list now carries the RAW resolved name (and raw config names on the parse-only path) next to the normalized spellings. * 🧯 fix: Honest Audit Completeness; Shadowed-Server Form-Key Guard - resolveAllMcpConfigs tolerates ensureConfigServers failures, so the merged registry read can silently omit config-only servers while the audit still reported complete: true - a foo/foo! collision would go unseen and a persisted key could route to the wrong server. Both audit consumers now union the snapshot-derived raw config names back in (resolveCollisionAuditNames unions the caller's rawServerNames; the initializeAgent heal unions configRawServerNames), keeping the completeness label honest without an extra read: operator names come from the registry-independent config snapshot, user-DB names from the merged read that fails loudly into the existing incomplete path. - The client tool_options migration now mirrors the runtime heal's fail-closed rule for SHADOWED servers: when the dialog's server has lost its normalized slot to another catalog name, legacy raw keys stay raw instead of being rewritten onto the winning server's key, where a later save would apply the wrong server's per-tool settings. The dialog's own server joins the alias construction so a stale catalog map can't misread as a collision. * 🧯 fix: Heal Legacy Assistant MCP Tool Names on Save The assistants create/update controllers look tools up in the cached definitions by exact key, and the cache is now normalized-keyed - an assistant saved before the convention resubmits its raw-suffixed MCP name on every edit, so any save silently removed the tool. healMcpToolNames pre-heals the payload's tool list: a delimiter-bearing string that misses the cache resolves through the configured raw names (longest-suffix, boundary-exact) and rewrites to the normalized key only when that key actually exists in the cache. SHADOWED raw names stay raw and fail closed, mirroring the runtime heal; the config read happens only when a delimiter-bearing name actually misses, and read failures propagate (write path) rather than silently dropping tools. v2's update loop also stops re-reading the tool cache per iteration. * 🧯 fix: Full-Audit Shadow Set + Dedupe in the Assistant Key Heal - The assistant-save heal built its shadow set from operator config names alone, so a cross-tier collision (user-DB `foo` owning the normalized slot of operator `foo!`) looked unshadowed and the legacy key healed into the shared normalized name - which direct-first execution then binds to the DB server. The shadow set now comes from resolveCollisionAuditNames' full accessible audit, and an incomplete audit skips healing outright (every rewrite candidate is normalization-sensitive by construction, so raw-and-fail-closed is the only safe answer). - Healed string entries dedupe order-preserving: a payload carrying both spellings of the same tool collapses to one entry instead of expanding into duplicate function definitions the provider rejects. |
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Danny Avila
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e7f1838515
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⚡ feat: Reliable Interrupt & Steer Escalation and Recovery (#14558)
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* feat: surface interrupt-steer escalation on waiting messages The interrupt & steer feature shipped reachable only through the composer chord, the send-button hovercard, and the composer button; a message already waiting (queued for after the run, or steered and parked at the next tool boundary) had no path to it. Both waiting surfaces now carry one: - Queued rows get an icon-only ZapOff escalation button beside the existing Steer primary. It routes through sendQueuedNow, which now takes a preempt option on its live-run path. The tooltip teaches the composer chord, derived through resolveComposerKeyDown so a rebound or yielded chord is never advertised. - In-flight steer bubbles get an "Interrupt now" overflow entry with the same race rules as Edit: reclaim first, and only a `reclaimed` outcome resubmits (via retrySteer with preempt, swapping the chip for an interrupting one). `applied` and run-ended-mid-reclaim outcomes stop at the existing informational toasts, so the words can never land twice. Not offered on a steer already preempting. - Every during-run overflow menu gains an "Always interrupt instead" toggle for steerInterruptsByDefault, next to the existing steer/queue default toggle. MenuEntry supports disabled for the new entries. Only one interrupt can be unresolved at a time: while one preempt is pending (or the run is paused on approval, where the server 409s), every escalation control disables instead of racing the same seal. Ten new tests across both surfaces; 381 green in the affected suites. * fix: lock escalation across its reclaim window, keep the paused control visible, label as steer Codex round 1, all three findings. P2, escalation race. The single-interrupt invariant had a window between clicking "Interrupt now" and the reclaim resolving, where no preempt chip existed for the chip-derived gate to see: two bubbles escalated back-to-back could both resubmit. A shared escalating flag (Jotai, per-conversation) now covers the window and disables every escalation control on both surfaces, and a fresh recheck before resubmitting catches an interrupt armed elsewhere meanwhile (composer chord, queued row); those words re-home to the queue with an informational toast instead of breaking the invariant. P2, unreachable paused state. canSteer is defined as hasRealConvoId && !pausedOnApproval, so gating the button on canSteer removed it exactly when it was meant to render disabled; the test only passed on an impossible stub combination. The render gate is now duringRunActive && (canSteer || pausedOnApproval), and the test uses the real invariant. P2, label semantics. "Interrupt & send now" borrowed the name of the hard-abort action; this one preserves the partial answer and steers. Renamed to "Interrupt & steer now" (com_ui_interrupt_steer_now). Both behavior fixes counterfactually verified; 384 tests green across the affected suites. * fix: disable bubble escalation while the run cannot accept a steer Codex round 2, one P2. Answer mode (ask_user_question) sets duringRunActive false while pausedOnApproval stays false, since that flag only detects approval-bearing tool calls. The bubble's escalation entry stayed enabled there, so clicking it cancelled a healthy waiting steer and the preempt resubmission bounced off RUN_PAUSED, degrading the words to the queue. The entry now also disables on !duringRunActive, matching the queued-row control's gate. Counterfactually verified: reverting the gate fails the new answer-mode test. * fix: recheck live run state after the reclaim, not just at the click Codex round 3, one P2, and it is the round-1 recheck principle applied one level deeper: the entry-time disable cannot see a run that pauses (tool approval, answer mode) while the reclaim round-trip is in flight, and the .then closure held the render's stale steering controls, so the resubmit would fire into a RUN_PAUSED rejection after the reclaim had already surrendered the steer's boundary slot. The escalation continuation now reads the LIVE controls through a latest-ref: if the run can no longer accept a steer, the words re-home to the queue with an informational toast instead of resubmitting, and the resubmit itself also goes through the live controls. Counterfactually verified: reading the stale closure instead of the ref fails the new mid-reclaim pause test. * refactor: make escalation one atomic server-side arm, in place Codex round 4: four P2s, every one an interleaving of the same window — escalation as reclaim-then-repost is a compound, non-atomic operation whose continuation must revalidate the world (FIFO position lost, ref assigned too late, no run fence, competing bubble actions). Rounds 1-3 patched that window with a lock and rechecks; round 4 shows the window itself is the defect, so this removes it instead of guarding it again. Escalation is now POST /chat/steer/arm: the server flips preempt on the EXISTING queued item in one atomic store op (new IJobStore.armSteer; a decode-patch-encode LSET Lua on Redis, an in-place mutation in memory), fenced to the validated generation and refused once the queue closes. The handler mirrors the steer POST's preempt contract exactly: durable flag gated on the owner's recorded capability, volatile requestPreempt fire-and-forget because the durable flag is the truth resume/handover re-arm from. By construction this resolves all four findings: FIFO survives (the item never moves; the whole queue still drains in instruction order at the seal), there is no continuation to hold stale controls, the store op is fenced to the original run, and a competing Edit/Queue/Cancel either beats the arm (armed:false, chip untouched) or operates on the armed item, whose cancel already disarms. The client escalation entry becomes one mutation: armed:true relabels the chip in place (same steerId, same position), PREEMPT_UNSUPPORTED and lost races toast honestly, and the round 1-3 machinery — the escalating lock atom, the latest-ref, the post-reclaim rechecks and their two toast strings — is deleted rather than extended. Verified: 7 new handler tests on the real in-memory manager (including FIFO preservation and the stale-generation fence), 2 Redis integration tests against real Redis (in-place arm keeps order and every field; missing/stale/closed all refuse), client suites 396 green. * fix: decide capability inside the atomic arm, neutralize the lost-race toast Codex round 5, both findings, both edges of the new arm design rather than its mechanism. P2, capability TOCTOU. A HITL resume on a rolling deploy rewrites preemptCapable for the SAME generation, so the handler's read could go stale between validation and the flag flip, arming a steer the live owner cannot seal. armSteer now returns armed | missing | incapable, with the owner's live capability part of the same atomic predicate as the generation fence (HGET preemptCapable inside the Lua; the flat job field, not a metadata blob — the in-memory store reads the same field). The handler's pre-check is deleted rather than kept alongside; the store predicate is the single source. New handler test rewrites the capability after queueing and expects PREEMPT_UNSUPPORTED with the item left unflagged; the Redis guards test now asserts the incapable refusal against real Redis. P2, ambiguous toast. armed:false covers injected, cancelled, re-homed, and run-over alike, so telling the user the message "already reached the agent" claimed one specific outcome. The lost-race branch now uses a neutral message (com_ui_steer_arm_lost_race) and defers to the events for what actually happened. * fix: flip the escalation lock synchronously before the arm request Codex round 6, one P2. Round 4 deleted the escalating flag along with the reclaim continuation it guarded, but that left the one-interrupt gate blind during the arm request's own round trip: the chip-derived check cannot see an arm until its response relabels the chip, so on a slow connection two bubbles could both arm before either response landed. Double-arm is harmless server-side now (the run seals once and drains the whole queue in order), but every escalation control advertises "one interrupt at a time" by disabling, and the controls must tell the truth. The per-conversation escalating flag returns as a pure UX gate: set synchronously at click, before the mutation, cleared on settlement, and folded into interruptPending on both surfaces. Unlike its round 1-3 ancestor there is no continuation behind it to guard and no recheck to pair with it. Counterfactually verified: without the synchronous set, the two-bubble race test arms twice. 207 tests green across the Chat Input suites. * test(e2e): cover escalation of waiting messages through the real seal Three mock-harness tests on E2E_SLOW_REPLY, a 160-chunk stream with no tool boundary, so an in-thread steer part can ONLY come from a genuine mid-stream seal — which makes each test a behavioral proof rather than a UI check: - Queued row escalation: the ZapOff button turns a waiting queued message into a preempt-armed steer (202 echoes preempt: true) that seals and injects, where the sibling steering.spec test proves the unescalated path waits for run end instead. - Bubble in-place arm: an ordinary steer (202 with no preempt echo) waits as a bubble, POST /chat/steer/arm answers armed: true, the bubble relabels in place (same single bubble, same text, escalation no longer offered on reopen), and the armed steer seals mid-stream. - Always-interrupt toggle: flipped from a waiting row's overflow menu, plain Enter now produces a preempt: true steer that seals in the SAME run, and the menu offers the way back. An afterEach clears the localStorage preference so a mid-test failure cannot leak preempt-by-default into the rest of the serial suite. All three verified locally through the full harness (real backend, mock LLM, seeded DB): 3 passed in 27s. * feat: dedicated escalation arrow + shortcut, menu split into actions and preferences The escalation was still half-hidden: the bubble only offered it inside the overflow menu, and the tooltip taught the composer chord, which does a different thing (interrupts with typed text, not this chip). Three changes make it a first-class command: - A shared EscalateNowButton (circular arrow, ghost-bordered like the composer's interrupt control) is always visible on BOTH surfaces: beside each queued row's Steer primary and on every waiting steer bubble next to its menu. It disappears once a steer is interrupting. - A dedicated registry shortcut, escalateSteer (Cmd/Ctrl+Shift+.), editing-allowed and rebindable like every other action. Deliberately NOT an Enter chord: the composer owns every Enter chord, and the yield design rests on no default binding using Enter besides submit. Its handler clicks the newest enabled arrow control (bubbles beat queued rows), so the shortcut can never diverge from the button, and the arrow's tooltip teaches THIS command via the registry display. - The overflow menus separate one-off actions from sticky behavior changes: Edit, Cancel, Queue, then a smaller "Preferences" section holding the queueing and always-interrupt toggles, each with the standard InfoHoverCard reusing the Settings panel's descriptions. "Interrupt & steer now" leaves the menu entirely. 386 client tests green, including a menu-structure test locking the order and the absence of the escalation entry; bubble escalation tests drive the visible arrow. The e2e spec's bubble test now clicks the arrow, and a fourth test drives the dedicated shortcut end to end through a real mid-stream seal. * style: bind the escalation arrow to its message (variant A anatomy) Two same-weight circles in a row read as one control group, leaving the arrow's ownership ambiguous, and a floating arrow stops meaning anything once several messages stack. The shared control now carries variant A's anatomy: a thin divider binds a small SOLID arrow (filled, inverted) to the message region on its left, and the menu ellipsis stays a bare glyph, so the two affordances can no longer blur together — and the divider+arrow pairing repeats cleanly per chip at N messages. * chore: drop the unused within import CI lint caught * fix: advertise the escalation shortcut only while the control is live Codex on the e2e head, one P2: the tooltip appended the chord hint even while the button was disabled, advertising a shortcut that does nothing during an approval pause. The flagged control (InterruptNowButton) was since replaced by the shared EscalateNowButton, which inherited the pattern; the successor now omits the chord whenever the control is disabled, matching the rule the during-run hovercard already follows. * fix: harden steer escalation lifecycle and recovery * test(e2e): disambiguate accessible steer preferences * test: align abort persistence coverage with prerequisites * chore(i18n): remove obsolete steer race message * chore: normalize imports across steering changes * test: exercise stream integration on Redis Cluster * test: scope HITL checkpoints to generation * test: fix cluster cleanup and locale policy * fix: keep escalation visible during ask pauses * fix: fence recovery downgrade and stale predecessors * fix: require generation owner abort acknowledgement * fix: validate delayed preempt arms * test: align final escalation fixtures * fix: preserve in-memory predecessor abort handoff * fix: restore controls for recovered queued messages * test: cover recovered queue controls * fix: close final steering review gaps |
