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91 commits
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0e3c9088f6
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🫰 feat: Configure Tool Approval Modes Per Agent (#16707)
* 🫰 feat: Configure Tool Approval Modes Per Agent
* fix: Fence Remembered Tool Approval Authority
* fix: Unify Tool Approval Execution Invariants
* fix: Revalidate Learned Approval at MCP Invocation
* fix: Preserve One-Time MCP Review at Invocation
* fix: Execute Reviewed Calls on Templated MCP Connections
* fix: Scope Approval Witnesses to Executing Agents
* fix: Retain Approval Bindings for Hook-Rewritten Inputs
* fix: Pin Review Authority and Retire Settled Tool Calls
* fix: Fingerprint Effective MCP Request Headers
* fix: Preserve Routing Around Renewable MCP Token Fragments
* fix: Bind Tool Consent to OAuth Credential Generations
* test: Keep Mobile Approval Save Outside Drawer Escape Race
* fix: Fence OAuth Consent at MCP Transport Retries
* fix: Let Shared Agent Viewers Reset Personal Consent
* fix: Preserve Renewed Consent Across Reset Races
* fix: Resolve Verified Aliases for Personal Tool Reset
* fix: Fence Renewed OAuth Consent and Credential Review
* fix: Require Foreground Execution for Review-Only MCP Calls
* fix: Pin Invocation Ownership and Stable MCP Consent
* fix: Fence Superseded Tool Consent Completion Writes
* fix: Scope Consent Epochs to Effective MCP Authentication
* fix: Scope Approval Admission to Reachable Agent Tools
* fix: Preserve Approval Epochs for Runtime-Detected OAuth
* fix: Address Tool Approval Review Findings
* fix: Preserve Captured Consent When Tool Approval Is Inherited
* fix: Preserve Approval Admission Through Lazy Metadata
* fix: Fence Programmatic Reviews and Unresolved Lazy Approval Keys
* fix: Account for Normalized and Skill-Contributed Lazy Tools
* fix: Scope Lazy Approval to Selected Tool Spellings and Servers
* fix: Honor Disabled MCP Capability During Lazy Approval Admission
* test: Preserve Approval Merge Regressions After Rebase
* fix: Preserve One-Time Review During Non-OAuth Grant Outages
* fix: Retain One-Time Consent Across Resume Recovery
* fix: Preserve Reviewed Consent Through Transport Outages
* fix: Preserve Case-Variant Lazy Approval Hook Admission
---------
Co-authored-by: Lia <lia@librechat.ai>
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73d704656e
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📔 feat: Preserve Owner Text During PII Redaction (#16311)
* 📔 feat: Preserve Owner Text During PII Redaction * 🧵 fix: Keep Ordinary Chat Views Outside Private Text Provider * 🧷 fix: Preserve Owner Text Across Copy and Edit Paths * 🔏 fix: Protect PII on Denial and Abort Paths * fix: preserve protected text through denial, stop, and owner reload * test: cover preliminary private metadata in disconnect fixture * test: carry preliminary metadata in resume controller fixture * test: preserve Stop prerequisite identity in tenant fixture * fix: keep protected owner text out of search and exports * fix: preserve trusted PII placeholders through provider inspection * fix: coordinate protected turns across Stop and native sharing * fix: Preserve Private Text Admission and Query Lifecycles * fix: Track Private Query Effect Dependencies * fix: Fence Protected Admission and Screenshot Targets * fix: Share Protected Admission and Preserve Native Token Trust * test: Wait for Private Message Concurrency Indexes * fix: Preserve Protected Admission Across Recovery and Titles * fix: Coordinate Protected Root Admission and Early Stop --------- Co-authored-by: Lia <lia@librechat.ai> |
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e1e1d1b19d |
🎒 feat: Carry Project Context Across Conversations (#15684)
* 🎒 feat: Carry Project Context Across Conversations
* fix: fail a project attach whose upload hold cannot be released and keep file deletes independent of project cleanup
- Attaching a project file now fails, with nothing attached, when the file's
temporary upload hold cannot be released, instead of attaching a file that
can still expire.
- A failed project cleanup after a file delete is logged rather than failing a
delete that already happened, and a user-wide delete clears that user's
project references without reading every file first.
- Both resize handles share the orientation-aware grip, so a primary handle in
a vertical group renders a rotated grip like the alternate one.
* fix: treat an empty tenant id as no tenant in the project file picker
* fix: attach nothing when a project file is deleted while the attach is in flight
* fix: localize project file association failures instead of showing server text
* test: expect a localized reason for a rejected project file association
* fix: scope project file listing to the caller's tenant and name the file limit when attaching an existing file
- Listing a project's attached files now returns not found when the project
belongs to another tenant, matching the available-file listing and the
chat context resolver.
- Choosing an existing file for a full project now names the project file
limit instead of the generic attach error, like the upload path.
* fix: treat an empty tenant id as no tenant in every project tenant check
A caller whose tenant id is an empty string was refused its own tenantless
project when listing attached or available files, because the handlers
compared '' with null. The project handlers and the chat context resolver now
share one comparison that treats an empty tenant id as no tenant, the rule the
project file queries already follow.
* test: wait for the workspace layout swap and the mobile drawer before acting in the long-metadata spec
The desktop title was measured while the phone layout could still be the one
rendered, and the sidebar row menu was opened before the mobile drawer
committed its open state, which closes a menu opened ahead of it. The spec
now waits for the workspace's phone-only sidebar toggle to leave and for the
drawer to drop inert, the same drawer signal the agents helpers use.
* fix: keep the agent context fingerprint of a turn outside any project unchanged
Every turn now passes a project context key into the agent context
fingerprint, and a turn outside any project passed the no-project sentinel,
which changed the digest of every existing no-project checkpoint. An agent
event conversation written before this change then cold-started and reloaded
its history on its next event. The fingerprint now hashes the no-project key
as absent, so those checkpoints keep matching.
* test: load the long-metadata spec at phone width before driving the mobile drawer
The spec crossed back from desktop to phone width without a reload, which
leaves the drawer on the desktop toggle path whose delayed focus handoff to
the close button dismissed the row menu roughly 200ms after it opened. The
spec now reloads at phone width, as a phone arrives, and waits for the
drawer's own focus handoff before opening the menu.
(cherry picked from commit
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d33c72e6a8
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🛂 fix: Rate Limit Authenticated 2FA Management (#16565)
* fix: Rate Limit Authenticated 2FA Management * fix: Explain 2FA Rate Limits With Localized Retry Guidance * fix: Preserve Minimum 2FA Setup Budget |
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ea7ac99209
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🛶 fix: Keep Trigger Bans Off Shared Loopback IPs (#16535)
Co-authored-by: Lia <lia@librechat.ai> |
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418d62d52d
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🔐 feat: Support Cognito Access Tokens for Agent Management (#16224)
* feat: support Cognito M2M for Agent management * fix: reject compound management scopes * fix: require scopes for audience-less management tokens |
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696bcb6c1e
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🏦 fix: Reserve Credits for In-Flight Requests (#15879)
* 💳 fix: Reserve Balance for In-Flight Requests Admit each balance-checked request against the credits that other in-flight requests have not already reserved, and hold its prompt cost on the balance record until the turn settles. Apply a due auto-refill in the same fenced write so one refill window credits exactly once. - data-schemas: reserveBalance / releaseBalanceReservation replace createAutoRefillTransaction; the write is a compare-and-swap on tokenCredits, reservations and lastRefill (no pipeline updates) - balance.reservations is select:false so existing reads never see it - checkBalance returns a reservation handle; BaseClient and the assistants controllers release it once the turn settles - balance.reservationTtlMs bounds how long an unreleased reservation counts (default 30 minutes) * 🧮 refactor: Admit Reservations Without Contention and Record Refills Durably - admission is a conditional $push/$inc against a reservedCredits total, so concurrent admissions of a funded balance commit on their first write - expired reservations are pruned per element with their credits - auto-refill is fenced on every setting its decision reads and leaves a pendingRefill ledger marker in the same write; any later read records the transaction under the fixed id and clears the marker - a missing record is created with $setOnInsert inside reserveBalance - reservation lifecycle moves to packages/api (createBalanceReservations, withBalanceReservations); BaseClient releases once usage is recorded * 🪪 fix: Resolve Each User to One Balance Record - balance records a creator inserts are keyed by the user id, so creators racing on a missing record converge on one document; every balance read and write resolves a user to their oldest record, so existing duplicates stay inert - upsertBalanceFields takes insert-only fields; the balance-config middleware, schedules and lazy initialization pass the starting credit through them so it never overwrites a record another writer created - the auto-refill write is also fenced on reservedCredits - the scheduled-chat balance pre-skip counts reserved credits as unavailable * ⏳ fix: Count Only Unexpired Reservations in Scheduled Balance Checks findBalanceByUser with includeReservedCredits now totals the reservations that have not expired, so a reservation left by a crashed request stops pre-skipping scheduled chats at its expiry instead of when a later reservation write prunes it. * 🔁 fix: Renew Balance Reservations While Their Request Runs A reservation is renewed every half TTL until it is released, so only a reservation whose process stopped expires. Pruning removes a reservation only while it is still expired at the write, so one renewed after the pruning read survives. * 🛟 fix: Keep Reservations Alive Through Renewal Failures and Lost Acks - renewal reschedules itself: every half TTL, capped to the timer range, and a failed renewal retries within a tenth of that window - an admission write that errors removes its possibly committed reservation before rethrowing * 🛑 fix: Hold a Stopped Turn's Reservation Until Its Charge Lands - an aborted turn lets its reservations lapse after a minute (or the TTL) instead of releasing them, so the Stop request's charge lands before the credits are admitted again - balance.reservationTtlMs has a 10 second minimum, enforced in the schema and at runtime, so renewal stays bounded * ↩️ revert: Release a Stopped Turn's Reservation When the Turn Settles An aborted turn releases its reservations when it settles, the same as every other exit, instead of holding them for a fixed lapse window that refused funded requests after every Stop. The minimum reservation TTL stays. * ⏸️ fix: Hold Assistants Reservations Through Background Run Retries An in-progress Assistants run continues in the background after the handler responds; the turn's reservations now stay held until that run settles (createBalanceReservations().holdUntil). * 🔁 fix: Apply an Auto-Refill Once per Admission A refill interval that is due again the moment it is applied, such as a zero interval, let one admission refill repeatedly until the retry bound. Each admission now applies at most one refill, as the previous check did. * 🧹 fix: Prune Expired Reservations in One Write An admission that found expired reservations issued one write per hold, so a backlog left by a stopped process fanned out into as many concurrent writes. The prune is now a single write fenced on every hold it removes; a hold renewed after the read makes the write miss and the admission re-read. * ⏱️ fix: Renew Reservations From Their Stored Expiry The next renewal was scheduled half a TTL after the previous write settled, and the first one half a TTL after the admission returned, so a slow write could let a live hold expire before its renewal. Renewals are now scheduled from the expiry the last write stored. Expired holds are pruned as one bulk write of per-hold fenced updates, so a hold that changed after the read is skipped while the rest are removed, and the admission no longer spends a retry on the whole prune. |
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9cf33cc8be
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🧿 fix: Bind Login Flows to the Browser That Started Them (#15880)
* 🧿 fix: Bind Login Flows to the Browser That Started Them Social OAuth logins (Google, Facebook, GitHub, Discord, Apple) now store a random state in an HttpOnly cookie scoped to the callback path and only exchange the returned code when the callback carries that state. Apple's form_post callback uses a SameSite=None cookie, and passport-apple's own fixed state no longer bypasses the store. Local login, temp-token 2FA verification and admin local login reject requests a browser sent from another origin (Sec-Fetch-Site, falling back to Origin vs Host), trusting DOMAIN_CLIENT and DOMAIN_SERVER. Requests without browser fetch metadata, such as server-side callers, pass unchanged. The sessionless OAuth callbacks drop failureMessage, which wrote to req.session and turned any rejected callback into a 500. * 🧿 fix: Configure Login State Cookies and Localize Origin Rejections - OAuth state cookies take secureCookie and maxAgeMs from the caller; registration.oauthStateTtlMs in librechat.yaml sets the lifetime (default 10 minutes). - Secure deployments use a __Host- cookie at Path=/ so a sibling subdomain cannot plant a state. - The cookie keeps up to three pending states, so logins started in separate tabs all complete, and an unmatched callback no longer discards them. - passport-apple's preset state is dropped by deferStateToStore in packages/api. - The Origin fallback compares scheme and host against the request itself. - The same-origin rejection carries ErrorTypes.AUTH_CROSS_ORIGIN, which the login and 2FA screens show as a localized message. * 🧿 refactor: Sign Login State Against a Per-Browser Binding - The OAuth state store keeps a random per-browser binding in a __Host- cookie (reused across flows) and signs each state as issuedAt.nonce.HMAC(JWT_SECRET, provider, binding, issuedAt, nonce). Nothing is stored per flow, so any number of tabs complete, each state expires on its own clock, and concurrent starts no longer overwrite each other. - The experimental server entrypoint passes its app config to configureSocialLogins. - The same-origin guard also trusts an explicitly configured ADMIN_PANEL_URL. * 🧿 fix: Keep Separate Bindings for Racing First Logins A browser without a login-state binding now gets one under a cookie name with a random suffix, so two tabs that start their first login at once each keep their own binding. Later starts reuse an existing binding, and a callback is accepted when its state was signed for any binding the browser presents. * 🧿 fix: Sanitize Request-Derived Values in the Cross-Site Rejection Log The same-origin guard logged the request Origin and path verbatim. A non-browser client fully controls the Origin header, and the console transport uses a printf format that does not escape control characters, so a crafted value could forge log lines. Strip ASCII control characters (CR, LF, NUL and the rest) before logging, matching the pattern apiNotFound already uses. |
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f25242df98
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🦘 feat: Share Run-Scoped Files With Subagents (#15848)
* feat: add run-scoped file sharing for subagents Delegate current-message files through authorized execution catalogs and publish selected immutable code-output versions through the existing file pipeline. Requires the companion agents SDK context adapter before the dependency can be released and pinned. * fix: preserve child tool artifacts and verify file-sharing lifecycle Keep citations and other non-sandbox artifacts on their existing delivery path while retaining private code outputs and inspected images until publication. Cover native and text delivery, nested and sibling authorization, concurrent runs, cancellation cleanup, and checkpoint recovery through the browser harness. * test: align file-sharing fixtures and integration cleanup * test: repair LibreOffice conversion fixtures * test: verify deployment skill bytes across checkout formats * fix: align subagent file budgets and refresh boundaries * chore: update agents SDK to 3.8.6 * refactor: move code output processing into API workspace * fix: enforce shared file budgets for parents and teams * fix: declare the shared file encoder interface |
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e7dea565d1
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🧵 fix: Preserve Per-Message Inspection Budgets Through Provider Preparation (#15860) | ||
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8f13845da5
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📿 fix: Inspect Stored File Locators Per Message (#15841)
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* fix: inspect stored file locators per message * fix: declare traversal diagnostics for isolated declaration builds * refactor: inject locator traversal reporting from application callers * fix: propagate traversal diagnostics across protected entry points * fix: complete middleware reporters and hydration message counts |
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f1bd85498e
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🪫 fix: Recharge Direct OpenID MCP Bearer Sessions (#15704)
* fix: recover direct OpenID MCP bearer sessions * fix: harden direct bearer recovery lifecycle * fix: close direct bearer lifecycle races * test: align direct bearer checks with current dev * fix: unify direct bearer recovery budget * fix: infer direct bearer recovery from placeholder * fix: preserve bearer precedence and recovery budget * fix: propagate bearer recovery across joiners * fix: preserve direct bearer fallback without session provider * fix: close direct bearer recovery race windows * chore: sort bearer recovery test imports * fix: align bearer recovery with OAuth cleanup lifecycle * fix: fence request-scoped MCP creation during config mutations * fix: retain suspended MCP catalog authentication outcomes * fix: cancel MCP bearer recovery and reuse refreshed credentials * fix: close MCP bearer recovery lifecycle boundaries * fix: preserve ordered catalog authentication rejection * fix: isolate bearer recovery across request and transport boundaries * fix: preserve shared recovery ownership and credential precedence * fix: wait for recovery borrowers and validated OpenID publication * fix: observe the validated browser publication flight * fix: cancel abandoned OpenID publication followers * fix: fence refresh grant admission after lease acquisition |
