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| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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Danny Avila
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fa913148fb
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🔒 fix: Refresh MCP OBO Tokens From the Live OpenID Session (#15334)
* 🧊 fix: Inline-refresh OpenID session tokens at MCP OBO call time Resolves the walk-away failure mode where MCP tool calls using OBO auth fail with "No valid OpenID access token is available for OBO exchange" after a user idles past their access-token lifetime. The strategy-time snapshot on `user.federatedTokens` could expire mid-stream before `resolveOboToken` ran, while `req.session.openidTokens` carried a still- valid (or refreshable) token that nothing read. - New OpenIDSessionRefresh service: per-user single-flighted closure that reads `req.session.openidTokens` at OBO time and inline-refreshes via `openid-client.refreshTokenGrant` when expired (30s skew), persisting via `req.session.save()`. No cookie writes (headers already flushed). - `resolveOboToken` gains a required UpstreamTokenProvider parameter (typed as `() => Promise<OIDCTokens | null>`, reusing the shared shape from @librechat/data-schemas). Compile-time guarantee that every call site is updated. - New `session_refresh_failed` OboTokenResolutionReason distinguishes "session expired and IdP rejected refresh" from "no upstream token ever existed." - `req` threaded through createMCPTool/createMCPTools/createToolInstance to construct the closure with captured request, plus fail-closed guards in MCPConnectionFactory.getOboTokens and MCPManager.callTool when the closure isn't plumbed. - Startup warning in MCPServersInitializer when OBO is configured but OPENID_REUSE_TOKENS is unset (the strategy populating user.federatedTokens is only registered under reuse, so OBO would fail every call without it). Tests: 16 new in OpenIDSessionRefresh.spec.js; obo.spec.ts extended for the new param + error reason; wiring smoke tests in MCPManager, MCPConnectionFactory, MCPServersInitializer, and MCP.spec.js. * 🛡️ fix: Harden OBO inline-refresh against token type and session edge cases - Token-preference asymmetry: live-token reuse and expires_at derivation now strictly gate on the access_token, not the id_token. Added a required `tokenPreference` parameter on isLiveSessionTokenStillValid, buildOIDCTokensFromSession, and createOpenIDSessionTokenProvider so every call site is explicit. Dropped the bogus id_token-exp fallback in performIdpRefresh — id_token TTL is governed by IdP session policy and would mark a short-lived access_token reusable past its real lifetime. - Missing req in /reinitialize route: the manual reconnect endpoint now forwards req into reinitMCPServer, so OBO servers can build a session-aware upstream-token closure instead of failing with missing_upstream_token. - Single-flight key collisions: composed key as tenantId:openidIssuer:openidId:sessionId via getSingleFlightKey. Concurrent calls in the same session still coalesce; separate sessions never share an in-flight refresh, preventing refresh-token rotation from breaking sibling sessions and preventing cross-tenant token crossover when distinct users share an IdP sub. - Opaque access token reuse): persist accessTokenExpiresAt (unix seconds, from tokenset.expires_in) on each refresh AND on initial login / SPA refresh in setOpenIDAuthTokens. New getAccessTokenExp helper falls back to it when the access token isn't a JWT, avoiding redundant inline refreshes for Microsoft Graph and Auth0 default audiences. - Log hygiene: the single-flight key (containing sessionId, openidId, openidIssuer, tenantId) is now SHA-256-hashed in the "Joining in-flight refresh" debug log. Preserves cross-line correlation via a 12-char prefix without leaking credential or PII material. Documented req.session.openidTokens shape contract via JSDoc typedef so the new accessTokenExpiresAt field has a discoverable home alongside the existing accessToken/idToken/refreshToken/expiresAt/lastRefreshedAt. Tests: OpenIDSessionRefresh.spec.js up to 30 passing (added coverage for opaque-token reuse, JWT-access-token-exp fallback, no-id_token-fallback regression, cross-session no-coalesce, persistence on refresh, and a guard against stale accessTokenExpiresAt carryover). AuthService.spec.js adds two cases covering accessTokenExpiresAt persistence on login. mcp.spec.js (route) gains a regression test asserting req flows into reinitMCPServer. * 🔍 fix: Detect OBO-only MCP admin config overrides Admin Config overlays for YAML-defined MCP servers compare only ADMIN_CONFIGURABLE_FIELDS to decide whether to lazy-init a config-tier override. The OBO config field was added after that fingerprint list, so an override that only added or changed `obo` was treated as unchanged YAML and skipped. Include `obo` in the admin-configurable field list and add a regression test for an OBO-only override. * 🔊 fix: Mock MCP OAuth timeout in SDK integration test MCPConnectionFactory.attemptToConnect reads mcpConfig.OAUTH_HANDLING_TIMEOUT when building the OAuth connection timeout. The SDK OAuth integration test mocked mcpConfig without that field, which made the timeout calculation produce NaN and caused the test to fail before the OAuth refresh/start path completed. Add OAUTH_HANDLING_TIMEOUT to the test mock. * ♻️ refactor: Pass OBO upstream-token closure into MCP instead of req Build the OpenID upstream-token provider at the request boundary and thread only the closure through MCP handling, so the MCP service layer no longer receives the raw Express request. The closure still reads/refreshes the live session at tool-call time, preserving the walk-away recovery. - Drop `req`/`capturedReq` from createMCPTools, createMCPTool, reconnectServer, createToolInstance, and reinitMCPServer; forward `upstreamTokenProvider` instead. Closure is constructed in loadTools, loadToolDefinitionsWrapper, and the reinitialize route, where req/res are in scope. - OBO: fall back to user.federatedTokens when the provider yields no live session, so OIDC remote-agent calls (verified bearer, no session) still work. - Inline refresh: mirror a rotated refresh token to the refreshToken cookie via a shared setRefreshTokenCookie helper, guarded by !res.headersSent (no-op on the streaming path; session copy stays authoritative). - Single-flight: hydrate a joining request's own session from the resolved tokens so a later OBO call doesn't replay a rotated-away refresh token. Addresses owner feedback and three review findings. * 🔒 fix: Recover OIDC refresh-token rotation after SSE OBO refresh When an inline OBO refresh rotates the OpenID refresh token after SSE headers have already been sent, the browser refreshToken cookie cannot be updated. Store a short-lived encrypted bridge from the stale cookie token to the rotated token so /api/auth/refresh can recover after express-session loss. Use the signed openid_user_id cookie to load user context for bridge validation, retry only on invalid_grant, and delete the bridge only after the bridged refresh succeeds. * 🔨 fix: hydrate joined OIDC refresh sessions with stable refresh tokens Update single-flight OIDC refresh joiners whenever refreshed access token state changes, even if the IdP keeps the refresh token unchanged. This prevents joined requests from retaining stale accessToken or accessTokenExpiresAt values and redundantly refreshing later in the same run. * 🌉 Persist OIDC refresh-token recovery bridges in MongoDB Store SSE OBO refresh-token recovery bridges in MongoDB instead of process-local memory so /api/auth/refresh can recover after worker restarts or cross-worker routing. Derive bridge expiry from REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRY so the recovery window matches the stale refreshToken cookie it repairs, and delete bridges after successful recovery. * 🤝 Coordinate OIDC inline refreshes across workers Add a short-lived Mongo-backed refresh-flight record so concurrent OBO refreshes for the same OpenID session do not redeem the same rotating refresh token on different workers. The winning worker performs the IdP refresh and stores an encrypted result; joiners wait for that result, hydrate their request session, and return without calling the IdP. * ⚓ Keep OpenID marker cookies aligned on inline refresh Refresh token_provider and openid_user_id with the same expiry as the rotated refreshToken cookie when an inline OBO refresh can still write headers. Share the marker-cookie writer with the normal OpenID auth refresh path so the fallback /api/auth/refresh branch continues to recognize valid OpenID refresh tokens after session expiry. * 🔑 fix: include refresh token in OIDC local refresh flight key Key the process-local OIDC refresh coalescing by the current session refresh token, matching the Mongo-backed flight key. This prevents a request with a newly