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Danny Avila
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60ca751a7f
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🧠 fix: Preserve Deferred Tool Schemas Across HITL Resume (#14552)
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* 🧠 fix: Preserve deferred tool schemas across HITL resume * 🧪 test: Harden deferred tool resume regression * 📦 chore: bump @librechat/agents to v3.3.10 |
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Danny Avila
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78ec1940a2
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🧹 fix: Clean Up MCP OAuth State Mappings on Uninstall + Reject Superseded Callbacks (#14549)
* 🧹 fix: Clean Up MCP OAuth State Mappings on Uninstall + Reject Superseded Callbacks Disconnecting an OAuth MCP server deleted its mcp_oauth flows but left the mcp_oauth_state:{state} mappings behind for the full TTL. Because flow ids are deterministic (userId:serverName) and the CSRF token is HMAC(flowId), a stale browser tab's callback could resolve its orphaned state to the NEXT flow for the same server, pass CSRF, burn the fresh flow's one-shot CSRF cookie, and fail the PKCE exchange, sabotaging the legitimate retry. - Add MCPOAuthHandler.deleteFlowAndStateMapping: reads the flow's stored state and deletes the mapping before the flow (mapping-first so a crash between deletes fails closed instead of recreating the orphan) - Route mcp_oauth deletions in clearStoredMCPOAuthState through the helper for both tenant-scoped and legacy flow ids - Reject callbacks whose state does not match the resolved flow's stored state: the only control distinguishing a superseded attempt from the current one on a deterministic flow id Fixes #14534 * fix: gate failFlow on state match in the OAuth error branch (Codex P1) The provider-error branch failed the resolved flow on CSRF/session alone, so a superseded error callback resolved through an orphaned mapping could mark the current flow FAILED. Apply the same stored-state equality gate before failFlow. * fix: leave the flow in place when the state-mapping delete fails (Codex P2) deleteFlow swallows storage errors and returns false, and deleteStateMapping discarded that result, so a failed mapping delete followed by a successful flow delete would silently recreate the orphan. Surface the boolean from deleteStateMapping and throw from deleteFlowAndStateMapping before touching the flow, so the caller's allSettled warn branch fires and the next replacement retries both. * fix: restore the state mapping when the flow delete fails (Codex P2) The inverse partial failure of the round-3 fix: a successful mapping delete followed by a silently failed flow delete left a PENDING flow whose reused authorization URL could never resolve, dead-ending every callback in invalid_state until the flow went stale. Check deleteFlow's result, re-store the mapping on failure, and throw so the caller's allSettled warn branch fires. * fix: never leave a callback-capable flow behind on uninstall (Codex round 6) Teardown runs after the server's tokens are deleted, so a preserved flow+mapping pair (the round-3 early-throw path) let a lingering consent tab complete the callback and recreate credentials post-uninstall. Now that both callback branches gate on stored-state equality, an orphaned mapping is the benign failure mode, so invert the order: delete the flow first, attempt the mapping delete regardless, and reject when either reports a storage failure. This supersedes the round-4 mapping restore, which also preserved a callback-capable pair. * fix: delete the flow even when its metadata read fails (Codex round 7) A storage error on the initial getFlowState aborted teardown before any delete ran, preserving the callback-capable flow after token deletion. Tolerate the read failure, delete the flow blindly, skip the mapping it could not identify (the callback gates neutralize the possible orphan), and reject so the caller's warn branch fires. |
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Danny Avila
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1e1de6eff9
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🎯 fix: Exact Ask-Question Attribution via Interrupt tool_call_id (#14539)
The ask_user_question pause/answer stamps (server pause-time args stamp, resume-time answer stamp, and the client mirror) targeted the newest unanswered ask part by position. When a model emits several ask calls in one turn, the interrupt's question and the user's answer land on the wrong card. @librechat/agents > 3.3.8 surfaces the interrupting call's tool_call_id on the ask interrupt payload. All three stamps now target that id exactly when present, keeping the positional fallback for older payloads. The tool body passes config.toolCall.id through to askUserQuestion via a typed alias that is a no-op on the pinned SDK and lights up on the next dependency bump. Companion to danny-avila/agents#366, which also fixes the underlying dangling tool_use 400 (INVALID_TOOL_RESULTS) when one of the parallel ask calls streams malformed args. |
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Danny Avila
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8e165eb451
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🔒 fix: Remove Owner Email from Agent owner_contact Fallback (#14541)
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* 🔒 fix: Remove Owner Email from Agent `owner_contact` Fallback The owner-contact fallback for agents without an explicit support_contact exposed the owner's private account email to any VIEW-level caller via GET /agents/:id and GET /agents. The fallback now resolves a display name only (name/username/authorName): the User query no longer projects email, the resolver never returns one, and the shared AgentOwnerContact type drops the field. Emails are only served when the owner opts in via support_contact. * 🔒 fix: Reject Email-Shaped Owner Display Names in Contact Fallback OpenID and SAML strategies fall back to the account email for the user's name and username when no display-name claims exist, so the name-only owner fallback could still surface the email through those fields. The resolver now rejects email-shaped display-name candidates entirely. * 🔒 fix: Treat Any @-Containing Display Name as Email-Derived RFC-5321 quoted local parts may contain whitespace and the User schema email validator is an unanchored substring match, so such addresses can reach the name/username fields via SSO fallbacks. Rejecting on '@' presence covers every legal email form without re-fetching the account email. |
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Jens Schumann
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ad74a282d1
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🪃 fix: Resolve User Vars Before the First Post-OAuth Reconnect (#14538)
* fix: resolve customUserVars before first post-OAuth-callback MCP reconnect
The OAuth callback route reconnects the user's MCP connection immediately
after storing new tokens, but never resolves customUserVars before doing
so - unlike the /reinitialize route a few hundred lines below, which does.
As a result, headers/oauth_headers templates like `{{MY_KEY}}` are sent
to the MCP server literally, unsubstituted, on this first connection
attempt, even though the user's value is already saved. The upstream
server rejects it as an invalid credential.
Fixes #14537
* refactor: share getServerCustomUserVars reader from @librechat/api
The mcp_-prefixed key shape was built by getUserMCPAuthMap but re-derived
by hand at each read site (a private helper in services/MCP.js, and the
new callback-route extraction). Export a reader from the same module that
owns the writer and reuse it at both sites, so the key shape has a single
source of truth.
* chore: sort destructured require members in routes/mcp.js
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Co-authored-by: Danny Avila <danny@librechat.ai>
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Danny Avila
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8af6414e13
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🪟 fix: Surface MCP Initialization Errors (#14529) | ||
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Danny Avila
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7bb6651883
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🛑 feat: Preemptive Steer - Backend Interrupt & Steer (#14518)
* 🛑 feat: Preemptive Steer — server half (Interrupt & Steer, PR 2 of 3) Lets the steer route ask the generating replica to seal its live model stream at the next provider-safe boundary instead of waiting for a tool step. The run is never aborted, job status never changes, the partial answer is kept, and generation resumes in the same assistant message after the injected steer. Consumes the SDK seam in @librechat/agents (danny-avila/agents#335, #346). Transport: IEventTransport gains a fenced emitPreempt/onPreempt pair beside abort. RedisEventTransport fans PREEMPT out on the SAME events channel and subscription (no new connection, key, or subscribe call); onPreempt returns a registration-scoped unsubscribe with the same replacement-safe state-identity guard onAbort uses. InMemory implements neither — single-process preempt lives entirely in the runtime set. Runtime state: RuntimeJobState carries the per-generation request set, createdAt-fenced and capped at STEER_QUEUE_MAX_DEPTH, plus a bounded `cleared` tombstone so a late cross-replica arm cannot resurrect a request whose steer already drained. registerPreemptSubscription mirrors the abort registration's double fence (runtime identity + generation createdAt); releaseAbortSubscription retires BOTH listeners and the armed set, so every terminal path drops preempt state for free. Public surface: requestPreempt (arm + fenced publish, never a rejection surface, never touches job status), isPreemptRequested (O(1) level-triggered poll), noteSteersRemoved (drain/cancel bookkeeping + fenced clear), clearPreemptRequests (empty-boundary disarm). One drain body, two boundaries: createSteerDrainHook (PostToolBatch) and createSteerPreemptBoundaryHook (PreemptBoundary) share drainAndBuildInjections, so the two injection sites cannot drift — the SDK's provider-safety argument rests on identical HumanMessage shapes. The shared body builds injections incrementally under a swallow-all catch (a mid-loop throw still injects what was applied — those parts are already persisted), clears preempt requests in finally, and disarms the generation when a boundary drains nothing. Request path: POST /chat/steer accepts preempt: true. The guard ladder is unchanged in order and in every status code. A preempt request is NEVER a rejection reason — without the capability the steer still enqueues and the 202 echoes preempt: false. Armed strictly after a successful enqueue; cancel disarms. The capability is read from the OWNING replica's recorded `preemptCapable` rather than the route replica's own SDK probe, so a rolling deploy cannot label a steer "interrupting" that the older owner will only inject at a tool step. Durable label: SteerQueueItem.preempt → TPendingSteer.preempt, so a parked/claimed/replayed chip keeps its wording. Run wiring: createRun registers the PreemptBoundary hook and threads RunConfig.preemption, both gated on isSteerPreemptSupported() — a separate probe from isSteeringSupported(), so the client affordance can never arm against an SDK that only injects at tool boundaries. buildSteerWiring builds both hooks from one shared closures object, so preemption survives HITL pause/resume for free. Honest finalization: an empty preempt boundary persists and emits with unfinished: true — the same contract an abort gets — re-marked explicitly because BaseClient has already saved the row as unfinished: false by that point. Not changed: no new job status, store method, Lua, SSE event type, endpoint, or authorization surface. abortJob, completeJob, transitionStatus, closeAndDrainSteers, getResumeState, emitChunk, applySteerPart and the whole abort path are untouched. Tests: 120 packages/api steering specs (preempt lifecycle, tombstone, fences, caps, terminal release, both-boundary drain parity, level-triggered poll, request/cancel arming, owner-capability degradation) plus 5 in api for buildSteerWiring gating, and 2 Redis-gated cross-replica transport specs. * 🔒 fix: Codex round 2 — evict tombstones, scope the empty-boundary disarm, honest resumes All four server findings were fresh consequences of the round-1 fixes, which is the review doing exactly what it should. - Tombstone cap refused new entries instead of evicting. Every drained or cancelled steer is tombstoned, not just preempting ones, so a generation that processed 20 steers exhausted the set and the late-arm race resurfaced silently. Now evicts oldest-first (Set iteration is insertion-ordered), with the budget named PREEMPT_TOMBSTONE_MAX rather than an inline expression. - The empty-boundary disarm I added in round 1 wiped the generation's ENTIRE armed set. A second steer can enqueue and arm between the atomic drain returning empty and the disarm running — that arm is backed by a live, uninjected queue item and must survive. The drain now snapshots the armed ids BEFORE draining (getArmedPreemptIds) and clearPreemptRequests takes an explicit id list instead of clearing everything. - HITL resume finalized with a hardcoded unfinished: false. The boundary hook is re-registered on resume via buildSteerWiring, so a resumed segment can end on an empty preempt boundary exactly like a fresh one; finalizeResumedTurn now reads getPreemptStats() and the halt reason, matching the normal request path. - Ownership moves on resume, so the job's recorded preemptCapable must describe the replica that will actually generate. Refreshed before resumeCompletion; a job created on a capable replica that resumes on an older one during a rolling deploy no longer acknowledges steers as interrupting. Tests: +3 (scoped disarm sparing a post-snapshot arm, oldest-first tombstone eviction, id-list disarm). 122 packages/api steering specs green. * 🚨 fix: Codex round 3 — deserialize preemptCapable from Redis (feature was dead under Redis) The P1 here is the most consequential defect in the whole feature, and it was introduced by round 1's own capability fix. - `RedisJobStore.serializeJob` writes booleans generically, so `preemptCapable` reached Redis — but `deserializeJob` is an EXPLICIT field map and had no line for it. Every `getJob()` therefore dropped the flag, `job.metadata.preemptCapable` was always undefined, and `handleSteerRequest` computed `preemptArmed: false` unconditionally. Interrupt & steer would have silently degraded to ordinary tool-boundary steering in EVERY Redis deployment — i.e. the feature shipping as a no-op in production while passing every in-memory test. Now deserialized, with a round-trip assertion in the metadata spec that fails (`Received: undefined`) against the unfixed store. - The resume capability refresh moved from just-before `resumeCompletion` to immediately after `approvals.resolve` claims the run. That call already flips the job back to `running`, so the steer route accepts requests from that instant; leaving the refresh 135 lines later (across the whole client reconstruction) left a real window where a steer read the PREVIOUS owner's capability. Not the fully atomic transition Codex suggested — that reaches into the approvals Lua — but it shrinks the window from seconds to one await, which is proportionate for a label-accuracy issue. Refuted: "avoid triggering preemption inside subagents". The premise — that the run-wide poll can seal a subagent stream — does not hold against the shipped SDK. Child graphs are constructed with `subagentScope: true` (SubagentExecutor) and `preemption` is NOT propagated into child inputs, while `canClaimPreemptSeal()` requires `!subagentScope && preemption != null`. Both conditions fail independently, so a subagent can never claim a seal and the boundary cannot fire with `agentId` set. The `input.agentId != null` guard in the hook is defensive depth, not the thing standing between us and the described failure. 