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4b3a6eaf0e
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🪧 feat: Surface Conversation Code Approval Modes (#15703)
* feat: Add conversation code approval modes * refactor: Reuse shared code approval types * fix: Scope approval selector to stateful agents * fix: harden code approval state propagation * fix: fail closed during approval discovery * test: cover approval mode acceptance * test: use visible approval mode label * test: drive approval menu by keyboard * test: expose accept edits in BYOM acceptance * fix: read approval mode atomically on send * fix: align code modes with endpoint policy * fix: initialize code limiters at startup |
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dd5829ed77
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🏰 fix: Enforce Platform Grants for Code Workers (#15700)
* fix: Require Platform Grants for Code Workers * fix: Separate Platform Scope From Tenant Identity |
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911b6324d8
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🧲 fix: Coalesce and Bound Code Environment Status Polls (#15701)
* fix: Bound Code Environment Status Polling * refactor: Move Code Limiters Into API Package * fix: enforce status polling boundaries |
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09da878a47
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🚰 fix: Throttle Shared Link Reads and Aggregate Audit Findings (#15605)
* 🪵 fix: Aggregate Audit Findings and Rate Limit Shared Link Reads Audit-mode content filter rules wrote one `logger.info` per matching fragment, and inspection deliberately continues past every finding. A shared conversation full of distinct matching strings therefore produced one log write per fragment, regenerated on every retrieval of `GET /api/share/:shareId` — a public, unauthenticated route with no limiter. The 4,096-entry inspection dedupe set is a memory bound, not an event budget: once full, further values are inspected and logged again. Audit metadata carries no inspected text — only rule, source, field and provenance — so thousands of those writes were byte-identical lines. Findings are now counted inside an aggregation scope and reported once per distinct key with an `occurrences` count when the scope ends: - `assertModelBoundContent` opens a scope when audit rules are configured, bounding one inspection pass (a single message's fragments). - `assertConversationImportContentAllowed` opens the outer scope for import and shared-link snapshots, so per-message inspections nest into one report instead of one per message. - `createShareContentPreflight` spans the shared-file metadata pass too. Nested scopes reuse the outermost aggregation, and outside any scope the previous immediate write is kept. `GET /api/share/:shareId` re-inspects the whole snapshot on every request, so it now carries IP and user limiters like the neighbouring fork route (`SHARE_IP_MAX`/`SHARE_IP_WINDOW`, `SHARE_USER_MAX`/`SHARE_USER_WINDOW`, `SHARE_VIOLATION_SCORE`); the user limiter skips anonymous viewers. * 🔒 fix: Address Codex Findings on Share Audit Aggregation - The aggregation key joined rule fields with a space, but the filter schema allows spaces in custom pattern ids and labels, so `{id: 'a', label: 'b c'}` and `{id: 'a b', label: 'c'}` collided on the same source/field/provenance and merged two rules' counts under one identity. Serialize the tuple instead. - `SHARE_VIOLATION_SCORE` left unset reached `logViolation` as `undefined`, which selects that function's default score of 1 rather than the documented zero. With default ban settings a viewer refreshing a rate-limited shared link would be banned after 20 rejections. Default the score to 0 in code, not only in `.env.example`. - `removePorts` returns a full IPv6 address, so an attacker holding a prefix could rotate the host portion for a fresh bucket on every request — and for anonymous viewers the IP limiter is the only bound. Derive the key through `ipKeyGenerator` so IPv6 clients group by /56. |
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aec2121923
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🔐 feat: Add M2M Authentication for Agent Management (#15555)
* feat: add M2M authentication for Agent Management * fix: Harden Agent Management authentication * fix: Preserve OIDC authentication safeguards * fix: Normalize management principal IDs * fix: Bound OIDC signing key lookups * fix: Allow non-browser Agent Management clients |
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057039570b
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🔭 feat: Audit PII Filter Findings (#15508)
* feat: add audit-only content filter action * refactor: align filter action typing and tests * fix: preserve audit-only filter behavior * fix: enforce audit mode across content paths * fix: honor audit mode for canonical files |
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6195273429
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🧲 fix: Anchor Memory Partitions to Accessible Agents (#15475)
* fix: validate agent memory partitions * fix: authorize agent memory mutations * test: cover agent manager memory access * fix: centralize agent memory authorization * fix: harden agent memory authorization * fix: support synchronous role providers |
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74535662fe
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🎖️ fix: Apply Fallback Role on Group Overage (#15472) | ||
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fcae1025c0
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🧳 feat: Register Principal-Owned Code Environments (#15365)
* feat: add principal-owned code environments * fix: address code environment CI coverage * fix: expose principal code environments in endpoint config * fix: reject missing code environment bodies * fix: harden code environment lifecycle * fix: revalidate principal code environments * fix: synchronize code environment authorization * fix: bind code environments to current principals * fix: fail closed on code ACL cache errors * fix: prevent code environment override shadowing * fix: preserve principal environment defaults * fix: suppress revoked code environment aliases * fix: fail closed on environment augmentation * fix: narrow code environment defaults * fix: isolate code environment fallback * style: sort code config imports |
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70f735336d
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🛎️ fix: Enroll Remote Agent Runs in the Generation Lifecycle (#15349)
* fix: enroll remote agent runs in generation lifecycle * fix: close remote lifecycle ownership gaps * fix: close remote conversation drain races * fix: fence remote runs during conversation deletion * fix: reconcile remote deletion and settlement races * fix: complete owner deletion recovery * fix: preserve remote cleanup receipts * fix: consume deletion receipts before cleanup * fix: expose idempotent deletion option * chore: sort remote lifecycle imports |
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7a0061507e
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🪪 fix: Admit Confirmed Generation Retries Before Message Limits (#15341)
* fix: admit idempotent retries before message limits * fix: bound generation retry admission * fix: keep retry probe store-compatible * fix: exclude normalized resume routes * fix: preserve trusted retry exemptions * fix: bound retry claim admission * style: satisfy generation retry static checks |
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a70bcf66a4
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🪢 feat: show Langfuse session link in shared chats (#15273)
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* feat: show Langfuse sessions in shared chats * fix: wait for optional auth before loading shares * fix: require Langfuse access for shared session links * refactor: move shared Langfuse policy into API package * fix: wrap shared chat actions on mobile * fix: coordinate shared Langfuse link loading * perf: batch shared Langfuse capability checks |
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0c959deb99
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🧢 fix: Cap Batched HITL Answers Before PII and Moderation (#15257) | ||
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8f9fae0a6e
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🛂 fix: Preserve Legacy Assistant Attribution (#15118) | ||
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3ebef4c84e
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📨 feat: Add Authenticated Agent Event Ingress (#15110)
* feat: add authenticated agent event ingress * style: sort agent ingress imports * fix: harden agent event ingress * fix: bind event provenance to API keys * fix: inspect event input with legacy PII filters * fix: scope event status reads to source keys * fix: bind event status reads to remote sources |
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67b7b441b2
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🛂 feat: Filter Model-Bound Content by Source (#14425)
* feat: introduce optional content protection seam * feat: enforce source-aware content filters * feat: complete source-aware content enforcement * test: activate skill file-text fail-close fixtures * fix: harden source-aware content filters * fix: harden model-bound content filtering * fix: preserve legacy filters and generated files * fix: inspect shared scalar metadata * test: align mocks with current dev dependencies * feat: add persisted content filter safeguards * feat: complete source-aware content filter enforcement * fix: move resume content preflight into TypeScript * fix: close content inspection edge cases * fix: harden content protection boundaries * fix: complete content protection safeguards * test: align persisted memory filter coverage * fix: reconcile content protection with current dev * fix: reconcile content protection with latest dev * fix: close content protection review gaps * fix: enforce source-aware provider boundaries * fix: preserve legacy PII preflight semantics * test: stabilize stored branch preflight fixture * fix: defer agent writes until protected model admission * perf: harden source-aware model-bound filtering * fix: canonicalize provider lineage before validation * fix: satisfy model-bound callback type checks * perf: Bound content protection filtering work * fix: Bound submission array traversal * fix: Stabilize bounded content snapshots * fix: Scope model-bound traversal overflows * fix: Preserve scoped content inspection * fix: Accumulate aggregate traversal scopes * fix: centralize content policy boundaries * test: align deferred tool policy context * test: align controller policy mocks * style: normalize content protection imports * fix: close content policy review gaps * fix: narrow active skill policy config * fix: address content protection review boundaries * fix: retain exact provenance overflow sentinel * fix: preserve literal and scoped provenance updates * fix: narrow persisted edit provenance * fix: isolate exact overflow attribution * fix: centralize stored prompt protection * fix: fail closed on incomplete transcript evidence * fix: align canonical transcript routing * refactor: centralize content policy preflights * fix: isolate upload policy error typing * style: sort policy preflight imports * refactor: centralize content policy boundaries |
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29f6ec6eae
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🙈 feat: Config Option to Hide Response Feedback Buttons (#15085)
* feat: add interface option to hide response feedback buttons Adds `interface.feedback` to librechat.yaml. When set to false, the thumbs up/thumbs down buttons are removed from the message action row and the feedback endpoint rejects writes with 403, so deployments that do not consume the data can stop collecting it. Defaults to true. * refactor: hoist the feedback gate out of the message row and into typed middleware Reading startup config inside HoverButtons put a query observer and two Recoil subscriptions on every message row, and rows never unmount, so the cost grew with the conversation. Resolve the flag once per chat in useChatHelpers and carry it on TMessageChatContext; useMessageActions withholds handleFeedback when it is off, which the action row already treats as "no feedback controls". The flag now stays false until the config resolves, so a disabled deployment never flashes controls whose writes are rejected. Move the server-side policy into requireFeedbackEnabled under packages/api so the route keeps no policy of its own. * test: stub the feedback gate in specs that replace the api package The messages router now imports requireFeedbackEnabled, and express rejects an undefined handler at require time, so every spec that mocks @librechat/api wholesale has to carry the export. |
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d0f9d5625e
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🧵 fix: Close Child-Thread Read and Search-Cleanup Gaps (#15055)
* fix: close child thread read and cleanup gaps * fix: preserve child search cleanup invariants * test: complete mocked update result * perf: parallelize scoped message reads * fix: close child thread compatibility gaps * test: expect preserved cleanup failure * fix: reconcile legacy Meili cleanup markers |
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c5276fc63d
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⏱️ feat: Run Scheduled Chats Through Durable Agent Triggers (#14939)
* feat: Scheduled Chats — agent-centric scheduled runs creating real conversations
Squash of the full review-hardened branch (PR 14540, supersedes 14373) onto
latest dev, preserving the exact verified tree. History prior to this commit
lived on the pre-squash branch; every invariant below survived 25 Codex review
rounds plus two external audit rounds (R26) with regression tests that fail
without their fixes.
Feature:
- Schedules CRUD + side-panel UI (cadence dialog, run cards, Run Now), roles/
permissions (SCHEDULES:USE), interface.schedules availability, per-user limits
and capacity slots, timezone-aware cadence with DST-conservative floors and
misfire grace.
- Engine: single-process claim/fire loop with leases, loopback POST dispatch
(signed schedule-fire JWT claims, per-occurrence idempotency key inside the
route's clientRequestId charset), overlap/balance/capacity/duplicate skip
policies with auto-disable streaks (too_many_failures, insufficient_balance),
reconciliation from retained terminal-job evidence, erasure sweep.
- Scheduled runs create real conversations through the resumable agents chat
path: HITL pauses surface on the card (requires_action), resumes re-apply the
fire boundary's admission policy (revision fence, enabled, global kill switch,
SCHEDULES:USE, availability) before continuing a billed generation.
Correctness invariants (the audit surface):
- Settlement discipline: every persistence-producing write happens-before a
run's terminal outcome write; Stop/complete/pause race through single-winner
terminal CAS claims (dev's TerminalJobClaim substrate) with retained,
completedAt-less evidence for scheduled fires plus an owner-intended outcome
stamp (scheduleOutcome) the reconciler prefers over re-derived success —
round-tripped through the Redis hash mapper.
- Swallowed generation failures (client error content parts) classify to
error/skipped_balance instead of success on both initial and resumed paths;
stale stamps are refreshed evidence-first when persistence plus the Mongo
outcome write both fail.
- Abort honesty: delivery judged by generation ownership and the CAS's actual
from-status; republication escalates to the transport's acknowledged variant;
the Stop route settles only genuinely paused runs.
- Account deletion: one-way barrier (deletionRequestedAt) with auth-cache
tombstone-before-stamp, boundary rechecks across all auth strategies, quiesce
of scheduled + interactive work with durable per-stream abort fences
(positive-evidence acknowledgement only), owner-side finalization markers for
post-terminal billed writes, deferred-deletion sweep (explicitly ensured
partial index) that completes cascades autonomously. Remote OpenAI-compatible/
Responses requests are documented as outside the quiesce and tracked in issue
14594.
- Store compatibility: finalization markers optional on the legacy IJobStore
contract with coherent degradation (registration fails -> synchronous title
fallback; count reads 0).
* fix: fence terminal response persistence from deletion; retain stale-pause evidence
Two blockers from the third external review round.
Terminal persistence visible to account deletion:
- The finalization marker was registered only when post-terminal TITLE work was
possible, but every persistence-owning terminal CAS opens the same window: the
claim drops the job out of the active set BEFORE the response save (and the
background user-message/convo saves), so a deletion quiesce landing there saw
neither an active job nor a marker and could cascade while the admitted request
could still recreate messages. Both controllers now register the marker before
every persistence-owning claim — the fresh-turn path and the HITL resume — and
release it only after their pending saves (and any post-terminal title) have
landed, on success and failure paths alike. The TTL bounds a crash.
- settleAbortFence no longer clears a complete/error fence while
`terminalPersistencePending` is set: terminal at the CAS is not settled while
the owner is still persisting. The job facade now surfaces the flag.
- The marker trio is REQUIRED by the runtime store contract (assertJobStoreV2
refuses a store without it at configure time, keeping the failure loud and
deterministic) while remaining optional on the legacy public IJobStore type for
source compatibility. The silent degrade path from the previous round is gone —
it was not deletion-safe.
Stale-pause recovery retains scheduled evidence:
- Three crash/timeout recovery paths — ApprovalLifecycle.failStalePausePersistence
and the InMemory/Redis stale-pause cleanups — unconditionally stamped
`completedAt`, putting a scheduled fire's failed-pause error terminal on the
short completed TTL. A Mongo outage longer than that TTL erased the evidence and
the reconciler recovered the run as `interrupted` instead of `error`. All three
now follow the controller-observed path from the previous round: scheduled jobs
omit `completedAt` (retained-evidence TTL) and stamp the error outcome.
The PR description now explicitly narrows the deletion guarantee for the remote
OpenAI-compatible/Responses paths (tracked in issue 14594).
* fix: deletion-fence marker protocol — generation-scoped, atomic, fail-closed, all terminal paths
One consolidated pass over the finalization-marker mechanism, per the fourth
external review round. The invariant it establishes: NO persistence-owning
terminal CAS runs without a durable, generation-qualified marker covering the
window it opens, and every consumer treats a pending terminal as unsettled.