rotated token from joining an older pending refresh and inheriting its failure/result. * 🌉 fix: store OIDC refresh bridge without cookie response Treat missing or non-cookie responses like headers-sent streaming responses during inline OIDC refresh. When the IdP rotates the refresh token and cookies cannot be written, persist a recovery bridge so a later /auth/refresh can recover after session expiry. * 🫙 fix: preserve stale OIDC cookie bridge key Track the refresh token last written to the browser cookie separately from the current session refresh token. When inline OIDC refreshes rotate tokens without a writable response, keep bridging from the browser-stale token directly to the latest session token. * 🙌 fix: keep OIDC bridge recovery success on cleanup failure Make refresh-token bridge cleanup best-effort after a bridged OIDC refresh succeeds. A transient delete failure now logs a warning but does not convert the already-refreshed session and cookies into a 403 response. * 📦 test: Exclude RefreshTokenBridge from tenant-isolation coverage Add RefreshTokenBridge to the tenant-isolation coverage allowlist because refresh bridge lookups run during unauthenticated OpenID refresh recovery. The controller first recovers user context from the signed OpenID marker cookie, then the bridge methods apply explicit user and tenant filters. Ambient tenant isolation would bind this recovery path to request-local tenant context that is not available at the point the stale cookie is being resolved * ⚡ Fix OpenID refresh flight retry and marker hydration Allow failed OpenID refresh flights to be reclaimed immediately instead of pinning transient errors. Preserve the browser refresh-token marker when joined refreshes hydrate session tokens from a shared flight result. Stabilize AuthService tests by isolating mocked module imports from prior suites. * 🛠️ fix: centralize OBO identity scoping Add shared auth identity helpers for app user ids, OpenID subjects, tenant ids, and normalized OpenID issuers. Thread a non-placeholder-visible OBO identity context from the real request user through MCP connection, tool-call, reinit, and refresh paths. Keep tenantId and openidIssuer out of createSafeUser so MCP user placeholders do not expose those fields. Scope OBO token cache and in-flight exchange keys by tenant, issuer, OpenID subject, scopes, and a SHA-256 hash of the upstream assertion. This prevents cross-tenant/cross-issuer collisions and avoids reusing tokens minted from stale rotated assertions. Use the shared identity helpers for OpenID refresh-flight keys and refresh-token bridge recovery records so related OBO refresh paths share the same identity normalization rules. The helper is intended for auth-boundary and credential-cache code, not as a blanket replacement for ordinary app user id ownership checks. * 🛠️ fix: preserve OIDC refresh-token sync on save failures Sync OpenID refresh-token cookie/bridge state before persisting the session so a transient session-store failure cannot lose an IdP-rotated refresh token. Also trigger sync when the session refresh token differs from the browser refresh-token marker, not only when the current grant rotates the token. This lets later writable refreshes repair stale browser cookies left behind by SSE refreshes. Route refresh bridge identity through the shared identity helper with the threaded OBO identity context, falling back to request/user context when needed. Add regression coverage for session-save failures, stale browser cookie repair, non-writable bridge storage, and shared-helper identity fallback. * 🛠️ fix: keep OIDC refresh bridge during recovery grace After successful bridged refresh recovery, re-store the stale-cookie bridge with a short grace TTL instead of deleting it immediately. This lets parallel /api/auth/refresh requests that already sent the stale browser cookie recover before they can observe the first response's Set-Cookie. Retarget the bridge to the refresh token returned by the bridged retry so B-to-C refresh-token rotation remains recoverable. The grace TTL is parsed with math() and defaults to 60s, which shrinks the replay window from the original REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRY bridge lifetime to the short recovery grace period. Remove the now-unused explicit bridge delete path from the service and data-schemas method surface. Add regression coverage for grace re-store, identity symmetry, retry failure behavior, and same-key