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Author SHA1 Message Date
Marco Beretta
76c25680ce
🔐 fix: Retire Credentials by Their Committing Write and on Opt-In 2FA (#17504)
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* fix: Retire Credentials by Their Committing Write and on Opt-In 2FA

Re-date password reset and enrollment cutoffs once the write that set them commits, so a credential minted while the write is in flight is retired. Opt-in 2FA confirmation now stamps twoFactorEnrolledAt and rotates the session like required enrollment. OpenID refresh ends a session established before a reset or enrollment instead of spending its IdP grant.

* fix: Bind Opt-In 2FA Rotation to the Caller's Refresh Session

Confirmation now requires the refresh session the request was issued with, rotates it in place and revokes only the others, so an access token on its own cannot trade enrollment for a long-lived session. The OpenID retirement check moves into the refresh recovery service and ends the session through the existing session-missing path, leaving the CJS controller unchanged.

* fix: Clear a Retired OpenID Session Against the User It Was Checked For

* refactor: Inject the Refresh Secret Into OpenID Recovery

* fix: Report a Reset Whose Cutoff Could Not Be Re-Dated

A failed re-stamp now propagates as RETIREMENT_RESTAMP_FAILED. The reset controller still revokes sessions and passkeys and answers CREDENTIAL_RETIREMENT_INCOMPLETE; the CLI re-stamps after its revocations and exits non-zero; enrollment revokes sessions before the re-stamp and mints nothing when it fails.

* fix: Re-Date the Reset Cutoff Only After the Link Is Consumed

The web reset re-stamps credentialsChangedAt in the controller once resetPassword has committed, consumed the token and sent the notice, so a failed re-stamp can no longer leave the link replayable. Revocations still run and the response reports CREDENTIAL_RETIREMENT_INCOMPLETE.

* fix: Retire Credentials on Every Exit Path After a Reset Commits

resetPasswordWithToken owns the post-commit steps: deleting the link and sending the notice no longer throw, and a link issued before the account's last credentialsChangedAt is refused, so it is spent even when its deletion fails. The reset write is conditioned on the cutoff it read, so one link commits once. The controller re-dates the cutoff and revokes sessions and passkeys whenever the password changed, and answers CREDENTIAL_RETIREMENT_INCOMPLETE if any of that fails.

* fix: Spend Undated Reset Links and Move the Reset Notice Into TypeScript

* fix: Tell the User When a Reset Could Not Sign Out Every Session

The reset page now recognizes CREDENTIAL_RETIREMENT_INCOMPLETE, shared from librechat-data-provider, and shows a localized warning that the new password is active with a sign-in action, instead of reporting the spent link as invalid.

* perf: Re-Date the Reset Cutoff From the Committed Write

The committed reset hands its credentialsChangedAt back through PasswordResetResult, so the controller re-stamps without a second user read.

* fix: Retire Every Superseded Credential Before Minting on 2FA Enrollment

Opt-in confirmation and setup finalization now revoke sessions, re-date twoFactorEnrolledAt and wait for the auth cache to drop the pre-enrollment document, running every step even when one fails. If any step fails they mint nothing and answer CREDENTIAL_RETIREMENT_INCOMPLETE; the settings dialog keeps 2FA on with a warning and the setup screen sends the user back to sign in with the new factor.

* test: Cover the Settings Warning When 2FA Enrollment Leaves Sessions Behind

* fix: Send the User Back to Sign In After an Incomplete Opt-In Enrollment

Enrollment retires the confirming tab's bearer, and an incomplete retirement mints no replacement, so the settings dialog now shows the backup codes and then signs out to the login page, whether the user completes setup or closes the dialog.

* test: Run the Retirement Warning Scenarios Against Their Own Signed-Out or Fresh Accounts

* test: Open the Sidebar Drawer Before the Account Menu on Phones

* fix: Report a Committed Opt-In Enrollment When Rotating the Session Fails

Once 2FA is promoted, a later failure in confirm2FA withdraws whatever session it may have minted and answers CREDENTIAL_RETIREMENT_INCOMPLETE, so the settings dialog hands over the backup codes and signs the user in again instead of reporting an invalid code.

* test: Prove an Incomplete Reset Does Not Resume the Retired Session

The Sign in action sends a browser with a live session through /login for about 150 ms before it lands in chat, so the signed-in version of the warning scenario only passed when the URL check caught that window. The warning scenario runs signed out, and a new scenario holds a pre-reset session and asserts its refresh is refused and the user stays on the login page.

* fix: Settle the Auth Cache After the CLI Reset's Final Cutoff Write

* test: Require the Login Form After Signing In From a Signed-Out Reset

* fix: Explain an Incomplete Session Retirement Before Restarting Sign-In After Required 2FA Setup

* perf: Start the Opt-In Enrollment User and Session Reads Together
2026-11-05 22:53:11 +01:00
Marco Beretta
2ad2c1c14b
🔑 perf: Cache JWT Users and Batch Auth-Path Reads (#17466)
* perf: Serve JWT Bearer User Lookups From the Auth User Cache

* perf: Batch Agent Permission Reads on the File Access Path

* perf: Remember a Loaded Google Service Key Across Endpoint Config Reads

* perf: Run Independent Startup, Tool, Skill and Erasure Reads Concurrently

* fix: Drop JWT User Cache Writes That Race a User Mutation

Confirm each cache write with a second read and evict when the user changed,
so an in-flight lookup cannot repopulate an entry a credential change just
evicted. The cache mode now arrives through the loader dependencies.

* refactor: Move Agent Skill Access Reads Into packages/api

The chat-completions and Responses controllers call loadSkillAccess instead of
orchestrating the three reads in CJS. The preview route spec mocks the batched
file access helper the middleware now calls.

* test: Cover Agent File Access, JWT Bursts and Remote Skill Reads End to End

* fix: Serve a Cached JWT User Only While Its updatedAt Is Current

A cache hit now reads the stored updatedAt and deletion fence instead of the
fence alone, so a document cached from a read that raced a user mutation is
never served, even when the write landed after that mutation's eviction.

* refactor: Move Startup Migration Checks Into packages/api

* refactor: Inject the Startup Migration Checks Instead of Mongoose Models

* fix: Serve Cached OpenID Users Only While Their updatedAt Is Current

Moves the freshness check into getCurrentCachedAuthUserDoc and uses it on the
OpenID bearer path as well as the local JWT one, so a document cached from a
read that raced a credential or role change is never served there either.

Fixes berry-13/LibreChat#432

* fix: Compare Authorization Fields on Every Auth Cache Hit

updatedAt has millisecond resolution, so the freshness read also compares the
token retirement stamps, role, tenant and two-factor state.

* fix: Annotate the Auth Freshness Projection for Isolated Declarations

* perf: Reuse the OpenID Cache Freshness Read for Deletion Admission

A cache hit already proved the deletion fence is clear, so only users read from
the database take the separate fence query.

* refactor: Keep the OpenID Cache Freshness and Fence Decisions in packages/api

* test: Exercise JWT Cache Freshness Against Real User Methods in MongoDB

* fix: Stamp the JWT User Lookup So the Cache Write Fence Applies

* fix: Reload a Google Service Key File When It Changes or Disappears

The availability check remembers a loaded key only while the file's mtime and
size are unchanged, and fetches URL sources every time as before.

* fix: Recheck a Service Key File After a Permission Change
2026-10-30 00:24:08 +01:00
Marco Beretta
7f597b4787
🧊 fix: Fence Auth User Cache Writes After Eviction and Evict Favorite Holders (#17505)
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* fix: Fence Auth User Cache Writes After Eviction and Evict Favorite Holders

An eviction now leaves a per-user fence in the auth user cache that outlives
every document read before it. The reader skips a cached document while its
user is fenced, and a lookup slower than one cache TTL is not cached, so a
request that read the user before a change can no longer repopulate the cache
afterwards, and a document the reverse index lost is hidden as well. Role and
user methods share one bulk eviction helper, and the terms reset only waits
out the TTL when an eviction failed.

Deleting an agent, deleting a user's agents and removing an agent from
favorites now evict the cached auth documents of the users whose favorites
changed.

* fix: Anchor Cached Auth Document Expiry to the Lookup Start

A stalled reverse-index write could land a stale document after the eviction
fence expired, with a fresh TTL. The document now carries an expiry two cache
TTLs after its lookup began; its Redis TTL is computed after the index write
and the reader refuses it past that expiry.

* refactor: Time the Auth User Lookup in the API Package

The lookup start that anchors a cached document's lifetime is now stamped by
timeAuthUserLookup in packages/api, so the OpenID JWT strategy only wires the
lookup through it.

* fix: Wait Out the Full Cached Document Lifetime After Failed Eviction

A document read just before a change can live two cache TTLs from its lookup,
so a credential change or terms reset whose eviction failed now waits that
long before reporting success.

* fix: Recheck Cached Auth Document Expiry After the Fence Read

A fence read that stalls can return after both the fence and the document
expired, so the reader checks the document's expiry again before serving it.
2026-10-29 17:44:51 +01:00
Marco Beretta
5b8bb3c31f
⏱️ fix: Bound Remaining Outbound Calls With Timeout Budgets (#17468)
* fix: Bound outbound HTTP calls that had no timeout

Add timeouts.toolsMs, speechMs and imageGenerationMs to the timeouts block and apply the
existing budgets to the RAG delete paths, built-in tool APIs, TTS/STT providers (TTS also
aborts when the client closes), Stable Diffusion, Firebase reads and Mailgun. Calls made
before app config exists (remote config, RAG health, service key URL, Google refresh) get a
fixed 10 second budget.

* fix: Honor configured budgets for RAG deletes and per-chunk TTS deadlines

* refactor: Share one budget helper between speech and image CJS callers

* test: Cover a stalled RAG delete with a mock scenario

* test: Wait for the RAG embed before stalling the delete

* test: Embed at upload so the stalled delete has a vector to remove

* fix: Close a started TTS response on a late chunk timeout and share the service budget helper

* fix: Fail startup when the remote config fetch times out
2026-10-29 09:55:18 +01:00
Danny Avila
64f2124cc6
🔐 fix: Keep the Admin OpenID State So PKCE Holds When the IdP Omits S256 (#17478)
openid-client's Passport Strategy replaces the authorization request's state with a random one
when the IdP's discovery metadata does not list S256 in code_challenge_methods_supported and the
request has no nonce. Azure Entra ID omits that field, so the admin callback could not find the
admin panel's PKCE challenge under pkce:<state> and issued an exchange code that any
code_verifier, or none, could redeem.

The admin strategy now adds a nonce in that case, so openid-client keeps the admin route's state
and checks the nonce against the ID token on the callback. The chat OpenID flow is unchanged.
2026-10-28 18:33:12 +01:00
Marco Beretta
7d0e79786f
🪶 fix: Time Out Client Refresh and Trim Lodash Imports (#17467)
* perf: Bound client hygiene paths (lodash imports, timeouts, listener cleanup, upload concurrency)

* feat: Make client request timeouts configurable

* test: Cover the configured refresh deadline end to end

* feat: Rename client timeouts to client limits and expose upload concurrency

* fix: Keep the published refresh deadline for the next page load
2026-10-27 23:30:08 +01:00
Danny Avila
0abbf3313d
🔐 fix: Apply Base Config Overrides Before Sign-In and Refuse Script Policy Links (#17351)
* 🔐 fix: Apply Base Config Overrides Before Sign-In and Refuse Script Policy Links

Sign-in decisions made before the user is known now read librechat.yaml plus the `__base__`
override of the request's tenant, or of the deployment outside a tenant, and fail closed
(`resolvePreAuthAppConfig`). Registration, the first phase of password reset and the first
email-domain check of the LDAP, OpenID, SAML and social strategies use it. The second check
applies the account's role overrides with or without a tenant, and a new account is checked
against the role it will be created with before anything is inserted. OpenID checks again when
the admin claim or role sync changes the role. Password reset issues no link when the
account's config cannot be read.

The signed-out `GET /api/config` serves Base `registration.socialLogins` and the pre-login
interface fields (`resolvePreLoginAppConfig`), falling back to librechat.yaml when overrides
cannot be read. `turnstile` becomes a base-only section, so Turnstile comes only from
librechat.yaml.