- Generation-scoped markers. Entries were keyed (userId, streamId), so a
Stop-superseded generation finishing late could clear the marker its
replacement registered on the same conversation. Marker fields are now
qualified by the generation's createdAt; clears must present the same
identity, and an unqualified legacy clear cannot drop a qualified entry.
- Atomic Redis registration. HSET-then-EXPIRE loses the fresh marker when the
user's existing hash expires between the two commands (or the process dies
there); registration is now a single Lua script carrying both.
- Fail closed everywhere. Registration failure (after one retry) now REFUSES
the terminal CAS instead of proceeding uncovered: the completion claim throws
into the error path, the error path skips completeJob and leaves the job
ACTIVE — deletion-visible by itself, recovered by the stale-running reaper —
and abortJob returns a new retryable `fence_unavailable` failure the Stop
route answers with 503 and the deletion quiesce treats as an unacknowledged
stop (fence kept). The previous round's log-and-proceed is gone.
- Every terminal path enrolled. abortJob now owns its window (register before
the abort CAS, clear in its finally — the Stop route's checkpoint prune and
partial save run inside beforePublish, between CAS and publication); the
interactive and background generation-error paths register before their
completeJob; the resume controller's error finalization registers before its
completeJob. A lost or thrown claim releases the marker after pending saves
flush instead of holding the user's deletion behind the TTL.
- Every pending terminal unsettled. settleAbortFence defers on
terminalPersistencePending for ALL statuses — including `aborted`, whose
route-side persistence the previous guard missed.
Also: a direct Redis regression for scheduled stale-pause retention (the P2
test gap), and the PR description no longer claims to carry every commit.
* fix: lease-token lifecycle fences — same-generation isolation, admission fence, undelivered-Stop retention, legacy abort enrollment
Fifth external review round; four P1s, handled as the requested consolidated
lifecycle-fence pass.
- Lease tokens. Marker fields were (streamId, createdAt), shared by every
contender on the same generation — completion and Stop, or two racing Stops —
so a losing contender's cleanup erased the winner's still-live marker. Every
registrant now carries a unique lease token in the field and may only ever
clear its own lease; unqualified legacy clears cannot touch qualified entries.
- Admission fence. Authentication can pass before the deletion barrier goes up,
and the durable createJob is several async steps later — a deletion quiesce in
that window saw neither an active job nor a marker and could cascade before
the admitted request created its job. The controller now registers an
admission lease and THEN rereads the deletion barrier: the ordering guarantees
either this request observes the barrier (403, lease released, slot/claim
cleanup) or the quiesce observes the lease and defers. Held until createJob is
durable; released on every refusal and initialization-error path. Fail closed
when the lease itself cannot be registered (503 retryable).
- Undelivered-Stop retention. abortJob released its lease in a finally even when
delivery AND publication had provably failed — the job reads terminal
(invisible to active-set scans), a user Stop writes no durable abort fence,
and the remote owner keeps generating and will persist its abort-catch writes
whenever the signal finally lands. The lease is now retained in exactly that
case, and each resignal attempt heartbeats a fresh lease so the fence outlives
the TTL for as long as delivery is still being driven. The abort-winning
turn's own loser-side pending saves are additionally fenced in the controller
catch (best-effort — those writes are already in flight).
- Legacy abort enrollment. abortMiddleware (assistants abort route fallback for
non-assistants endpoints) awaited abortJob and then spent usage and saved the
stopped response AFTER the abort's lease was released. Both writes now run
inside `beforePublish`, between the abort CAS and publication, covered by the
same lease as every other abort.
Barrier tests, each verified to fail without its fix: same-generation lease
isolation (store), racing two-Stop loser cleanup (manager, stale-read forced
CAS race), undelivered-Stop lease retention, resignal heartbeat, admission
refusal with lease-before-reread ordering plus release-on-durable-create, and
legacy-abort persistence inside beforePublish.
* fix: heartbeat-backed owner-lifecycle leases close the settlement handoff races
Sixth external review round: the remaining P1 interleavings were one structural
problem — lease handoffs that were not atomic — resolved as the requested
consolidated lifecycle-lease pass.
- Quiesce reads leases BEFORE the active-job scan. The admission-lease -> durable
-job handoff is only atomic against a reader in the OPPOSITE order of the
writer: writers hold the lease strictly until the job is active-set visible,
so leases-first shows every interleaving either the lease or the job.
Jobs-first allowed a request to create its job after the scan and release its
lease before the count — hiding both, cascading, and letting the new
generation persist into a deleted account.
- The abort acknowledgement is fenced by the owner-lifecycle lease. Redis ACKed
the moment the owner's AbortController tripped; the stopping side released its
lease on that ACK while the owner's asynchronous abort-catch persistence was
still ahead. The transport now awaits a manager-installed pre-ACK hook that
registers a DETERMINISTIC owner lease (exactly one owner exists per
generation, and determinism is what lets the signal-time registrant and the
owner's catch-side release agree across processes) before the acknowledgement
is persisted or published; an owned same-replica abort bridges to the same
lease before tripping its local controller. Both generation-owner catches
(fresh turn, resume) release it once their writes land.
- A failed replacement handoff no longer orphans the predecessor. The atomic
replacement removes it from active storage, and an unconfirmed handoff
terminalizes the replacement too — leaving nothing a quiesce could discover
while the predecessor's provider may still be generating. Its owner lease is
now retained at the point the receipt fails delivery; the owner replica renews
it through the pre-ACK fence when the signal finally lands.
- Leases HEARTBEAT while held. The five-minute store TTL only bounds a crashed
holder; live persistence — a stalled save, a long deferred title — must never
outlive its own fence. holdUserFinalization registers and renews every minute
until released; the controllers' completion/error/admission leases all hold.
The undelivered-Stop retention moved to a deterministic `stop` lease that
every resignal attempt renews and the first successful one clears (no more
opaque leases accumulating to TTL), and a THROWN abort transition releases the
contender lease instead of leaking it.
- The user-document abort-fence mutations now invalidate the auth user-doc
cache, matching every other user-doc write.
Barrier tests, each verified to fail without its fix: quiesce lease-scan
ordering (plus the observed-lease defer), pre-ACK fence ordering at the
transport, owned-abort owner-lease bridging, replacement-handoff predecessor
retention, held-lease heartbeat past the TTL, and failed-then-successful
resignal reaping the retained stop lease.
* fix: one manager-owned owner-lease span across every abort delivery path
Seventh external review round; four lifecycle-fence gaps, closed by making the
owner-lifecycle lease a single manager-owned, heartbeat-held span.
- Fail-closed acknowledgements. The pre-ACK hook registered a one-shot lease and
the transport ACKed even when it failed; a same-replica owned abort likewise
swallowed registration failure. The hook now acquires a HELD owner lease
(heartbeat until the owner's catch releases it via releaseOwnerLease) and a
rejection SUPPRESSES the acknowledgement — the stopping side stays retryable
behind its retention lease, and every resignal re-drives the handler. The hook
also stopped gating on `job.createdAt === generationId`: during a replacement
handoff the store holds the replacement while the abort targets the
predecessor, and that gate silently skipped exactly the generation being
acknowledged (the store job is owner identity, never a generation gate). A
local owned abort acquires the same held lease before tripping its provider;
post-CAS the trip cannot be withheld, so acquisition failure downgrades
delivery and the retention handoff keeps the user fenced.
- Committed-but-lost-reply disambiguation. A thrown abort transition released
the contender lease as if nothing had happened, but a Lua CAS can commit and
lose its reply — an aborted job invisible to active-set scans whose provider
was never signalled, with no fence left. The throw path now re-reads the exact
generation: only a job still live under the caller's identity proves no
commit; committed or ambiguous outcomes hand the fence to the deterministic
stop lease (kept on the contender lease if even that fails) before rethrowing.
- Replacement handoff covered end to end. A LOCAL replacement abort acquires the
predecessor's held owner lease before the trip (failure reports the receipt
undelivered, engaging retention). Failed-handoff retention is no longer a
swallowed one-shot: it heartbeats with the durable acknowledgement proof as
its renewal predicate — acquisition failures keep retrying for as long as the
fence is needed, and the retainer stands down (without clearing the shared
field) once the remote owner ACKs and thereby holds its own lease.
- A LOCAL resignal delivery hands off to the owner lease BEFORE clearing the
retained stop lease, and keeps the stop lease when that handoff fails.
Barrier tests: hook rejection suppressing the ACK, commit-then-lost-reply
retention with its provably-uncommitted counterpart, local-resignal owner
handoff ordering, pre-ACK owner lease held past the store TTL until release
(and provably stopped after), and failed-handoff retention retrying on its
heartbeat — verified fail-before/pass-after by stashing the fixes.
* fix: finish scheduled chat lifecycle hardening
* fix: close scheduled chat review follow-ups
* fix: generation-fence abort recovery evidence
* test: wait for settled approval tool output
* test: preserve scheduled init reconciliation option
* refactor: rebuild scheduled chats on durable agent triggers
* test: reset MCP cache mock between cases
* test: isolate scheduler startup in server specs
* fix: harden scheduled run lifecycle
* fix: normalize schedule capacity conflicts
* test: type schedule collision fixture
* fix: re-fence scheduled resume and expiry
* fix: fence scheduled resume handoffs
* fix: release superseded manual schedule leases
* fix: release failed run-now claims
* fix: release superseded engine claims
* fix: repair schedule dialog interaction and rework its form
The agent picker was unusable: ControlCombobox portals its popover to the
body by default, which lands it outside the dialog's Radix focus trap. Clicks
passed through it, it could not be tabbed into, and the trap fighting Ariakit
for focus locked the page up on selection. The prop is documented for exactly
this case — pass `portal={false}` and give the dialog `overflow-visible`, as
ProjectButton already does. The time and day dropdowns defaulted the same way.
Alongside that:
- Extract the agent builder's instructions editor (special-variable menu plus
expand-to-fullscreen) into a controlled `VariableEditor` and use it for the
schedule prompt. Insertions now route through `onChange`, so react-hook-form
sees them — the schedule PATCH is built from `dirtyFields`, and a `setValue`
that skipped dirty tracking would have dropped an inserted variable silently.
- Replace the hand-rolled frequency buttons with the shared `Radio`. They marked
the selection with `bg-surface-hover` on an outline button whose hover is the
same token, so the selected option was indistinguishable from a hovered one;
`Radio` is also a real radiogroup rather than four `aria-pressed` toggles.
- Wrap the fields in a real `<form>` and associate the footer button by id, so
Enter submits. Group the frequency, day and time controls in fieldsets.
- Add placeholders for name and prompt, match the textarea fill to the other
fields, and label the hourly case as minutes past the hour.
- Widen the dialog to `md:max-w-3xl` and pair name with agent so the form fits
without scrolling on desktop.
- Move scheduled chats below skills and above prompts in the side nav.
The new dialog spec fails when the portal fix is reverted.
* test: cover scheduled and subagent deletion drains
* refactor: own the form-control appearance in the client primitives
Addresses the codex finding on ScheduleDialog: a feature-local `FIELD_CLASS`
restated the `Input` primitive's border, radius, height and background so it
could be pasted onto the schedule dropdowns, leaving those controls with no
connection to the primitive they were imitating.
Move that appearance into `packages/client/src/components/Field.ts` as the
single source `Input` and `Textarea` now compose, and give `Dropdown` and
`ControlCombobox` a `variant="field"` that applies it. The schedule dialog
passes the variant and carries no class strings of its own.
This also repairs a break the dev merge would otherwise have introduced: the
newer `Dropdown` splits `className` (wrapper) from `triggerClassName`, so the
old pasted classes would have landed on the wrapper and left the triggers
unstyled.
The semantic-token guard now watches the shared module and asserts each
primitive still composes it, which covers more than the two files it read
before.
* fix: keep an explicit schedules disable from becoming an opt-in
`use` is two things at once for a dual-purpose runtime interface field: a
permission bit, which DB overrides strip, and the runtime disable signal that
`getLimits` reads. Stripping it from `{ use: false, maxPerUser: 2 }` leaves an
object, and `getLimits` treats any object without `use: false` as enabled — so
an admin override written to stop scheduled billing for a role or user started
it instead.
Collapse an explicit disable to the boolean form before the strip, on both
paths that accept it: the `interface.schedules` field patch, which admitted the
object wholesale because bare runtime paths deliberately bypass the permission
gate, and the overrides merge, which reached the composite-field branch and
kept `maxPerUser`. Objects that only narrow limits are untouched, so a
principal can still be given a smaller cap.
Both regressions fail without the normalizer.
* fix(schedules): Wave A — null-balance CAS, atomic paused-card clear, clustered erasure sweep
Slice 1 (thread r3804518381): route the existing-null balance initialization
through a { user, tokenCredits: null } compare-and-set instead of a blind $set,
so a concurrent initializer/charge landing between the preflight read and the
write is never handed back its spent starting balance. On a CAS miss the
preflight re-reads the winner. The absent-record $setOnInsert path and the
credited-record refill-config sync are unchanged. Adds the initializeNullBalance
adapter (no upsert) and regression coverage for winner/miss/sync cases.
Slice 2 (thread r3804518388): updateScheduleById now drops a `requires_action`
lastRun projection atomically with the configRevision bump. Any pause present at
edit time was projected under the pre-edit revision and can never be replaced by
its own revision-fenced terminal outcome — a disabling edit would strand the
card on "Needs approval" forever. Implemented as classic-operator CAS branches
(DocumentDB rules out a conditional pipeline $unset), fenced on the card STILL
being the pause so a terminal outcome or newer occurrence that races in is
preserved. Terminal history survives untouched.
Slice 4 (thread r3803826204): expose initializeScheduleErasureSweep from the
schedule runtime facade and start it in every clustered (experimental) worker
after Mongo is up. It re-drives eraseScheduleIfDrained for soft-deleted rows so
a hidden prompt cannot outlive its drain when the delete/erase-on-settle
attempts miss. It arms nothing else and never infers owner death from a
process-local missing job (isTopologySafeToArm gates that).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CZwZPDBgxy4mCWWg6zQSjq
* fix(schedules): Wave B.1 — reversible account-deletion schedule suspension
Thread r3804518383. Account-deletion quiesce marked every schedule `deleting`,
disabled it, and cleared nextRunAt destructively. When a later cascade step (or
the drain itself) failed, the controller cancelled the user-deletion fence —
restoring the user — but the schedules stayed `deleting` and were erased by the
sweep, silently losing all of a live user's scheduled prompts.
Replace the destructive marking with a REVERSIBLE, token-fenced suspension:
- suspendUserSchedulesForDeletion(userId, token) snapshots each schedule's prior
enabled/nextRunAt under a per-attempt token, then fences firing (disable, clear
nextRunAt, rotate claimToken). It never sets `deleting`, so a suspended row is
not erasure-eligible. Snapshotting reads then bulkWrites (a classic update
cannot copy field values under DocumentDB), fenced per row so an already-
suspended/soft-deleted/edited row is left alone; idempotent per token.
- restoreUserSchedulesFromDeletion(userId, token) reverses it, re-enabling and
re-arming only rows still carrying the exact attempt token and not independently
deleted — so an owner-deleted or newer-attempt-suspended schedule is never
resurrected.
- deleteUserController generates the attempt token, passes it to quiesce, and on
any failure that cancels the user-deletion fence restores the suspended rows. A
successful deletion hard-deletes them (and their snapshots) via the existing
cascade and never restores.