upsert replacement. * 🛠️ fix: fail closed on OBO MCP user identity mismatch Add an OBO-specific guard before MCP tool execution that requires the effective invocation user and captured request user to both have ids and to match. This prevents OBO tool calls from falling back to a separate configurable.user_id identity after request-bound OBO context has already been captured. Keep the existing user id fallback behavior for non-OBO MCP calls. Tests cover mismatched OBO users, missing user ids, and the matching-user path ignoring a conflicting configurable.user_id. * 🛠️ fix: Guard OpenID bridge retry user identity Extract the shared OpenID refresh/user-resolution flow in AuthController so the normal refresh path and bridge-recovery retry use the same grant, claims, issuer, user lookup, and diagnostic logging code. Preserve the existing path-specific behavior: the normal path still owns migration updates and 401 login redirects, while the bridge retry still falls through to the existing 403 invalid-token response. Add a bridge-recovery guard that rejects retry results whose resolved user id differs from the signed openid_user_id cookie before issuing tokens or re-storing the grace bridge. Cover both the successful matching-user recovery and the mismatched-user rejection. * 🛠️ fix: type-safety polish on OBO data layer Replace refresh token bridge query/update Record<string, unknown> usage with typed Mongoose FilterQuery and UpdateQuery definitions. Harden OpenID marker cookie JWT expiry handling by converting refresh expiry milliseconds to integer seconds and rejecting invalid or non-positive durations. Add focused CSRF tests for fractional refresh expiry values and invalid expiry configuration. * 🛠️ fix: Bind OpenID session tokens to authenticated identity Stamp OpenID session token state with the LibreChat user id, OpenID subject, tenant id, and normalized issuer when tokens are stored. Fail closed before OBO inline token reuse/refresh when the session token identity does not match the current authenticated identity, preventing a stale or mixed Express session from supplying another user's upstream assertion. Also validate the normal /api/auth/refresh session-token reuse shortcut against the signed marker-cookie user before returning cached session tokens. Note: sessions created before this change carry no identity stamp and are treated as a mismatch. This is self-healing — the reuse path forces a full IdP refresh (which re-stamps the session) and the OBO path throws, surfacing as a one-time re-authentication for active OBO users at deploy time. The session re-stamps within one session lifetime (SESSION_EXPIRY, default 15 min). * 🛠️ fix: Recover OpenID refresh token drift Prefer the browser refresh-token cookie when it differs from the server-side OpenID session state, and force a real IdP refresh in that case instead of reusing stale session tokens. Store a short-lived refresh-token bridge when inline OBO refresh writes a rotated browser cookie but session persistence fails, so follow-up refreshes can still recover from the old token. Keep the bridge grace TTL centralized in RefreshTokenBridge so both recovery paths use the same env-backed value. Note: drift is measured against the last-synced browserRefreshToken marker, so the SSE path (intentionally stale cookie, authoritative session) does not false-positive. Sessions predating the marker have no browserRefreshToken; for those, drift falls back to comparing the cookie against the session refresh token and prefers the cookie on difference. This is the same self-healing pre-change-session window as the identity binding fix and re-syncs within one session lifetime. Tests cover cookie/session drift selection, reusable-session bypass on drift, bridge storage after session-save failure, and the shared bridge constant wiring. * 🛠️ fix: Harden OBO token caching and expiry handling Reject malformed OBO grant responses before writing them to the exchanged-token cache so a missing access_token cannot poison the cache. Store absolute expires_at values with cached OBO tokens and ignore legacy cache entries without usable expiry metadata. This keeps cached-token freshness based on the token’s real remaining lifetime instead of reusing the original relative expires_in on cache hits. Move OBO expiry normalization and skew helpers into packages/api and use them from both the JS exchange service and the TS MCP resolver. Apply a 30-second safety margin with a