Config reads that merge documents stay in one tenant partition (`tenantPartition`, Mongoose
binding `tenantPartitionFilter`): the active tenant's documents, or the tenantless ones outside
a tenant. The config store's Mongoose binding reads, writes, lists and restores role documents,
`__base__` included, in that partition, and its `listActive` draws every document from it;
group and user documents stay addressed by id. Only a `list` with `acrossTenants` reads every
partition, which `listConfigTombstones` uses so the startup MCP tombstone report still names
each tenant's documents. The tenant-isolation conformance suite gains single-partition cases.

Privacy policy and terms of service `externalUrl` must be http(s), `mailto:`, `tel:`, relative
or blank (`isSafeLinkUrl`). Admin writes of another scheme are refused, a librechat.yaml link is
dropped with a warning at load, a stored one is dropped at merge, and every payload and the
client remove one that reaches them. The admin config meta reports
`features.preAuthBaseOverrides: true`.

* 🧪 test: Layer a Required-Field Override Through interface.currency Instead of Turnstile

Turnstile is set in librechat.yaml only now, so profile overrides of it are skipped and the
layering scenario could no longer see a role's Turnstile options completed by a user's site key.
The scenario now layers `interface.currency`, whose `code` and `rate` are both required: the role
stores only the rate, the user only the code, and /api/config serves both.

* 🛂 fix: Admit a First OpenID Login Under Its Claimed Role Before Creating the Account

The admin-role claim and role sync are now decided before a first-login OpenID account is created, and createUserOnce admits the email under that role's config, read in parallel with the USER role's, before inserting anything. A login the claimed role refuses creates no account and no start balance. Admitted logins are unchanged: the account is still created as USER (now explicitly), moved into the claimed role, re-checked and audited as before, with the claims decided once. An account a concurrent first login created gets the claims decided again for its own role and tenant.
2026-10-22 22:49:54 +02:00
lia-by-librechat[bot]
f08868d21f
🧑‍✈️ feat: Enroll Machines Through Explicit Browser Approval (#17344)
* feat: add browser-approved machine enrollment

* fix: preserve enrollment authority and durable admission invariants

* test: verify in-document two-factor setup returns

* test: exercise merged browser setup CLI against durable authorities

---------

Co-authored-by: Lia <lia@librechat.ai>
2026-10-22 16:54:00 +02:00
Marco Beretta
ded1e734e0
🔕 fix: Quiet Client Disconnects, Fall Back When Hash Workers Fail, Log Speech Truncation (#17278) 2026-10-20 10:47:15 +02:00
Marco Beretta
4c6ea7e981
🔐 fix: Hash Passwords on a Worker Pool and Surface API Key Lookup Failures (#17261)
* fix: Hash Off the Event Loop and Surface API Key Lookup Failures

Registration, email verification, password reset and verification resends
hashed and compared with bcryptjs's synchronous calls. bcryptjs is pure
JavaScript, so each call blocked the event loop for every request in the
process. They now use the promise APIs, and the password reset
dependencies are async.

validateAgentApiKey caught its own query failures and returned null, so a
database outage answered remote callers with 401 Invalid API key. It now
lets the failure reach requireApiKeyAuth, which answers with a 500.

* fix: Run bcrypt on a Worker Pool in packages/api

bcryptjs's promise API still computes on the main thread, only in chunks
of up to 100 ms, so concurrent registrations and resets kept stalling
unrelated requests (four cost-10 hashes delayed a 5 ms timer by about
190 ms). hashSecret and compareSecret now run bcryptjs on a small
worker_threads pool in packages/api, and AuthService.js calls them.

* feat: Configure the Password Hashing Worker Count

* fix: Verify Login and Step-Up Passwords on the Hash Pool
2026-10-19 22:13:31 +02:00
Marco Beretta
e57aa3aa5b
🙊 fix: Keep API Keys and Internal Errors Out of Logs and Responses (#17258)
* fix: Keep API Keys and Internal Errors Out of Logs and Responses

The log redaction patterns did not cover the appid query parameter, so a
failed Wolfram request logged its AppID with the axios request URL. appid
now joins the redacted token and query names.

OpenWeather returned a fetch error's message to the model verbatim, and
node-fetch puts the full request URL, appid included, in that message. The
tool now passes it through redactMessage, as ToolService does.

The public startup config route and the unauthenticated password reset
route sent raw error text on unexpected failures. Both now answer with a
fixed message and keep the detail in the server log.

* refactor: Format Tool Error Text in packages/api

* fix: Redact appid Metadata Keys in Structured Logs
2026-10-19 21:36:46 +02:00
Marco Beretta
ecd6943194
✂️ refactor: Remove Dead Helpers, Classes and Dependencies From packages/api (#17118)
* refactor: Remove Unused Agent Helpers and Superseded Wrappers

* refactor: Remove Dead Auth, Middleware, Protection and Prompt Helpers

* refactor: Remove Dead MCP, File, Skill and Endpoint Code

* refactor: Remove Dead Stream, Telemetry, Utility and Type Exports

* chore: Drop Unused packages/api Dependencies From bun.lock

* refactor: Keep Published Compatibility and Deprecated packages/api Exports
2026-10-16 15:43:12 +02:00
Ravi Kumar L
a7e6cc89f6
🔓 fix: Prevent 30-Second OpenID Refresh Stalls After a Discarded Prerender (#17174)
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* fix: release OpenID delivery lease when the client disconnected before delivery

A refresh whose client disconnects before the response is sent claims the
delivery lease and then arms finish/close listeners on a response that has
already closed. Neither event fires again, so the lease is never released and
every later refresh for the same generation polls until the 30-second lease
expires.

Arm the listeners only while the response is open; otherwise release the lease
directly after the send.

* fix: defer the silent refresh until a prerendered page is shown

A prerendered page runs the startup silent refresh before the user sees it.
When the browser discards the prerender, the refresh is aborted mid-flight
after the server has already rotated the refresh token, and the page the user
actually opens has to recover from a session it never received.

Wait for prerenderingchange before refreshing so a prerender has no effect on
the session.

* refactor: move OpenID response delivery into packages/api
2026-10-15 16:02:28 -07:00
Marco Beretta
d0e253043a
🙈 fix: Mask Emails and Drop Personal Identifiers From Logs (#17048)
* fix: Mask Email Addresses and Drop Personal Identifiers from Logs

* fix: Log User IDs in OpenID Admin Role and LDAP Domain Block Messages

* fix: Mask Unicode Email Addresses in Log Redaction

* test: Add Log Email Masking Scenarios

* fix: Bound the Email Redaction Matcher and Handle Quoted Local Parts

* fix: Mask Quoted and Special-Character Email Local Parts

* fix: Redact Whole Email Tokens, Top-Level Log Fields and Metadata Keys

* fix: Redact Top-Level Metadata Keys and Escaped Quotes in Email Local Parts

* fix: Redact Truncated Emails, Address Literals and Request Paths in Logs

* fix: Redact the Full Log String Before Truncating

* fix: Preserve Colliding and Object Keys When Redacting Log Metadata

* fix: Bound Log Redaction to a Window Past the Truncation Limit

* fix: Redact the Truncation Window Without a Whitespace Cut

* fix: Redact Serialized Quoted Addresses and Keep Key Collisions Linear

* fix: Bound Every Log Redaction Path and the URL Credential Pattern

* fix: Keep Long-Scheme Credential Redaction and Serialized Escaped Quotes

* test: Cover Every Secret Shape Across the Log Truncation Cap

* fix: Drop Unfinished Window Tokens, Mask Short TLDs and Redact Direct Error Stacks

* fix: Treat Input End as a Token Boundary and Mask Parenthesized Identifiers

* fix: Remove the Quoted Local Part Length Cap Without Quadratic Scans

* fix: Drop an Unfinished Quoted Address at the Window Edge

* fix: Check Quoted Locals Before Accepting a Window Delimiter

* fix: Count Only Opening Quotes When Trimming the Window

* fix: Track Unmatched Quoted Locals Instead of Counting Closing Quotes

* fix: Lift Residual Email Caps, Keep Punctuated Credential URIs Masked and Move OBO Log Id to the API Package

* fix: Mask Empty Quoted Locals and Tolerate Read-Only Log Fields

* fix: Return a Sanitized Copy When a Log Field Cannot Be Replaced

* fix: Treat a Failed Key Removal as a Failed Replacement and Guard Stack Writes

* fix: Skip Heavy Error Graphs and Accept Escaped Backslashes in Serialized Locals

* fix: Accept Lone Escaped Backslashes in Serialized Locals Without Rescans

* fix: Compact Axios Request Info Before Redaction and Skip Heavy Splat Error Graphs

* fix: Redact Address Keys on Nested Error Objects

* fix: Materialize and Redact Enumerable Getters on Nested Errors

* fix: Guard Throwing Top-Level Getters and Skip Heavy Fields Only on Error Records

* fix: Skip Serialized Quotes When Trimming an Unfinished Address

* fix: Bound Redaction With a Per-Record Node Budget and Accept JSON Control Escapes

* fix: Match Credential URIs From the Separator So Scheme Length Is Unbounded

* fix: Count Strings Against the Redaction Budget and Guard Nested Getters

* fix: Rebuild the Log Record When a Top-Level Accessor Ignores Writes

* fix: Rebuild the Log Record When a Stack Accessor Ignores Writes

* fix: Guard the Initial Stack Read on Direct Error Logs

* fix: Accept Escaped Solidus and Preserve the Outer Budget on Reentrant Logging

* fix: Guard the Axios Marker and Error-Like Probes Against Throwing Getters

* fix: Guard the Axios Marker on Nested Errors

* fix: Replace Skipped Heavy Fields Up Front, Budget Top-Level Fields and Mask Encoded Emails

* fix: Mask Encoded Address Keys and Guard Nested Axios Config Compaction

* fix: Redact URL Objects in Compact Request Info

* fix: Remove Encoded Email Caps and Strip Serializer Hooks From Clones

* fix: Strip Serializer Hooks From Error Clones and Top-Level Records

* fix: Neutralize Inherited Serializer Hooks on Log Records

* fix: Guard the Serializer Hook Probe

* fix: Replace Function Values in Log Records

* fix: Mask Percent-Encoded Domain Separators in Logged URLs

* fix: Bound the Encoded Email Domain at URL Delimiters

* fix: Shadow Throwing Serializer Getters on Nested Errors

* fix: Rebuild Accessor Messages and Mask Doubly Encoded Addresses

* fix: Redact Multiply Encoded Address Keys

* feat: Make the Log Redaction Node Budget Configurable

* fix: Guard Message and Serializer Property Reads

* fix: Contain Proxy Failures and Redact the Compact Request Method
2026-10-15 15:54:27 +02:00
Marco Beretta
9adabde72e
🗂️ feat: Audit MCP, Code Worker, Langfuse, Skill Credential, Passkey and Audit Log Access (#17054)
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* fix: Remove Group Dependents Before Deleting the Group

* feat: Audit Code Worker Pairing and Langfuse Connection Changes

* feat: Audit Skill Sync Credential Changes

* feat: Audit Passkey Enrolment and Removal

* feat: Audit Audit Log Reads and CSV Exports

* feat: Audit Audit Log Retention Purges

* feat: Audit MCP Server Create, Update and Delete

* fix: Keep Purge Result When the Purge Audit Write Fails

* test: Cover Admin Integration Audit Scenarios

* fix: Tighten Admin Integration Audit Scope and Group Cleanup Order

* fix: Run Security Fences Before Awaiting Audit Writes

* fix: Move MCP Post-Commit Audit Ordering Into the Auditor and Audit Verify Reads

* fix: Fail Closed When Recording Audit Log Access

* fix: Audit Group Deletion Before the Cascade and Restore Dependents on Failure

* fix: Restore Only Config Overrides When Group Deletion Fails

* fix: Audit Worker Pairing and Export Before the Work and Append Failures

* fix: Record Group Deletion as Pending Without Delaying Revocation

* fix: Skip Config Restore When a Concurrent Delete Removed the Group

* fix: Restore Group Config When the Existence Recheck Fails

* fix: Keep Group Config Restricted When Delete State Is Unknown

* fix: Record Worker Pairing and Revocation as Pending Until Confirmed

* fix: Deliver the Pairing Code Before the Terminal Audit Write

* test: Assert Pairing Code Delivery Precedes the Terminal Audit Write

* fix: Send Revocation and Group Deletion Responses Before the Terminal Audit Write