Adds a `deletionSuspension` embedded field (excluded from the wire schedule),
data-method regression tests (suspend/restore/fence/idempotency/no-resurrect),
and controller tests (restore on drain-false and post-quiesce cascade failure,
no restore on success).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CZwZPDBgxy4mCWWg6zQSjq
* fix(schedules): Wave B.2 — wire the interactive Stop persistence protocol
Thread r3804255932. The durable Stop primitives (requestRunAbort 'stop',
getScheduleRunAbortState, markRunAbortPersisted) already existed but production
only used requestRunAbort(..., 'deletion'). An interactive Stop flipped the job
to `aborted` and then persisted its partial message + checkpoint inside
`beforePublish`, without ever stamping the schedule Stop or acknowledging it —
so reconciliation, the generation owner, or a concurrent schedule/account
deletion could terminalize the run and release its capacity (and erase data)
mid-write.
Wire the request -> persist -> acknowledge -> settle barrier through the
schedule runtime (the route never touches raw Mongo):
- Expose beginScheduledStop / acknowledgeScheduledStopPersistence on the service.
- The abort route stamps the Stop BEFORE signalling abortJob (a serialized
'in_progress' loser returns 409 STOP_IN_PROGRESS without a second abort),
acknowledges only after beforePublish persistence succeeds, and on a
persistence failure leaves the barrier unresolved so the run stays preserved
(client retries; stale-owner timeout is the bounded recovery). A failed abort
releases the stamp it placed so a replacement/retry is never blocked through
its predecessor.
- recordScheduleOutcome (the owner settlement path) now waits, bounded, for the
Stop acknowledgement before terminalizing; a resolved/non-stop/stale marker
proceeds immediately. The paused Stop settles only after its own ack.
Adds service-layer barrier tests and route-level ordering/persistence-failure/
in-progress tests; the data-layer serialization is already covered.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CZwZPDBgxy4mCWWg6zQSjq
* fix(schedules): Wave C.1 — reconcile durable trigger delivery with the reservation
Threads r3803826192 (manual limiter) and r3804255924 (PII/moderation), plus the
independently-found long-Retry-After race. fireSchedule reserves a `started` run
and a global capacity slot BEFORE the durable trigger delivery reaches the chat
route, where an interactive limiter (manual Run Now), PII, or moderation can
reject it before any generation job exists — dead-lettering the delivery while
the run sat `started` until the 30-minute orphan sweep mislabeled it interrupted.
And a valid delivery deferred by Retry-After (up to 24h) could be orphan-settled
and have its capacity released, then fire anyway.
Translate durable delivery state into the schedule outcome:
- Store the deterministic trigger deliveryKey on the ScheduleRun reservation
(computed from the envelope BEFORE enqueue, so an ambiguous commit still has it).
- Add a getTriggerDelivery engine dep (wired to the merged trigger service's
getDelivery) that reads the durable delivery by key.
- Schedule reconciliation, for a jobless `started` run: staging/pending/leased →
admission is live, never orphan; dead → record `error` from the durable
lastError and release capacity promptly (no 30-minute wait), through the
ordinary outcome/auto-disable path; succeeded or no record → the existing
legacy orphan policy (interrupted only past the cutoff); a delivery lookup
failure defers rather than orphaning a possibly-live delivery. Limiter/PII/
moderation middleware writes no schedule state.
Adds reconcile state-mapping tests (dead/pending/leased/staging/succeeded/none/
lookup-failure) and a fire test that the reservation's deliveryKey equals the
enqueued delivery's idempotency key.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CZwZPDBgxy4mCWWg6zQSjq
* fix(stream): Wave C.2 — durable retry/ack for terminal host lifecycle actions
Thread r3804518375. Approval expiry won the `requires_action → aborted` CAS and
then invoked the host hook best-effort: `runApprovalExpiredHandler` swallowed a
failure, and because later sweeps enumerate only `requires_action` jobs, the now-
aborted job was never offered again. In the clustered entrypoint (no schedule
reconciler) the ScheduleRun stayed `requires_action` and its retained job
persisted indefinitely.
Make the host lifecycle work durable rather than schedule-specific:
- Add a generic `terminalHostActionPending` marker, set ATOMICALLY in the same
terminal transition (ApprovalLifecycle.expireWithIdentity), only when a host
adapter is installed.
- Retain and index such jobs: both stores keep them out of terminal reaping and
expose getTerminalHostActionJobs(); Redis adds a set + extended (24h-bounded)
TTL, in-memory a bounded 24h retention so a permanently-failing hook cannot leak.
- The manager clears the marker only after the adapter acknowledges success,
fenced by generation identity (clearTerminalHostAction), so a replacement
generation can neither clear nor execute its predecessor's action.
- cleanup()/expireStaleApprovals() enumerates unacknowledged terminal host actions
across restarts and replicas and retries the idempotent hook; the relay only
re-invokes while the marker is unacknowledged, so a successful ack prevents
duplicate work. Store-won expiry marks it too, so a loser-replica relay still
crosses the hook.
- Terminal SSE notification continues regardless of host-hook outcome.
Covers in-memory behavior (retry after failure, restart/other-replica retry, ack
prevents duplicates, identity fence, terminal notification on failure, no marker
accumulation for non-scheduled jobs) and updates the Redis cluster-membership
contract test for the new index.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CZwZPDBgxy4mCWWg6zQSjq
* style(schedules): satisfy import sorting in fire.ts and fire.spec.ts
CI "Static checks" failed on IMPORT_SORT for the two files Wave C.1 added imports
to (the AgentTriggerEnvelope type import and getAgentTriggerIdempotencyKey).
Applied scripts/sort-imports.mts to exactly those files — imports-only reordering,
no behavior change. Other files reported by a repo-wide check are pre-existing on
dev and deliberately left untouched so this PR is not widened.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CZwZPDBgxy4mCWWg6zQSjq
* fix(schedules): repair the deletion CLI and order restore before the fence release
Addresses three findings from the fresh Codex review.
P1 — config/delete-user.js called methods.disableUserSchedulesForDeletion, which
Wave B removed in favor of suspendUserSchedulesForDeletion. The file is
@ts-nocheck and its spec mocked the removed name, so neither typecheck nor tests
caught it; the real CLI would throw a TypeError before deleting anything and then
only unwind the fence. The CLI now uses the tokenized protocol: it mints a
suspension token, suspends with it, and restores that exact attempt's rows in its
finally block when the deletion does not commit. Its spec mocks the real methods,
so the breakage can no longer hide.
P2 — both the HTTP controller and the CLI released the user-deletion fence BEFORE
restoring schedules. That fence is what refuses new schedule writes/claims, so the
gap let an owner PATCH edit a still-suspended row and have its enabled/next-run
state overwritten by the older snapshot, and let a second deletion attempt
re-suspend under a new token — making the first restore a no-op and stranding the
disabled snapshot permanently. Restore now runs first, while writes are still
fenced.
Hardening for the same defect class across a crash: suspendUserSchedulesForDeletion
now ADOPTS an existing suspension's snapshot when re-suspending a row abandoned by
an earlier attempt, instead of re-capturing the row's current (already-suspended)
state. Without this, an attempt that died before restoring would have its
successor snapshot "disabled, no next run" and permanently strand the schedule.
Tests: CLI restore-before-fence ordering and no-restore-on-success; the same
ordering assertion on both controller post-quiesce failure paths; a data-method
regression that a second attempt adopts the abandoned snapshot and restores the
original enabled/next-run state.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CZwZPDBgxy4mCWWg6zQSjq
* fix(schedules): converge dead deliveries in topology-safe maintenance
Codex finding: the `dead` delivery mapping added in Wave C.1 lives only inside
startScheduleEngine's reconciler, but the clustered entrypoint arms no engine — it
runs erasure-only maintenance. A delivery queued before a restart into clustered
mode and then rejected before generation creation (interactive limiter, PII,
moderation) dead-letters while its ScheduleRun stays `started`, holding a global
capacity slot indefinitely for an ordinary non-deleting schedule.
Add a dead-delivery convergence pass to the erasure sweep, so every topology that
runs schedule maintenance settles it. The pass is POSITIVE-EVIDENCE-ONLY and is
therefore safe where absence-based reconciliation is not: a `dead` delivery is
durable shared state proving no generation owns the reservation. It settles only
when the job is confirmed absent or identity-mismatched (an identity-matched job
still owns the run), defers on an unknown job lookup, on an in-flight abort, and
on an in-flight resume hand-off, ignores legacy reservations with no deliveryKey,
and applies a short grace so an accepted delivery still creating its generation is
never settled mid-handoff. Auto-disable policy is deliberately left to the armed
engine; this path records the failure and frees the slot.
Deliberately does NOT touch api/server/experimental.js — the clustered entrypoint
already starts this sweep, so the convergence arrives through the existing
initializer and the shared-file footprint stays as-is.
Tests: settles a dead delivery as error under an explicitly UNSAFE topology,
leaves live deliveries alone, never settles under an identity-matched running
generation (delivery is not even consulted), defers an in-flight abort, and
ignores a reservation with no deliveryKey.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CZwZPDBgxy4mCWWg6zQSjq
* fix(stream): refresh host-action retention on each retry attempt
Codex finding: unacknowledged terminal host-action evidence was capped at the
24h pause TTL, so a host dependency (Mongo) unreachable for longer than that let
the Redis key — and its pending marker — expire with no generation-fenced
acknowledgement, stranding the ScheduleRun where no reconciler is armed.
Measure retention from the LAST retry rather than from the terminal transition:
enumerating a pending host action IS the retry attempt, so both stores refresh
its retention as they hand it to the hook (Redis re-EXPIREs the job key; the
in-memory store stamps terminalHostActionRefreshedAt and bounds from it). Evidence
therefore survives as long as some replica is still actively retrying, while a
deployment that stops sweeping entirely still lets it age out — so this does not
reintroduce the unbounded leak the cap existed to prevent.
Test: after a failed hook, a later cleanup pass keeps the marker pending and moves
its retention basis forward.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CZwZPDBgxy4mCWWg6zQSjq
* fix(schedules): defer settlement when the Stop barrier times out
Codex finding: waitForStopPersistence returned after its 5s poll budget even when
the Stop was still fresh and unacknowledged, and recordScheduleOutcome then went
straight on to terminalize the run — releasing its capacity, deletion, and erasure
barriers while beforePublish may still have been writing. Slow checkpoint cleanup
is indistinguishable from a dead route on that signal, so the timeout was being
treated as if the barrier had been satisfied.
The poll budget now means "undecided", not "clear". On timeout with a fresh,
unacknowledged Stop the barrier DEFERS: recordScheduleOutcome returns false
without recording, leaving the run active/preserved. Settlement then happens
either when the route acknowledges, or once the existing stale-owner cutoff
(ABORT_OWNER_PRESUMED_ALIVE_MS) authorizes a later attempt — which the loop
already treats as clear-to-settle. Callers with durable retry (the approval-expiry
host action, reconciliation) re-drive it, so a deferral converges rather than
stranding the run.
Test: a fresh Stop that never acknowledges within the budget reports not-settled
and records no outcome.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CZwZPDBgxy4mCWWg6zQSjq
* fix(schedules): require definite delivery failure, extract its message, converge deferred Stops
Third Codex round. Three findings in code from this closeout, plus one pre-existing
P1 that is a one-line operator-safety fix.
P1 — dead-delivery settlement demanded too little evidence. `dead` does not prove a
request was rejected: the trigger host marks response timeouts and invalid success
responses `certainty: 'ambiguous'`, and the engine dead-letters those once retries
are exhausted. The erasure sweep treated every dead letter as positive evidence, so
an ambiguous one sitting over a generation a peer had accepted could terminalize the
run and release its capacity mid-flight. It now settles only on a DEFINITE rejection,
unless job absence is deployment-authoritative (safe topology), where the
confirmed-absent job is itself the evidence.
P1 — `lastError` is an `AgentTriggerDeliveryFailure` object, not a string. A
duplicated local interface declared it `string` (against CLAUDE.md's no-duplicate-
types rule), so both the sweep and the engine reconciler passed the object into the
String-typed run/schedule `error` fields; Mongoose would reject the cast, the per-row
catch would swallow it, and the run would keep its global capacity slot. The dep type
now reuses the canonical `AgentTriggerDeliveryFailure` and both call sites pass
`.message`. Re-typing immediately surfaced a stale test that had asserted a string.
P1 (pre-existing) — the base-config global stop is honored in `getLimits` via
`isRuntimeDisabled` rather than a literal `=== false`. The stop has two shapes, and
deepMerge turns base `{ use: false }` plus a principal override of `true` into
`{ use: true }`, so the literal check reported the feature enabled and Run Now
dispatched straight through fireSchedule, bypassing the operator's emergency stop.
Now the same predicate the engine gate already uses.
P2 — a Stop whose settlement DEFERRED past the poll budget had no convergence path
where no reconciler is armed. `acknowledgeScheduledStopPersistence` now optionally
re-drives the terminal outcome once the barrier clears; `recordRunOutcome` is
match-guarded and idempotent, so an owner that already settled makes it a no-op. The
abort route passes it for a running generation; a paused job still settles explicitly.