140 packages/api specs green. * 🔁 fix: Codex round 4 — re-arm durable interrupt steers when resume moves owners - An arm lives only in the owning replica's runtime plus a transient pub/sub message, while the steer's `preempt` flag is durable on the queue item. A HITL resume landing on a different replica therefore started with an empty armed set and a poll stuck false, so an interrupt the user had already been ACKed for silently waited for an ordinary tool boundary. New `GenerationJobManager.rearmQueuedPreempts` rebuilds the armed set by peeking the durable queue (fenced on the generation) and re-arming every item flagged `preempt`; resume calls it right after claiming. Safe by construction: every item peeked is still queued, so no drained steer can be resurrected. - Capability-refresh failure now logs at error rather than warn, but deliberately does NOT fail the resume — see the reply on that thread. Tests: +2 (rebuild from queue arms only the flagged item and reports the count; a stale generation arms nothing). 124 packages/api steering specs green. * 📡 fix: Codex round 5 — acknowledge only what was actually armed - A cross-replica arm was fire-and-forget: `emitPreempt` logged its own publish failure and `requestPreempt` returned void, so the route answered `preempt: true` even when the owner never armed a poll. The steer still injected at the next tool boundary, but the chip claimed an interrupt that could not happen — and unlike HITL resume, an ordinary running generation had no durable reconciliation to recover it. `emitPreempt` now resolves to the subscriber count and rejects on failure; `requestPreempt` is async and returns whether the arm truly landed (owned locally, or delivered to at least one subscriber). The 202 reports THAT rather than what was asked for, so the chip relabels to ordinary steering exactly as it does for a capability-degraded deployment. Errors are swallowed into `false` — an unarmed interrupt is a downgrade, never a failed steer. - The owner capability is re-read immediately before enqueue rather than reused from the top of the guard ladder. `checkAgentAccess` and file resolution are awaits, so a request can span an entire HITL pause/resume that moves ownership to a replica with different capability and rewrites that very flag. Only paid for by requests that actually asked to interrupt. Tests: +3 (not-armed when the publish reaches nobody; armed when this replica owns the generation; a throwing publish downgrades instead of propagating). 127 packages/api steering specs green. * 🎯 fix: Codex round 6 — real ownership, confirmed disarms, and a CI regression of my own Three review findings plus three CI failures the round-5 commit caused. Review: - Ownership came from `runtimeState`, which a cross-replica `getJob` populates with a FACADE runtime on any replica that merely read the job. Matching `createdAt` therefore proved only "we looked at this job", so a non-owner could arm nothing and report success. Ownership now comes from `ownedJobs`, the actual owner map. - `armPreemptIds` returns how many ids it accepted, and a local arm is only reported as armed when one was. A tombstoned id (its steer drained at an ordinary boundary mid-request) no longer answers `preempt: true` for an interrupt that cannot happen. - The cancel disarm is awaited. A dropped clear is worse than a dropped arm: the owner keeps a level-triggered request for a steer that no longer exists, seals its next chunk and truncates an unrelated answer. The boundary drain's own call stays non-blocking — there the owner is local, so the disarm is already effective and awaiting the informational publish would only delay injection. - Subscriber count is NOT read as proof of owner receipt: the count includes this replica's own facade subscription. A successful publish reports armed, a rejected one does not. Documented rather than papered over — see the acknowledgement-semantics note on the PR. CI regressions from round 5, all mine: - `registerPreemptSubscription` was AWAITED at both runtime-init sites, so job creation blocked on a second Redis channel subscription and hung when that subscribe was slow. Abort is awaited because a missed abort strands a run; a missed preempt only degrades that steer to the next tool boundary, so it now registers without gating createJob. - Two api specs mocked `@librechat/api` without the newly imported `isSteerPreemptSupported`, so the call threw before createJob; and one exact-match assertion needed the new `preemptCapable` metadata field. - My own Redis integration spec asserted arm-before-clear ordering, which two publishes carry no guarantee of — the receiving tombstone exists precisely because of that. Now asserts delivery and payload fidelity, order-independent. 158 packages/api specs, 27 api specs green. * 🧭 fix: Codex round 7 — settle the acknowledgement semantics (Option A) Round 7's second finding is the incoherence I flagged on the PR: the route persisted `preempt: true` on the durable queue item while returning `preempt: false` when delivery could not be confirmed. Those two then disagreed, and `rearmQueuedPreempts` trusts the DURABLE one — so a resumed owner would honour an interrupt the client had explicitly been told degraded to ordinary steering. Rather than patch the disagreement, this settles the meaning: `preempt` in the 202 means "queued as an interrupt request", NOT "a seal is guaranteed". It mirrors `SteerQueueItem.preempt` exactly, so the response, the durable record, and the resume-time re-arm can never disagree. The gates that ARE knowable stay — the owner's recorded capability and a successful enqueue. Everything past that degrades to the documented fallback of injecting at the next tool boundary. A route cannot synchronously know whether another replica will seal: proving it needs a correlated request/response over pub-sub, and even that only proves the owner heard, not that it is still streaming when the arm lands. Four rounds of tightening this boolean each surfaced a narrower case; the sequence does not converge, so the invariant is now "the flag describes the durable decision" and an unconfirmed arm logs a warning instead of rewriting the answer. Also from this round: a failed disarm publish is retried once and its outcome reported. `handleSteerCancel` keeps `removed: true` — the steer really did leave the queue, and saying otherwise would make the client re-show a chip for a steer that can never arrive — and adds `disarmed: false` so the residual risk is visible rather than swallowed. Damage stays bounded regardless: the empty-boundary self-clear disarms the generation after a single seal. Tests: +1 pinning the response/durable-flag invariant. 159 packages/api specs green. * 🧹 fix: Codex round 8 — remove the unverifiable disarm signal Round 8 found the same over-promise on the disarm side that round 7 corrected on the arm side, so this applies the same answer rather than patching around it. The `disarmed: false` field added in round 7 was both unreliable and unused: a resolved publish is not proof the owner heard it (the delivery count includes this replica's own facade subscription), and it was never threaded into `CancelSteerResponse` or read by any client. A signal that claims a certainty the transport cannot provide is worse than no signal — it invites callers to trust it. Removed from the response. The retry stays, because it genuinely reduces the failure rate, and `noteSteersRemoved` still returns whether the publish succeeded FOR LOGGING, now documented explicitly as "published without error", not "the owner disarmed". Disarm is best effort with a bounded, self-healing failure: if the clear is lost the owner seals once, the empty-boundary self-clear disarms the generation, and the turn is persisted `unfinished: true` rather than silently truncated. Tightening that further needs a correlated request/response over pub-sub with a timeout — noted on the PR as the deliberate boundary of this design rather than an oversight. 130 packages/api steering specs green. * 🧽 fix: Codex round 9 — spend snapshot arms on nonempty drains too The round-6 scoping fix only cleared the pre-drain snapshot when the drain came back EMPTY. On a nonempty drain the `finally` cleared just the drained ids, so a stale arm — typically a cancel whose cross-replica clear was lost — survived the boundary. It would then immediately seal the continuation meant to answer the steer that had just been injected, and land on an empty boundary as `preempt_incomplete`: the interrupt appears to work, and the answer to it is truncated. A boundary that runs has spent its seal, so everything armed at snapshot time is spent whether or not it came back from the drain. The `finally` now clears the union of the snapshot and the drained ids. Arms that land AFTER the snapshot are still spared — their queue items are live and uninjected, which is the property round 6 added. Also fixes an api-workspace CI failure of mine: `resume.spec.js` stubs `GenerationJobManager` wholesale, and the round-3/4 resume work added two calls (`updateMetadata`, `rearmQueuedPreempts`) the stub did not define, so 34 specs threw. Stub extended. Tests: +2 (a nonempty drain clears a stale snapshot arm; a nonempty drain spares an arm that landed mid-drain). Counterfactually verified — the stale-arm spec fails against the unfixed drain. 132 packages/api specs, 60 resume specs green. * fix: never let a failed preempt subscription reject into the void registerPreemptSubscription is called detached at both sites, so a rejected Redis SUBSCRIBE became an unhandled rejection — process-fatal under Node's default --unhandled-rejections=throw. The comment already promised this path merely degrades steering; it now does. Swallowed and logged inside the registration rather than at each call site, so a future third caller cannot reintroduce the trap. Losing the channel costs this generation's cross-replica preempts, not the server: same-replica arming is runtime state and still works, and remote arms fall back to the next tool boundary. Verified counterfactually — the new spec surfaces SUBSCRIBE failed as an unhandled rejection against the unfixed registration. * docs: state the real blast radius of a failed preempt subscription LibreChat's own entrypoints install a global unhandledRejection handler that logs and keeps serving, so the escaping rejection this guards was never fatal to this server — only to another consumer of @librechat/api that installs no handler. The fix stands either way; the comment just should not overstate what it prevents. * test: cover the cross-replica preempt hop with two manager instances Every other preempt test runs against a single manager, so the hop that actually carries an interrupt in production had no coverage: the steer POST lands on whichever replica the balancer picks, which is usually not the one generating. Non-owner publishes, owner arms, owner's level-triggered poll flips — none of that was exercised end to end. Two GenerationJobManagerClass instances are a faithful replica pair here. runtimeState and ownedJobs are private instance fields, there is no module-level mutable state between them, and createStreamServices duplicates a dedicated subscriber connection per call, so separate OS processes would exercise the same objects over the same Redis. Both assertions verified counterfactually against real Redis: - Deleting the preemptCapable deserialization in RedisJobStore fails this with 'Expected: true, Received: undefined' — the exact P1 that shipped past every in-memory test and would have made the feature a silent no-op on every Redis deployment. - Dropping the non-owner arm publish fails it with 'Received: false'. * test: remove the fixed sleeps and vacuity from the cross-replica preempt test Codex round 11, both findings, both on the test I added last commit. P2 — the 300ms waits were load-bearing. Redis pub/sub never replays and the owner's SUBSCRIBE is detached, so on a slow CI worker the publish could land before anyone was listening and the test would fail against correct code. Now it republishes until the owner's state converges, which is safe because arms and clears are idempotent set writes keyed by steerId. Side effect: the tests got ~10x faster (85ms/57ms vs 929ms/606ms) since they finish on delivery rather than on a timer. P3 — afterEach destroyed only the transports, leaving each manager alive in its own cleanup-interval closure, still working against a dead transport. Now tracks the managers and awaits destroy(), which disposes the job store and its timer too. Matches how the rest of this file cleans up. Fixing the sleeps exposed a third problem codex did not flag: the stale-arm test could pass vacuously, because an undelivered arm and a fenced one look identical. It now brackets the stale publish between two control arms — the first proves the owner is listening before the stale one is sent, the second proves it has had its chance to arrive. Verified counterfactually against real Redis, and stable over 5 runs: - dropping the preemptCapable deserialization fails with 'Received: undefined' - dropping the non-owner arm publish times out both tests - removing the generation fence fails the stale test with ["control-before", "steer-stale", "control-after"] — which also confirms the bracketing orders as intended rather than by luck * fix: gate interrupt on the OWNER's capability alone, not the route's Codex round 12. The comment above this gate already said 'the OWNER's recorded capability, not this replica's probe' — and then the code ANDed in isSteerPreemptSupported(), which is exactly this replica's probe. The contradiction dates to the original commit; round 6 made the gate owner-scoped and wrote that comment without removing the local conjunct. The route never seals. It enqueues and publishes an arm, neither of which touches the SDK, so during a rolling deploy a steer landing on an un-upgraded replica silently lost its interrupt even though the owner could seal. When the route IS the owner the probe is redundant anyway: the flag it would consult is the one this process wrote at createJob. The real degradation path is unchanged and still tested — an owner that recorded no capability relabels to an ordinary steer. The test that pinned the local probe asserted an impossible same-replica state (capable metadata plus an incapable local SDK, when the metadata is written from that probe); it now pins the mixed-SDK direction instead, and fails with 'Expected: true, Received: false' if the probe is put back. * fix: reconcile arms at handover, and stop holding the 202 on a publish Codex round 13, two of three findings. P2 — rearmQueuedPreempts only ever ADDED. A replica that merely read the job still installs a facade runtime and subscribes, so it can accept an arm and then miss the best-effort clear that follows the drain. HITL resume promotes that facade to owner, the union keeps the orphan, and the first resumed stream seals on a steer no longer in the queue, drains nothing, and truncates the resumed answer as preempt_incomplete. acquireResumedJobOwnership only sets ownedJobs, so nothing else was clearing it. The durable queue is the sole authority at a handover: arms it does not back are now disarmed and tombstoned, so an in-flight publish cannot revive them either. Worth recording that my own independent review raised this and my verifier refuted it. Codex found it separately; two reviewers converging should have outweighed one refutation. P2 — the route awaited the arm publish before answering. The 202 reports capability, not delivery, so the await could not change the response; it only exposed the caller to Redis latency after the queue item was already durable. A client that times out and retries mints a second steer while the first stays queued, injecting the same instruction twice, whereas a lost publish merely takes the tool-boundary fallback. Detached, with both outcomes logged. All three tests verified counterfactually: union-only rearm fails the two new handover specs, and re-awaiting the publish hangs the stalled-publish spec until jest kills it. * fix: snapshot arms before reading the queue at handover Codex round 14 — a regression from my own round-13 fix, and a worse failure than the one it corrected. Round 13 read the durable queue first, then tombstoned any armed id the snapshot did not back. But approvals.resolve reopens steering before reconciliation runs, so another replica can commit a preempt steer and publish its arm while the peek is in flight. That arm is then present locally but absent from a snapshot taken before the steer existed, so a LIVE interrupt the route already acknowledged got dropped — and tombstoned, which blocks the re-arm, making it unrecoverable