* fix: Snapshot Group Config Before the Destructive Cascade Step

* refactor: Type the Group Config Snapshot Dependency Without Mongoose Shapes

* fix: Fence Shared MCP Users Before the Deletion Audit and Correlate Audit Attempts

* fix: Diff MCP Server Audits Against the Committed Config

* fix: Read the Committed MCP Config at Commit Time for the Audit Diff

* refactor: Start the Committed MCP Config Read Inside the Auditor

* fix: Audit Langfuse Patches When Activation Fails and Surface Failed Group Config Restores

* fix: Record Member Removals When Group Deletion Completes After a Failed Restore

* test: Serve the Committed Config on the MCP Update Audit Reread

* fix: Audit the Group Returned by the Compensating Deletion

* fix: Keep Member Removal Audits Fail-Open During Group Deletion

* fix: Retry ACL Cleanup After a Compensating Group Deletion

* fix: Mark Unavailable Audit Detail and Order Member Removals After the Pending Deletion

* fix: Guard Synchronous Committed-Config Read Failures in the MCP Auditor

* fix: Return the Persisted MCP Config and Audit Commits That Outlive Cache Invalidation

* style: Sort Imports in MCP Audit Files

* style: Sort Imports After Restack

* fix: Audit MCP Commits That Outlive Any Post-Write Step and Pend Audit Exports Until Complete

* test: Provide the Fail-Closed Setting in the Code Route Mock

* fix: Refresh MCP Read Caches When a Repository Step Fails After the Write

* fix: Finish Audit Exports on Response Completion and Keep Error Details Out of Messages and Logs

* fix: Watch Response Completion Before the Truncation Footer Write

* fix: Skip Audit for No-op MCP Deletes and Close Remaining Post-Failure Audit Gaps

* fix: Keep Causes Out of Structured Logs and Treat a Lost Compensating Delete as Not Found

* fix: Mark Failed MCP Post-Commit Steps and Null Langfuse Activation in Audits
2026-10-15 00:30:26 +02:00
Marco Beretta
ccae5b988d
📜 feat: Audit Admin Role, Group, Config and IdP Role Mutations (#17052)
* feat: Extend the Audit Action Vocabulary to Admin, Sync and Credential Mutations

* feat: Audit Admin Role, Group and Config Mutations

Role deletion now removes the role's grants, ACL entries and config
overrides before the role itself and returns ROLE_CLEANUP_FAILED instead
of success when any of them fails, so a recreated role cannot inherit
leftover privileges.

* feat: Audit IdP and Startup Role Changes

* fix: Keep the Startup Role Sync Running When Its Audit Verification Read Fails

* test: Cover Admin Role Audit Trail End to End

* fix: Audit a Remote Agent Role Sync Only After It Persists

* fix: Restore Role Dependents When Role Deletion Fails Midway

* fix: Restore Role Dependents Only When the Role Still Exists

* style: Sort Role Admin Imports

* fix: Keep the ACL Snapshot When Role Cleanup Fails Ambiguously

* test: Read Role Audit Entries From the Audit Log Route

* fix: Audit Only Real Membership Changes and Restore Deleted Role Config in Full

* fix: Restore Deleted Role Grants in Full and Sanitize Audit Write Logging

* fix: Audit and Report a Role Deletion Confirmed After a Lost Response

* fix: Never Restore Dependents Onto a Recreated Role

* fix: Snapshot Role Dependents Before Deleting and Detect Membership Changes Atomically

* fix: Restore From the Data a Cascade Step Actually Removed

* fix: Restore Only Config Overrides When a Role Delete Fails

* fix: Log Only Safe Metadata When the Startup Audit Read Fails

* fix: Audit Grants Removed by a Failed Role Delete

* fix: Audit Removed Grants on Unverifiable Role Delete Exits

* fix: Honor Fail-Closed Auditing in the Admin Config, Group and Role Routes

* fix: Bind Role Deletion to the Captured Id and Audit Only Atomic Role and Config Changes

* fix: Skip the Config Restore When the Targeted Role Is Gone

* fix: Audit Initial Group Members and Skip No-Op Role Description Updates

* fix: Record Role Deletion as Pending Before Cleanup and Append Its Outcome

* fix: Audit Reassigned Role Members and Return the Persisted Config After a Tracked Toggle

* fix: Keep a Committed Role Deletion Successful When Cascade Audit Writes Fail

* fix: Decide Group Update Audits From the Atomic Write and Sanitize Permission Update Logs

* fix: Audit Grants From a Snapshot, Fail on Member Lookup Errors and Chunk Member Audit Entries

* fix: Audit Group Deletion Members and Previous Role Removal, Abort on Grant Snapshot Failure

* fix: Invalidate Config Caches After Partial Secret Writes

* fix: Retry Failed Cascade Restores, Report Changed Group Fields and Audit Every Reassigned Member

* fix: Log Safe Metadata When Cache Invalidation Fails After a Partial Write

* fix: Keep Error Messages Out of the Audit Write Failure Log

* style: Sort Audit Log Spec Imports

* fix: Sanitize Admin Handler Error Logs and Dispatch System Audit Writes Without Waiting
2026-10-14 23:57:07 +02:00
Marco Beretta
80e3707964
🪪 fix: Boot-Paint a Cached Theme Only for Its Signed-In Owner (#16926)
* fix: Boot-Paint a Cached Theme Only for the Tab's Signed-In Owner

The boot script and DeploymentTheme's first commit replayed the deployment-theme cache without checking its owner, so a browser that last held one identity's theme painted it for another until the config answered. The tab now records its signed-in owner in session storage and both paths replay the cache only when it matches.

* test: Assert Session Ends Forget the Tab Theme Owner

* test: Hold the First-Paint Config Answer Until the App Paints

* fix: Skip the Boot-Painted Theme Cache Once the Session Has Ended

* fix: Bind the Readable Session Hint to the Signed-In Owner

* test: End the Session for Real in the Expired-Hint Scenarios

* fix: Clear the Session Hint When a Local Refresh Finds No Session

* test: Give the Refresh Specs the Cookie Surface the Session Hint Uses

* test: Count the Signed-Out Config Answer in the No-Cached-Paint Scenarios

* fix: Retire the Session Hint on Every Rejected OpenID Refresh

* fix: Retire the Session Hint When a Refresh Carries No Token

* fix: Retire the Session Hint on Account Deletion and Password Reset

* refactor: Own the Session Hint Lifecycle in the Typed Auth Cookies
2026-10-14 11:08:53 +02:00
Marco Beretta
1994a4949d
🔏 fix: Encrypt Provider Keys With v3, Reject Plaintext in decryptV2 and Default to Strong Backup Codes (#17051)
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* fix: Write User Provider Keys With Random-IV v3 Format

* fix: Reject Undelimited Input in decryptV2 Instead of Returning It

* fix: Default 2FA Backup Codes to the Strong Format

* fix: Limit Admin Secret Preview to the Last Four Characters

* fix: Re-Derive Stored Secret Previews Under the Last-Four Policy

* test: Build Legacy Credential Fixtures With the Server Key

* fix: Load Request Config for User Key Writes and Mask Legacy Previews
2026-10-13 22:19:37 +02:00
Marco Beretta
c0f7822f2e
📧 fix: Log User IDs Instead of Emails in Admin Panel Auth Flow (#17032)
* fix: Log User IDs Instead of Emails in Admin Panel Auth Flow

* fix: Sort Imports in Admin Middleware Spec

* test: Cover Admin Exchange and Access Denial in Mock Scenarios

* test: Remove the Generated User After the Admin Denial Scenario
2026-10-13 08:42:57 +02:00
Marco Beretta
ee1d59e590
🕵️ fix: Redact Email Addresses and IPs From Auth Flow Logs (#16994) 2026-10-12 10:50:56 +02:00
Danny Avila
8b58ebc4d5
🔁 fix: Recover Concurrent First SAML, LDAP and Social Logins (#16779)
* 🔁 fix: Recover Concurrent First SAML, LDAP and Social Logins

SAML, LDAP and social logins looked the user up and then inserted it
with nothing in between, so two first logins for one new identity both
inserted and the unique index failed the second with E11000.

Every strategy now provisions first-login users in packages/api:
createUserOnce inserts through createUserIfAbsent and, on user_exists,
repeats the strategy's own lookup and resolves to the account that won,
once its creator finished provisioning it (its start balance exists when
one is configured), admitted exactly as a found account (a tenant
account resolves its tenant config and that config's email-domain policy
applies). provisionSamlUser, provisionLdapUser and provisionSocialUser
own the create / recover / refresh decision, so a recovered account gets
the same refresh as any account the login finds (claimSamlIdentity, the
LDAP directory overwrite, handleExistingUser), and the CJS strategies
only pass their models and services and map the result to passport.
The lookups take a plain FindUserByFields and the contracts carry
UserRecord and NewUserData. createOpenIDUser now goes through
createUserOnce.

Related to #16766

* ⚡ perf: Read a Recovered Account's Config and Balance Together

After losing the insert race, createUserOnce resolved the tenant config
and only then read the start balance, although the balance check now
depends only on the creation config. Both reads start together.
2026-10-05 17:57:23 -04:00
Danny Avila
f556fc0b5d
🚪 fix: Let Concurrent First OpenID Logins Continue as the New User (#16778)
* 🚪 fix: Let Concurrent First OpenID Logins Continue as the New User

Two requests for the same not-yet-created OpenID identity both missed
findOpenIDUser and both called createUser; the unique email and OpenID
indexes rejected the second insert, and that login failed with E11000.

createUserIfAbsent (data-schemas) inserts a first-login user and reports
a lost race as { ok: false, error: { code: 'user_exists' } }. It
initializes the start balance under the new user's id before inserting
the user, so the account is never visible without it, and removes that
balance when the write fails or a unique index rejects the insert.
createUser shares the insert-only credit (creditStartBalance).

createOpenIDUser (packages/api) creates through it and, on user_exists,
repeats findOpenIDUser with its provider and issuer checks and continues
as the account that won, admitted and refreshed exactly as if the first
lookup had found it: the account's own config (tenant config for a
tenant account) and its email-domain policy apply, and applyOpenIDProfile
writes this callback's claims. It continues only once the winner
finished provisioning the account: when that config sets a start
balance, the balance must exist, which a previous-release creator
credits only after its insert. UserRecord and NewUserData are the plain,
storage-neutral contracts.

Related to #16766

* ↩️ fix: Hold a Recovered Login on the Creation Config's Start Balance

The provisioning barrier read the recovered account's tenant config.
With a tenant start balance the base config does not set, every
concurrent first login in that tenant failed again, because the winner
creates the user under the base config and login balance sync only
initializes the tenant balance afterwards.

The barrier guards against a previous-release creator's $inc landing on
a balance login balance sync already initialized, and that creator only
credits the base config's start balance. createOpenIDUser now holds the
recovered login only when the config new users are created under sets a
start balance; a tenant-only start balance is initialized insert-only by
login balance sync and cannot be added twice.
2026-10-05 17:56:57 -04:00
Danny Avila
b6b24741da
🗝️ fix: Strengthen Two-Factor Recovery Credentials (#16742)
* fix: Strengthen Two-Factor Recovery Credentials

* fix: Declare Recovery Helper Return Types

* fix: Consume Recovery Codes Atomically

* fix: Stage Recovery Code Rollout and Improve Input
2026-10-04 12:16:37 -04:00
Marco Beretta
92432e95d5
🔐 feat: Enforce Required Two-Factor Authentication (#14731)
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* feat: enforce required two-factor authentication

Require local and LDAP accounts to enroll in TOTP before they can use the
app when ENFORCE_TWO_FACTOR_AUTHENTICATION is set. Sign-in, refresh, bearer
verification, optional share auth and image authorization all route an
unenrolled account into a staged setup flow, and every bearer credential
minted before enrollment or a password reset is retired.

Password reset retirement uses the existing credentialsChangedAt stamp, and
commitPasswordReset clears any staged enrollment in the same write. Passkey
sign-in follows the same enrollment gate as password sign-in.