Tests: ambiguous dead letters refused under unsafe topology but settled when absence
is authoritative, definite rejections settled either way, the failure message carried
through, and the abort route's re-drive present for running / absent for paused.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CZwZPDBgxy4mCWWg6zQSjq
* fix(schedules): converge terminal runs in clustered workers, retry suspension restore
Fourth Codex round on
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a33b128c47
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🪪 fix: Preserve Stored Access Token Expiry Over ID Token Exp (#14982)
* 🪪 fix: Preserve Stored Access Token Expiry Over ID Token Exp extractOpenIDTokenInfo let the ID token exp claim overwrite the token set's stored expires_at. The ID token is minted at login and never refreshed, so once a session outlives the ID token TTL, isOpenIDTokenValid reports the access token as expired even when expires_at is hours in the future, and OpenID placeholder substitution silently stops: MCP headers configured with {{LIBRECHAT_OPENID_ACCESS_TOKEN}} ship the literal placeholder string as the bearer credential and the receiving server rejects every connection with an unparseable JWT until the user fully logs out and back in. The ID token exp now only fills a missing expiresAt instead of overriding a stored one. Identity claim enrichment from the ID token is unchanged, and the exp fallback for token sets without expires_at is preserved. * 🪪 fix: Validate ID Token Expiry Before ID Token Placeholder Substitution The precedence fix made isOpenIDTokenValid track only the access token expiry, so an MCP header using {{LIBRECHAT_OPENID_ID_TOKEN}} could substitute an ID token that had already expired. The ID token exp is now preserved separately as idTokenExpiresAt and checked at the ID token substitution site, so an expired ID token substitutes empty rather than a stale credential while access token substitution is unaffected. * 🪪 fix: Address OpenID Expiry Review Round Fix expires_at at the source in the OpenID JWT strategy. The stored value described the incoming bearer's exp even when access_token came from the session or a cookie, so it could describe a different credential entirely. A new decodeJwtExpiry helper reads the exp of the token actually stored, and payload.exp is kept only when the raw bearer is the resolved access token. Opaque session or cookie tokens now store no expiry rather than a wrong one. Apply a 30 second clock skew buffer in isOpenIDTokenValid and isIdTokenCurrent via a new exported OPENID_EXPIRY_BUFFER_SECONDS, mirroring OPENID_REUSE_EXPIRY_BUFFER_SECONDS in AuthController. Tokens that would expire in transit are treated as already expired. Make isIdTokenCurrent fail closed when idTokenExpiresAt is absent. exp is REQUIRED in an ID token, so a missing value means the token is malformed or the claims parse threw. The check uses == null so an exp of 0 counts as present and therefore expired. Read the ID token exp with a numeric type check so an exp of 0 records idTokenExpiresAt and fails closed downstream while a non-numeric exp is ignored, and compare the stored expiry with != null so a gap filled expiry of 0 reads as expired instead of as no expiry at all. Raise an actionable re authentication error for the ID token placeholder instead of substituting an empty string. An empty substitution produced a malformed Authorization header and a 400 downstream rather than a clean signal that the user must re authenticate. Raise the same re authentication error from processSingleValue when a user has an OpenID identity, the stored token set is no longer valid, and the value still contains a credential bearing OpenID placeholder, so the expired access token case that motivated this PR signals re auth instead of silently shipping or stripping the placeholder. Only the access token, ID token, and generic token names raise: identity metadata resolves from the user document and an expiry hint never needed a token, so those keep their existing literal then strip behaviour. Unknown placeholder names also stay literal and diagnosable, matching the existing resolvable placeholder policy. Add the comments the review asked for on the exp fallback heuristic, the EXPIRES_AT placeholder semantics, why stale ID token claims stay usable for identity fields, and the advisory nature of the freshness check. * 🪪 fix: Honour Opaque Access Tokens And Type The OpenID Re-Auth Error Drop the ID token exp fallback in extractOpenIDTokenInfo. Storing the access token expiry honestly means an opaque access token now records no expiry, and the fallback then handed the ID token exp authority over a credential it does not describe. A deployment issuing opaque access tokens alongside a short lived ID token saw isOpenIDTokenValid go false and the credential guard reject a perfectly good access token, which worked before this branch. An unknown access token expiry is now treated as no expiry, and the ID token exp only ever gates ID token substitution through idTokenExpiresAt. Give the re-authentication signal a type. OpenIDReauthRequiredError is raised at both the ID token placeholder and the credential placeholder guard, ErrorController maps it to a 401 carrying the actionable message, and the class exposes statusCode so the agent generation path answers 401 instead of a bare 500 for the same condition. Omit rather than blank a header whose credential placeholder is still unresolved on a final resolution pass, since an empty bearer credential is malformed under RFC 6750 while an absent header lets the upstream answer its own challenge. Identity placeholders keep stripping to an empty string. Move the resolvable placeholder docblock onto the pattern it describes, resolve an EXPIRES_AT of 0 as the string 0 for consistency with the neighbouring null checks, and let AuthController consume the exported OPENID_EXPIRY_BUFFER_SECONDS so the 30 second skew allowance has a single definition. |
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f829aca9fb
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🧩 fix: Align Tenant and MCP Configuration Resolution (#14904)
* fix: Align Tenant and MCP Configuration Resolution * fix: Preserve Operator-Owned MCP Entries * fix: Preserve Configuration Source Ownership * style: Normalize Middleware Import Order * fix: Preserve Process Server Precedence * test: Align Tenant-Aware E2E Setup |
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5e464bc930
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📎 fix: Alias Shell Script MIME Variants to application/x-sh (#14817)
* 📎 fix: Alias Shell Script MIME Variants to `application/x-sh` Chrome on Linux reports `.sh` files as `application/x-shellscript` (freedesktop shared-mime-info) and libmagic reports `text/x-shellscript`. Neither string appears anywhere in the source, so uploads were rejected even though `application/x-sh` is in the default allowlist and `codeTypeMapping` maps `sh` to it — `inferMimeType` only consults the extension map when the client sends no type at all, so a non-empty browser value passed straight through to the allowlist check. Alias both variants to the canonical `application/x-sh`, matching the existing treatment of `text/x-markdown` and `application/x-zip-compressed`. Also attach `statusCode`/`body` to multer file-filter rejections. Without them the error misses the `isCustomError` branch in `ErrorController` and falls through to a bare `500 An unknown error occurred.`, so the rejection reason was logged server-side but never reached the client. The upload hook already surfaces `error.response.data.message`, so a rejected file now explains itself instead of showing a generic upload failure. * 🔁 refactor: Move Upload Error Contract Into `packages/api` Addresses codex P1 on #14817. The producer of the `statusCode`/`body` pair now sits beside its consumer: `isCustomError` and `ErrorController` are already in `packages/api/src/middleware/error.ts`, and `CustomError` is already in `packages/api/src/types/error.ts` — only the construction of that pair was stranded in legacy JS. `createCustomError` is exported from the same module as the guard that recognizes it, and `multer.js` is back to a thin caller. Also pins the `.sh` back-compat claim with tests: configs from the documented workarounds (`application/x-sh` per #4660/#5689/#6297, and the broad patterns from #14804) still accept a `.sh` upload after the alias rewrites the type. A negative control confirms the endpoint config is genuinely in play rather than falling back to the default allowlist. |
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7347cfc195
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🍡 feat: Batched User Questions With A Single Bounded Answer Form (#14737)
* feat: support batched user questions * test: align batched question fixtures * fix: harden batched question lifecycle * test: submit batched HITL answers in e2e * fix: address batched question review findings * fix: preserve invoke return typing |
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ed9542ed75
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🧬 fix: Rebind Request Context After Remote Agent Auth (#14685) | ||
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dd159c4566
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🔐 fix: Preserve Structured JWT Auth Context (#14652)
* 🔐 fix: Preserve structured JWT auth context
* fix: Omit identity from auth correlation logs
* fix: Isolate pre-auth request context
* style: Sort auth context imports
* fix: Preserve structured auth metadata
* fix: Narrow structured log formatter types
* fix: Annotate structured log context keys
* test: Fix request fixture typing
* fix: Namespace request path log context
* fix: Namespace request method log context
* fix: Preserve captured tenant error paths
* style: Sort tenant error imports
* fix: Classify bulk tenant isolation failures
* fix: Enforce safe request correlation invariants
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3f0a1ec8d9
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🛡️ fix: Run message-filter PII patterns on a linear-time regex engine (ReDoS) (#14554)
* 🛡️ fix: Run message-filter PII patterns on a linear-time regex engine The messageFilter.pii middleware compiled admin-configured customPatterns with the native RegExp engine and ran them synchronously against every message on the shared event loop, so a catastrophic-backtracking pattern such as (a+)+$ could stall the entire process (native RegExp takes tens of seconds at roughly 32 characters) and take the instance down for every user. Compile these patterns with RE2JS, a linear-time RE2 port with no native addon, so catastrophic backtracking is impossible regardless of the pattern rather than something the code tries to detect. Patterns using features RE2 does not support, such as backreferences, fail to compile and are dropped and logged exactly as an invalid pattern already is. The filter only tests for a match, so this is a drop-in engine swap with no behavior change for valid patterns. * 🛡️ fix: Reject RE2-incompatible messageFilter patterns at config load The customPatterns regex was validated with native RegExp at config load, but the runtime now compiles it with a linear-time engine (RE2) that does not support backreferences or lookaround. Such a pattern passed validation, then failed to compile and was silently dropped at request time, quietly removing PII protection after upgrade. Reject backreferences and lookaround during config validation with an explicit message, and document RE2 syntax in the example config instead of "JavaScript-flavor". The runtime engine remains the authoritative boundary and still drops-and-logs anything this load-time check misses. * 🧹 test: Use direct MessageFilterPiiConfig annotations in the PII specs The added ReDoS cases satisfy the exported MessageFilterPiiConfig type directly, so the `as unknown as` assertions were unnecessary. Annotate the config objects directly, matching the repo's type-safety guidance. * 🧹 fix: Reject named backreferences in messageFilter patterns at config load Extend the config-load check to also reject named backreferences (\k<name>), which are valid JavaScript regex but unsupported by the linear-time runtime engine, so they surface at load rather than being dropped at request time. Together with the existing numeric-backreference and lookaround checks this covers the RE2-incompatible construct set; the runtime engine remains authoritative. * 🛡️ fix: Preserve Unicode whitespace matching in messageFilter starter patterns RE2's \s is ASCII-only, so after the engine swap the built-in api-key and Bearer starters no longer matched a secret separated by non-ASCII whitespace (e.g. a non-breaking space), which native RegExp did match. Broaden the whitespace classes to [\s\p{Zs}] so those patterns keep their original coverage, and add a regression test for a non-breaking-space separator. * 🛡️ fix: Validate messageFilter patterns with the RE2 engine at config load Replace the syntax blacklist (numeric/named backreferences, lookaround) with authoritative validation: config load now compiles each custom pattern with the same linear-time engine the runtime uses, so any RE2-incompatible construct (including control escapes like \cA) is rejected at load with a clear error instead of being silently dropped at request time. The validator is swappable and defaults to native RegExp so browser builds add no engine; the server wires the RE2-backed check at startup via configureMessageFilterRegexValidator in both entry points. * 🛡️ fix: Match the full whitespace set in messageFilter starter patterns RE2's `\s` omits the vertical tab and `\p{Zs}` omits U+2028, U+2029, and U+FEFF, so a separator built from one of those characters slipped past the `api-key` and `Bearer` starter patterns and reached the model. Broaden the starter whitespace class to the full JavaScript whitespace set so those separators are covered again. * fix: fail closed when messageFilter.pii compiles to zero patterns DB and admin config overrides bypass the RE2 schema validation (it only runs at YAML load), so an override whose only pattern is RE2-incompatible was dropped at compile time, left zero patterns, and let the request through. compile() now returns a failClosed flag when a config declared patterns but every one failed to compile; the middleware returns 400 and findPiiMatchInMessages returns a distinct misconfigured match that the OpenAI and Responses controllers surface with an admin-facing message. * 🛡️ fix: Fail closed when any messageFilter.pii custom pattern drops compile() previously set failClosed only when every pattern dropped (patterns.length === 0 && dropped > 0). With the default starters present, a single RE2-incompatible custom override incremented dropped but left patterns.length > 0, so the filter silently enforced only the surviving subset and text matching only the dropped rule passed. failClosed now keys off dropped > 0, so any dropped custom pattern blocks with the misconfigured 400. YAML patterns are RE2-validated at load, so dropped stays 0 for valid configs and only unvalidated DB or admin overrides can trip it. Reframed the two keeps-others-active specs to assert fail-closed and added a default-starters partial-drop regression. * 🧹 fix: Correct the misconfigured JSDoc and drop redundant casts in the PII specs The misconfigured flag now means any configured custom pattern failed to compile, not that every pattern failed, so its JSDoc on PiiMatch is updated to match. The partial-drop regressions now use direct MessageFilterPiiConfig annotations instead of as-unknown-as casts, keeping the specs type-checked, consistent with the rest of the suite. |
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044c134ecf
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🤏 fix: Filter Admin Config Reads by Section-Scoped Read Capability (#14472)
listConfigs, getBaseConfig, and getConfig only checked the broad read:configs capability, so a caller holding nothing but read:configs:<section> grants got a blanket 403 on all three instead of a response filtered to the sections they hold. Any deployment using section-scoped config grants hits this. Adds hasAnyConfigReadAccess as a cheap pre-flight check covering broad and section-scoped read and manage grants (manage implies read), so a zero-access caller still 403s before a DB fetch while a section-scoped caller gets the response filtered to exactly what they hold. The same manage-implies-read rule is fixed at its root in getParentCapabilities so a manage-only caller sees the section they manage instead of having it stripped after passing the pre-flight. Resolves every section for a request in one batched getHeldCapabilities query via getReadableConfigSections instead of one round trip per section. Includes AppConfig field-renaming normalization (interfaceConfig, turnstileConfig, mcpConfig) so the filter checks the canonical section name rather than the renamed response field, and stops availableTools from bypassing the filter by gating it on its filteredTools/includedTools source sections. |
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6f21be73a9
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feat: add low-noise Redis observability (#14309)
* feat(api): add low-noise Redis observability * fix(api): preserve Redis proxy constructor |
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73c43ded25
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💂 fix: Enforce ALLOW_EMAIL_LOGIN on the Backend Login Route (#14180)
* 🔒 fix: Enforce ALLOW_EMAIL_LOGIN on Backend Login Route
ALLOW_EMAIL_LOGIN=false previously only hid the login form; POST
/api/auth/login stayed mounted and accepted valid credentials. Add a
validateEmailLogin middleware (mirroring validateRegistration /
validatePasswordReset) that rejects login with 403 when the flag is
disabled, with an ALLOW_EMAIL_LOGIN_OVERRIDE escape hatch for
intentional direct API login (each use logged with request IP).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: Gate admin local login by email login flag
* fix: Move email login gate into api package
* test: Avoid mutating readonly request ip
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Danny Avila <danny@librechat.ai>
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44d1275f36
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⚙️ perf: reduce first-load MongoDB round trips (#14101)
* perf(api): reduce first-load database round trips * docs: move agent guidance to claude docs * refactor(api): move message validation into api package * fix(api): narrow active generation job lookup * fix(api): preserve omitted source identity |
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e452a130e9
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⚡ perf: Minimize group membership query in principal resolution (#14055)
getUserPrincipals resolves a user's ACL principals on nearly every
authenticated request. It fetched full group documents (including entire
memberIds arrays) only to read each group _id, and always issued a
separate User lookup for idOnTheSource.
- Project { _id: 1 } on the memberIds group query so it returns only ids
and can be served from the { memberIds: 1 } index instead of fetching
and decoding whole group docs.
- Accept role and idOnTheSource from the already-loaded request user and
thread them from the capability middleware, collapsing the hot path to
a single indexed group query (idOnTheSource: null means known-local).
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6dbf9d5ad3
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🪝 feat: Human-in-the-Loop Runtime - Tool Approval + Ask-User-Question (Slice B) (#13942)
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* chore: add @langchain/langgraph-checkpoint-mongodb for HITL durable resume
* feat: HITL tool approval runtime — backend (Slice B)
- endpoints.agents.checkpointer config + durable Mongo checkpointer (seam over the app
connection; SDK MemorySaver fallback) with a TTL index + deleteThread pruning
- HITL run wiring (PreToolUse policy hook + humanInTheLoop) attached in createRun, fully
inert when toolApproval.enabled is off
- interrupt gate (pause job -> requires_action + emit on_pending_action) and a resume
route that rebuilds the run from the durable checkpoint and run.resume()s it
- atomic single-winner resolve; agent-consistency guard; expireStaleApprovals terminal
event; checkpoint pruned on every non-paused completion (thread_id == conversationId)
* feat: HITL tool approval UI — frontend (Slice B)
approve/reject/edit/respond + ask-user controls in the tool card (OAuth-button precedent),
batch-aware single submit, live + reconnect (resumeState.pendingAction) wiring, and resume
mutations posting to /agents/chat/resume.
* fix(hitl): decouple ApprovalProvider from chat context
ApprovalProvider is now pure state (safe to mount in provider-less / shared / test
renders); the context-dependent submit moved to a useResumeSubmit hook the cards call.
Part imports getAskUserQuestionPart from ~/utils/approval directly so suites that
partial-mock ~/utils render Part without throwing.