rather than merely late. Fixed by inverting the two reads rather than by locking or paying a second round trip. A steer is durably enqueued BEFORE its arm is published, so any id in an arms-first snapshot was already queued when it was armed, and the later peek must observe it unless it has since drained — which is exactly the orphan this reconciliation exists to drop. Arms landing after the snapshot are simply not candidates. Also re-checks runtime identity across the await, since the generation can be replaced while the queue read is in flight. New spec injects a steer + arm during the peek and verifies it survives; against the round-13 ordering it fails with Received array: []. * fix: bound the cancel disarm wait and fence enqueue to its generation Codex round 15. P2 — the cancel awaited its disarm publish unbounded. ioredis queues commands during an outage rather than rejecting, so that await could hang for the length of the outage with the steer ALREADY durably cancelled; a client that gives up then treats the cancel as failed and restores a chip for a steer that can never produce an applied event. Every successful cancel publishes, so ordinary steers were exposed too, not only preemptive ones. Now bounded at 1s, with the publish continuing behind it — its retry and logging are unchanged, it is just no longer in front of the response. This is the sibling of round 13's arm-publish finding; I fixed one path and left this one. P3 — enqueue was not fenced to the generation the capability decision was made against. The access checks, file resolution and owner re-read are all awaits, so the run can be replaced before the enqueue: the item then lands on the REPLACEMENT queue while the durable preempt flag and the arm still name the previous epoch, the arm is fenced out at the owner, and the 202 promises an interrupt that cannot happen. enqueueSteer now takes an expected generation, mirroring drain/peek, and the Redis path enforces it inside STEER_ENQUEUE_LUA so the check is atomic with the push rather than racing it. All three new specs verified counterfactually, including the Lua guard against real Redis (removing it returns 1 where -1 is required). * fix: fence the steer to its authorized generation, bound resume setup, keep preempt when Redis parks Codex round 16, all three findings. P2 — round 15 fenced the enqueue to owner.createdAt, the RE-READ job. Every guard above it (ownership, tenant, paused-state, agent ACL) ran against the job read at the top, so if the run was replaced during those awaits the fence happily accepted the steer into a generation the request was never authorized against, carrying the wrong agent's metadata. Now rejects on any mismatch between the validated job and the re-read. P2 — resume awaited its steering bookkeeping unbounded, after approvals.resolve had consumed the action and flipped the job to running, and outside the resume lifecycle's own try/finally. .catch does not fire on a promise that never settles, which is what ioredis produces during an outage, so the client times out, its retry gets a 409 for a spent action, and no cleanup runs. Bounded at 1s with the writes finishing in the background. P3 — Redis parks leftover steers inside its terminal-transition Lua, which projects item fields one by one, so preempt was silently dropped and a steer recovered from /chat/status lost its interrupting label. Added to both projections. All three verified counterfactually, two against real Redis. Worth recording that my first version of the generation-mismatch test was VACUOUS — it faked a createdAt matching no live job, so the round-15 enqueue fence rejected it for the wrong reason and the test passed with the guard removed. Rewritten to replace the run for real; it now fails with 'Expected 404, Received 202'. |
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Dustin Healy
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af795be0c2
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🪢 feat: Langfuse Fanout Connection Setting (#14108)
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* feat: encrypt tenant Langfuse secret in admin config Add generic per-field secret encryption to the admin config layer: registered secret paths (langfuse.secretKey) are encrypted with encryptV3 on write and a non-secret fingerprint companion is stored. Admin config reads (base + per principal) redact registered secrets so they are never returned; the fingerprint is kept so the UI can show which key is configured. The Langfuse fanout read path decrypts the tenant secret before export. Adds secretKeyFingerprint to langfuseConfigSchema and tests for the encrypt/redact policy. * fix(api): secure admin config secret handling * fix(api): preserve encrypted langfuse config secrets * fix(api): couple config secret fingerprint deletion * fix(api): read langfuse fanout collector url from env * fix(api): display langfuse secret key hint * fix(api): remove langfuse secret fingerprint breadcrumbs * fix(api): use langfuse destination keys for tenant config * fix(api): remove langfuse config compatibility fallbacks * refactor(api): simplify langfuse secret helpers * refactor(api): simplify langfuse config secret handling * feat: in-app Langfuse connection settings panel Add a discoverable, admin-gated Langfuse connection panel inside LibreChat Settings (Dify-style): enable toggle, host, public key, masked write-only secret, configured-key fingerprint, and a test-connection action. Backed by a dedicated /api/admin/langfuse/connection endpoint that encrypts the secret at rest, returns metadata plus fingerprint on read, and validates credentials. Builds on the per-field encryption and fanout decrypt from the langfuse-config-encryption branch. * refactor: align Langfuse secret field to CustomUserVars pattern Use the established SecretInput plus Set/Unset state pill (com_ui_set/com_ui_unset) from the MCP CustomUserVars UI for the saved-secret state, instead of a bespoke masked input. * fix: drop em dash from saved-secret placeholder * feat: show loading state on Langfuse test connection button * feat: gate in-app Langfuse settings on fanout config and admin role * test: align Langfuse connection spec with SecretInput refactor * feat(langfuse): refine tenant connection controls * fix(admin): refine Langfuse connection verification * fix(langfuse): refine tenant connection settings * fix(langfuse): simplify export enablement controls * fix(langfuse): validate tenant export configuration * fix(langfuse): align startup fanout gate * fix(admin): time out Langfuse verification * fix(ui): rename Langfuse connection setting * fix(admin): enforce Langfuse config capability * feat(langfuse): require explicit tenant export activation * feat(langfuse): support single-tenant connection settings * fix(i18n): remove obsolete integrations label * fix(langfuse): authenticate ingestion verification * fix(langfuse): validate public key independently * fix(langfuse): localize connection errors * perf(config): skip Langfuse checks for non-admins * fix(langfuse): preserve trace sampling for feedback * test(langfuse): fix feedback sampling fixture * fix(langfuse): align secret preview field * fix(langfuse): harden connection settings state * fix(langfuse): preserve trace destination state * fix(langfuse): enforce tenant-wide routing invariants * fix(langfuse): preserve verified connection invariants * fix(langfuse): preserve stable project identity * fix(langfuse): warm project identity asynchronously --------- Co-authored-by: Ravi Kumar L <ravi.lazar@clickhouse.com> Co-authored-by: Danny Avila <danny@librechat.ai> |
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Danny Avila
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cc813f430e
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🎯 feat: Tool Intent Label Capability (tool_intents) (#14499)
* 🎯 feat: Tool Intent Label Capability (tool_intents) Adds the fourth member of the per-tool capability family (defer_loading, allowed_callers, run_in_background): an admin capability AgentCapabilities.tool_intents plus a per-tool tool_options[name].describe_intent flag. Opted-in tools get an optional intent string injected as the FIRST property of their schema — one model-authored sentence per call, streamed to the client as the call's live status label (args already reach the client verbatim, so no new event plumbing). Native host tools (web_search, create_file/edit_file, set_memory/delete_memory, ask_user_question) default on while the capability is enabled; explicit false opts out. SDK-native intent schemas (@librechat/agents coding suite) are recognized and left alone. - packages/api/src/agents/intent.ts: structural sibling of background.ts — first-key non-mutating injection with registry parity (covers deferred/tool_search discovery), eligibility and PTC-only skips, arg read/strip helpers, self-spawn strip for defs and registry, ephemeral/model-spec synthesis with a tool_options merge so the background and intent toggles compose. - handlers.ts: intent runs BEFORE background injection so the label stays the first streamed key when a tool carries both (pinned by test); the arg is stripped before invocation unless the tool's own schema declares it, on both the foreground and background-dispatch paths; PTC target schemas are sanitized like background's. - Capability plumbing through all four routes (endpoint initialize, openai + responses controllers, the exported OpenAI-compatible service) plus handoff discovery and added-convo agents, and the intentToolNames execution channel via configurable. - describe_intent on toolOptionsSchema (all three written-out Zod annotations), ToolOptions, TEphemeralAgent, TModelSpec (+ zod), and data-schemas doc comments (tool_options is Mixed — no migration). - intent.spec.ts: 28 tests cloned from background.spec.ts structure, including the intent+background key-order composition. * 🧯 fix: Codex Review — Opt-Out Strips SDK-Native Intent, Skip mcp_all Placeholders - An explicit describe_intent: false now REMOVES an SDK-native intent property from the definition and registry entry, so the per-tool opt-out actually disables the arg's token cost for tools like web_search that carry the schema natively (SDK bodies tolerate its absence). Previously the early return left the property in place. - synthesizeIntentToolOptions skips lazily-expanded mcp_all placeholders instead of recording options under names that applyIntentLabels' exact-name matching can never match, and documents the limitation (parity with synthesizeBackgroundToolOptions). The P1 about the client not rendering the label is the documented slicing: the UI streaming-label PR follows once #14391's ToolCallGroup changes merge — args already reach the client, so that slice is purely rendering. * 🧯 fix: Codex Re-Review — Label Marker Guard, Capability Kill Switch, Late Defs, Service Threading - removeIntentParam is now marker-guarded (the label contract's opening instruction discriminates it), so an MCP/action tool's own business `intent` parameter is never stripped by an opt-out or the disabled path — previously an explicit false could remove a real, possibly required argument. - New sanitizeIntentLabels pass runs AFTER every registration step (the skill catalog appends its SDK definition post-injection): with tool_intents disabled it strips SDK-native intent labels from all definitions and registry entries, making the capability a real kill switch over their token cost; with it enabled it enforces explicit per-tool opt-outs on late-registered definitions. - ask_user_question removed from the native default-on set: its graph tool is rebuilt in run.ts from its own Zod schema (also the HITL card's wire shape), so definition-level injection never reached the model. Its intent support lands with the HITL slice, which threads the label into the interrupt payload deliberately. - The exported OpenAI-compatible service now threads intentToolNames into the run configurable, so the executor's PTC path can strip host-injected intent schemas on that route like the in-repo controllers do. * 🧯 fix: Codex Round 2 — Post-Skill Injection, PTC Native Strip, Service Boundary, Honest Docs - Intent injection now runs LAST in initializeAgent, after the skill catalog — which both appends its own definition and REPLACES upgraded ones (skill-aware read_file), clobbering an earlier injection while intentToolNames still listed the tool. Injection PREPENDS while background APPENDS, so intent stays the first schema property under the new ordering (pinned by a reverse-order composition test). - The PTC target-schema strip is now marker-guarded strip-ALL: SDK- native intent labels (which are deliberately never in intentToolNames) are removed from sandbox-advertised schemas alongside host-injected ones; business intent params survive. - toolIntentsAvailable on the exported service documents the loader boundary: a custom LoadToolsFn returning only structured instances bypasses definition/registry injection and sanitize by construction. - librechat.example.yaml describes tool_intents as backend groundwork with UI rendering in an upcoming release rather than promising a live label today. * 📦 chore: bump `@librechat/agents` to v3.3.6 Brings in the SDK half of tool intent labels (danny-avila/agents#347, #349): intent-first schemas on the coding suite across all three engines, plus web_search / subagent / skill / tool_search, and the outcome / outcome_patch result channel. Activates three host paths that were inert while no SDK tool shipped an `intent` property — verified against the real 3.3.6 schemas: - capability OFF now strips SDK-native labels (a real admin kill switch) - explicit `describe_intent: false` removes them per tool - host injection stays idempotent against an SDK schema, keeping `intent` first and never double-injecting * 🔬 test: Real-Provider Verification for Tool Intent Labels Adds the live check the unit tests structurally cannot perform: whether a real model actually authors the injected arg, places it FIRST, and gives sibling calls to one tool distinct labels. Reuses the existing real-provider harness (in-memory Mongo, seeded user, credential neutralizer) and the existing stdio MCP fixture as a genuine tool, so no external service is involved. - e2e/config/librechat.real.yaml: adds the e2e-memory MCP server and the tool_intents capability, giving the real model something to call. The sibling spec asserts only relative token growth, so the extra schemas do not perturb it. - e2e/playwright.config.real.ts: optional Langfuse passthrough. The LANGFUSE_* keys match the credential-neutralizer pattern and were being blanked before the server booted; they are preserved explicitly, read from the invoking environment only, and never written to the generated config. - e2e/specs/real/tool-intents.spec.ts: two facts stored in one turn, both through the same tool, asserting intent is the first key of each call and that the two labels differ. Args are read from persistence rather than the DOM deliberately — no UI renders the label yet, and persistence is what a reloaded conversation and the trace both read. First run against claude-haiku-4-5 produced 'Recording the location of the OAuth callback router' and 'Recording the location of the MCP connection pool configuration' — distinct, first-position, no tool name. Also updates tool-intent-spec.md: records the 3.3.7 removal of the tense verb map with the evidence that motivated it, the trimmed description and the marker's role as an API, and a new mandatory requirement that client-side label rendering be gated on a server-sent signal rather than the presence of an intent key (a tool's own business 'intent' parameter would otherwise render as a status label). * 📦 chore: bump `@librechat/agents` to v3.3.7 and dedupe the intent contract Picks up danny-avila/agents#353: the tense verb map is gone (a bare intent now displays unchanged, with completion carried by UI state), the model-facing description is trimmed 502 → 289 chars, and both the marker and the description are exported. Stops redeclaring the SDK contract here: - INTENT_LABEL_MARKER is imported instead of duplicated as a string literal. Every removal path in this module keys on it, and a local copy that drifted from the SDK's would make them all stop recognizing SDK-native labels — failing OPEN, with labels left in schemas and per-tool opt-outs silently inert. - INTENT_DESCRIPTION is imported too, so host-injected tools and SDK-native tools present the model with one identical instruction. Keeping the old local copy would also have meant host-injected tools still paying ~126 tokens per schema while SDK tools paid ~72. Verified live against real Anthropic after the trim: two sibling calls to one MCP tool produced 'Storing the OAuth callback router file location' and 'Storing the MCP connection pool configuration file location' — first-position and distinct, so the shorter description holds compliance. |