* test: cover passkey sign-in handing off to required enrollment

* refactor: keep Mongoose user types out of two-factor auth contracts

* fix: withdraw a minted session when its retirement recheck fails

* fix: hold Agent API keys and the reset CLI to the required two-factor policy

* fix: adopt a setup token handed off after the setup screen mounted

* fix: move every tab that receives an enrollment hand-off into setup

* fix: read the enrollment gate's retirement cutoff in system scope

* fix: clear minted session cookies before the fallible session deletion

* fix: adopt a setup token persisted before the setup screen subscribed
2026-10-01 23:39:51 +02:00
Marco Beretta
5b84c4b57f ⏳ feat: Add Ephemeral Retention Mode for Forced Temporary Chats (#13811)
* feat: add ephemeral retention mode for forced temporary chats

Adds RetentionMode.EPHEMERAL, which forces every newly saved chat
temporary: hidden from history and search, given the temporary-chat
expiration, and with the toggle locked on.

Forces isTemporary and applies the temporary expiration in the normal
conversation and message save methods, routes Assistants/Threads
messages through the normal message save, applies the all-data
retention policy to file uploads and shared links, and stamps imports,
forks, and duplicates. Locks the frontend toggle and keyboard shortcut
behind an administrator-enforced badge.

The default temporary mode and the existing all mode are unchanged.

* fix: enforce ephemeral retention when resuming paused chats

* fix: preserve forced retention across pauses and assistant turns

* test: Use Real Module IDs for Installed Package Mocks

* test: Wait for Resumed Retention Persistence

* test: Control Mongo Index Setup in OpenID Fixture

* test: Close Mobile Drawer Before Retention Resume Scenario

* fix: Store Responses API Messages Under the Retention Write Context

Input and output messages were saved with the raw request, so under
ephemeral retention they missed the forced-temporary classification the
conversation received. Route both through getConversationWriteContext
and announce the stored reply as saved.

* fix: Align Resumed Responses With the Parent Retention Deadline

A resumed response was saved with a fresh forced-temporary window while
the re-stamp kept the conversation's earlier deadline, so a chat that
paused again could leave its response stored after the conversation
expired. Stamp the saved response with the parent's deadline.

* fix: Clear Released Bookmark Tags When Forcing a Chat Temporary

stampForcedRetention released a converted chat's bookmark counts but
kept its tags, so deleting that chat before TTL removal decremented the
same tags again and reduced counts owned by other visible chats. Clear
the tags in the conditional conversion update that releases them.

* fix: Store No Bookmark Tags on Forced-Temporary Imports

An ephemeral import, fork or duplicate skipped its tag count increment
but kept the source tags, so deleting the copy before TTL removal
decremented counts owned by other visible chats. Store the same tags the
import counts, which is none for a forced-temporary copy.

* test: Provide the Forced-Temporary Retention Helper to the Header Stacking Mock

* test: Reuse One Admin Login per Worker in Ephemeral Retention Scenarios

* fix: Keep Legacy Temporary Chats Temporary When Forking Under All-Data Retention

* fix: Convert a Resumed Chat Under Ephemeral Retention Before It Can Re-Pause Empty

* fix: Treat a Reloaded Pre-Policy Run as Temporary Once Retention Is Forced

* fix: Stamp Messages with the Deadline a Concurrent Retention Stamp Stored

* fix: Wait for the Startup Config Before Rebuilding a Resumed Submission

* test: Wait for the Resumed Response Row in the Ephemeral Resume Scenario

* test: Provide the Real Command Executor Stamp to the Callbacks Mock

(cherry picked from commit 02a70e9c58)

Original-PR: https://github.com/LibreChat-AI/LibreChat/pull/13811
2026-10-01 03:46:19 +00:00
Marco Beretta
26b6988355 🧯 fix: Outlast Failed Auth Cache Eviction on Credential Changes (#16435)
* fix: outlast failed auth cache eviction on credential changes

A credential change committed to MongoDB could report success while a
cached auth user document without the new credentialsChangedAt stayed
readable, so an old OpenID access token kept authorizing until the
cache TTL. The Redis-backed auth cache swallowed every failure (Keyv and
KeyvRedis resolve a failed GET as a miss and a failed DEL as a no-op), and
the eviction helpers stopped at the first error.

- The AUTH_USER_DOC namespace opts into throwOnErrors so a failed read or
  delete is visible; every caller of that namespace already catches.
- evictAuthUserDocs attempts every delete even when another fails and
  reports whether a document may still be served; the data-schemas and
  packages/api invalidation paths share it.
- updateUser waits out AUTH_USER_DOC_CACHE_TTL_MS before returning a
  credential change whose eviction was incomplete, so the change is only
  confirmed once no pre-change document can be served. Other updates stay
  best effort, and later revocations are delayed, never skipped.

* fix: record the reverse index before caching an auth user document

A document written before its reverse-index entry was cached without an
index naming it when the index write failed, so eviction could not find
it. Write the index first with a TTL that outlives the documents it names,
and skip the document when the index write fails.

* test: keep real data-schemas helpers in the pinned order spec

* fix: settle the auth cache after revoking reset credentials

Waiting out the cache TTL inside updateUser held the reset before its
session and passkey revocations, so a live refresh token or passkey could
mint an access token issued after credentialsChangedAt during the wait.
updateUser is best effort again; awaitAuthUserDocEviction retries the
eviction and waits one TTL only when it is still incomplete, and both the
web reset controller and the reset CLI call it after revoking sessions and
passkeys, before confirming the reset.

* fix: settle the credential barrier with a margin and on CLI revocation errors

Timers can fire a millisecond early, so the eviction barrier now waits the
cache TTL plus a 100 ms margin. The reset CLI also settles the barrier when
revoking passkeys or sessions throws, since the password is already changed.

* fix: treat an auth cache that cannot delete as not evicted

* fix: keep the reverse index until every document it names is evicted

A failed eviction still deleted the reverse index, so the credential
barrier's retry found no index and reported the cache clear while the
documents an unreadable index or a failed delete left behind stayed
cached. The index is now deleted only after it was read and every document
it names is gone, so a retry can still find what remains.

* fix: treat a malformed auth reverse index as unreadable

* fix: treat a reverse index with a non-string entry as unreadable

(cherry picked from commit 18b6937da3)

Original-PR: https://github.com/LibreChat-AI/LibreChat/pull/16435
2026-10-01 03:46:18 +00:00
Marco Beretta
eefeb2a7f9 ⚙️ feat: Make the Per-User Passkey Cap Configurable (#16259)
(cherry picked from commit 84180a87e2)

Original-PR: https://github.com/LibreChat-AI/LibreChat/pull/16259
2026-10-01 03:46:17 +00:00
Marco Beretta
ccae933e6d 🔐 fix: Revoke Password Reset Credentials Independently (#16320)
(cherry picked from commit c59fb60341)

Original-PR: https://github.com/LibreChat-AI/LibreChat/pull/16320
2026-10-01 03:46:17 +00:00
Marco Beretta
a9571ee13f 🧹 refactor: Keep Mongoose Types Out of the Passkey Handler Contract (#16263)
(cherry picked from commit fea7c17a56)

Original-PR: https://github.com/LibreChat-AI/LibreChat/pull/16263
2026-10-01 03:46:17 +00:00
Marco Beretta
a27d6ec35a 🔑 fix: Refresh the Stored Passkey Backup State on Each Sign-In (#16255)
verifyPasskeyAuthentication discarded credentialBackedUp, and
recordPasskeyUse updated only the counter and lastUsedAt, so the
stored backedUp flag kept its registration-time value and the Synced
badge in account settings could go stale after an authenticator
started or stopped syncing. Return the flag from the verification
helper and persist it in the same compare-and-swap update that
advances the counter, so a replayed assertion cannot flip it.

(cherry picked from commit eae6b4816d)

Original-PR: https://github.com/LibreChat-AI/LibreChat/pull/16255
2026-10-01 03:46:16 +00:00
Marco Beretta
4617302116 🔑 feat: Passkey Authentication with WebAuthn Sign-In and Management (#14715)
* feat: passkey authentication with WebAuthn sign-in and management

* refactor: tighten passkey account protections

Require password confirmation before adding or removing a passkey, and rate
limit those confirmations per user in their own namespace. Restrict passkey
enrollment and sign-in to local accounts, and re-evaluate account status once
the credential owner is resolved. Require user verification on the sign-in
ceremony. Invalidate outstanding access tokens on password reset. Tighten
redirect target validation and sanitize ceremony failure logs.

Adds coverage across the passkey controller, the WebAuthn helpers, the step-up
limiter, both JWT strategies, the redirect utility and the passkey settings UI.

* fix: localize passkey default name and respect router basename

Send a localized default credential label at enrollment so non-English
locales no longer persist the server's English fallback, and route the
passkey post-login and 2FA navigations through the deployment base path
so subdirectory installs stay inside the router.

Also mock syncStaticTools in the server boot specs; without it the
post-listen MCP initialization calls undefined and exits the worker.

* fix: harden passkey counter checks and reach stranded credentials

Make the signature counter write a compare-and-swap so two assertions
that verified against the same stored counter cannot both commit, and
reject the losing one; a cloned authenticator is otherwise accepted
inside that window. Counterless authenticators keep restamping at 0.

Keep the passkey panel reachable for identity-provider accounts, which
already get passwordless removal server-side but had no way in, while
hiding the add control they cannot use. Cascade passkey deletion from
the admin user-deletion path so credential IDs are not stranded.

* fix: reject stale 2FA temp tokens and surface passkey load failures

A temporary 2FA token proves only the first factor, so honouring one
minted before a password reset let anyone holding the second factor
survive account recovery. Apply the same credentials-changed cutoff the
JWT strategy uses.

Also distinguish a failed passkey query from an empty list; the error
state previously rendered as "no passkeys yet", which misreports what
is protecting the account.

* fix: fail closed when the passkey counter write cannot commit

Returning success on a storage error bypassed the compare-and-swap it
exists to enforce, so a cloned authenticator could be accepted while the
stored counter stayed stale. A database that cannot take this write
cannot mint the session either, so little is gained by failing open.
Counterless credentials carry no clone signal and keep their old path.

* fix: keep the passkey 2FA handoff inside the router

A full-page navigation to the 2FA screen remounted AuthContextProvider,
which silent-refreshes on mount; no refresh session exists yet at that
point, so it bounced back to login before the code could be entered.
Route through the router like the password flow does.

Also reveal the removal step-up field when the server refuses a
passwordless attempt, so an account migrated to an identity provider
without its old hash cleared can still clear its credentials; drop the
staged password when the dialog closes; and revoke passkeys in the CLI
password reset, which bypassed the HTTP controller's cleanup.

* fix: apply one email-verification policy across login methods

Accounts predating mandatory verification are marked verified as they
sign in when no email is configured, but only the password strategy did
it, so the same legacy account was admitted by password and refused by
passkey. Extract the rule into a shared helper and call it from both.

* fix: refuse a passkey sign-in when the ban check cannot complete

checkBan defaults next to a no-op, so calling it bare discarded any
internal failure and left req.banned unset, letting the request fall
through and be issued tokens. Capture the error the middleware chain
would have propagated and reject instead.

* fix: refine passkey management dialogs

* test: stabilize passkey tooltip assertions

* test: reconcile passkey specs with the canary reset and deletion flows

The credentialsChangedAt stamp now lives in commitPasswordReset, so its
assertion moves to the passwordReset unit spec. Restores the describe
blocks the rebase merged together.

* test: mock passkey routes in the cross-site login suite

* refactor: move passkey handlers and credential checks into packages/api

The passkey controller, the credentialsChangedAt predicate and the legacy
email-verification grandfathering now live in TypeScript with injected
dependencies; /api keeps only the wiring that builds the handlers.

* style: align passkey UI with Tailwind v4 order and design-rule lint

* fix: revoke earlier access tokens on a CLI password reset

passwordVersion is not a user schema field, so the write was dropped and
tokens issued before the reset kept verifying.

* test: cover passkey sign-in and credential revocation end to end

* fix: hide passkey sign-in when email login is disabled

The passkey endpoints already refuse under ALLOW_EMAIL_LOGIN=false, so
advertising the button only led to a 403.

* fix: let only one concurrent verification consume a passkey challenge

Without a native getDel the challenge was read then deleted, so two
concurrent verifications could both use it. The delete now arbitrates:
only the caller whose delete removed the key gets the challenge.