* fix(hitl): address Codex review — backend
- P1: enforce per-tool allowed_decisions on resume (reject a crafted decision the
policy disallows) via findDisallowedDecisions
- prune the durable checkpoint on user-abort of a paused run, and before a fresh
HITL turn, so a new turn cannot rehydrate an expired/aborted interrupt (thread_id
is the stable conversationId)
- persist + use isTemporary and the original parentMessageId on resume (temporary
chats stay temporary; initializeAgent scopes thread files off the right parent)
- generate a deferred first-turn title BEFORE completeJob so its event reaches the
client and the final event carries the real title
- moderateText: skip when there is no text (tool-approval resume) and moderate the
ask-user answer, instead of denying on an empty input
* fix(hitl): address Codex review — frontend
- render ToolApproval for ANY paused agent tool card (bash/code/file/etc.), not just
the generic ToolCall, by wrapping the tool-card branch in Part (moved the rendering
out of ToolCall)
- findPendingActionMessageIndex only matches an assistant message, never the user
message (the underscore-strip could target the user bubble before the assistant
placeholder exists)
* fix(hitl): address Codex re-review
- title eligibility checks the user message’s parent (first turn), not the response’s
parent — the previous check could never be true and skipped title generation
- use client.buildResponseMetadata() for the resumed message so contextUsage /
thoughtSignatures survive (the abort-only helper dropped them)
- moderate decisions[].responseText (the respond action’s user text)
- give /chat/abort req.config (configMiddleware) so the HITL checkpoint prune on abort
actually runs
- read resume state BEFORE setContentParts so the in-memory store does not lose the
pre-pause seed content
- count resumes against LIMIT_CONCURRENT_MESSAGES (increment/decrement) so paused-then-
resumed turns cannot bypass the limit
- require actionId on resume so a body without it cannot resolve the current action
* fix(hitl): address Codex re-review (round 3) — resume fidelity
Bring the lean resume path to parity with sendMessage for things it bypassed:
- carry userMCPAuthMap into the rebuilt run so approved MCP tools keep the user's creds
- seed initialSessions (buildInitialToolSessions) so approved code/file/skill tools have
the pre-pause uploaded-file context (esp. cross-replica / after restart)
- await client.artifactPromises and persist them as response attachments (else tool
artifacts created after the pause vanish on reload / for late subscribers)
- merge metadata: cumulative usage (+ summary marker) from the job, contextUsage /
thoughtSignatures from the client — fixes the round-2 regression that underreported
post-resume cost
* fix(hitl): address Codex re-review (round 4) — resume hardening
- resume: require an EXACT paused agent_id match (reject omitted/ephemeral
agent_id, not just a different one) and reject an endpoint mismatch, so a
request can't rebuild the claimed checkpoint on a different graph
- moderateText: also moderate a tool-approval decision's reject `reason` and
stringified `editedArguments`, not just `responseText`
- request: re-mark the paused response `unfinished:true` after BaseClient saves
it as completed, so an expired / never-resumed approval doesn't leave a
"finished" response in history; the resume path overwrites it on success
* test(hitl): route-level integration test for the resume controller
Adds api/server/controllers/agents/__tests__/resume.spec.js, a supertest
integration test that drives the real ResumeAgentController over the full
pause -> approve -> resume -> finalize lifecycle with the SDK run, durable
checkpointer, Mongo, and concurrency cache mocked. The pure decision/liveness
helpers run for real via requireActual, so the guard ladder is exercised end to
end rather than stubbed.
25 cases covering:
- the authorization / staleness / agent-and-endpoint / actionId guard ladder
- tool_approval validation (undecided tool call, policy-disallowed decision)
- ask_user_question answer requirement
- the concurrency gate (429) and the atomic single-winner claim (409)
- the happy path: ACK, run reconstruction, decision->SDK mapping, finalize
(save the now-finished response, emit done, complete job, prune checkpoint)
- first-turn title generation before stream completion
- re-pause (no double finalize), abort-during-resume (no double finalize),
and the resume-failure terminal path (emitError + completeJob + prune)
* test(hitl): strengthen resume coverage + add approval util tests
Acts on a self-audit of the new resume integration test.
resume.spec.js (25 -> 32 cases):
- replace the tautological emitDone assertion (it only checked the hardcoded
`final: true`) with a structural check of the finalEvent payload —
responseMessage content/id/unfinished, requestMessage identity, title
- cover the previously-unwalked finalize branches: tool-artifact attachments
(null-filtered), the aggregatedContent fallback when live content is empty,
and client response-metadata attachment
- add guard cases: unsupported pending-action type (400) and the
pre-multi-tenancy null-tenantId pass-through (must not 403)
- add error-path cases: first-turn title generation throwing must still
finalize, and a completeJob failure during a resume error must force a
terminal job state via the last-resort updateJob
client/src/utils/approval.spec.ts (new, 15 cases):
- applyPendingAction tool_approval: join by tool_call_id not position,
skip completed calls, default allowed_decisions to [], referential
stability when nothing changes
- applyPendingAction ask_user_question: append, idempotent replace on replay,
non-array content coercion
- getAskUserQuestionPart type guard; findPendingActionMessageIndex
assistant-only resolution (never resolves to the user bubble)
* fix(hitl): address Codex re-review (round 5)
Five findings verified against the code before fixing:
- resume: require an EXACT endpoint match (like agent_id) — a resume that OMITS
endpoint must not fall through, since the shared chat middleware treats a
missing/non-agents endpoint as the ephemeral agent and could rebuild the
claimed checkpoint on a different graph
- resume: filter malformed content parts before saving the finished response,
matching the normal AgentClient path (a resumed turn could otherwise persist
an empty/invalid tool_call part that breaks reload/rendering)
- resume: accumulate tool artifacts across pause segments — persist them on
re-pause and MERGE (not overwrite) at finalize, so artifacts produced before
a second approval pause aren't dropped by the next rebuilt client
- approval (client): findPendingActionMessageIndex returns -1 when a provided
responseMessageId isn't found, so the caller retries instead of attaching the
prompt/approval to a prior assistant reply; fall back to the last assistant
only when no responseMessageId is given
- RedisJobStore: make appendChunk extend-only (XADD + EXPIRE-if-shorter via a
single eval) so the on_pending_action chunk emitted after a pause can't reset
the chunk-stream TTL back to the running window and evict pre-pause content
before the approval is resolved
Tests: +endpoint-omitted/unsupported-type/malformed-filter/attachment-merge/
re-pause-persist cases in resume.spec.js (36); ask-retry -1 semantics in
approval.spec.ts (16); extend-only TTL assertion in the RedisJobStore Redis
integration spec.
* test(hitl): mongodb-memory-server integration test for the checkpointer seam
The checkpointer unit spec covers config/selection with no DB connection; this
exercises the durable Mongo seam against a real (in-memory) MongoDB — the part
correctness actually depends on:
- getAgentCheckpointer builds a real MongoDBSaver when Mongo is connected and
setup() creates the TTL index (expireAfterSeconds) on the checkpoint collection
- memory type returns undefined (SDK MemorySaver fallback) even when connected
- saver is memoized per resolved config
- deleteAgentCheckpoint prunes a thread's persisted checkpoint (the cross-turn
isolation guarantee: turn N+1 on the same conversationId can't rehydrate it)
- pruning is thread-scoped — deleting one conversation leaves others intact
- undefined threadId is a no-op
* fix(hitl): address Codex re-review (round 6)
Four findings verified against the code before fixing:
- messageFilterPii: scan the resume payload's user-authored text (ask-user
`answer`, and a tool-approval decision's `respond` text, `reject` reason, and
edited tool arguments) — the shared /resume route ran through the PII filter
but it only inspected req.body.text, so a blocked token rode the resume
payload back into the model/tool (mirrors the earlier moderateText fix)
- resume: re-prime skill files invoked in the pre-pause segment before rebuilding
the run, so an approved code/file-backed tool keeps the injected skill-file
session refs instead of running without them (mirrors the normal path's
primeInvokedSkills; the pre-pause content stands in for the message payload)
- hitl: pin the graph identity. Persist a fingerprint of the graph-determining
request fields (endpoint, agent_id, model, spec, ephemeralAgent — normalized)
on the pending action at pause, and reject a resume whose recomputed
fingerprint differs. This closes the ephemeral-agent gap, where agent_id is
undefined so the id guard can't tell two ephemeral configs apart
- resume: reject incomplete edit/respond decisions (findIncompleteDecisions) —
an `edit` without an object editedArguments or a `respond` without non-empty
responseText is 400'd before mapping, rather than defaulting to {} / '' and
resuming with behavior the user never approved
Tests: incomplete-decision + fingerprint match/mismatch cases in resume.spec.js
(41); findIncompleteDecisions + computeAgentRequestFingerprint unit tests; and
resume-field PII cases in messageFilterPii.spec.ts.
* fix(hitl): address Codex re-review (round 7)
Four findings verified against the code before fixing:
- RedisJobStore: clear `agent_id` on createJob (add it to staleHitlFields). The
job hash is keyed by conversationId and reused across turns; updateMetadata
only writes agent_id when truthy, so a conversation that switched from a saved
agent to an ephemeral/no-agent turn kept the old id and the resume guard
rejected the valid pause as a different agent. (real correctness bug)
- fingerprint: include `promptPrefix` in computeAgentRequestFingerprint, and
re-send it on resume (ResumeAgentFields + buildResumeFields). Ephemeral agents
derive their system instructions from promptPrefix, so a resume changing it
previously passed the pin and rebuilt different instructions. (completes the
round-6 fingerprint)
- resume: the re-pause branch now persists the segment's accumulated CONTENT
(filtered), not just artifacts, so an approval that expires/reaps without a
final resume no longer loses everything streamed during the resumed segment.
- request: carry `manualSkills`/`alwaysAppliedSkills` on the persisted user
message so a resumed turn's reconstructed requestMessage keeps its skill pills
instead of dropping them until a full reload.
Deferred (narrow, no safe contained fix yet — see PR thread replies):
- resume rebuild without `addedConvo` for a multi-conversation/added-agent pane
- cross-replica re-prime of manually-selected (not model-invoked) skill files
Tests: stale-agent createJob clearing (Redis integration), promptPrefix
fingerprint match/mismatch (resume.spec.js + policy.spec.ts), re-pause content
persistence (resume.spec.js).
* fix(hitl): address Codex re-review (round 8)
Five findings verified against the code before fixing; the headline is a durable-
resume correctness fix (the fingerprint had surfaced it as a 403):
- resume durability (the important one): persist the graph-determining request
fields (endpoint, agent_id, model, spec, promptPrefix, ephemeralAgent) on the
pending action as `resumeContext`, and REPLAY them onto the resume request via
a router-level middleware that runs before buildEndpointOption. The client
can't reconstruct the ephemeral-agent config after a reload/cross-session, so
the round-6/7 fingerprint would 403 a valid durable resume — and even without
it the rebuilt agent would lose its tools. Replaying server-side rebuilds the
SAME graph regardless of client state (and a crafted resume can't swap it; the
fingerprint still matches because the body is restored first).
- RedisJobStore: also clear `isTemporary` on createJob (same class as agent_id):
a prior temporary turn's flag would otherwise survive a reused conversation
hash and a later non-temporary resume would save its response as temporary.
- resume: persist `contextMeta` (context-window calibration) onto the saved
response like BaseClient does, so the next turn can seed its pruner.
- request: carry manualSkills/alwaysAppliedSkills into the onStart metadata
update (not just the preliminary one it overwrites), so a resumed turn's
requestMessage keeps its skill pills.
Deferred (narrow — see thread reply):
- saved-agent edited WHILE a run is paused: agent_id matches but the definition
changed; needs an agent version/config hash, which is a larger change for a
narrow window.
Tests: resumeContext pick/apply + round-trip (policy.spec.ts), contextMeta +
manualSkills-on-requestMessage (resume.spec.js), isTemporary clearing (Redis
integration).
* style(hitl): prettier line-wrap in policy.spec.ts (R8 lint fix)
* fix(hitl): address Codex re-review (round 9)
Five findings, all fixed (addedConvo — deferred in rounds 7/8 — is now trivial
thanks to the round-8 replay):
- replay addedConvo: add it to RESUME_CONTEXT_KEYS so the resume middleware
restores the parallel/secondary-agent config from the paused request; the
client can't reconstruct it, and it determines the rebuilt graph.
- skill pills (the real fix this time): the round-8 onStart metadata write was
overwritten by trackUserMessage (the authoritative userMessage writer). Carry
manualSkills/alwaysAppliedSkills in the emitted `created` message and persist
them in trackUserMessage; widen UserMessageMeta + SerializableJobData.userMessage.
- execute-code files on resume: seed the paused user message's own files onto
req.body.files before initializeClient — they're excluded from the
parent-walk code-session rebuild, so an approved code/read-file tool would
otherwise resume without them.
- in-memory pending-action UI: route ApprovalEvents.ON_PENDING_ACTION in the
resume replay/pending-event loops to applyPendingActionToMessages (mirror the
live handler), so a pause that lands in the snapshot window still renders its
approval controls instead of sitting paused with no UI.
- abort isTemporary: the /chat/abort partial-save now sources isTemporary from
the job metadata, not req.body (the stop button posts only conversationId), so
aborting a paused temporary chat no longer persists an orphaned partial.
Tests: addedConvo in pickResumeContext (policy.spec.ts), file-restore on resume
(resume.spec.js), abort-from-job-isTemporary (abort.spec.js).
* fix(hitl): address Codex re-review (round 10) — resume/expiry races
Three concurrency/coherence findings, verified against the code before fixing:
- expiry-sweep CAS scope: both stale-approval sweeps (GenerationJobManager
expireStaleApprovals and the RedisJobStore requires_action cleanup) called
expire()/transitionStatus WITHOUT the observed pendingAction.actionId, so the
CAS only checked status===requires_action. Between the read and the CAS a user
could resolve the observed action and the run re-pause on a FRESH action; the
stale sweep would then abort that valid new pause. Now both pass the observed
actionId as expectActionId, so the CAS only fires for the action read as stale
(a re-paused action has a different id → no-op).
- resume graph cache: resumeCompletion cached the rebuilt graph (created with
messages:[]) via setGraph; RedisJobStore.getContentParts prefers a cached
graph over reconstructing from the chunk log, so a same-replica reload/status
poll mid-resume returned aggregatedContent missing the pre-pause content. Skip
setGraph on resume so introspection falls back to the complete chunk
reconstruction (setContentParts still seeds the in-memory store).
- pending-action UI: applyPendingActionToMessages scheduled a SINGLE
animation-frame retry then dropped the pending action; Recoil/React updates can
take several frames under load, leaving a valid requires_action run with no
approval controls. Retry across frames (bounded at 120) until the target
message commits.
Test: expire() with a mismatched expectedActionId no-ops while the matching id
expires (pendingAction.spec.ts).
* chore(deps): update @librechat/agents to version 3.2.53 and @langchain/langgraph to version 1.4.7 in package-lock.json and related package.json files
* refactor(hitl): add resolveToolApprovalPolicy seam for layered policy
Extract the single point where tool-approval policy is resolved for a turn
(`resolveToolApprovalPolicy`) and route the run call site through it instead
of reading `endpoints.agents.toolApproval` inline.
Behaviour-preserving: only the `endpoint` layer is wired today, so the result
is identical to reading the app policy directly. The `agent` and `skills`
layers are reserved seams with documented precedence (endpoint owns the
`enabled` kill switch; agent overrides mode/allow/deny/ask/reason; skills may
only tighten), so future per-agent and per-skill policy plumbing lands in one
function rather than at the `createRun` site. Adds focused unit tests.
* fix(hitl): address Codex re-review (round 11) — resume hardening
F1 (P2, security) — applyResumeContext now DELETES any RESUME_CONTEXT_KEY
absent from the persisted context, so the resume body carries exactly the
graph-determining fields the pause had. Previously only defined keys were
overwritten, leaving a client-supplied `addedConvo` (which the request
fingerprint does not cover) in place — a crafted resume could rebuild a
single-agent checkpoint as a different multi-agent graph/tool set.
F3 (P2) — the resume route ACKs (res.json) before initializeClient, so a
post-ACK getMCPRequestContext(req, res) saw the response as finished and
returned undefined, leaving the resumed run without its run-scoped MCP
connection store (approved MCP / OAuth-overlay tools then ran without their
request-scoped connections). Pre-seed the store with a null res +
cleanupOnResponse:false before the ACK and tear it down in the finally,
mirroring the normal stream path (request.js). userMCPAuthMap was already
preserved separately, so credentials were not lost — only the connection store.
Declined: the ApprovalContext NEW_CONVO guard (P2) is a false positive — the
`created` SSE event updates the conversation atom before any pause renders, so
the id is concrete by click time (details in the PR thread).