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Danny Avila
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7b6900d556
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🏷️ feat: Activity Groups With Fast-Model Headers (#14391)
* ✨ feat: Activity Groups with Fast-Model Labels Groups each contiguous block of reasoning + tool calls into a collapsible unit headed by a fast-model label (claude.ai-style hierarchy), off the critical path: a PostToolBatch hook claims a live content slot at the batch boundary (steering index-offset pattern), renders a deterministic counts phrase instantly, and swaps in the generated label ~1s later while the next model call streams. Labels are UI-only — stripped before the SDK formatter and skipped in the legacy formatter — and reach live clients via a dedicated on_activity_label SSE event (live/replay/pending paths). Grouping preserves legacy rendering byte-for-byte when no label part is present. Generation bridges to Run.generateActivityLabel() when the SDK ships it (session-grouped Langfuse tracing); falls back to a direct call today. Env-gated: ACTIVITY_LABELS_POC=true, ACTIVITY_LABEL_MODEL. * 🧷 fix: Address Codex and Copilot Review Findings for Activity Labels - Settle in-flight label fills (bounded 3s) before finalization on both the main and resume paths, so a label resolving during the final batch still reaches the durable log and saved message. - Overlay on_activity_label chunks in RedisJobStore content reconstruction (splice path last-wins per index; replay path chronological overwrite), matching steer handling. - Wire activity labels into the HITL resume createRun so post-resume batches keep claiming slots. - Guard against out-of-order publishes: fill() awaits the claim emit before emitting the resolved label, and the client applier ignores a stale pending placeholder once a resolved label is present. - Stamp the batch's groupId onto label parts so parallel-column runs place them inside their group instead of filtering them out. - Localize the counts fallback phrase (10 keys, singular/plural) through useLocalize across chat rendering and exports. - Type the hook with Providers/ClientOptions instead of stringly types; drop the unknown cast in the spec; add a dedicated rAF retry ref for label events with effect cleanup. * 🛡️ fix: Address Independent Review — Abort, Usage, Lane Context, Redis Test - Propagate the run abort signal into label generation (both wiring call sites; runtime combines host + dispatch signals with the timeout) so a user abort cancels in-flight label calls instead of paying to timeout. - Record label-call usage like titles: the SDK bridge aggregates via chainOptions callbacks, the fallback path via a per-generation callback factory; both feed recordCollectedUsage under context 'activity-label'. - Scope block-context capture: reasoning collection stops at the previous block's label part and filters by executingAgentId, so consecutive or parallel batches can no longer bleed another block's thinking into the payload; intent text still scans past labels (persists across batches). - Forward the effective charLimit to the SDK call so host and SDK prompts agree (SDK default aligned to 600 in agents#327). - Add a Redis integration test proving last-write-wins reconstruction of on_activity_label chunks per claimed index. - Rebased onto main: only the two activity commits replay (the nine steering commits belonged to the old base branch), zero conflicts, steering suites green. * 📐 refactor: Move Activity-Label Wiring to TypeScript, Address Codex Round 2 - [P1] Slot claiming, lane stamping, emit ordering, context capture, and settle tracking now live in packages/api (createActivityLabelWiring + captureActivityBlockContext); client.js is a thin closure wrapper. - Register the activity-label hook BEFORE the steer drain so a steer draining at the same batch boundary cannot flush the tool block and orphan the label outside its group. - Resolve request-based header placeholders in resolveActivityLabelLLM (titleConvo parity) so metadata-keyed proxies work on label calls. - Trim labels centrally before filling so whitespace-only output from either generation path keeps the deterministic counts fallback. * 🧭 fix: Codex Round 3 — Capture Order, Shared Strip, Token Estimator, Hide Filter - Capture block context BEFORE pushing the label part: the scan stops at ACTIVITY_LABEL parts, so post-push capture hit the just-inserted label and silently collected no reasoning excerpts (regression test added). - Share stripActivityLabelParts from packages/api and apply it in the Responses and OpenAI-compatible controllers, closing the replay leak for entry points still running SDKs without the formatter skip. - Exclude activity_label parts from the fallback response-token estimator (UI-only parts must not inflate no-usage provider billing). - Keep label parts explicitly under hide_sequential_outputs — they summarize exactly the outputs that mode hides. * 🔁 fix: Codex Round 4 — Resume Gap, Delta Flush, Agent-Scoped Intent, Token Counter - Synthesize on_activity_label events for labels claimed or filled in the snapshot→subscribe window (the publish is fire-and-forget, so Redis-mode reconnects missed them). Feature-gated so the default path adds no content re-read; the client applier already ignores duplicates. - Flush queued deltas before applying a label part, matching the pending- action and steer appliers — without it the handler read a stale message cache and syncStepMessage pushed a pre-delta copy back. - Skip another agent's tail text when resolving intent, so parallel runs cannot seed a label prompt with a sibling agent's narration. - Exclude activity_label parts from countFormattedMessageTokens (the agent-path counter), not just the legacy BaseClient one. * 🏗️ refactor: Codex Round 5 — Extract Label Host Logic, Report Usage, Icon Strip - Move provider/model resolution, usage-metadata mapping, and the settle loop into packages/api (activityLabels/host.ts); client.js keeps only thin delegations, per the repo's TypeScript-implementation convention. - Fold label usage into the response rollup with an 'activity-label' tag (subagent precedent) so metadata.usage and the live cost gauge account for it; tagged, so it stays out of PRIMARY usage/context pairing. - Narrow tool metadata once in ToolCallGroup so THINK parts in a labeled block no longer render phantom generic icons in the stacked strip. - Import the activity-label helpers by deep path in GenerationJobManager: the package barrel now reaches provider-config/cache modules that import back into the stream layer, and the cycle broke suite loading. Declined: resetting steerOffsetState before HITL resume — resume builds a FRESH AgentClient via initializeClient (initialize.js:978), so the offset is already zero; the seed wrapper alone accounts for pre-pause parts. * 🚦 fix: Codex Round 6 — Stream Label Usage, Close Late Fills - Emit an on_token_usage chunk for label calls (sink push alone left the live session gauge blind); retained in pendingSubagentEmits so job cleanup cannot race the persist, tagged 'activity-label' as before. - Close the label scope when settle times out: the wiring gates fill() on isClosed and the client fires a label-scoped AbortController, so a straggling generation can neither mutate a saved response nor emit into a job whose runtime is gone. The controller also chains to the run signal, so a user abort still cancels label work. * 🩹 fix: Repair CI — Package Typecheck and Module Mocks Local runs covered the client tsconfig and jest, but never packages/api's own tsconfig, so nine type errors in the extracted host module shipped. - Type host.ts against the real contracts: ServerRequest, EndpointDbMethods, AppConfig from @librechat/data-schemas, IUser for createSafeUser, and a MaybeAzureConfig view for the azure instance-name probe and configuration. - Widen resolveConfigHeaders' llmConfig to Partial<RunLLMConfig>: it only reads the three provider header carriers, so auxiliary generations with a bare ClientOptions can resolve headers without assembling a run config. Type-only widening; every existing caller still satisfies it. - Add stripActivityLabelParts to the @librechat/api mock in the OpenAI and Responses controller specs — those mocks enumerate exports, so a new import read as undefined and threw before the assertions ran. - Use the real activity-label helpers in the ToolCallGroup spec's ~/utils mock; stubbing them out would hide the header logic under test. * ⚙️ feat: Configure Activity Labels via librechat.yaml, Drop Env Vars Replaces the ACTIVITY_LABELS_POC / ACTIVITY_LABEL_MODEL env gate with per-endpoint settings, following the title options convention rather than a top-level block — each endpoint picks its own cheap label model. - Add activity, activityModel, activityEndpoint, activityPrompt, activityMaxPerRun, and activityCharLimit to the endpoint schema, and to the endpoints.all pick list (enumerated, so 'all:' would otherwise drop them silently). - resolveActivityConfig reads them with title-style precedence: endpoints.all > named endpoint > custom endpoint config. - Model precedence is now activityModel > titleModel > the agent's model. activityEndpoint runs labels on another endpoint's credentials, with titleConvo's fallback-on-unknown-name behavior. - Thread activityPrompt/MaxPerRun/CharLimit through the wiring into the hook and the SDK bridge; they were hardcoded defaults. - The resume gap-repair gate keyed on the env var; it now keys on the snapshot actually containing label parts, so deployments without the feature still perform no extra content read. - Document the fields in librechat.example.yaml; add host.spec.ts covering precedence, custom-endpoint fallback, and opt-out. * 📝 refactor: Rename Enable Flag to activityLabel, Document Schema Inheritance - Rename the boolean from `activity` to `activityLabel`, matching the titleConvo/titleModel shape: a verb-object toggle whose prefix matches its modifiers (activityModel, activityPrompt, ...). `activity: true` alone read ambiguously — it could mean tracking or logging activity. - Document the two endpoint-schema inheritance paths, which behave oppositely and are ~900 lines apart: * `endpoints.all` omits from baseEndpointSchema, so new options are inherited automatically — nothing to maintain. * `azureEndpointSchema` enumerates via .pick(), so a new option is silently unavailable on Azure endpoints until listed there. The activity block now carries a pointer to the Azure caveat. * 🔍 fix: Address Codex Findings on the Config Rework - Pass the matched custom-endpoint config into the label gate. Custom endpoints live in the `endpoints.custom` ARRAY, so without it every custom endpoint resolved as disabled — including the example this PR added to librechat.example.yaml. - Give label usage a unique `runId:seq`. Label usage is billed but never appended to `collectedUsage`, so its length was static: every label event reused the last primary usage's pair and collided with itself, and the client dedupes on exactly that. - Attach `cost` to label usage when `interface.contextCost` is on; aggregateEmittedUsage treats coverage as all-or-nothing, so an event without it suppressed the whole response's cost. - Honor `activityPrompt` on the direct fallback path, not just the SDK bridge — it previously always used the built-in instruction. - Seed the per-response label cap from labels already on the response so a HITL resume cannot mint a fresh quota after every approval. - Reconcile label gaps on resume via a durable per-job `activityLabels` flag instead of probing the snapshot: the FIRST label of a run can be claimed inside the snapshot->subscribe window, which the old signal missed. The flag is read from a job record already fetched there, so runs without the feature still add no content read. - Auto-collapse labeled single-tool groups; one-call batches are common in agent runs and rendering them expanded defeats the grouping. * 🎯 fix: Correct Label Usage Seq, Cross-Endpoint Pricing, Close Scopes - Give label usage a NEGATIVE seq namespace. The previous fix was wrong: seq is a position in `collectedUsage` (push, then emit with the new length), so sink-length + array-length still lands on a real position — primary emits 1, the label computes 2, the next primary also emits 2. Labels have no position at all (billed separately, never appended), so they now occupy a namespace positional sequences cannot reach. The client key is a string used for Set membership, so the sign is inert. - Price cross-endpoint labels with the LABEL endpoint's token config: resolveActivityLabelModel now returns the resolved endpointTokenConfig, and both the streamed cost and recordCollectedUsage use it instead of the agent endpoint's rates. - Make close state per-wiring rather than per-client. A HITL resume rebuilds the wiring, and resetting a shared flag re-opened closures from the pre-pause segment whose provider call ignored the abort; settle now closes every retained scope, past generations included. * 🎯 fix: Make the Activity Header Say Something the Cards Cannot The header read "ran 1 command" next to a card already labeled "Code" — it restated the UI beneath it instead of adding to it. Two causes, both about content rather than timing: - A deterministic tool-type tally was the primary display and also fed the prompt, so the best case was a tally and the worst case was a tally dressed as prose. Removed from the metadata, the prompt, the part type, and the client. - The instruction only ever reached the fallback path. The wiring passed a prompt only when was configured, so the preferred SDK path silently used the published package default. The wiring now always supplies one and the hook forwards it on both paths. The register is rewritten around what the cards cannot show: past-tense git-commit-subject, leading with the distinctive noun, outcome over attempt, tool names and counts and arguments explicitly forbidden. The batch entries are labeled as reference material so the model stops transcribing them. Claiming a slot no longer emits. The slot still reserves its index so streamed parts never collide, but with nothing to say there is nothing to render: until a description exists the block looks exactly as it does without the feature. * 🧹 fix: Drop the Localize Hook Left Unused by the Counts Removal * ✅ test: Add Activity-Label e2e Coverage with a Recording Label Server Activity labels are the one model call a mock run does not already fake: fake-model.js swaps the GRAPH model via overrideTestModel, while run.generateActivityLabel() calls the endpoint resolved client options over HTTP. The custom endpoints already point baseURL at 127.0.0.1:8889, so serving that port exercises the real path with no production seam. fake-label-server.js answers it in both JSON and SSE form, records each prompt, and can inject blank/error responses. Recording is what lets the spec assert the CONTRACT rather than the rendering: that this repo register and the tool OUTPUTS actually reach the model. That is the bug class that produced unusable labels before, and rendered text looks identical whether or not the instruction arrived. Labels get a dedicated endpoint (Mock Provider E). A labeled block auto-collapses even at one tool call, which hides the tool cards other specs assert on -- enabling this on a shared endpoint broke steering.spec.ts. Provider D is the unlabeled control. Request-count assertions are scoped to a per-test token: a 5xx label response is retried by the provider client, and a retry can land after the next test has reset the server. * 🩹 fix: Address Review Findings on Activity-Label Indexing and Pricing Replay index (P1). Reserving the slot only in server memory left no event for it, so a cross-instance replay rebuilt content as [tool, hole, later], compacted the hole away, and the fill for the reserved index landed on the following part and overwrote it. The claim now publishes the empty, pending part so the index is real for every consumer, and fill publishes even when generation returned nothing so the client cannot stay pending. It stays invisible: an empty label still DELIMITS its batch in groupSequentialToolCalls but is not attached as