one- second floor for short-lived tokens, covered by direct helper tests and caller-level regression tests. Tests: - packages/api: npm run build - packages/api: npx jest src/mcp/oauth/expiry.spec.ts src/mcp/oauth/obo.spec.ts - api: npx jest server/services/OboTokenService.spec.js * 🛠️ fix: Harden OBO refresh-token bridge lookup and indexing Reuse getValidOpenIDReuseUserId for the bridge-recovery user lookup in refreshController instead of re-verifying openid_user_id inline. The shared helper enforces the JWT_REFRESH_SECRET presence check and a strict typeof payload.id === 'string' guard, rejecting tokens whose id claim is present but not a string (e.g. a numeric id) that the inline check accepted. Fail closed on issuer mismatch in getRefreshTokenBridge. Both the stored and the expected issuer are now normalized and compared for equality, so a bridge is recovered only when both sides agree (both absent, or both present and equal after normalization). Previously the check was skipped whenever the stored issuer was absent, allowing recovery across mismatched issuer context. Drop the unused {oldRefreshTokenHash, userId, tenantId, openidIssuer} index and the openidIssuer field on RefreshTokenBridgeQuery. The data-layer filter only queries the 3-field {oldRefreshTokenHash, userId, tenantId} index; the issuer is verified in application code, not the query. Hoist the repeated model accessor into getRefreshTokenBridgeModel. Note: issuer is now load-bearing for recovery. A bridge stored with an issuer recovers only when the lookup supplies a matching issuer; the recovery lookup reads user.openidIssuer via AUTH_REFRESH_USER_PROJECTION (an exclusion projection that retains the field). If a user's persisted openidIssuer is empty while the stored bridge has one, recovery fails closed (falls through to normal re-authentication) until the bridge TTLs out — no security regression. Tests cover invalid signed-cookie payloads bypassing the bridge, both asymmetric issuer-presence cases, issuer normalization before comparison, and an index-alignment assertion guarding against re-adding the dropped index. * 🛠️ fix: Degrade OBO discovery on token resolution failures Catch expected OboTokenResolutionError failures during MCP tool discovery and fall back to unauthenticated tool listing instead of aborting discovery. This keeps discovery aligned with the existing unauthenticated listing behavior while preserving unexpected errors as real failures. Also correct OBO tool-call freshness comment and tighten the OBO trust-check permissions type to the existing role permission shape. Tests: - npx jest src/mcp/__tests__/MCPConnectionFactory.test.ts --runInBand --coverage=false - npx jest src/mcp/oauth/obo.spec.ts --runInBand --coverage=false * 🛠️ fix: tighten OBO tool-call errors, bridge logging, and flight typing Move resolveToolCallUserId inside the tool-call try/catch so an OBO identity mismatch surfaces with serverName/toolName context and the standard tool-call-failed message instead of an opaque bare Error. Raise the refresh-token bridge lookup failure log from debug to warn so transient infrastructure failures on the unauthenticated /api/auth/refresh path are observable, and guard the message access against non-Error values. Replace the unknown+cast in isDuplicateKeyError with a hasErrorCode type predicate so the duplicate-key check reads error.code without an assertion. Preserve real math/isEnabled in the MCPConnectionFactory test mock (mock only processMCPEnv) so mcpConfig timeouts no longer resolve to NaN, fixing the TimeoutNaNWarning that masked slow OAuth retry behavior. * 🧪 fix: Restore the Flight Uniqueness Index and Buffer the Graph Cache TTL Two CI failures on the merge, both in suites this environment cannot run (their MongoDB binary download is blocked). `GraphApiService.spec.js` still asserted the unbuffered TTL. Graph tokens route through the same `getTokenCacheTtlMs` as the OBO and openidStrategy caches, so the entry now expires 30s before the credential does. `openidRefreshFlight.spec.ts` dropped the database between tests, which takes the indexes with it, and Mongoose builds them only once when the model is compiled. Whether the unique `key` index survived into a test was a race with that one-time build. Without it a second `create` inserts instead of raising a duplicate-key error, so every worker believes it won the flight — the mutual exclusion the file exists to prove. Indexes are now rebuilt after each drop, which also makes the reclaim and complete cases reach those paths for the right reason. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SxKWxwqxAGckYpRsYTqx3F * fix: address OBO review findings * 🔐 fix: Install Bridge Indexes and Carry OBO Through Assistant Recovery Two findings from the Codex pass on |