* test: run passkey ceremonies on the localhost relying party

WebAuthn refuses an IP address as the RP ID, and the harness serves the
app on 127.0.0.1. The reset scenario runs once per project, so the mock
harness lifts the per-IP reset request limit as it does for forks.

* fix: keep passkey management when email login is disabled

Gate only the sign-in button on emailLoginEnabled, since only the sign-in
routes sit behind that gate; list, rename and remove stay reachable.

* fix: build the passkey credential index before the first registration

With MONGO_AUTO_INDEX=false the unique credentialId index was never
created, so concurrent registrations could store the same credential.

* test: enable password reset in the mock harness and cover email-login-off passkeys

* fix: stop re-exporting the passkey cap from data-schemas

The bundler left every import of methods/passkey.ts unlinked while that
module re-exported MAX_PASSKEYS_PER_USER from librechat-data-provider, so
the index build and the counter-failure log threw ReferenceError at
runtime. Consumers now import the cap from librechat-data-provider.

* test: close nested settings dialogs before logging out in passkey scenarios

* fix: reject cross-site passkey assertions

The verify route accepted a form posted from another site, which let an
attacker sign a victim into the attacker's account. It now runs the same
requireSameOrigin guard as password login and the 2FA step.

* fix: end refresh sessions on a CLI password reset

A surviving refresh session could mint an access token issued after the
credentialsChangedAt stamp, so the CLI now deletes sessions like the web
reset does.

* fix: keep the passkey button locked when it supersedes autofill

Starting the modal ceremony aborts the pending autofill one, and the
autofill error path cleared the shared lock and busy state while the
modal ceremony was still running.

(cherry picked from commit 471abaa64d)

Original-PR: https://github.com/LibreChat-AI/LibreChat/pull/14715
2026-10-01 03:46:16 +00:00
Marco Beretta
4ffe3825ec 📧 feat: add email address change (#14597)
(cherry picked from commit 9ff251dd96)

Original-PR: https://github.com/LibreChat-AI/LibreChat/pull/14597
2026-10-01 03:46:16 +00:00
lia-by-librechat[bot]
d7e7064692
🧧 fix: Redeem Admin OAuth Codes Only Once (#16513)
Co-authored-by: Lia <lia@librechat.ai>
2026-09-29 12:09:13 -04:00
Dustin Healy
418d62d52d
🔐 feat: Support Cognito Access Tokens for Agent Management (#16224)
* feat: support Cognito M2M for Agent management

* fix: reject compound management scopes

* fix: require scopes for audience-less management tokens
2026-09-22 20:37:40 -04:00
lia-by-librechat[bot]
35d5a70b21
🧦 fix: Restore OpenID Refresh After the Session Store TTL Expires (#15983)
* 🧦 fix: Restore OpenID Refresh After the Session Store TTL Expires

express-session raises `failed to load session` only when the store holds no
record for the session id. #15655 treated that as terminal, so a refresh whose
cookie refresh token was still valid ended in 401 OPENID_SESSION_MISSING once
the OpenID session store TTL (15 minutes by default) elapsed before the IdP
access token (~1 hour with Entra ID).

Reload the persisted record through one tolerant helper: an absent record is an
empty session, not a session that advanced past this result, so publication
seeds a new record. Store outages still propagate, and logout still fails a
retired refresh token through its durable revoked publication flight.

* 🧪 test: Pin the logout fence around the tolerated session reload

Tolerating an absent session record leaves the durable revoked publication
flight as the only thing between a logged-out refresh token and a resurrected
session, so cover both of its checks with an expired record: the tombstone read
that precedes the reload, and the completion that follows it.

Drop a needless optional chain in publishResolvedSessionTokens, whose `req`
parameter is not optional.

---------

Co-authored-by: Lia <lia@librechat.ai>
2026-09-15 23:54:42 -04:00
Danny Avila
854645ffc0
🔁 feat: Retry OpenID Discovery After Startup Failures (#15899)
* fix: retry OpenID discovery after startup failures

* fix: keep OpenID background retries resilient

* refactor: move OpenID retry policy into API package

* 🔁 feat: Expose OpenID Discovery Retries Through Registration Config

* 🧭 refactor: Own OpenID Discovery Registration and Defaults in TypeScript

---------

Co-authored-by: insoln <insoln@ya.ru>
2026-09-13 23:16:26 -04:00
Danny Avila
f1bd85498e
🪫 fix: Recharge Direct OpenID MCP Bearer Sessions (#15704)
* fix: recover direct OpenID MCP bearer sessions

* fix: harden direct bearer recovery lifecycle

* fix: close direct bearer lifecycle races

* test: align direct bearer checks with current dev

* fix: unify direct bearer recovery budget

* fix: infer direct bearer recovery from placeholder

* fix: preserve bearer precedence and recovery budget

* fix: propagate bearer recovery across joiners

* fix: preserve direct bearer fallback without session provider

* fix: close direct bearer recovery race windows

* chore: sort bearer recovery test imports

* fix: align bearer recovery with OAuth cleanup lifecycle

* fix: fence request-scoped MCP creation during config mutations

* fix: retain suspended MCP catalog authentication outcomes

* fix: cancel MCP bearer recovery and reuse refreshed credentials

* fix: close MCP bearer recovery lifecycle boundaries

* fix: preserve ordered catalog authentication rejection

* fix: isolate bearer recovery across request and transport boundaries

* fix: preserve shared recovery ownership and credential precedence

* fix: wait for recovery borrowers and validated OpenID publication

* fix: observe the validated browser publication flight

* fix: cancel abandoned OpenID publication followers

* fix: fence refresh grant admission after lease acquisition
2026-09-07 21:05:26 -04:00
Danny Avila
f1a21764f3
🧺 fix: Discard Stale Session Tokens at OpenID Login (#15668)
With `OPENID_REUSE_TOKENS=true`, `sendOpenIDAuthResponse` compares the
incoming token set against `req.session.openidTokens`. Passport runs with
`session: false`, so the Express session is never regenerated at login and a
token set from an earlier authentication survives there. Its refresh token
differs from the one the IdP just issued, which the advanced-session check
reads as "a concurrent refresh already advanced the session": the fresh IdP
tokens are discarded and the stale set is republished. When that stale
access token has already expired, the completed flight's TTL clamps to 1ms
and the publication assertion fails with "OpenID refresh result is no longer
available for publication", which fails every login for as long as the stale
session lives.

The advanced-session comparison exists for refresh races and has no business
at a fresh authorization-code login. The login controller now asks the
publication service to discard whatever the session holds, and the service
does so after its own session reload so the store cannot resurrect the
stale set. Refresh callers are unchanged.

Fixes #15648
2026-09-06 15:07:08 -04:00
Danny Avila
9089d8cba8
🚮 fix: Require Sign-In After Missing OpenID Sessions (#15655) 2026-09-06 12:47:58 -04:00
Danny Avila
b3b8986752
🪠 fix: Unblock Failed OpenID Publication Flights (#15641)
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* fix: settle failed OpenID authentication publications

* test: simplify recovery dependency assertion

* test: provide a complete typed recovery fixture

* fix: distinguish preparation errors from completion dispatch
2026-09-05 23:58:08 -04:00
Danny Avila
ee0a51ac19
🪵 fix: Log Code API Auth Header Failures With Request Context (#15592)
* 🪵 fix: Log Code API Auth Header Failures With Request Context

Every Code API tool LibreChat builds — `execute_code`, `bash_tool` and
the PTC tools — resolves its auth headers through
`codeExecutionAuthHeaders`. When that throws, `@librechat/agents`
replaces it with a fixed "Code execution is not authorized" string
before either the model or the operator sees it, and the SDK's own
console diagnostic carries no request or user id.

Log the failure here before rethrowing. Winston attaches requestId,
userId and tenantId to every record, so this is the only line that can
be correlated with the `[code-env:inject]` events surrounding a failed
execution. Rethrowing unchanged keeps the SDK's sanitization intact —
the model-facing message does not change.

* 🧵 fix: Carry Non-Error Auth Failures Into the Log Message

winston folds an `Error` meta's message and stack into `info.message`
before any format runs, so an Error cause already survives the plain
console format that prints `info.message` alone. A non-Error rejection
does not: winston drops a string or plain-object meta from that format
entirely, leaving the same generic line the SDK's sanitization produces.

Append the cause to the message only when it is not an Error, so the
Error path stays free of a duplicated message. A new spec renders both
paths through a real winston transport whose format prints nothing but
`info.message`, which is what pins the distinction.

* 🧯 fix: Keep the Auth Failure Cause Out of Winston Metadata

Passing the caught value as positional metadata had three separate
failure modes, all measured against real winston.

Winston merges object metadata onto the log record, so a rejection
carrying `tenantId`, `userId` or `event_name` lands on top of the fields
`attachRequestContext` fills in — and that function deliberately keeps an
already-present value, so the failure would be attributed to the wrong
user or have its identity stripped by a matching event name. An `Error`
is no safer: only its custom enumerable properties are copied, which is
exactly the reachable set.

Any metadata also arms `format.splat()`, which then treats a `%s` in the
cause as a substitution token: rejecting with `service said %s
unavailable` rendered `service said service said %s unavailable
unavailable`.

And `String()` throws on a null-prototype object, so an exotic rejection
made the catch block throw its own formatting error instead of logging
and rethrowing the original.

The cause is now derived through a guarded formatter and inlined in the
message, with no metadata at all — which is also what makes it visible on
the console format that prints `info.message` alone. The rendering spec
now runs through `errors()` and `splat()` as well as the bare printf, and
restores each transport's previous `silent` value rather than assuming it
was false.

* 🔑 fix: Keep Signing Material Out of Code API Key Load Failures

Node 24's JSON `SyntaxError` quotes an excerpt of the source around the
offending token, so a malformed `CODEAPI_JWT_PRIVATE_JWK_JSON` produces
`Unexpected token 'M', ..."d":MIIEvgIBAD"... is not valid JSON` — private
key material inside an error message, which every caller then logs. The
message redaction patterns do not recognize a bare base64 fragment, so
nothing downstream would have caught it.

`createSigningKey` now converts any load failure into a diagnostic naming
the failure and the key format it attempted, and nothing more. That makes
the message safe by construction rather than by scrubbing, which matters
because the log added in this branch is what would have persisted it.

Also guard the `name`/`message` reads in the cause formatter: a proxy can
throw from either accessor, which would have replaced the rejection with
a formatting error and logged nothing at all.

* chore: bump agents sdk
2026-09-04 10:38:49 -04:00
Lailson Henrique
1c2796b978
📮 fix: Validate Invite Email Claims (#15542)
* 🔒 fix: Require the email getInvite claims to validate

`findToken` builds its query from the fields it is given, so an absent
email is a lookup by token alone: the invite matches, `checkInviteUser`
deletes it, and the registration then fails on the missing field. The
invite is consumed and no account is created.

* 🎨 style: Sort spec imports by line length

---------

Co-authored-by: lailson henrique <dev@iagiliza.com.br>
Co-authored-by: Danny Avila <danny@librechat.ai>
2026-09-03 22:27:49 -04:00
Dustin Healy
aec2121923
🔐 feat: Add M2M Authentication for Agent Management (#15555)
* feat: add M2M authentication for Agent Management

* fix: Harden Agent Management authentication

* fix: Preserve OIDC authentication safeguards

* fix: Normalize management principal IDs

* fix: Bound OIDC signing key lookups

* fix: Allow non-browser Agent Management clients
2026-09-03 20:07:00 -04:00
Danny Avila
51edb2a660
🛫 feat: Enable Self-Service Code Worker Pairing (#15367)
* feat: add self-service code worker pairing

* fix: enforce code worker principal boundaries

* fix: separate pairing control planes from execution

* fix: preserve principal worker routing

* fix: pin artifact traffic to code workers

* fix: authenticate code worker selection

* test: mock worker-aware artifact headers

* fix: harden self-service code worker routing

* fix: fail closed for principal code pairing

* style: format code execution headers

* fix: close self-service pairing gaps

* fix: satisfy code environment type checks
2026-09-01 18:46:33 -04:00
Danny Avila
fa913148fb
🔒 fix: Refresh MCP OBO Tokens From the Live OpenID Session (#15334)
* 🧊 fix: Inline-refresh OpenID session tokens at MCP OBO call time

Resolves the walk-away failure mode where MCP tool calls using OBO auth
fail with "No valid OpenID access token is available for OBO exchange"
after a user idles past their access-token lifetime. The strategy-time
snapshot on `user.federatedTokens` could expire mid-stream before
`resolveOboToken` ran, while `req.session.openidTokens` carried a still-
valid (or refreshable) token that nothing read.