Tests: policy.spec (absent-key delete) + resume.spec (MCP context pre-seed/cleanup order).
* fix(hitl): address Codex re-review (round 12) — resume fidelity + multi-tool UI
F4 (P2) — temporal prompt vars: resume rebuilt the agent without restoring
req.conversationCreatedAt or req.body.timezone, so {{current_datetime}}-style
vars compiled a different system prompt than the paused graph (resume wall-clock,
unzoned). Add 'timezone' to RESUME_CONTEXT_KEYS (persisted at pause, replayed by
the resume middleware) and restore conversationCreatedAt from the convo before
initializeClient — mirroring the normal path's resolveConversationCreatedAt.
F5 (P2) — multi-tool approval: applyPendingActionToMessages stopped retrying once
ANY tool-call part was tagged, so siblings that rendered on later frames never got
approval controls and the resume route 400'd the partial batch. Add
countTaggedApprovalParts and keep the bounded RAF retry going until every
action_request is tagged (ask_user_question unchanged — one synthetic part).
F6 (P3) — Edit accepted `null`/`[]` (valid JSON, non-object), enabling Submit for
a value the resume route rejects via findIncompleteDecisions. Mirror the server's
plain-object check in the client (store + editIsValid) so Submit only enables for
an accepted value.
Tests: policy.spec (timezone round-trip), resume.spec (conversationCreatedAt
restore), approval.spec (countTaggedApprovalParts).
* fix(hitl): address Codex re-review (round 13) — recurse into subagent approvals
F9 (P2) — a tool paused INSIDE a subagent has its tool_call_id in the parent
subagent tool_call's nested `subagent_content`, not as a top-level message part.
applyToolApproval and countTaggedApprovalParts only scanned top-level content, so
the approval never attached and the round-12 retry loop counted 0 tagged parts and
spun to its frame cap with no controls. Both now recurse into `subagent_content`
(immutably, so React refs update): the nested call gets tagged and is counted, so
the retry terminates. Added approval.spec cases for the nested tag + count.
Note: surfacing the interactive approve/reject controls inside the subagent view is
a deliberate follow-up — ToolApproval -> useResumeSubmit -> useChatContext crashes
when rendered in the portaled subagent dialog (outside the chat/approval providers),
so that needs the controls scoped to the in-provider inline render (or the dialog
wrapped with the providers). This commit fixes the data/traversal layer only.
F7 (discovered-tool history on resume) and F8 (redis chunk TTL pause race) were
verified false positives — see the PR threads.
* fix(hitl): address Codex re-review (round 14) — resume fidelity + expiry relay
F13 (P2) — manualSkills are graph-determining (skill allowed-tools union into the
tool set before tools load) but weren't replayed, so a reload lost the skill tools
and a crafted resume could inject a different skill past the fingerprint. Add
'manualSkills' to RESUME_CONTEXT_KEYS (same replay-only pattern as timezone/
addedConvo; the delete-absent half blocks injection). Not alwaysAppliedSkills —
that's resolved server-side from the DB, not req.body.
F12 (P2) — the resume final SSE built requestMessage from job.metadata.userMessage
(persisted without files), so attachments vanished from the user bubble on resume.
Spread the already-restored req.body.files onto it, matching the normal path.
F11 (P2) — multi-replica approval expiry: RedisJobStore.cleanupRequiresActionIndex
on another replica can win the requires_action->aborted CAS (it sets the hash error
but has no event transport), and the local sweep then skips because the job is no
longer requires_action, so a client subscribed here never gets the terminal error
until the reap path. expireStaleApprovals now relays APPROVAL_EXPIRED_ERROR for a
locally-subscribed job already aborted FOR approval expiry (error-string gated,
idempotent via the errorEvent flag). emitError already publishes cross-replica.
Tests: policy.spec (manualSkills round-trip + inject-drop), resume.spec (final
requestMessage carries restored files).
* fix(hitl): render approval controls for subagent-nested tool pauses (F10)
Round-13 made applyToolApproval/countTaggedApprovalParts recurse into
subagent_content (data), but SubagentDialogPart rendered nested TOOL_CALL parts
with <ToolCall> only and never mounted <ToolApproval>, so a tool paused inside a
subagent showed no controls and the run was unresolvable.
Render <ToolApproval> in SubagentDialogPart's TOOL_CALL branch when the nested
tool_call carries an approval and isn't yet resolved, mirroring the top-level
Part.tsx render. The subagent dialog portals (OGDialog → ReactDOM.createPortal),
but React context flows through the React tree, not the DOM tree, so ToolApproval
resolves ApprovalProvider/ChatContext and the controls work + submit.
Also harden useResumeSubmit: read ChatContext via useContext (non-throwing)
instead of the throwing useChatContext wrapper, so the cards never crash when
rendered outside a ChatContext.Provider (e.g. a search/citation render that passes
chat context as a prop) — they degrade to inert (buildResumeFields returns null).
* style(hitl): re-sort run.ts imports after dev rebase
* fix(hitl): address Codex re-review (round 15) — resume content fidelity
F14 (P2) — hide_sequential_outputs was applied in chatCompletion before
saving/emitting content but not on resume, so a sequential-agent chain that
pauses for HITL and resumes persisted/emitted intermediate outputs the setting
is meant to hide. Extracted the filter into applyHideSequentialOutputsFilter()
and call it from both chatCompletion and resumeCompletion (after handleRunInterrupt,
covering the finalize + re-pause reads of client.contentParts).
F16 (P2) — on a reloaded HITL pause, the DB already holds the paused user row +
partial assistant row; useResumeOnLoad fed those as submission.messages, then
finalHandler/createdHandler appended the same pair via requestMessage/responseMessage,
duplicating the turn (buildTree doesn't dedupe children by messageId). buildSubmission-
FromResumeState now strips the paused user/response rows (by messageId, incl. the
padded/unpadded response id) from submission.messages — they're re-supplied by the
placeholders + final event. Frontend-only; live (non-reload) pause path untouched.
Deferred: F15 (collapsed-card subagent approval registration/visibility) — see thread.
Tests: client.test (filter keeps last + tool_call parts / no-op when off),
useResumeOnLoad.spec (paused pair stripped from submission.messages).
* fix(hitl): address Codex re-review (round 16) — chunk TTL, slot, job replacement
F17 (P2) — chunk-stream TTL on pause-before-chunk. CHUNK_APPEND_LUA derived its
ceiling only from the chunk key's current TTL, so when the chunks key didn't exist
at pause (fire-and-forget append in flight, or an ask-user pause before any chunk),
the on_pending_action append created the stream with only the 20m running TTL while
the approval window is 24h — content evicted before resume. The Lua now also reads
the job key (KEYS[2]); when status == requires_action it takes max(running, TTL(jobKey))
(the approval window transitionStatus set), else the running TTL. Extend-only preserved;
gated on paused status so normal runs never inflate. Both keys share {streamId} (cluster-safe).
F19 (P2) — with LIMIT_CONCURRENT_MESSAGES, the approval prompt was emitted before the
original request released its slot, so a fast Approve got /resume 429'd. handleRunInterrupt
now releases the slot (idempotent via pendingRequestReleased) right after the pause, before
the prompt; the request.js pause branch and resume.js finally only release if it didn't
(no double-release).
F20 (P2) — finalizeResumedTurn never checked the job wasn't replaced before emitDone/
completeJob/saveMessage, so a stale resume could clobber a newer turn that reused the
conversationId. Added the createdAt guard the normal request path uses (skip finalization
when the live job's createdAt != the paused job's).
Deferred: F18 (subagent_content not reconstructed on Redis resume) — joins the subagent
cluster (F15). See thread.
Tests: RedisJobStore integration (pause-before-chunk gets approval TTL; running stays short),
resume.spec (skip finalization on replacement; no double slot release on re-pause).
* 🛡️ fix: Guard HITL terminal side-effects against job replacement
Jobs are keyed by streamId == conversationId, so a new request REPLACES the
running one on the same conversation. The replaced generation's tail must not
clobber the live generation's state. Each path now re-reads the live job and
compares createdAt against the generation's captured identity before acting.
- Thread the generation's createdAt onto the client (request.js + resume.js)
as client.jobCreatedAt — the identity every guard compares against.
- handleRunInterrupt: skip approvals.pause when this run is no longer the live
job, so a stale interrupt can't flip the NEWER job to requires_action.
- chatCompletion finally: skip the checkpoint prune when replaced, so an older
run's late finally can't delete the newer run's resume checkpoint.
- resume catch-path: gate emitError/completeJob/prune behind a stillLive check
(fail-open if the read throws), mirroring finalizeResumedTurn's success guard.
- Persist the turn's uploaded files on job.metadata.userMessage (authoritative
trackUserMessage writer) and prefer them on resume over the user DB row, whose
save can still be racing a fast /resume.
Tests: 13 guard-predicate cases in jobReplacement.spec.js.
* 🔁 fix: Harden HITL resume — ownership re-check, file seeding, deferred-tool replay
Three follow-ups to the round-17 job-replacement guards (Codex review 4594099963):
- G1 (resume.js): the success-path ownership guard runs at the START of
finalizeResumedTurn, but saveMessage + first-turn title generation await long
enough for a new request to replace the job on the same conversationId. Re-read
the live job immediately before emitDone/completeJob/prune so the terminal writes
can't tear down the REPLACEMENT job — mirrors the catch-path guard.
- G2 (request.js): onStart's metadata/chunk writes that persist the turn's files
are fire-and-forget, so a fast approval could read job.metadata.userMessage before
files landed. Seed files into getPreliminaryUserMessage instead — that write is
AWAITED before the run starts, so files are durable before any interrupt can emit.
- G3 (run.ts + client.js + resume.js + IJobStore.ts): the resumed graph is rebuilt
with messages: [], so createRun's tool_search-discovery scan finds nothing. A
deferred tool discovered earlier in the turn (and targeted by the paused call) was
therefore absent from the rebuilt schema-only toolMap — resume would throw "unknown
tool" (no loadRuntimeTools fallback is wired). Capture discovered tool names at
pause via extractDiscoveredToolsFromHistory(run.getRunMessages()), persist them on
job.metadata.discoveredTools, and replay them into createRun's new discoveredToolNames
input (merged with message-extracted names, gated on hasAnyDeferredTools — inert
otherwise). A new createRun test proves the deferred tool is promoted with the replay
and absent without it (reproducing the bug).
Tests: real createRun deferred-replay suite (run-summarization.test.ts) + G1/G2/G3
guard predicates (jobReplacement.spec.js). Full suite green.
* 🔒 fix: Close HITL resume metadata + file-substitution + pause-race gaps
Four findings on the round-18 commit (Codex review 4594430222):
- H1 (P1, regression in round-18 G3): the discoveredTools captured at pause never
reached resume — three metadata allowlists dropped it: GenerationJobManager
.updateMetadata, RedisJobStore.deserializeJob, and buildJobFacade (plus the
GenerationJobMetadata type). Added discoveredTools to all four, so the deferred-tool
replay actually works end-to-end (in-memory store already kept it via Object.assign).
- H2 (P2, security): /resume honored a client-supplied `files` array, letting a crafted
client resume an approved code/read-file tool against a DIFFERENT file set than the one
approved (files aren't in the resume fingerprint/context). Resume now ALWAYS sources
files from the paused job (metadata → DB row), clearing any client-supplied set.
- H3 (P2, ephemeral fidelity): non-default model parameters (temperature, max tokens,
custom endpoint params) were lost on resume — ephemeral agents derive them from the
request body, which the resume payload omits. Capture the resolved model_parameters in
resumeContext at pause and replay them onto the body on resume (excluding `model`, which
is replayed via the fingerprinted RESUME_CONTEXT_KEYS path). Saved agents already source
these from the DB.
- H4 (P2, Redis race): a pause landing between the resume snapshot and the Pub/Sub
subscription reached neither resumeState.pendingAction nor (Redis) pendingEvents, and
approval events aren't persisted to replayEvents — the client attached to a paused job
with no approval UI. subscribeWithResume now re-reads the live job AFTER subscribing and
surfaces the pending action if the snapshot missed it (live read, no staleness).
Tests: discoveredTools metadata round-trip + subscribeWithResume re-read (pendingAction
.spec.ts); client-file substitution rejection (resume.spec.js); model-parameter replay
predicate (jobReplacement.spec.js).
* 🧹 fix: Clear stale discovered tools, release slot on claim error, extend run-step TTL
Three follow-ups on the round-19 commit (Codex review 4594783691):
- I1 (P2): the round-19 discoveredTools field wasn't cleared on Redis streamId reuse.
HSET only overwrites listed fields and handleRunInterrupt only writes discoveredTools
when THIS turn discovers a deferred tool — so a replacement turn that pauses without its
own discovery inherited the prior run's tool names and force-loaded undiscovered deferred
tools on resume. Added discoveredTools to createJob's staleHitlFields HDEL list (the
in-memory store already builds a fresh object, so it was Redis-only).
- I2 (P2): with LIMIT_CONCURRENT_MESSAGES, approvals.resolve runs after the slot increment
but before the run's try/finally, so a store/Redis error there leaked the slot until the
counter TTL expired (spurious 429s on retry of the still-paused approval). Wrapped the
claim in try/catch that decrements the slot and returns 500.
- I3 (P3): saveRunSteps did SET ... EX running unconditionally, resetting the run-steps key
to the 20-min running TTL even while the job is paused for the longer approval window —
a reload after that window lost the tool timeline. Now uses a paused-window TTL script
mirroring the chunk-stream no-shrink behavior (extends to the approval window when the
job hash is requires_action).
Also fixes a latent strict-tsc cast error in the round-19 pendingAction test.
Tests: claim-throws-releases-slot (resume.spec.js); discoveredTools cleared on reuse +
saveRunSteps preserves the paused TTL (RedisJobStore integration, USE_REDIS).
* 🛡️ fix: Guard fast-resume save race, gate HITL to resumable routes, expire on stale submit
Three findings on the round-20 commit (Codex review 4595045652):
- J2 (P1): a fast /resume can claim + finalize the COMPLETED response while the original
request's pause branch is still awaiting `response.databasePromise`; the later
unfinished-save then overwrites the completed content. Re-check the job is still paused on
THIS generation's action (a claim leaves requires_action; a replacement bumps createdAt)
before marking the row unfinished; fail open on a read error.
- J3 (P1): the tool-approval wiring (humanInTheLoop + PreToolUse hook + checkpointer) was
applied to EVERY createRun caller when toolApproval.enabled, but the OpenAI-compatible and
Responses controllers never inspect run.getInterrupt() or persist a pending action — an
approval-gated tool would pause there with no approval surface or resume endpoint and the
route would emit a normal final response / [DONE] with the tool call dangling. Gate the
wiring on a new createRun `hitlCapable` flag, set only by AgentClient (chat + resume).
- J4 (P2): a stale-action 409 on submit returned without driving expiry, leaving the job
requires_action with a dead action until the periodic sweeper ran — any attached SSE client
got no terminal event and the stream appeared to hang. Extracted GenerationJobManager
.expireApproval(streamId, actionId) (expire CAS + terminal SSE, shared with the sweeper) and
call it from the resume route when the observed action is stale.
J1 (nested subagent approval controls not mounting while the details dialog is closed) is a
valid frontend issue in the deferred subagent-HITL path — tracked separately (replied on the
thread) since the fix touches the shared dialog primitive and needs UI verification.
Tests: HITL-gate both directions (run-summarization.test.ts); expire-on-stale-submit
(resume.spec.js); fast-resume unfinished-save guard predicate (jobReplacement.spec.js).