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Danny Avila
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de59da9636
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🎟️ refactor: Require Credentials for Local Image Access by Default (#15252)
* 🔐 fix: Protect Local Image Access by Default * 🔐 fix: Scope Image Authorization to Active Sessions * 🧹 style: Format Image Authorization Checks * 🛡️ fix: Harden Image Avatar Authorization * 🧭 style: Sort Image Authorization Imports * 🔐 fix: Close Image Authorization Review Gaps * 🧭 fix: Normalize Stored Avatar Base Paths * 🏢 fix: Resolve Tenant Assistant Image Policy * 🛂 fix: Enforce Effective Image Access Policy * 🧹 style: Flatten Assistant Config Selection * 🧷 fix: Preserve Image Access Compatibility * 🪪 fix: Make Image Sessions Revocable * 🏗️ fix: Move Image Session Policy Into API |
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Dustin Healy
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6d2f29266c
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🔑 feat: Refresh-Capable Google Admin OAuth Sessions (#13832)
* 🔑 feat: Refresh-Capable Google Admin OAuth Sessions Google admin sessions cannot be refreshed today. Three gaps add up to that: passport.authenticate('googleAdmin', ...) in api/server/routes/admin/auth.js never sets access_type=offline, so Google omits the refresh_token from its token response; createOAuthHandler in api/server/controllers/auth/oauth.js only forwards a refresh token into the admin exchange payload when the user's provider is 'openid' AND OPENID_REUSE_TOKENS is enabled; and /api/admin/oauth/refresh is openid-only, calling openid-client.refreshTokenGrant against the configured OIDC issuer. OpenID admins refresh transparently because all three are in place for them. This PR closes all three. The googleAdmin authenticate call now passes accessType: 'offline' and prompt: 'consent' so Google issues a refresh token on consent; the chat-side googleLogin is untouched. The shared socialLogin verify callback now passes the IdP refreshToken through as passport's third argument (info), landing on req.authInfo, with the two-argument call shape preserved when no refresh token is present so existing strategy tests stay valid. createOAuthHandler reads req.authInfo?.refreshToken for non-OpenID admin providers and forwards it into the exchange code; the OpenID branch and its OPENID_REUSE_TOKENS gate are unchanged. /api/admin/oauth/refresh now accepts an optional provider field ('openid' | 'google', default 'openid'). The new Google branch POSTs grant_type=refresh_token to https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token, decodes the returned id_token for the sub claim, looks up the admin user by googleId, enforces tenant scope and ACCESS_ADMIN, and mints a fresh LibreChat JWT in the same response shape /oauth/exchange returns. It is gated on GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID and GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET being set (returns 503 GOOGLE_NOT_CONFIGURED otherwise); unknown provider values return 400 INVALID_PROVIDER. * 🔁 fix: Harden Google admin refresh against bot review findings Five validated findings from the initial bot pass: socialLogin.js: mirror the OpenID migrate-or-reject pattern on the email fallback. When an existing user is found by email and the stored provider id is empty, persist the refreshed sub so the refresh path can later bind to it. When the stored id is present and differs, reject as AUTH_FAILED to prevent identity-swap, matching the existing OpenID behavior in packages/api/src/auth/openid.ts. oauth.js: scope the non-OpenID admin refresh-token forwarding to provider === 'google'. The previous else branch would have forwarded a Discord refresh token (passport-discord supplies one) into the admin exchange payload even though /api/admin/oauth/refresh only accepts openid or google, leaving the admin client with a token it could not refresh. admin/auth.js (refreshGoogleAdminSession): drop id_token from the mandatory-fields check. Google's OAuth refresh response is documented to include id_token only conditionally, so the previous mandatory