- New OpenIDSessionRefresh service: per-user single-flighted closure that
  reads `req.session.openidTokens` at OBO time and inline-refreshes via
  `openid-client.refreshTokenGrant` when expired (30s skew), persisting
  via `req.session.save()`. No cookie writes (headers already flushed).
- `resolveOboToken` gains a required UpstreamTokenProvider parameter
  (typed as `() => Promise<OIDCTokens | null>`, reusing the shared shape
  from @librechat/data-schemas). Compile-time guarantee that every call
  site is updated.
- New `session_refresh_failed` OboTokenResolutionReason distinguishes
  "session expired and IdP rejected refresh" from "no upstream token
  ever existed."
- `req` threaded through createMCPTool/createMCPTools/createToolInstance
  to construct the closure with captured request, plus fail-closed
  guards in MCPConnectionFactory.getOboTokens and MCPManager.callTool
  when the closure isn't plumbed.
- Startup warning in MCPServersInitializer when OBO is configured but
  OPENID_REUSE_TOKENS is unset (the strategy populating
  user.federatedTokens is only registered under reuse, so OBO would
  fail every call without it).

Tests: 16 new in OpenIDSessionRefresh.spec.js; obo.spec.ts extended
for the new param + error reason; wiring smoke tests in MCPManager,
MCPConnectionFactory, MCPServersInitializer, and MCP.spec.js.

* 🛡️ fix: Harden OBO inline-refresh against token type and session edge cases

- Token-preference asymmetry: live-token reuse and expires_at derivation
  now strictly gate on the access_token, not the id_token. Added a
  required `tokenPreference` parameter on isLiveSessionTokenStillValid,
  buildOIDCTokensFromSession, and createOpenIDSessionTokenProvider
  so every call site is explicit. Dropped the bogus id_token-exp
  fallback in performIdpRefresh — id_token TTL is governed by IdP
  session policy and would mark a short-lived access_token reusable
  past its real lifetime.
- Missing req in /reinitialize route: the manual reconnect
  endpoint now forwards req into reinitMCPServer, so OBO servers can
  build a session-aware upstream-token closure instead of failing with
  missing_upstream_token.
- Single-flight key collisions: composed key as
  tenantId:openidIssuer:openidId:sessionId via getSingleFlightKey.
  Concurrent calls in the same session still coalesce; separate sessions
  never share an in-flight refresh, preventing refresh-token rotation
  from breaking sibling sessions and preventing cross-tenant token
  crossover when distinct users share an IdP sub.
- Opaque access token reuse): persist accessTokenExpiresAt
  (unix seconds, from tokenset.expires_in) on each refresh AND on initial
  login / SPA refresh in setOpenIDAuthTokens. New getAccessTokenExp
  helper falls back to it when the access token isn't a JWT, avoiding
  redundant inline refreshes for Microsoft Graph and Auth0 default
  audiences.
- Log hygiene: the single-flight key (containing sessionId,
  openidId, openidIssuer, tenantId) is now SHA-256-hashed in the
  "Joining in-flight refresh" debug log. Preserves cross-line correlation
  via a 12-char prefix without leaking credential or PII material.

Documented req.session.openidTokens shape contract via JSDoc typedef so
the new accessTokenExpiresAt field has a discoverable home alongside the
existing accessToken/idToken/refreshToken/expiresAt/lastRefreshedAt.

Tests: OpenIDSessionRefresh.spec.js up to 30 passing (added coverage for
opaque-token reuse, JWT-access-token-exp fallback, no-id_token-fallback
regression, cross-session no-coalesce, persistence on refresh, and a
guard against stale accessTokenExpiresAt carryover). AuthService.spec.js
adds two cases covering accessTokenExpiresAt persistence on login.
mcp.spec.js (route) gains a regression test asserting req flows into
reinitMCPServer.

* 🔍 fix: Detect OBO-only MCP admin config overrides

Admin Config overlays for YAML-defined MCP servers compare only
ADMIN_CONFIGURABLE_FIELDS to decide whether to lazy-init a config-tier override.
The OBO config field was added after that fingerprint list, so an override that
only added or changed `obo` was treated as unchanged YAML and skipped.

Include `obo` in the admin-configurable field list and add a regression test for
an OBO-only override.

* 🔊 fix: Mock MCP OAuth timeout in SDK integration test

MCPConnectionFactory.attemptToConnect reads mcpConfig.OAUTH_HANDLING_TIMEOUT
when building the OAuth connection timeout. The SDK OAuth integration test
mocked mcpConfig without that field, which made the timeout calculation produce
NaN and caused the test to fail before the OAuth refresh/start path completed.

Add OAUTH_HANDLING_TIMEOUT to the test mock.

* ♻️ refactor: Pass OBO upstream-token closure into MCP instead of req

Build the OpenID upstream-token provider at the request boundary and thread
only the closure through MCP handling, so the MCP service layer no longer
receives the raw Express request. The closure still reads/refreshes the live
session at tool-call time, preserving the walk-away recovery.

- Drop `req`/`capturedReq` from createMCPTools, createMCPTool, reconnectServer,
  createToolInstance, and reinitMCPServer; forward `upstreamTokenProvider`
  instead. Closure is constructed in loadTools, loadToolDefinitionsWrapper, and
  the reinitialize route, where req/res are in scope.
- OBO: fall back to user.federatedTokens when the provider yields no live
  session, so OIDC remote-agent calls (verified bearer, no session) still work.
- Inline refresh: mirror a rotated refresh token to the refreshToken cookie via
  a shared setRefreshTokenCookie helper, guarded by !res.headersSent (no-op on
  the streaming path; session copy stays authoritative).
- Single-flight: hydrate a joining request's own session from the resolved
  tokens so a later OBO call doesn't replay a rotated-away refresh token.

Addresses owner feedback and three review findings.

* 🔒 fix: Recover OIDC refresh-token rotation after SSE OBO refresh

When an inline OBO refresh rotates the OpenID refresh token after SSE headers
have already been sent, the browser refreshToken cookie cannot be updated. Store
a short-lived encrypted bridge from the stale cookie token to the rotated token
so /api/auth/refresh can recover after express-session loss.

Use the signed openid_user_id cookie to load user context for bridge validation,
retry only on invalid_grant, and delete the bridge only after the bridged refresh
succeeds.

* 🔨 fix: hydrate joined OIDC refresh sessions with stable refresh tokens

Update single-flight OIDC refresh joiners whenever refreshed access token
state changes, even if the IdP keeps the refresh token unchanged.

This prevents joined requests from retaining stale accessToken or
accessTokenExpiresAt values and redundantly refreshing later in the same run.

* 🌉 Persist OIDC refresh-token recovery bridges in MongoDB

Store SSE OBO refresh-token recovery bridges in MongoDB instead of
process-local memory so /api/auth/refresh can recover after worker
restarts or cross-worker routing.

Derive bridge expiry from REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRY so the recovery window
matches the stale refreshToken cookie it repairs, and delete bridges
after successful recovery.

* 🤝 Coordinate OIDC inline refreshes across workers

Add a short-lived Mongo-backed refresh-flight record so concurrent
OBO refreshes for the same OpenID session do not redeem the same
rotating refresh token on different workers.

The winning worker performs the IdP refresh and stores an encrypted
result; joiners wait for that result, hydrate their request session,
and return without calling the IdP.

* ⚓ Keep OpenID marker cookies aligned on inline refresh

Refresh token_provider and openid_user_id with the same expiry as the
rotated refreshToken cookie when an inline OBO refresh can still write
headers.

Share the marker-cookie writer with the normal OpenID auth refresh path
so the fallback /api/auth/refresh branch continues to recognize valid
OpenID refresh tokens after session expiry.

* 🔑 fix: include refresh token in OIDC local refresh flight key

Key the process-local OIDC refresh coalescing by the current session
refresh token, matching the Mongo-backed flight key. This prevents a
request with a newly rotated token from joining an older pending refresh
and inheriting its failure/result.

* 🌉 fix: store OIDC refresh bridge without cookie response

Treat missing or non-cookie responses like headers-sent streaming
responses during inline OIDC refresh. When the IdP rotates the refresh
token and cookies cannot be written, persist a recovery bridge so a later
/auth/refresh can recover after session expiry.

* 🫙 fix: preserve stale OIDC cookie bridge key

Track the refresh token last written to the browser cookie separately
from the current session refresh token. When inline OIDC refreshes rotate
tokens without a writable response, keep bridging from the browser-stale
token directly to the latest session token.

* 🙌 fix: keep OIDC bridge recovery success on cleanup failure

Make refresh-token bridge cleanup best-effort after a bridged OIDC
refresh succeeds. A transient delete failure now logs a warning but does
not convert the already-refreshed session and cookies into a 403 response.

* 📦 test: Exclude RefreshTokenBridge from tenant-isolation coverage

Add RefreshTokenBridge to the tenant-isolation coverage allowlist because
refresh bridge lookups run during unauthenticated OpenID refresh recovery.
The controller first recovers user context from the signed OpenID marker
cookie, then the bridge methods apply explicit user and tenant filters.

Ambient tenant isolation would bind this recovery path to request-local
tenant context that is not available at the point the stale cookie is being
resolved

* ⚡ Fix OpenID refresh flight retry and marker hydration

Allow failed OpenID refresh flights to be reclaimed immediately instead of pinning transient errors.

Preserve the browser refresh-token marker when joined refreshes hydrate session tokens from a shared flight result.

Stabilize AuthService tests by isolating mocked module imports from prior suites.

* 🛠️ fix: centralize OBO identity scoping

Add shared auth identity helpers for app user ids, OpenID subjects,
tenant ids, and normalized OpenID issuers.

Thread a non-placeholder-visible OBO identity context from the real
request user through MCP connection, tool-call, reinit, and refresh
paths. Keep tenantId and openidIssuer out of createSafeUser so MCP
user placeholders do not expose those fields.

Scope OBO token cache and in-flight exchange keys by tenant, issuer,
OpenID subject, scopes, and a SHA-256 hash of the upstream assertion.
This prevents cross-tenant/cross-issuer collisions and avoids reusing
tokens minted from stale rotated assertions.

Use the shared identity helpers for OpenID refresh-flight keys and
refresh-token bridge recovery records so related OBO refresh paths share
the same identity normalization rules.

The helper is intended for auth-boundary and credential-cache code, not
as a blanket replacement for ordinary app user id ownership checks.

* 🛠️ fix: preserve OIDC refresh-token sync on save failures

Sync OpenID refresh-token cookie/bridge state before persisting the
session so a transient session-store failure cannot lose an IdP-rotated
refresh token.

Also trigger sync when the session refresh token differs from the
browser refresh-token marker, not only when the current grant rotates
the token. This lets later writable refreshes repair stale browser
cookies left behind by SSE refreshes.

Route refresh bridge identity through the shared identity helper with
the threaded OBO identity context, falling back to request/user context
when needed.

Add regression coverage for session-save failures, stale browser cookie
repair, non-writable bridge storage, and shared-helper identity fallback.

* 🛠️ fix: keep OIDC refresh bridge during recovery grace

After successful bridged refresh recovery, re-store the stale-cookie bridge
with a short grace TTL instead of deleting it immediately. This lets parallel
/api/auth/refresh requests that already sent the stale browser cookie recover
before they can observe the first response's Set-Cookie.

Retarget the bridge to the refresh token returned by the bridged retry so
B-to-C refresh-token rotation remains recoverable. The grace TTL is parsed with
math() and defaults to 60s, which shrinks the replay window from the original
REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRY bridge lifetime to the short recovery grace period.

Remove the now-unused explicit bridge delete path from the service and
data-schemas method surface. Add regression coverage for grace re-store,
identity symmetry, retry failure behavior, and same-key upsert replacement.

* 🛠️ fix: fail closed on OBO MCP user identity mismatch

Add an OBO-specific guard before MCP tool execution that requires the
effective invocation user and captured request user to both have ids and
to match. This prevents OBO tool calls from falling back to a separate
configurable.user_id identity after request-bound OBO context has already
been captured.