the header, so grouping does not re-shuffle when the text lands and the block renders exactly as it does with the feature off. Edited-response index (P1). Edit-and-resubmit replays the kept prefix and the server indexes only new content, so run steps offset by that prefix. Labels are claimed in the same space and now take the identical shift; without it a label could land inside the prefix and overwrite it. Redis flag. deserializeJob never read activityLabels back, so every Redis reload left it undefined and resume skipped label gap reconciliation. Executing agent. RunActivityLabelOptions.agentId selects the executing agent tracing metadata AND its tool-output redaction policy; omitting it let a handoff be redacted under the default agent configuration. Label pricing. An undefined endpointTokenConfig is meaningful for a built-in label endpoint (priced from the shared table), so the nullish fallback billed those labels at a custom primary rates. Inherit only when the label runs on the agent own endpoint. HITL usage sequence. runId is the response message id and the counter was instance-local, so a resume restarted at -1 and the client runId:seq deduper discarded the post-approval label usage. Seeded past the labels already on the response. Also distinguishes "cannot serve" (undefined) from "no label" (null) in the SDK bridge, so a missing run falls back to the direct call instead of filling the slot empty. Version gating already happens at wiring time via the sdkCapable prototype probe. * 🩹 fix: Keep Unfilled Activity Labels Invisible and Unmask Endpoint Settings Follow-up review round. Publishing the reservation on every batch made two latent rendering paths reachable on every run, and both are fixed here. Empty labels no longer change grouping. The previous pass still formed a tool-group for a textless label, which wrapped even a single tool call and pulled THINK parts inside it — and since a reservation is published the moment each batch ends, that applied during every generation and permanently after a blank or failed fill. An empty label now flushes the legacy way instead: it still delimits its batch, but the block re-splits exactly as it renders with the feature off. Parallel lanes no longer show a blank line. Lanes render raw parts, so an unfilled label had nothing to draw; empty ones are dropped. Making labels act as collapsible headers inside lanes is still a separate gap. Edited responses no longer offset on resume. The sync replaces initialResponse.content with the server's aggregatedContent, which already contains the kept prefix AND everything generated since — so its length is not the prefix length, and indices reconciled from that snapshot are already absolute. Offsetting again pushed the label past its slot onto a later part. The shift now applies only to a fresh edited submission. Activity settings resolve field by field. Selecting one config object whole meant any endpoints.all block — even one carrying nothing but headers — shadowed the named or custom endpoint and silently disabled activity labels everywhere. Global still wins per field. Adds groupToolCalls coverage for the invisible-while-empty contract, which is the part most likely to regress: it is normal state on every run, not an edge case. * 🔒 fix: Scope Detached Label Writes to Their Generation Epoch Epoch scoping (P1). Label generation is detached and can outlive the generation that started it. emitChunk only proves that SOME runtime is current, not that the caller belongs to it, so an aborted generation's fill(null) -- and its usage event -- could be attributed to whichever generation replaced it, landing an index from the abandoned response on top of the new one. Because an empty label renders nothing, that overwrote content silently. emitChunk now takes an optional jobCreatedAt and drops the event when the runtime epoch differs, mirroring the existing setGraph/setContentParts convention, and both label emitters pass it. An abort now CLOSES the label scope instead of only cancelling the call: the rejected generation still runs its catch and calls fill(null), which would otherwise emit into a stream the next generation may already own. Edited-response indexing (P1). The previous pass skipped the prefix offset on resume, which was the wrong half of the problem: a sync replaces initialResponse.content with the server's aggregatedContent, which is completion-local, so after a reconnect its length is not the kept-prefix length and the offset is wrong -- but it is wrong for run steps in exactly the same way. Tool cards and the label that heads them must share one index space; a label shifting differently from its tools lands on another part. The label path now uses the identical expression as useStepHandler, with no resume special-case. Correcting the post-resume prefix length belongs in calculateContentIndex, where it fixes both at once. titleModel masking. The activity settings were made per-field last pass, but the titleModel fallback a few lines below still selected an entire config object, so a partial endpoints.all (for example one carrying only headers) hid a named endpoint's titleModel and quietly fell the label back to the main agent model. Both now read through one shared per-field helper. Resume reconciliation no longer depends solely on markActivityLabels, which is best-effort yet had come to gate correctness: a lost flag write silently dropped a label. The snapshot is consulted as a fallback. The exported host type for generateLabel now admits undefined, which is the documented "cannot serve, fall back to the direct call" signal the hook keys on -- distinct from null, meaning it ran and produced nothing. * 🧷 fix: Keep Group Identity Stable and Memoize Label Endpoint Resolution Group remount. Tool-group identity was keyed on the first part in the block. An activity label absorbs the block's leading THINK part the moment its text lands, so the key flipped from tool:<id> to fallback:<scope>:<idx> mid-run, remounting the group and discarding whatever the user had expanded. The key now scans for the first tool call, which does not move when the block re-forms. Label endpoint resolution is memoized per response. It reads provider config and can hit the database for user keys, yet nothing it depends on changes between batches of one run — and it ran twice per batch, once for generation and once for usage accounting. The promise is cached rather than the value so concurrent batches share a single in-flight resolution, and a rejection is evicted so one transient credential failure cannot disable labels for the rest of the response. * 🎯 fix: Offset Edited Resubmissions by a Prefix Length That Survives Resume The server indexes only NEW content for an edited resubmission, so the client offsets incoming indices by the prefix it retained. That prefix was read as initialResponse.content.length, which is correct only until a resume: the sync replaces that array with the server's completion-local snapshot, whose length is unrelated to the prefix. After a reconnect every offset was therefore wrong -- run steps and activity labels alike -- and could write over content the edit kept. For a label the symptom is worse than a bad position: the fill misses its own reservation, so the pending placeholder is never resolved. The prefix length is now captured when the submission is built, while initialResponse.content still IS the retained prefix, and carried on the submission as editPrefixLength. calculateContentIndex takes that length instead of deriving it from an array that a resume may have replaced, so run steps and labels share one index space by construction rather than by both happening to read the same field. Note the prefix is the FULL original content with the edited part substituted in place (useChatFunctions clones latestMessage.content and mutates one entry) -- it is not a slice, so the length cannot be inferred from editedContent.index. Group identity no longer changes when a label fills. Tool-group keys were derived from the first part in the block; an activity label absorbs the leading THINK part when its text lands, flipping the key mid-run and remounting the group, which discarded the user's expansion state. The key now scans for the first tool call, which does not move. Label endpoint resolution is memoized per response. It reads provider config and can hit the database for user keys, yet ran twice per batch -- once to generate, once for usage accounting -- while nothing it depends on changes within a run. The promise is cached so concurrent batches share one in-flight resolution, and rejections are evicted so a transient credential failure cannot disable labels for the rest of the response. The resume gap passes for steers and activity labels now share a single lazy content read instead of each issuing its own. The label pass stays gated on the run flag with a snapshot fallback: reconciling unconditionally would also close the residual first-label window, but it would bill a read to every resume of every run, including deployments with the feature off -- which the steer pass deliberately avoids. That residual requires a lost flag write, which shares fate with the content writes the labels live in. * 💵 fix: Bill Cross-Endpoint Labels at Their Own Rates recordCollectedUsage never accepted an endpointTokenConfig, so the value the activity-label caller passed was dropped and the balance transaction was written at the primary agent's rates. Only the UI cost honored the label endpoint, so a custom primary pointing activityEndpoint at another endpoint showed one price and charged another. The parameter is now accepted, and an explicit config wins outright over per-agent resolution: that map is keyed by AGENT, so it cannot describe usage that ran on a different endpoint. Group identity is stable for id-less tool calls too. The previous pass anchored the key to the first tool call ID; where a supported tool call carries no id the fallback still used the block's first part index, which shifts when a filled label absorbs the leading THINK part. The fallback now anchors to the first TOOL entry's index, so only a block containing no tool call at all keys off parts[0]. markActivityLabels is retried rather than fire-and-forget. It gates resume gap reconciliation and is a SEPARATE write from the durable label append, so a single lost write silently drops a label the content itself recorded. The earlier "shared fate with content writes" reasoning was wrong. One retry at run setup costs nothing and removes the only realistic way the gate goes stale, without billing a content read to every resume. * 🧮 fix: Stop Offsetting Once SYNC Drops the Edited Prefix The edit offset was applied unconditionally, but whether it is correct depends on which branch SYNC took. SYNC either preserves the content already loaded for the response -- which still contains the retained prefix, so the offset is required -- or replaces it with the server's aggregatedContent, which is completion-local and indexed from zero, after which any offset writes past the end of a now shorter array. That is why the two previous attempts each fixed half of it: skipping the offset on resume was right for the replace branch, applying it unconditionally was right for the preserve branch, and neither holds on its own. The offset now tracks the actual state of the rendered content. For an activity label the replace branch was worse than a bad position: the fill landed past its own reservation, so the pending placeholder was never resolved and the block kept its generic header for the rest of the run. Applied to run steps as well, not just labels. useStepHandler reads the prefix from the same submission and had the same unconditional offset, so after a mid-session resume of an edited response tool cards were misplaced too. Normalizing at the dispatch boundary keeps both in ONE index space by construction: a label that shifted differently from the tools it heads would land on another part. Note the reload path was already coherent -- useResumeOnLoad rebuilds the submission without editedContent or editPrefixLength, giving no offset against server-supplied content -- so only the mid-session SYNC path was inconsistent. * 🧾 fix: Keep Label Accounting Out of the Primary Usage Slot Label usage no longer owns getStreamUsage(). recordCollectedUsage assigned its result to this.usage unconditionally, so when the primary provider reported no usage metadata but the label provider did, BaseClient took the label's output tokens as the assistant response's authoritative count. The later primary call returns early on an empty collectedUsage and never replaced it, so the wrong value stood, the text-based fallback was skipped, and the real generation went unbilled. Secondary usage is still billed but no longer writes that slot. Cross-endpoint pricing keys off an explicit discriminator rather than the presence of a value. A built-in label endpoint prices from the shared table, so an undefined endpointTokenConfig is its MEANINGFUL value -- reading that as "no override" fell back to the primary's custom rates and restored the exact mismatch the previous pass set out to fix. The caller already knows whether the label ran elsewhere and now says so. markActivityLabels rejects on failure instead of swallowing it. The flag gates resume gap reconciliation and the caller retries it, but the internal catch resolved successfully and made that retry unreachable -- so the two changes cancelled out and a transient write failure still left the flag absent. Late label accounting is suppressed with the same gate as the late fill. A straggler that outlived the settle timeout still ran its finally block, so it charged the balance and appended to usageEmitSink after the response had passed its usage flush and metadata snapshot: a cost the user pays but is never shown. The cleared-prefix state is scoped to one generation. It was set on a resume SYNC that replaced the response and then never reset, so a later edited resubmission in the same mounted hook dispatched run steps and labels with no offset against content that still held its retained prefix. Reconnects pass isResume and keep the state; a new generation clears it. * 🔑 fix: Key Prefix State to the Stream and Honor current_model for Labels The cleared-prefix reset keyed on isResume, which skips exactly the case it was added for: a submission whose POST succeeded server-side but lost its response is retried, comes back resumed: true, and subscribes in resume mode even though it is a NEW generation. A previous generation's cleared state then survived into it, and incoming run steps and labels applied no offset against content that still held its retained prefix. The state is now keyed to the stream id, which changes with the generation and stays put across reconnects of one. activityModel now honors current_model. The options are documented as title-shaped and the titleModel fallback already excludes the sentinel, but the higher-precedence activity override passed the literal string through to getOptions and the provider, so an endpoint following that convention failed every label instead of using the agent model. * 🎯 fix: Key Prefix State to the Generation and Resolve the Run Model The cleared-prefix state was keyed to the stream id, which never changes within a conversation: request.js sets streamId = conversationId, so once a reconnect cleared the state every later edited resubmission in that conversation dispatched run steps and labels with no offset and could overwrite the prefix it retained. It is now keyed to the response message id, the only per-generation identity available here -- minted per submission and carried through a resume unchanged. That is the third identity tried for this state. isResume missed the deduplicated-retry path (a lost response returns resumed: true for a new generation); the stream id is conversation-scoped. The response id is the boundary that actually matches a generation. current_model labels now resolve the model the run is really using. initializeAgent merges the request's endpointOption override into model_parameters and the run gives it precedence, so preferring the saved agent.model could send labels to a different, potentially unavailable or more expensive model than the conversation is on. * 🆔 fix: Key Prefix State to the Submission and Keep the Origin Title Model Editing an assistant response reuses that response's messageId as editedMessageId, and useChatFunctions carries it onto initialResponse.messageId -- so re-editing the same response produced two