check broke refresh whenever Google omitted it. Decode id_token when present (fast path); when absent, call Google's userinfo endpoint with the access token to read sub. Wrap tokenResponse.json() in try/catch and return IDP_INCOMPLETE on parse failure instead of a generic 500. Tighten access_token to a typeof string check. admin/auth.js (refreshGoogleAdminSession): reuse serializeUserForExchange for the response user so the Google refresh shape matches /oauth/exchange and the OpenID branch exactly (full _id, id, email, name, username, role, avatar, provider, openidId). The previous Google-specific subset dropped fields the admin client relies on for later provider-specific refreshes and disambiguation. Tests cover each fix: socialLogin's migration and rejection cases, the oauth.js Discord-gating case, the userinfo fallback path on missing id_token, CLAIMS_INCOMPLETE when both id_token and userinfo are absent, IDP_INCOMPLETE on a non-JSON token body, and the full response shape on the happy path. * 🧪 fix: Add updateUser to appleStrategy test mock for socialLogin migration The shared socialLogin verify callback now invokes `updateUser` when the email-fallback path discovers a same-provider user with an empty provider id, persisting the refreshed sub. The Apple strategy test's `~/models` mock did not stub `updateUser`, so the migration path hit `TypeError: updateUser is not a function` and failed the `should handle existing user and update avatarUrl` case in CI shard 1/3. * 🧹 refactor: Move Google admin refresh into TypeScript @librechat/api helper Per repo guidance (CLAUDE.md): all new backend code must be TypeScript in /packages/api, and /api is a thin JS wrapper. The previous commit landed the Google admin refresh flow as ~120 lines of new JS inside api/server/routes/admin/auth.js, which violates that. This commit extracts the flow into a new TS helper at packages/api/src/auth/googleRefresh.ts and reduces the route handler to a thin dep-wiring wrapper. The helper exports applyGoogleAdminRefresh(deps, options) with the same shape as the OpenID applyAdminRefresh: callers pass findUsers, getUserById, canAccessAdmin, and mintToken as deps so the package stays free of /api model imports and capability/session helpers. The route handler now builds those deps from the existing model + capability + token modules and calls the helper, mapping AdminRefreshError to the documented HTTP responses. While moving the code, the helper now guards getUserById with Types.ObjectId.isValid before the direct-lookup branch, matching the OpenID admin path at packages/api/src/auth/refresh.ts. Without this guard a malformed user_id from the admin client would hit Mongoose findById's CastError and surface as a 500 INTERNAL_ERROR instead of falling through to the documented sub-based lookup. Tests move with the code: packages/api/src/auth/googleRefresh.spec.ts now owns the helper's behavior (token endpoint, userinfo fallback, ObjectId guard, USER_ID_MISMATCH/TENANT_MISMATCH/USER_NOT_FOUND/FORBIDDEN, rotated refresh-token pass-through, GOOGLE_NOT_CONFIGURED, IDP_INCOMPLETE on non-JSON body, CLAIMS_INCOMPLETE when both id_token and userinfo miss). The route-level api/server/routes/admin/auth.refresh.test.js drops the duplicated end-to-end Google cases and keeps a smaller surface: route delegates to applyGoogleAdminRefresh with the right deps + options, maps AdminRefreshError to HTTP status/code, falls through to 500 for unknown errors, and rejects unknown providers with INVALID_PROVIDER. * 🔁 fix: Tighten Google admin refresh and limit social-login changes Brutal-review findings on top of the upstream feature work. socialLogin.js: the migrate-or-reject pattern from the previous commit applied to every provider's chat-side verify callback, not just the admin flow. Gate both branches on `options.existingUsersOnly` so the chat-side googleLogin / facebookLogin / etc. keep their pre-existing email-fallback behavior unchanged. Tests follow: restore the original `should fallback to finding user by email` chat-side case and re-add the migration and mismatch-reject cases as admin-only by passing `{ existingUsersOnly: true }` to socialLogin in those tests. googleRefresh.ts: add a defense-in-depth `isEmailAllowed(user)` dep that the helper invokes before `canAccessAdmin`. Mirrors the `isEmailDomainAllowed` check the initial Google admin login already runs, so a deployment that removes a domain from `registration.allowedDomains` after issuance