* 💄 style: Wrap captureAgents signature to satisfy prettier (CI lint)
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5eb1c2c107
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🖇️ feat: Reference Selected Chat Text with Multi-Quote Popup (#13868)
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* 🖇️ feat: Reference Selected Chat Text with Multi-Quote Popup Add a ChatGPT/Codex-style quote feature: selecting text in any message shows an 'Add to chat' popup that accumulates removable quote chips above the composer. On submit, the excerpts are merged into the user message text as Markdown blockquotes (counted in the user message token count, not a system message) and persisted on the message so they render on the user bubble and survive reload. - packages/api: add getReferencedQuotes + mergeQuotedText helpers (blockquote merge, length/count caps) with unit tests - BaseClient.sendMessage: temporarily merge req.body.quotes into userMessage.text before buildMessages, restore clean text, persist quotes array - data-schemas + data-provider: add optional quotes field to message schema/type - client: pendingQuotesByConvoId atom, QuoteButton selection popup, PendingQuoteChips composer row, MessageQuotes persistent display - useChatFunctions: drain pending quotes onto the message, carry forward on regenerate - add localization keys and component/integration tests * 🧪 test: Add Playwright e2e for chat quote feature Add e2e/specs/mock/quotes.spec.ts covering select -> 'Add to chat' popup -> chip -> send -> persistent reference block -> reload, plus multi-select accumulation and chip removal. Selection is driven programmatically (real DOM Range + dispatched mouseup) to summon the popup deterministically. Add data-testid hooks (add-to-chat-button, pending-quote-chips, message-quotes) to the quote components for stable selectors. * 🛡️ fix: Address Codex review on quote feature - Run PII filter + OpenAI moderation over req.body.quotes (P1): quoted excerpts are merged into the model-facing user message, so they must clear the same filters; a crafted quotes payload could otherwise bypass them. Adds tests. - Carry quotes through edit/save-and-submit replays (overrideQuotes in EditMessage), mirroring overrideManualSkills, so edited turns keep context. - Hide the quote UI for Assistants endpoints (which bypass BaseClient merge), so users can't queue quotes the assistant never receives. - Clear pending quote/skill queues by resolved conversationId in useClearStates, not the UI index, so queued-but-unsent selections don't linger in Recoil. - Cap queued quotes client-side at 10 to match the backend QUOTE_MAX_COUNT, so the composer never shows more quotes than are actually sent. * 🧵 fix: Durably re-merge quotes + Codex round 2 Address Codex's re-review of the quote feature: - Durable history re-merge (per maintainer decision): quotes are no longer merged at request time and stripped; instead each user message's persisted message.quotes is merged into its formatted content in AgentClient.buildMessages (new prependQuotes helper) for current AND historical turns. The model receives the referenced context on every prompt and the token count stays consistent with what was persisted; stored text stays clean for display. - Attach normalized quotes to the user message in handleStartMethods (before getReqData/onStart) so the optimistic bubble, resumable abort metadata, and saved row all carry them (fixes the abort-metadata gap). - Skip the quote drain entirely for Assistants endpoints in useChatFunctions, leaving the pending atom intact (UI is already hidden there). - Normalize req.body.quotes via getReferencedQuotes before moderation/PII so only the trimmed/truncated/capped excerpts the model will receive are checked. - Tests: prependQuotes unit tests; BaseClient quote tests assert early attachment + clean text; e2e now verifies the model receives the merged blockquote on the current turn and re-merged from history on a later turn (new E2E_ASSERT_QUOTE mock marker). * 🔗 fix: Quote share/memo/abort/PII gaps (Codex round 3) - Shared links: include quotes in the anonymized projection + SharedMessage type (+test) so the /share view renders the same reference blocks as the owner, mirroring manualSkills/alwaysAppliedSkills. - MessageRender memo: compare quotes length so a server/resume copy whose only change is the quote list re-renders (the block no longer goes stale/missing). - Resumable job metadata: include quotes in the userMessage written to GenerationJobManager so a reload/reconnect mid-stream reconstructs the chips. - PII + moderation: also scan the merged blockquote+text exactly as the model receives it, so a secret split across a quote and the typed body (each clean alone) is caught (+cross-boundary test). - e2e: make quote-add robust against the auto-scroll-dismisses-selection race via a retried select+click helper. * 🛑 fix: Keep quotes on aborted turn's request message (Codex round 4) abortMiddleware reconstructs finalEvent.requestMessage from jobData.userMessage but only copied ids + text; include quotes so a stopped quoted turn keeps its MessageQuotes in the UI and a regenerate-before-reload still sends the referenced context. Completes the resumable-metadata fix from the prior round. * 🧮 fix: Quote recount + preliminary abort metadata (Codex round 5) - Force a canonical token recount for messages carrying quotes in AgentClient.buildMessages, so a plain text-only Save edit (which recomputes tokenCount from text alone) can't leave a stale, quote-excluding count that undercounts context on later turns — recount from the quote-merged copy self-heals it. - Seed normalized quotes into the preliminary userMessage metadata (getPreliminaryUserMessage), so an abort during init/tool-loading (before onStart) still reconstructs the stopped turn's MessageQuotes. * ✅ fix: Add getReferencedQuotes to controller test mocks (CI) request.js's getPreliminaryUserMessage now calls getReferencedQuotes; the agents controller specs mock @librechat/api wholesale, so the mock must export it or the call throws and cascades. Added a faithful mock (normalize/cap, null when empty) to request.resumeMetadata.spec.js and jobReplacement.spec.js. * 📐 fix: Quotes in context projection + resumable metadata (Codex round 6) - Context-usage projection (resolveContextProjection): select message.quotes, prepend them into the projected user text, and recount quoted messages so the context gauge counts the same prompt the model receives (a text-only Save edit no longer makes the gauge undercount / over-report remaining budget). - Resumable job metadata: trackUserMessage (created-event rewrite) and abortJob (final requestMessage) now carry quotes; SerializableJobData.userMessage and CreatedEvent.message gained an optional quotes field. With the cross-replica created-event spread, stopping/reconnecting a quoted turn after the created event keeps its MessageQuotes. * 💬 feat: Collapse multi-select quotes into one chip with hover popup Composer feedback: the quote chip area now shows a single chip — the excerpt text for one selection, or a collapsed "{n} selections" pill for multiple, with a hover popup (HoverCard) listing every excerpt and a per-item remove. The chip is taller (py-1.5/text-sm) to read less skinny. Adds com_ui_quote_selections and com_ui_remove_all_quotes; updates unit + e2e tests (e2e drives the count via a data-quote-count hook and exercises the hover popup). * ♿ fix: Make multi-selection quote popup keyboard accessible The collapsed "{n} selections" pill used a HoverCard, which Radix only opens on pointer hover — its interactive content was unreachable by keyboard. Replaced it with a Popover: the trigger is a real button that opens on click / Enter / Space (focus moves into the list, each excerpt's × is tab-navigable, Escape closes and restores focus), with hover-open preserved for mouse via controlled open state + a close grace period. Hover-initiated opens skip auto-focus so they don't pull focus off the composer. Adds an e2e asserting keyboard open/close. * 📐 fix: Clamp the Add-to-chat button within the viewport (Codex round 7) The floating selection button positioned via translate(-50%,-100%) (bottom-center anchor) but clamped top/left as if they were its top-left, so a selection near the viewport top or sides could render the button partly/fully offscreen. Now it measures the button (ref + useLayoutEffect) and computes an on-screen top-left — clamping by the full width within side margins and flipping below the selection when there's no room above — with no transform, and stays hidden until measured so it never flashes at an unclamped spot. * ↩️ fix: Restore pending quotes on early-abort draft (Codex round 8) When a turn is stopped before the created event (e.g. during tool/MCP init), the final handler restores requestMessage.text to the draft, but the pending-quote atom was already drained on submit — so a retry sent no quotes. The abort requestMessage now carries quotes (preliminary metadata + abort fixes), so the three early-abort/no-response draft-restore paths in useEventHandlers now also re-queue pendingQuotesByConvoId from requestMessage.quotes. * ♿ fix: Use Ariakit Popover for quote selections (keyboard focus) The multi-selection popup used a hand-rolled Radix Popover with Popover.Anchor + a manual button, so Radix had no trigger to return focus to — Escape dumped focus to the page top. Refactored to Ariakit (the codebase's popover primitive, per DropdownPopup/Fork): the `PopoverDisclosure` is the real trigger, so Escape closes and returns focus to the composer instead of the top of the page. Keyboard opens (Enter/Space) autofocus into the list and tab through each excerpt's remove; hover opens for mouse with autofocus suppressed so it never pulls focus off the composer. e2e asserts the keyboard open/navigate/Escape flow keeps focus on a real control (never BODY). |
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98704f28c1
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🌐 fix: Centralize Outbound Proxy Handling (#13726)
* fix: centralize outbound proxy handling * chore: sort proxy imports * test: update proxy helper mocks * fix: honor proxy bypasses consistently * fix: support http axios proxy targets |
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e0f715bd24
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🔒 fix: Scan All Message Roles in messageFilter.pii (#13677)
A Codex security finding flagged that findPiiMatchInMessages was gating on msg.role === 'user' and silently skipping every other role. The OpenAI-compatible validator accepts system, assistant, and tool from the caller; the Responses input conversion accepts and converts developer and system. All of those roles flow into formatAgentMessages and then createRun, so an authenticated remote agent caller could place a credential-shaped value in any non-user role and reach the model despite the configured filter. Drops the role gate. The helper now scans every caller-supplied message regardless of role; the loop count is unchanged (one outer over messages, one inner over content parts) and the early-exit on first match still holds. Spec adds explicit cases for system, assistant, and tool roles in place of the now-incorrect skips-non-user assertion. |
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5867f1a065
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🛡️ feat: Configurable Message PII Filter (#13602)
* 🛡️ feat: Reject chat messages matching configured credential patterns
Adds an opt-in `messagePiiFilter` middleware mounted on the agent
chat route ahead of `moderateText`. When the configured patterns
match the user's input the request is refused with 400, so the
credential never reaches OpenAI moderation, the model, or MongoDB.
Three starter patterns ship by default and operators can subset
them or add their own regex via `customPatterns` in librechat.yaml.
* 🧪 test: Memoize compiled patterns + add middleware spec
Memoize the compiled pattern array via a WeakMap keyed by the
messagePiiFilter config object so repeat requests against the same
config skip the per-request RegExp construction. Cache entries are
released automatically when the config object itself rotates.
Adds packages/api/src/middleware/messagePiiFilter.spec.ts covering
the default-starter rejections, the starterPatterns subset and
empty-array semantics, customPatterns matching layered on top of and
in place of the starters, the no-config and empty-text pass-through
paths, and a memoization regression check.
* 🛡️ fix: Skip invalid customPattern regexes instead of crashing the request
Admin DB overrides for `messagePiiFilter.customPatterns` reach
`req.config` via `mergeConfigOverrides`, which deep-merges raw
override values without re-running `configSchema`. A typo'd regex
like `(` would slip past the YAML-load validation and throw inside
`new RegExp(...)` during `compile()`, returning 500 for every chat
request until the operator rolled the override back.
Wrapped the per-pattern compile in a try/catch that logs the
invalid pattern id + reason and skips it, so other valid patterns
(starters and other custom entries) keep filtering. Added a
regression test alongside the existing spec.
* 🛡️ feat: Extend PII filter to OpenAI-compatible and Responses agent APIs
The chat-route middleware operates on `req.body.text`, but the remote
agent API endpoints (`/api/agents/v1/chat/completions`,
`/api/agents/v1/responses`) accept the same prompt content as a
`messages` array or an `input` field. A caller using their API key
could send a credential-shaped value through either route and bypass
the configured PII filter even though they share the same agent and
model backbone the middleware is meant to guard.
Factored out `findPiiMatchInMessages`, a tolerant walker that handles
both `content: string` and `content: ContentPart[]` user-message
shapes against the same compiled, cached pattern list. Wired it into
the OpenAI-compat controller after agent lookup and into the
Responses controller right after `convertToInternalMessages`. Each
returns the endpoint's native 400 error shape
(`sendErrorResponse` / `sendResponsesErrorResponse`) with the
`message_pii_filter_block` code when a user message matches.
* 🩹 test: Add findPiiMatchInMessages to OpenAI + Responses controller mocks
The OpenAI-compat and Responses controller specs mock `@librechat/api`
with a hand-listed object. The new `findPiiMatchInMessages` export
wired into both controllers in
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6bc75d24c8
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⚡️ refactor: Migrate @librechat/api build to tsdown (#13595)
* ⚡️ refactor: Migrate @librechat/api build to tsdown Replace Rollup with tsdown (rolldown + oxc isolated-declarations) for the @librechat/api package build, mirroring the merged data-schemas migration. - Add tsdown.config.mjs (cjs output, oxc dts, externalize all bare deps, bundle first-party `~/` + relative imports) - Annotate exports for isolatedDeclarations (codefix-driven). Collapse the tokens.ts model->token maps to Record<string, Record<string, number>> and switch validation.ts's runtime `files` field from z.any() to z.unknown() so no explicit `any` is introduced - Repoint package.json main/types/exports to tsdown's .cjs/.d.cts output - Add src/telemetry.ts entry shim so the two index.ts entries don't collide in oxc's flat dts output (stable dist/telemetry.{cjs,d.cts}) - Delete rollup.config.js Build time ~36s -> ~0.5s. No runtime behavior change: 5712 unit tests pass, both entries load via require(), legacy /api consumes them unchanged. * 👷 ci: Hash packages/api/tsdown.config.mjs in build-api cache keys The build-api cache keys hashed `packages/api/server-rollup.config.js`, which never existed (api used `rollup.config.js`, now removed) — a copy-paste artifact from the data-provider key that matched no file. Replace it with the new `packages/api/tsdown.config.mjs` so edits to the build config (entry, format, externals) bust the api build cache, matching the data-schemas key. |
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192703e041
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⚡ perf: Migrate data-schemas Build to tsdown with isolatedDeclarations (#13578)
* ⚡ perf: Migrate data-schemas Build to tsdown with isolatedDeclarations Replace Rollup with tsdown (rolldown + oxc) for @librechat/data-schemas. With the source made isolatedDeclarations-clean, oxc emits .d.ts without tsc, dropping the package build from ~5.8s to ~0.8s (~7x). - Annotate exported model/method factories for isolatedDeclarations (TypeScript's fixMissingTypeAnnotationOnExports codefix plus hand-authored interfaces); type the ~44 mongoose `any`s and add an explicit PromptMethods interface (previously its declaration was silently dropped by the Rollup build). - Repoint package.json exports/main/module/types to tsdown output; drop rollup config. - Config lives in tsdown.config.mjs (native ESM) so CI without a TS-config loader can build it; bundle `dotenv` so the package stays self-contained for its env-loading side effect. - Fix a latent token `metadata` mismatch the accurate types surfaced: widen TokenCreate/UpdateData inputs to accept plain objects, flatten OAuthMetadata at the api boundary. - Update mongoMeili/aclEntry specs to the precise model types; drop redundant terser minification from data-provider's library build. All data-schemas tests pass; api builds clean against the new output. * 🔧 chore: Hash tsdown.config.mjs in data-schemas CI build-cache keys The data-schemas build switched from rollup to tsdown, but the build-data-schemas / build-api cache keys in backend-review, config-review, and playwright-mock still hashed the (now-deleted) rollup.config.js. Hash tsdown.config.mjs instead so a config-only change invalidates the cached dist/api builds. (Found by Codex review.) * 🔧 chore: Replace deprecated tsdown `external` with `deps.neverBundle` tsdown 0.22 deprecated the top-level `external` option in favor of `deps.neverBundle`. Migrate the data-schemas config and set `deps.onlyBundle: false` to silence the (intentional) dotenv bundling hint. Build output and externalization are unchanged — dotenv bundled, all peers external. |