generations with the same key and the cleared-prefix state survived between them, leaving run steps and labels with no offset against content the edit retained. Keyed now to clientRequestId, the per-submission uuid, which is minted fresh per edit attempt and forwarded unchanged on retries. That is the fourth key this state has had, and each earlier one failed at a real boundary: isResume missed the deduplicated-retry path, the stream id is the conversation id, and the response message id is reused across edits of one response. clientRequestId is the identity that actually means "this submission". The titleModel fallback is read from the ORIGINATING endpoint again, matching how titleConvo captures its config before switching credentials. Reading it after an activityEndpoint switch meant an OpenAI endpoint configured with titleModel claude-haiku and activityEndpoint anthropic fell through to the OpenAI run model and sent that name to Anthropic, failing every label. The destination endpoint supplies credentials, not the model choice. * 🧷 fix: Close the Remaining Edit, Epoch, and Scope Gaps for Labels SYNC clears the edit prefix on the new-row branch too. When a resumed edited submission cannot match an existing assistant row, that branch builds the response straight from the server's completion-local aggregatedContent, so it holds no retained prefix -- but the reset lived only in the matched branch, leaving later steps and labels adding an offset to indices that were already absolute. Label usage is keyed per GENERATION. Editing one assistant response reuses its responseMessageId while each fresh generation restarts activityLabelUsageSeq, so a second edit re-emitted the same runId:seq and the client discarded the newer usage while its balance transaction was still written. The key now carries jobCreatedAt, the run's own epoch: stable across reconnects and HITL resumes, distinct between generations. The scope is revalidated at commit time. Checking once before the await let a scope that closed mid-flight still charge the balance after finalization, while the matching fill saw the closed scope and dropped the label -- billed but never surfaced, the exact outcome the guard exists to prevent. The titleModel fallback no longer reaches the destination endpoint. With activityEndpoint set and no titleModel on the originating endpoint, it picked up the destination's, so changing only the credential target silently changed the model and its cost. Precedence is activityModel, then the originating endpoint's titleModel, then the run model; the destination supplies credentials only. * ✂️ refactor: Confine the Edit-Prefix Offset to Activity Labels useStepHandler is now byte-identical to dev again. The resume-aware prefix offset was applied there too, which was more correct in principle -- the post-resume prefix length is genuinely wrong for run steps as well -- but it changed index math that EVERY run step flows through, for every user, including everyone who never enables activityLabel. That shared correction needed five revisions in two days (isResume, the stream id, the response message id, clientRequestId, and the SYNC new-row branch), each passing the full suite and each failing at a boundary only review found. Carrying it inside an opt-in feature put every user behind logic with that track record. It belongs in its own change, with tests that construct the edit-plus-resume states none of the current suites reach. The offset now applies only where the label handler places its part, so this PR cannot alter rendering for anyone with the feature off. The known consequence is recorded in the description: with activity labels ENABLED, an edited response that reconnects mid-generation can place its label and its tool cards in different index spaces. That is a bug for opt-in users rather than a regression for everyone, and it disappears once the shared fix lands. submission.editPrefixLength stays: the label path still needs a prefix length that survives a SYNC replacing initialResponse.content. * 🧾 fix: Commit Labels Before Billing and Keep Blank Slots Invisible Round-nine review (all P2, feature-scoped): - Billing ordering (client.js:409, runtime.ts): usage accounting ran BEFORE the slot commit on both generation paths, so the settlement deadline could expire during the balance write — charged, then the fill dropped as out-of-scope: billed, never shown. `slot.fill` now resolves a commit flag, generators register their accounting via `deferUsage`, and the hook runs it only after a committed fill. - Scope gates (client.js:757): the direct-fallback `collect` omitted `scopeOpen`; both paths now gate on the OWNING wiring's scope, so a pre-pause straggler cannot bill because the resumed generation's scope is still open. - Blank-label grouping (groupToolCalls.ts:81): a blank slot forced a flush, splitting adjacent single-call batches into standalone cards where the feature-off path merges them. Blank labels now only mark the claim boundary — structurally invisible, while a later filled label still cannot claim an earlier batch. - Stale fill indices (wiring.ts:301): the skill-card unshift and the hide-sequential filter reshape contentParts before the finalization settle, so an in-flight fill emitted its claim-time index against a shifted array. Both completion paths now settle label fills before any post-run content reshaping (the finally settle stays as the error-path net; the second call sees an empty pending list). - Bounded serialization (runtime.ts:238): `JSON.stringify` fully materialized unbounded tool results to keep 200/600 chars per entry. A budget-bounded serializer stops at the limit (which also bounds cyclic values) and preserves the exact truncate-with-ellipsis output. Tests: fill/bill ordering + suppression on dropped fills (runtime.spec), blank-slot merging and claim boundaries (groupToolCalls.test), bounded serialization equivalence and giant-output truncation (runtime.spec). * 🧮 fix: Keep Deferred Label Billing Inside the Settle Window Self-review follow-up to the billing reorder: deferring usage until after the commit moved it PAST the fill's resolution, so a settle keyed on fills alone could let finalization flush the usage sink and snapshot metadata while the label's billing was still in flight — the usage row would silently miss the message rollup even on the happy path. The hook now reports its whole detached task (generate → fill → deferred usage) via a `trackTask` option, wired to the same settle tracker as the fills, so finalization waits for billing exactly as it did when accounting preceded the fill. The task never rejects. Pinned in runtime.spec: the tracked task resolves only after usage collection. * 🧰 fix: Harden Label Resolution, Output Bounds, and Cache Billing Round-ten review (all P2, feature-scoped); the sixth finding is the documented edited+reconnect index-space limitation, answered on-thread as deliberately out of scope for this PR. - Rejected-LLM memoization (runtime.ts): the hook cached a rejected `resolveLLM()` promise permanently, failing every later batch and silently defeating the host resolver's own rejected-cache eviction. The memo now evicts on rejection so the next batch retries. - `current_model` precedence (host.ts): an explicit `activityModel: current_model` resolved to `undefined` and then lost to a configured `titleModel`. The sentinel now resolves straight to the run model; the title fallback applies only when `activityModel` is absent. - Output bounds (runtime.ts): label text was persisted verbatim; a model ignoring the 4–9-word instruction (or steered by injection in untrusted tool output) could emit thousands of tokens duplicated through SSE, the chunk log, persistence, and the UI. `normalizeLabelOutput` keeps the first non-empty line, collapses whitespace, and hard-caps at 200 chars on both generation paths. - Cache-token billing (host.ts, client.js): the usage mapper dropped cache fields, vanishing Anthropic cache tokens from billing and charging OpenAI cache reads at the full input rate. The mapper now normalizes Anthropic/OpenAI/LangChain cache shapes into `input_token_details`, and the emit + cost path carries them with the label endpoint's `provider` (additive-provider adjustment). - Usage-type union (runs.ts): `TTokenUsageEvent.usage_type` now includes the emitted `activity-label` literal; the lone consumer keys on `usage_type != null`, so this is type-level completion. Tests: sentinel/title/explicit model precedence and all three cache shapes (host.spec), transient-resolution retry and output normalization with truncation (runtime.spec), the new usage literal (runs.spec). * 🪗 fix: Let Settled Labels Collapse Void Tools and Keep the Tail Cursor Round-eleven review (all P2, client-side). Two fixed; the other two findings restate documented Known limitations (edited+reconnect run-step index space; parallel-lane collapsible headers), answered on-thread. - Void-tool auto-collapse (ToolCallGroup.tsx): `allCompleted` keyed solely on output truthiness, so a tool that legitimately returns an empty string kept its labeled group expanded forever. A settled, filled label is itself a completion proof — the PostToolBatch claim only happens after every output in the batch returned — so it now satisfies `allCompleted`; pending labels keep the group live. - Trailing-reservation cursor (ContentParts.tsx): a blank label reservation at the content tail renders nothing but still counted as the last part, stripping the streaming cursor and last-item affordances from the last VISIBLE part until the next delta. `lastContentIdx` now walks back past empty label slots. Tests: labeled void-tool group auto-collapses, pending-label group stays expanded (ToolCallGroup.test). * 💳 fix: Price Label Cache Correctly, Honor endpoints.agents, Cancel Every Retry Round-twelve review: four fixed here; the remaining P1 (move the client.js bridge into packages/api) is an architecture call answered on-thread for the maintainer. - Provider on billed entries (client.js, P1): round ten added cache details to label usage entries but not `provider`, and `splitUsage` treats an unknown provider as additive — re-adding cache_read and cache_creation on top of an input count that already contains them, double-charging Anthropic/OpenAI cached label calls while the streamed cost (which carried the provider) disagreed. Every mapped entry now carries the label endpoint's provider. - endpoints.agents honored (host.ts, client.js): `initializeAgent` rewrites `agent.endpoint` to the backing provider, so activity settings under the PUBLIC `agents` endpoint — valid config, inherited by `agentsEndpointSchema` — were silently ignored. Field resolution is now `all` > public endpoint > backing provider/custom, applied to both the enable gate and the model/titleModel resolution. - E2E_LABEL_PORT reaches the YAML (playwright.config.mock.ts): an overridden port moved the fake label server and its health check but not the generated config's hard-coded 8889 baseURLs, so readiness passed while every label request targeted the wrong port. The override is now substituted into the generated copy. - Every retry frame cancelled (useResumableSSE.ts): concurrent label retry chains (reservation + fill per slot) overwrote one rAF handle, so cleanup cancelled only the newest chain; the rest ran up to 120 frames past unmount and could apply a stale label to a replacement generation reusing the same response id. Outstanding frame ids now live in a Set that cleanup drains. Tests: public-endpoint gate/precedence/all-above-public (host.spec). * 🖱️ fix: Keep the Last-Part Cursor in Parallel Lanes Too Round-thirteen review (single P2): `ParallelContentRenderer` computed `lastContentIdx` from the unfiltered array, so a trailing blank label reservation — filtered out of every lane — left NO rendered part carrying the last-part cursor and running-subagent affordances until the label filled. The sequential renderer's walk-back is extracted into a shared `lastVisibleContentIdx` helper (utils/activityLabels) used by both `ContentParts` and `ParallelContentRenderer`, so the two index spaces cannot drift again. Behavior pinned in activityLabels.spec: trailing blank skipped, consecutive blanks skipped, filled label counts, label-free content unchanged. * 🧹 chore: Alias the Retry-Frame Set for the Effect Cleanup Lint Rule * 📏 fix: Let activityCharLimit Reach Tool Inputs Round-fifteen review: `activityCharLimit` is documented as the per-entry truncation for tool input AND output, but `buildPrompt` hard-coded inputs at 200 characters — so raising the setting could never surface a distinguishing path, query, or operation that appears past the first 200 characters of a long argument. Inputs now truncate at the configured limit alongside outputs; the 200-char constant remains only for the intent line (renamed INTENT_CHAR_LIMIT to match). Config fidelity pinned in runtime.spec: a 400-char argument survives a 450 limit and truncates under a 50 limit. The round's other finding is the fifth restatement of the documented edited+reconnect index-space limitation, answered on-thread with the prior four cross-references. * 🤝 fix: No Labels for Pure Handoff Batches Round-sixteen review: a PostToolBatch containing only `transfer_to_*` calls claimed a label slot, but transfer parts are never groupable — the client flushed the handoff card standalone and the label orphaned into a stray line after it, restating what the card already says. Two-sided fix: - Hook (runtime.ts): a batch whose every entry is a transfer call claims nothing — no slot, no model call, no `maxPerRun` consumption. Mixed batches still label (the header describes the real work). - Renderer (groupToolCalls.ts): an orphan label whose `tool_call_ids` are all transfer calls is dropped instead of rendered standalone, covering content persisted before the hook-side skip. The round's two P1s are repeats answered on-thread: the packages/api extraction (maintainer-decided follow-up, recorded in the description) and the sixth restatement of the edited+reconnect index limitation. Tests: transfer-only batch claims nothing, mixed batch still claims (runtime.spec); transfer-only orphan label dropped, real-batch orphan label still renders (groupToolCalls.test). * 🎛️ fix: Sanitize Label Client Options and Bound the Batch Prompt Round-seventeen review: two fixed; the other two findings repeat the maintainer-decided packages/api extraction (follow-up) and the edited+reconnect index limitation (seventh instance), answered on-thread. - Primary-option strip (host.ts): the label client copied the resolved `llmConfig` wholesale, so an endpoint whose defaults enable extended thinking or carry model-specific output caps forwarded them to the (often cheaper) label model — unsupported options failed every label, and supported thinking spent real tokens and the settlement window on a 4–9 word header. The copy now strips `omitTitleOptions` keys and the `modelKwargs` output caps exactly like the title path, restoring the Anthropic `clientOptions` carrier by reference so proxy `defaultHeaders` still reach label requests. - Batch prompt budget (runtime.ts): per-entry truncation left the batch dimension unbounded — hundreds of parallel calls could build a prompt past the fast model's window. The entries section now has a total budget (8k chars, scaling with `activityCharLimit` so a raised limit still fits several entries); entries past it are skipped without paying their serialization cost, and the list notes how many were omitted. The first entry always renders in full. Tests: option strip with header-carrier survival (host.spec); giant batch bounded with omission marker, small batch untouched (runtime.spec). * 🛡️ fix: Keep SSRF Guards on Label Calls, Skip Mixed Handoff Batches Round-eighteen review: four fixed; the fifth repeats the maintainer-decided packages/api extraction (eighth instance), answered on-thread. - SSRF-safe carrier (host.ts, P1): the sanitize step restored the Anthropic `clientOptions` carrier only when `defaultHeaders` existed, but for user-provided base URLs `getLLMConfig` stores the guarded Undici dispatcher and `redirect: 'error'` there — dropping it reopened DNS-rebinding/redirect paths on label calls to user-controlled URLs. The carrier (client CONSTRUCTION options, not generation params) is now restored whenever present, same reference. - Primary maxTokens (host.ts): top-level `maxTokens` is not in `omitTitleOptions` and survived the strip; the title path deletes it explicitly, and a cap sized for the primary model can be rejected by the