can no longer mint fresh JWTs for that admin via refresh. The route handler wires it up with `resolveAppConfigForUser` + `isEmailDomainAllowed`, falling back to `baseOnly` config for users without a tenantId. googleRefresh.ts: drop the unreachable `?? ''` defensive coalescing in `fetchGoogleTokenset`. The `GOOGLE_NOT_CONFIGURED` guard upstream already narrows `clientId`/`clientSecret` to non-empty strings; the function takes a narrowed `GoogleAdminRefreshConfiguredOptions` shape and `applyGoogleAdminRefresh` constructs that shape after the guard. * 🔒 fix: Apply brutal-review hardening to Google admin refresh Tighten the Google OAuth refresh flow against all outstanding code review findings: enforce JWT aud claim verification against the configured clientId (ISSUER_MISMATCH on mismatch), reject ambiguous googleId matches (limit:2 in findUsers, USER_ID_MISMATCH when multiple rows match), scope the authInfo refresh-token carrier to the Google provider only, add TOCTOU re-read defense after the admin googleId migration write in socialLogin, deduplicate canAccessAdmin/mintToken closures via buildAdminRefreshClosures shared by both OpenID and Google refresh paths, document rotation semantics on AdminExchangeResponse.refreshToken, standardise all log prefixes to [admin/oauth/refresh], and expand test coverage for all new paths. * 🔒 fix: Reject refresh for users migrated off the Google provider The interactive Google admin login path in socialLogin.js already rejects a user whose provider field is not 'google', returning AUTH_FAILED. Without a matching guard in the refresh path, a user migrated to OpenID could use an unexpired Google refresh token to keep minting admin JWTs indefinitely. Add a PROVIDER_MISMATCH check after resolving the user in both the direct getUserById branch and the findUsers fallback branch of resolveAdminUser, mirroring the provider gate the interactive path enforces. * 🔒 fix: Add ban check and fix domain allowlist on admin OAuth refresh Two gaps in the /api/admin/oauth/refresh route: Add middleware.checkBan to the route chain before preAuthTenantMiddleware, matching the gate that /login/local and createOAuthHandler already apply. Without it a banned admin could keep minting JWTs until their IdP refresh token expired. Replace getAppConfig({ baseOnly: true }) in the non-tenant isEmailAllowed closure with getAppConfig({ role: user.role }), which includes DB-layer overrides from the admin panel. baseOnly returns only YAML-derived config, so any allowedDomains list maintained entirely through the admin panel was silently inert on this path. Extract isEmailAllowedForUser as a shared helper, move it into buildAdminRefreshClosures so both Google and OpenID refresh paths enforce domain policy consistently, and add isEmailAllowed to AdminRefreshDeps in the TS package so applyAdminRefresh can invoke it. * 🔒 fix: Harden admin OAuth refresh against user bans, tenant scope gaps, and cross-tenant migration Post-identity-resolution ban check: the initial checkBan middleware fires before the refresh token is exchanged and req.user is populated, so it can only evaluate IP bans. After applyGoogleAdminRefresh/applyAdminRefresh resolves the user identity, we now synthesize req.user and re-run checkBan against the resolved user's id before emitting the JWT, so a user-level ban is enforced even from a fresh IP. Domain allowlist now includes userId: the getAppConfig call in isEmailAllowedForUser was passing only role, missing user and group-level allowedDomains overrides that the initial OAuth callback's checkDomainAllowed enforces via userId. Both branches now pass userId so buildPrincipals takes the full user+group+role resolution path. The tenant branch is also inlined (replacing resolveAppConfigForUser) to accept userId, wrapped in tenantStorage.run for correct Mongoose scoping and cache-key resolution. Cross-tenant email-fallback migration: the Passport verify callback fires before tenantContextMiddleware, so findUser({email}) is unscoped and can return a same-email user from another tenant. Writing googleId onto that document permanently corrupts the other tenant's account. Migration is now blocked for users with a tenantId; single-tenant users are unaffected. --------- Co-authored-by: Danny Avila <danny@librechat.ai> |
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ac163c2212
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🤝 fix: Honor OPENID_REUSE_TOKENS in Admin OAuth Exchange (#13154) |