Keep the existing user id fallback behavior for non-OBO MCP calls.

Tests cover mismatched OBO users, missing user ids, and the matching-user
path ignoring a conflicting configurable.user_id.

* 🛠️ fix: Guard OpenID bridge retry user identity

Extract the shared OpenID refresh/user-resolution flow in AuthController
so the normal refresh path and bridge-recovery retry use the same grant,
claims, issuer, user lookup, and diagnostic logging code.

Preserve the existing path-specific behavior: the normal path still owns
migration updates and 401 login redirects, while the bridge retry still
falls through to the existing 403 invalid-token response.

Add a bridge-recovery guard that rejects retry results whose resolved
user id differs from the signed openid_user_id cookie before issuing
tokens or re-storing the grace bridge. Cover both the successful
matching-user recovery and the mismatched-user rejection.

* 🛠️ fix: type-safety polish on OBO data layer

Replace refresh token bridge query/update Record<string, unknown> usage
with typed Mongoose FilterQuery and UpdateQuery definitions.

Harden OpenID marker cookie JWT expiry handling by converting refresh
expiry milliseconds to integer seconds and rejecting invalid or
non-positive durations.

Add focused CSRF tests for fractional refresh expiry values and invalid
expiry configuration.

* 🛠️ fix: Bind OpenID session tokens to authenticated identity

Stamp OpenID session token state with the LibreChat user id, OpenID subject,
tenant id, and normalized issuer when tokens are stored.

Fail closed before OBO inline token reuse/refresh when the session token
identity does not match the current authenticated identity, preventing a stale
or mixed Express session from supplying another user's upstream assertion.

Also validate the normal /api/auth/refresh session-token reuse shortcut against
the signed marker-cookie user before returning cached session tokens.

Note: sessions created before this change carry no identity stamp and are
treated as a mismatch. This is self-healing — the reuse path forces a full IdP
refresh (which re-stamps the session) and the OBO path throws, surfacing as a
one-time re-authentication for active OBO users at deploy time. The session
re-stamps within one session lifetime (SESSION_EXPIRY, default 15 min).

* 🛠️ fix: Recover OpenID refresh token drift

Prefer the browser refresh-token cookie when it differs from the
server-side OpenID session state, and force a real IdP refresh in that
case instead of reusing stale session tokens.

Store a short-lived refresh-token bridge when inline OBO refresh writes
a rotated browser cookie but session persistence fails, so follow-up
refreshes can still recover from the old token.

Keep the bridge grace TTL centralized in RefreshTokenBridge so both
recovery paths use the same env-backed value.

Note: drift is measured against the last-synced browserRefreshToken
marker, so the SSE path (intentionally stale cookie, authoritative
session) does not false-positive. Sessions predating the marker have no
browserRefreshToken; for those, drift falls back to comparing the cookie
against the session refresh token and prefers the cookie on difference.
This is the same self-healing pre-change-session window as the identity
binding fix and re-syncs within one session lifetime.

Tests cover cookie/session drift selection, reusable-session bypass on
drift, bridge storage after session-save failure, and the shared bridge
constant wiring.

* 🛠️ fix: Harden OBO token caching and expiry handling

Reject malformed OBO grant responses before writing them to the exchanged-token cache so a missing access_token cannot poison the cache.

Store absolute expires_at values with cached OBO tokens and ignore legacy cache entries without usable expiry metadata. This keeps cached-token freshness based on the token’s real
remaining lifetime instead of reusing the original relative expires_in on cache hits.

Move OBO expiry normalization and skew helpers into packages/api and use them from both the JS exchange service and the TS MCP resolver. Apply a 30-second safety margin with a one-
second floor for short-lived tokens, covered by direct helper tests and caller-level regression tests.

Tests:
- packages/api: npm run build
- packages/api: npx jest src/mcp/oauth/expiry.spec.ts src/mcp/oauth/obo.spec.ts
- api: npx jest server/services/OboTokenService.spec.js

* 🛠️ fix: Harden OBO refresh-token bridge lookup and indexing

Reuse getValidOpenIDReuseUserId for the bridge-recovery user lookup in
refreshController instead of re-verifying openid_user_id inline. The shared
helper enforces the JWT_REFRESH_SECRET presence check and a strict
typeof payload.id === 'string' guard, rejecting tokens whose id claim is
present but not a string (e.g. a numeric id) that the inline check accepted.

Fail closed on issuer mismatch in getRefreshTokenBridge. Both the stored and
the expected issuer are now normalized and compared for equality, so a bridge
is recovered only when both sides agree (both absent, or both present and
equal after normalization). Previously the check was skipped whenever the
stored issuer was absent, allowing recovery across mismatched issuer context.

Drop the unused {oldRefreshTokenHash, userId, tenantId, openidIssuer} index
and the openidIssuer field on RefreshTokenBridgeQuery. The data-layer filter
only queries the 3-field {oldRefreshTokenHash, userId, tenantId} index; the
issuer is verified in application code, not the query. Hoist the repeated
model accessor into getRefreshTokenBridgeModel.

Note: issuer is now load-bearing for recovery. A bridge stored with an issuer
recovers only when the lookup supplies a matching issuer; the recovery lookup
reads user.openidIssuer via AUTH_REFRESH_USER_PROJECTION (an exclusion
projection that retains the field). If a user's persisted openidIssuer is
empty while the stored bridge has one, recovery fails closed (falls through to
normal re-authentication) until the bridge TTLs out — no security regression.

Tests cover invalid signed-cookie payloads bypassing the bridge, both
asymmetric issuer-presence cases, issuer normalization before comparison, and
an index-alignment assertion guarding against re-adding the dropped index.

* 🛠️ fix: Degrade OBO discovery on token resolution failures

Catch expected OboTokenResolutionError failures during MCP tool discovery and
fall back to unauthenticated tool listing instead of aborting discovery. This
keeps discovery aligned with the existing unauthenticated listing behavior while
preserving unexpected errors as real failures.

Also correct OBO tool-call freshness comment and tighten the OBO trust-check
permissions type to the existing role permission shape.

Tests:
- npx jest src/mcp/__tests__/MCPConnectionFactory.test.ts --runInBand --coverage=false
- npx jest src/mcp/oauth/obo.spec.ts --runInBand --coverage=false

* 🛠️ fix: tighten OBO tool-call errors, bridge logging, and flight typing

Move resolveToolCallUserId inside the tool-call try/catch so an OBO
identity mismatch surfaces with serverName/toolName context and the
standard tool-call-failed message instead of an opaque bare Error.

Raise the refresh-token bridge lookup failure log from debug to warn so
transient infrastructure failures on the unauthenticated /api/auth/refresh
path are observable, and guard the message access against non-Error values.

Replace the unknown+cast in isDuplicateKeyError with a hasErrorCode type
predicate so the duplicate-key check reads error.code without an assertion.

Preserve real math/isEnabled in the MCPConnectionFactory test mock (mock
only processMCPEnv) so mcpConfig timeouts no longer resolve to NaN, fixing
the TimeoutNaNWarning that masked slow OAuth retry behavior.

* 🧪 fix: Restore the Flight Uniqueness Index and Buffer the Graph Cache TTL

Two CI failures on the merge, both in suites this environment cannot run
(their MongoDB binary download is blocked).

`GraphApiService.spec.js` still asserted the unbuffered TTL. Graph tokens
route through the same `getTokenCacheTtlMs` as the OBO and openidStrategy
caches, so the entry now expires 30s before the credential does.

`openidRefreshFlight.spec.ts` dropped the database between tests, which takes
the indexes with it, and Mongoose builds them only once when the model is
compiled. Whether the unique `key` index survived into a test was a race with
that one-time build. Without it a second `create` inserts instead of raising a
duplicate-key error, so every worker believes it won the flight — the
mutual exclusion the file exists to prove. Indexes are now rebuilt after each
drop, which also makes the reclaim and complete cases reach those paths for
the right reason.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SxKWxwqxAGckYpRsYTqx3F

* fix: address OBO review findings

* 🔐 fix: Install Bridge Indexes and Carry OBO Through Assistant Recovery

Two findings from the Codex pass on d08c82f0d.

The refresh-token bridge relied on Mongoose auto-indexing for both of its
indexes, and `MONGO_AUTO_INDEX=false` is a supported deployment setting. A
bridge holds an encrypted refresh token and the TTL index is the only thing
that ever deletes one, so under that setting they would accumulate for the
life of the collection while concurrent upserts lost the compound uniqueness
the filter assumes. Installed before the first write, matching the flight
methods and the session and schedule methods before them.

`recoverServerTools`, the assistant create/update path that reruns
`reinitMCPServer` when a referenced server's catalog and connection snapshot
are both missing, was the last reinit site not carrying the upstream-token
closure. For an OBO server the factory rejects the connection outright, so the
assistant write failed with unavailable MCP definitions. It now builds the
provider at that request boundary like the other entry points; assistant
writes have no `res`, so a rotation there falls back to the recovery bridge.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SxKWxwqxAGckYpRsYTqx3F

* fix: harden OBO refresh coordination

* ⏳ fix: Keep Elapsed Expiries Elapsed and Revoke the Superseded Session

Two of the five findings from the Codex pass on fcdc15885 — the two that are
defects in code this branch introduced rather than design questions about the
bridge.

`getSkewedTokenExpiresAtMs` floored every result at a second in the future,
including an expiry the provider had already declared elapsed. An exchange
answering `expires_in: 0` or a past `expires_at` was handed to the MCP
connection stamped valid for another second, which only moves the failure
downstream. The floor now applies to a lifetime that is still live, which is
what it was for; an elapsed one stays elapsed so the caller rejects it. Same
for the cache TTL, which falls back to the elapsed-credential floor.

Bridge recovery left the stale token's durable Session behind. Only the token
it recovered through was passed as `existingRefreshToken`, so that one's
session was replaced while the token the browser actually presented kept its
record until its original expiry. That record, with the marker cookie still
bound to it, is what authorizes local image access for OpenID users — so a
copy of the stale cookie outlived the rotation it had lost. Revoked
explicitly on successful recovery.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SxKWxwqxAGckYpRsYTqx3F

* fix: close OBO refresh review findings

* 🎟️ fix: Carry the Bridged Token Through a Non-Rotating Recovery

Bridge recovery passes the browser's stale token as `existingRefreshToken` so
the durable Session naming it is the record replaced. That also makes the
stale token the fallback the installed session and the refresh cookie use when
a tokenset carries no `refresh_token` of its own, which holds only while the
recovery grant rotates.

An IdP that answers that grant without rotating sends the browser back to the
very token the bridge exists to retire: `storeOpenIDSession` installs and
deletes the same stale record in one call, and the cookie is rewritten to a
token the IdP already rejected — a sign-out on the next refresh. The grace
bridge one line above already guards this with `|| bridgedRefreshToken`; the
resolved tokenset now does the same, so leader and followers alike publish the
recovered token.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SxKWxwqxAGckYpRsYTqx3F

* 🚫 fix: Reject an OBO Exchange That Returns an Expired Credential

Preserving an elapsed expiry through the skew helper only helps if something
acts on it, and nothing did: `MCPManager.callTool` checks the access token and
nothing else before setting the Authorization header, so a credential the IdP
declared spent still went downstream to fail there. It is rejected at the
exchange now, where the reason is known, and retryably — the exchange itself
worked, so a fresh grant can succeed.

Completes the elapsed-expiry change in cb26a6f7d, which made the stamp honest
without giving anyone a reason to look at it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SxKWxwqxAGckYpRsYTqx3F

* fix: close OpenID refresh review findings

* fix: coordinate OpenID refresh entry points

* chore: sort OpenID flight imports

* fix: fence OpenID refreshes during logout

* fix: close OpenID logout publication races

* fix: narrow completed refresh flight

* test: cover bridge cleanup failure after ownership loss

The compensating delete in storeRefreshTokenBridgeWithLease swallows its own
failure so the lease error stays the one the caller sees. Nothing asserted
that, so removing the inner catch left every suite green while callers began
receiving the cleanup error instead.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SxKWxwqxAGckYpRsYTqx3F

* fix: compensate OpenID bridges only on proven ownership loss

The post-write lease assertion deletes the bridge it just published when it
throws, but it threw for two different reasons: a coordination record that is
no longer ours, and a coordination read that simply failed. Treating the second
as the first destroys the only mapping from the token the browser still holds
to the one the IdP already rotated to, so a transient Mongo error on the
headers-already-sent path signed the user out.