substitute. Deleted on the copy. - Bounded keys (runtime.ts): the object branch materialized every key via `Object.keys` and quoted oversized keys in full before the budget check. Enumeration is now lazy (`for..in` + own-property guard) and keys slice to the budget before quoting, like string values. - Mixed handoff batches (runtime.ts, groupToolCalls.ts): the client flushes the block at the transfer card, so a mixed batch's label orphaned exactly like a pure one. The hook now skips ANY batch containing a transfer call, and the renderer drops orphan labels covering one (legacy content). Tests: carrier survival without headers by same reference, maxTokens strip (host.spec); mixed batch claims nothing (runtime.spec); mixed orphan dropped, real-batch orphan kept (groupToolCalls.test). * 🧢 fix: Cap Label Generation, Order the Flag Persist, Detach Settled Listeners Round-nineteen review: three fixed; the fourth is the ninth instance of the edited+reconnect index limitation, answered on-thread. - Generation cap (host.ts): stripping the primary output caps left label calls with NO cap at all — `normalizeLabelOutput` bounds what persists, not what the provider generates and bills, so a model ignoring the 4–9-word instruction (or steered by injected tool output) could emit its provider-default output per batch. The sanitize step now installs a 256-token label cap (per provider family: `maxOutputTokens` for Google-style wrappers, `maxTokens` otherwise), after the filter so the omit set cannot remove it. - Flag-persist ordering (client.js): the `markActivityLabels` write was fire-and-forget, so an immediate cross-replica reconnect could read the job between the write and the first claim, see neither flag nor snapshot label, and skip gap reconciliation. Label emission now awaits the (settled-on-failure) persist chain, making "a label event exists" imply "the flag is durable" — the race window is gone; only the documented double-write-failure residual remains. - Listener detach (client.js): each HITL approval cycle's wiring adds a `once` abort listener to the shared job signal that only an actual abort removes; settled segments now detach theirs in `settleActivityLabels`, so long multi-approval runs cannot accumulate dead closures toward the listener-limit warning. Tests: the primary cap is REPLACED by the 256-token label cap (host.spec). * 🎯 fix: Route the Label Cap Per Model Family Round-twenty review: the 256-token label cap set maxTokens unconditionally, but GPT-5+ rejects max_tokens (the OpenAI builder routes its cap into modelKwargs.max_completion_tokens / max_output_tokens) and o-series models reject it with no stable kwargs alternative — every label on those models would have failed. The cap now mirrors the builder: modelKwargs for GPT-5+ (responses-API aware), no cap for o-series (title parity; the 200-char persistence bound still applies), maxOutputTokens for Google, maxTokens otherwise. Pinned in host.spec for both reasoning families. The round's other finding is the tenth instance of the documented edited+reconnect index limitation, answered on-thread. * ⏱️ fix: Persist the Label Flag at Run Start, Not on the Emit Path Round-twenty-one review: two fixed; the other three repeat the maintainer-decided packages/api extraction, the edited+reconnect index limitation, and the parallel-lane header limitation — all answered on-thread with their standing decisions. - Flag ordering, corrected (client.js): sequencing label emission behind the flag persist (previous round) delayed the claim-time reservation while the shared index offset had ALREADY shifted subsequent SDK chunks — reopening the cross-instance hole-compaction overwrite the reservation emit exists to prevent. The reservation emits immediately again; instead, run start (processStream and resume alike) awaits the settled-on-failure persist chain, so the flag is durable before any batch can claim a label. Same guarantee, zero latency on the emit path. - Tail-label cursor (ContentParts.tsx): a filled label at the content tail is consumed into the group header rather than listed in `group.parts`, so the `isLast` check missed it and nothing held the streaming cursor until the next delta. The check now includes `labelPart.idx`. * 🔌 fix: Detach Label Abort Listeners Even Without Claims A segment with labels enabled can end without a single claim (text-only, or handoff batches, which skip labels); the early return in settleActivityLabels skipped the detach added for HITL listener accumulation. The detach now runs on both paths. * ⚖️ fix: Make the Commit Flag the Sole Billing Authority Round-twenty-three review: a committed fill racing a late scope close (user abort or settle timeout during the durable emit) stayed visible — the part is mutated and persisted before the close — yet the deferred accounting's scope gates then skipped the charge: a completed provider call escaping both the label charge and the primary abort accounting. The scope gates on the deferred-usage path are removed; the hook's commit flag is now the single billing authority in BOTH directions. A dropped fill never reaches the accounting callback (billed-never-shown stays impossible), and a committed fill bills regardless of when its scope closed (shown-never-billed now impossible too). The dead `scopeOpen` payload threading is removed with it; the `recordActivityLabelUsage` parameter survives, defaulting open, for callers that own no commit signal. The round's other finding is the twelfth instance of the documented edited+reconnect index limitation, answered on-thread. * 🧮 feat: Bill Labels by Estimate When Providers Omit Usage Maintainer decision: follow the title convention rather than leaving label calls unbilled when a provider returns no usage metadata. The hook now passes a LAZY estimate thunk with the deferred accounting on the success path — the EXACT prompt the direct path sent (or the locally built equivalent for the SDK path: same entries, context, instruction, truncation contract, and continuity headers) plus the final normalized label. `recordActivityLabelUsage` invokes it only when no collected entry carries a real token count, counts both texts with the shared o200k_base tokenizer, and feeds the synthesized entry through the SAME pipeline (provider-tagged, streamed event, cost, balance transaction). Real provider usage always wins when present. The failure path passes NO estimate: a throw before a response bills only real collected metadata, never a full phantom prompt. Tests: the estimate thunk carries the exact invoked prompt and final label; the failure path defers with no estimate (runtime.spec). * 💵 fix: Estimate From the Raw Completion, Not the Normalized Label The fallback estimate counted the normalized label (first line, 200-char cap) while the provider generated and would bill the raw output up to the 256-token generation cap — under-recording verbose replies. The estimate thunk now carries the raw pre-normalization text; the persisted label is unchanged. Pinned with a multi-line reply test. * 🧾 fix: Commit Label Text Only After the Durable Emit, Estimate the Real SDK Prompt Round review on the billing work: two fixed; the third is the fourteenth instance of the edited+reconnect index limitation, answered on-thread. - Copy-first fill (wiring.ts): the fill mutated the shared content part BEFORE its durable emit, so a failed emit left the label text on `contentParts` anyway — persistence could save and display a label no client ever received and billing (keyed on the commit flag) never charged. The new state is staged on a copy; the shared part mutates only after the emit succeeds, so content, delivery, and billing move together. - Real SDK prompt for estimates (client.js): the estimate thunk carried this module's locally built prompt, but the SDK path frames entries differently — the estimated input count was for a prompt never sent. Chain-start callbacks (handleLLMStart/handleChatModelStart) now capture the prompt the SDK actually rendered, and the deferred accounting substitutes it into the estimate when capture succeeded, falling back to the local approximation otherwise. |
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Dustin Healy
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f4e0888f14
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🕶 feat: Generalize Admin Config Secret Redaction (#14509)
* feat: generalize admin config secret redaction to a field registry
Replace the single hardcoded langfuse.secretKey handling in the admin
config secrets module with a registry (CONFIG_SECRET_FIELDS) so every
credential-shaped config field is encrypted at rest, redacted on read,
and preserved when omitted on a subsequent write.
Registry covers langfuse.secretKey plus speech tts/stt provider apiKeys,
ocr.apiKey, the webSearch provider apiKeys, and the assistants /
azureAssistants endpoint apiKeys. Fields that conventionally hold
${ENV_VAR} references keep those references as plain, visible values;
literal secrets are always encrypted. langfuse.secretKey behavior
(display companion, always-encrypt, array-section handling) is unchanged.
Wire runtime decryption for the consumers that read these values from
the merged app config: resolveConfigSecret in the speech STT/TTS
services and decryptConfigSecret in the Mistral OCR auth loader. Legacy
plaintext literals and ${ENV_VAR} references continue to resolve.
* feat: add masked display companions for every registered config secret
Every non-langfuse field added to the secret registry was missing the
displayPath that langfuse.secretKey already had, so redacted admin reads
returned nothing for those fields instead of a masked value like
sk-mis...Z789. The registry-driven encrypt/redact/preserve/mutation-path
logic in secrets.ts was already field-agnostic; the only backend fix is
setting displayPath on the other 15 registry entries.
Add the matching optional display<Field> companion to each zod schema
in librechat-data-provider (ocr, speech tts/stt providers, webSearch
providers, the shared assistants/azureAssistants endpoint schema) so the
field is typed for consumers, mirroring langfuse.displaySecretKey. DB
overrides are Mixed-typed, so nothing breaks without this at the storage
layer, but the type is needed for any typed consumer of TCustomConfig.
A display path can never be written as a secret: direct writes to it are
rejected, and an ancestor-object write that includes a spoofed display
value alongside or instead of the real secret is overwritten or dropped,
never encrypted or persisted.
* fix: harden the config secret write path against masking and mixing bugs
getDisplaySecretKey disclosed the entire value for any secret of 10
characters or fewer, since the first-6/last-4 mask overlaps or covers
the whole string at that length (e.g. self-hosted LocalAI tokens).
Short secrets are now fully masked instead.
writeSecretIntoSection/writeDottedSecret encrypted a literal secret's
raw string verbatim, including leading/trailing whitespace, so a
padded paste round-tripped with the whitespace intact and a
whitespace-only value was not treated as empty. Literals are now
trimmed before encrypting and masking.
Both functions also returned early on an env-placeholder value without
clearing the display companion, so replacing a literal secret with
${ENV_VAR} left the previous masked value stale in the stored config,
and a client-supplied display value submitted alongside a placeholder
secret was never overwritten. The placeholder branch now clears the
display companion in both the dotted-patch and object-valued write
paths.
* fix: fail closed in Mistral OCR auth when a stored ciphertext can't decrypt
loadAuthConfig fell back to the raw v3: ciphertext string whenever
decryptConfigSecret returned undefined, so a corrupted or otherwise
undecryptable stored secret was sent to the Mistral API verbatim as
the apiKey instead of triggering the existing env-var fallback.
isEncryptedConfigSecret is now exported so the OCR auth loader can
distinguish "this looks like ciphertext and failed to decrypt" from
"this was never encrypted" and treat only the former as empty,
preserving literal and ${ENV_VAR} values exactly as before.
* fix: omit undecryptable TTS provider headers instead of sending "undefined"
openAIProvider, elevenLabsProvider, and localAIProvider built their
Authorization/xi-api-key headers directly from resolveConfigSecret's
return value, which is undefined on a decrypt failure. That produced a
literal "Bearer undefined" header (or an undefined-valued xi-api-key
header) sent to the provider instead of failing gracefully.
Each provider now resolves the key once and only includes the header
when it's non-empty, matching the pattern already used by
azureOpenAIProvider and STTService's providers.
* fix: strip secret-ancestor arrays at any depth, not just the top level
encryptConfigSecrets/redactConfigSecrets only stripped an array-valued
registered-secret ancestor when it appeared as a literal top-level key
(e.g. a dotted "speech.tts.openai" key). A true nested array at any
depth, e.g. { speech: { tts: { openai: [{ apiKey: "sk-secret" }] } } },
made walkToParent return null and silently skip that field entirely,
so the literal secret was stored unencrypted and returned verbatim to
any reader with section-level read access.
pruneSecretAncestorArrays now walks every registered field's ancestor
chain and deletes any array found at any depth before encryption or
redaction runs, closing the gap for both write and read paths.
* fix: migrate legacy plaintext secrets instead of dropping them on preserve
preserveConfigSecrets only restored an omitted secret when the existing
stored value was already v3-encrypted. Every field this PR newly
registers was previously stored as plaintext with no protection at
all, so any deployment upgrading into this registry has real
credentials sitting in Mongo as plaintext today. The first time an
admin edited an unrelated field in the same section (e.g. mistralModel
next to ocr.apiKey), the omitted plaintext secret failed the
"already encrypted" check and was silently dropped instead of
preserved, breaking the integration.
The existing value is now encrypted in place when it isn't already
ciphertext or an allowed env placeholder, so the credential survives
the edit and gets a computed display companion instead of being lost.
* refactor: derive masked-preview companions as <field>Preview
Replace the display*-prefixed companion names (displaySecretKey,
displayApiKey, displaySerperApiKey, ...) with a uniform <field>Preview
suffix (secretKeyPreview, apiKeyPreview, serperApiKeyPreview, ...) derived
automatically from the registered secret path — registry entries no longer
declare a displayPath, and the name never collides with display-label
config fields like modelDisplayLabel.
Legacy langfuse.displaySecretKey companions (the only shipped instance,
with no released reader) are stripped from writes and reads and migrated
to secretKeyPreview on preserve, so stored documents self-clean.
Also reject MongoDB operator segments ($, $[], $[id]) in admin config
field paths: isValidFieldPath previously accepted them, letting a patch
like webSearch.$[].serperApiKey reach patchConfigFields as a positional
update that bypassed secret-path validation.
* fix: translate legacy displaySecretKey to secretKeyPreview on reads
Redaction previously deleted the legacy companion outright, so the first
admin read of a not-yet-migrated document showed no configured-secret
indication until a later write migrated it. Reads now surface the legacy
value under secretKeyPreview (when no new-name preview exists) while still
stripping the legacy key from the response; stored documents migrate for
real on their next write.
* fix: detect runtime ciphertext by full encryptV3 payload shape
Runtime resolution (resolveConfigSecret, mistral OCR auth) now identifies
decryptable values by the exact v3:<32-hex-iv>:<hex> shape encryptV3
produces instead of the bare v3: prefix, so a legitimate literal credential
that merely starts with v3: (e.g. from YAML, which the admin write path
never encrypts) resolves as a literal instead of failing decryption.
Write-side prefix rejection stays broad as spoof/echo defense.
---------
Co-authored-by: Danny Avila <danny@librechat.ai>
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Ravi Kumar L
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f4723220cc
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🛡️ fix: validate message feedback payloads (#14500)
* fix: validate message feedback payloads * fix: enforce feedback rating tag consistency |