Tag the ownership error where the lease raises it and compensate only for that,
preserving the bridge whenever ownership is merely undetermined. A preserved
bridge stays behind the logout revocation fence, so the safe default costs
nothing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SxKWxwqxAGckYpRsYTqx3F

* fix: reject spent OpenID refresh results

Two ways a refresh could report success while handing back a credential
nothing can use.

An inline refresh carries the previous id_token forward when the IdP omits
one on rotation, so tokenset.id_token is not necessarily freshly issued.
setOpenIDAuthTokens applied its freshness guard only to the session copy and
took tokenset.id_token unconditionally, so /refresh returned an expired
bearer even though the grant produced a usable access token. Skip it only
when it is provably expired: an id_token whose expiry cannot be read stays
preferred, since access_token may be opaque or scoped to another audience.

normalizeExpiresIn preserves a zero or negative lifetime rather than
discarding it, so a grant declaring an already-spent access token still
published, rotating the refresh token and returning a token every freshness
check rejects. Each OBO call then repeated the grant. Reject an elapsed
lifetime before publishing; an unknown lifetime still publishes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SxKWxwqxAGckYpRsYTqx3F

* fix: harden OpenID refresh publication

* fix: keep identity and results intact through OpenID refresh cleanup

Two follow-ons from the last round's fixes.

Stripping an expired carried-forward id_token from the refresh result removed
the only identity material a rotation without id_token leaves behind. The
result is rebuilt by buildOIDCTokensFromSession, so it carries no provider
claims() either, and getTokenClaims accepts only those two — bridge recovery
failed with "no usable identity claims" before setOpenIDAuthTokens could hand
back the fresh access token. The stripped token now travels in a
non-enumerable marker, alongside the existing browser and predecessor markers,
which identity resolution reads and the authentication response never sees.

The lease drained a pending renewal by awaiting it in finally, so a transient
coordination failure there threw from finally and replaced the operation's
result. The refresh had already settled and published, so the caller saw a
failure on credentials that had rotated. Proven ownership loss is recorded on
ownershipLost and checked before the return, so the drain has nothing to add
but noise; it now absorbs and logs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SxKWxwqxAGckYpRsYTqx3F

* refactor: fence OpenID recovery publication

* fix: close OpenID publication transaction

* refactor: make OpenID publication transactional

* fix: satisfy OpenID publication type checks

* fix: fence OpenID session publication

* fix: authorize OpenID refresh publication

* fix: bind OpenID replay generations

* fix: fence OpenID response generations

* fix: authorize OpenID token delivery

* fix: linearize OpenID publication delivery

* chore: sort OpenID refresh flight imports

---------

Co-authored-by: J.C. Bartle <jcbartle@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: jbartle <jbartle@rand.org>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: jcbartle <7274202+jcbartle@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-29 23:55:58 -04:00
Danny Avila
14d6ce7caf
🎫 fix: Exclude System Tenant Sentinel from Code API JWT Claims (#15316)
`resolveTenantId` accepted any truthy tenant value, including the
`SYSTEM_TENANT_ID` sentinel that `runAsSystem()` installs for background
work. The expired-file sweep runs entirely under `runAsSystem()`, so on
deployments without multi-tenant onboarding (`file.tenantId` undefined)
it minted Code API tokens claiming `tenant_id: '__SYSTEM__'`.

The Code API derives its storage namespace from that claim, so the
re-derived session key never matches the one cached at upload time and
the delete is rejected with 403. `deleteCodeEnvFile` only treats 404/405
as already-gone, so `expiredAt` is never cleared and the same files are
retried on every sweep cycle and every process boot.

Treat the sentinel as absent tenant context, consistent with every other
identity-bearing `getTenantId()` consumer, so resolution falls through to
`CODEAPI_JWT_SINGLE_TENANT_ID` (both sides default to `legacy`) or fails
fast under `TENANT_ISOLATION_STRICT`.
2026-08-28 09:19:01 -04:00
Marco Beretta
151dc9e03e
📌 fix: Keep Pinned Chats Pinned Through a New Turn (#15230)
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* fix: keep pinned chats in the Pinned section after a new turn

A chat's conversation state snapshots the sidebar-owned flags when the chat
is opened, and the pin mutation never reaches it. Pinning a chat that is
already open therefore leaves a stale `pinned: false` on that state, and the
SSE handlers write it back over both list caches on the next turn. The chat
drops out of Pinned and reappears under Today, since groupConversationsByDate
only skips the rows the chats cache still marks pinned.

Strip `pinned` and `isShared` from the conversation state before it reaches
the caches, and carry the cached row's value forward whenever an updater omits
one. The pin mutation still sends `pinned` explicitly, so unpinning a chat
removes it from the section exactly as before.

The server half of this bug was fixed in #14860, which put `pinned` in
excludedKeys so saveMessageToDatabase's unset sweep stops clearing it, but it
went in without a test. Cover it here: without that entry the sweep unpins the
row on every message, which is what the released builds still do.

* fix: preserve pinned flags during uncached upserts

* fix: narrow nullable SAML profiles

---------

Co-authored-by: Danny Avila <danny@librechat.ai>
2026-08-27 07:47:30 -04:00
Danny Avila
0d0d7d05bb
🧬 fix: Harden SAML Identity Binding (#15264) 2026-08-27 06:45:41 -04:00
Danny Avila
e1178d3c65
🏘️ fix: Scope OpenID User Cache Keys to Signed User Identity (#14837)
* fix(auth): scope OpenID user cache by tenant

* fix(auth): preserve pre-auth cache scope

* fix(auth): type OpenID reuse secret
2026-08-14 15:51:18 -04:00
Dustin Healy
87a8b9aa12
📡 feat: Route Web Search and Scrape Egress through the SSRF-safe Agent (#14606)
* feat(web-search): route outbound search and scrape requests through the SSRF-safe agent

Build the SSRF-safe agents at the web-search tool-assembly site and pass them into the
search tool config so outbound search and scrape connections are validated at connect
time against their resolved IP, on every hop including redirects, consistent with the
other outbound clients.

Add allowedAddresses to webSearchSchema, reusing allowedAddressesSchema, so self-hosters
can permit a deliberately-private search or scrape endpoint (for example a private
SearXNG instance). The field is resolved directly from the webSearch config at the
createSearchTool call site, not through loadWebSearchAuth, because it is config and not
an auth credential. webSearchSchema is flat (providers are chosen by enums, not by
counting keys), so the field is inert with respect to provider selection.

Document the field and its operator warning in librechat.example.yaml, and assert the
wiring in handleTools.test.js: the SSRF-safe agents are threaded into the search tool
config, allowedAddresses is passed through when set, and omitting it still threads the
agents with no exemptions.

TODO awaits @librechat/agents release with the httpAgent hook: this consumes optional
httpAgent/httpsAgent fields on the search-tool config that are not yet in a published
@librechat/agents. package.json is intentionally left at the current version; bump it to
the release that ships the hook before this lands. Validated locally against a revendored
@librechat/agents build, not a published release.

* 🛡️ fix: Apply allowedAddresses to the Web Search SSRF Preflight

The connect-time SSRF agent already honors webSearch.allowedAddresses, but
loadWebSearchAuth ran the isSSRFUrl preflight without it, so an admin-permitted
private search or scrape URL was stripped before the agent could ever use it.

Thread allowedAddresses and the URL's effective port through isSSRFTarget and
resolveHostnameSSRF so the exemption is consistent across both SSRF layers.

* 🛡️ fix: Validate Web Search Destinations and Defer to Configured Proxies

Handing agents to createSearchTool covered only the connect-time DNS lookup,
which Node skips for IP-literal hosts, and a configured proxy connects on our
behalf without running that check. A literal private target such as
http://169.254.169.254 could therefore reach the network.

Route every resolved web-search destination through the existing
applySSRFSafeAgentIfDirect contract so a blocked literal target throws before
any request is made, and withhold the agents when a proxy owns egress, since one
agent pair is shared by every provider and a direct-connect agent on a proxied
connection would break the request while asserting protection the proxy's
network context cannot provide.

* 🛡️ fix: Keep Web Search SSRF Agents Under a Proxy and Restore Pooling

Withholding the agents whenever a proxy was configured removed protection from
every direct and NO_PROXY destination in exchange for preventing a failure that
cannot occur: for an https target Axios substitutes its own CONNECT tunnel, so
the injected agent is never used for the proxy connection. Only a plaintext http
target keeps our agent and repoints it at the proxy, and only a proxy whose
hostname resolves private then trips the connect-time check.

Always pass the agents and exempt the proxy endpoint instead, deriving host:port
from the same PROXY, HTTP_PROXY, and HTTPS_PROXY resolution the rest of LibreChat
uses so the proxy hop stays reachable while destinations remain guarded. Axios
already applies NO_PROXY per request, so bypassed routes keep enforcement with no
extra logic.

Drop the load-time destination validation. It duplicated the isSSRFTarget
preflight for user-provided URLs, rejected admin values that were previously
legal, and threw from inside loadTools, where both loader wrappers swallow the
error and drop every tool for the turn rather than degrading web search alone.

Build the agents with keepAlive and cache them per exemption list. A bare
http.Agent does not pool, so the previous code replaced the pooled global agents
for every search, scrape, and rerank call and allocated a fresh pair per turn.

* 🛡️ fix: Reject IP-Literal Private Targets on Web Search Connections

Node resolves nothing for a literal host, so the connect-time lookup never saw
one: a destination or a redirect target given as http://169.254.169.254 reached
the network. Redirect hops pass through the same createConnection, so checking the
literal there covers both cases and removes the need for a maxRedirects control
that createSearchTool cannot accept.

Gate it behind blockLiteralHosts so only web search opts in. A caller that
reaches a proxy or a deliberate private service by literal address must exempt it
first, and the merged consumers of createSSRFSafeAgents have no such exemption, so
enabling this everywhere would break configurations that work today.

* 🛡️ fix: Keep IPv6 Brackets on Derived Proxy Exemptions

The exemption parser accepts an IPv6 entry only as [ipv6]:port, so stripping the
brackets produced fd00::1:3128, which carries three colons and is dropped as
malformed. An IPv6 proxy therefore stayed unexempted and the connect-time check
rejected it, failing every web-search request routed through it.

Use the URL hostname as parsed, which already carries the brackets.

* 🛡️ fix: Exempt Proxies Configured Through ALL_PROXY

Axios resolves a proxy through proxy-from-env, which falls back to all_proxy in
either case after <protocol>_proxy, so ALL_PROXY on its own is enough to route a
request through a proxy. Exemptions were derived from PROXY, HTTP_PROXY, and
HTTPS_PROXY only, leaving such a proxy unexempted and rejected with ESSRF.

Derive the exemptions from the full set of variables that can put a proxy in
front of these requests instead. The installed proxy-from-env 2.1.0 reads no
npm_config variables, so those are deliberately not included.

* 🛡️ fix: Drop the Unearned PROXY Exemption and Harden the Web Search Guard

Nothing on this path consumes PROXY: Axios resolves proxies through
proxy-from-env, which reads only <protocol>_proxy and all_proxy, and web search
never calls applyAxiosProxyConfig. Exempting it therefore granted a bypass rather
than preserving a working route, and a user-settable search URL that redirects to
that address reached it and returned the body. Remove PROXY and proxy, and skip a
socks endpoint for the same reason, since Axios cannot proxy through one.

Tolerate a non-array allowedAddresses instead of spreading it, which threw out of
loadTools and dropped every tool for the turn. The YAML path is schema-validated
but the admin override path merges without parsing, so the value is reachable.

Separate cache keys with NUL rather than a newline, so an entry containing a
newline cannot collide with two separate entries, and bound the cache. Give the
agents the idle timeout the global agents carry, which keepAlive alone did not
restore. Reject a unix socket, which carries no host to validate. Also treat
fec0::/10 site-local as private, matching the fe80::/10 handling beside it.

Exercise the real resolver in handleTools.test.js rather than mocking it, so the
wiring test now fails if the agents it threads do not actually block a private
target.

* 🛡️ fix: Derive Proxy Exemptions Through Axios's Own Resolver

Unioning every populated proxy variable exempted addresses that never carry a
request. proxy-from-env picks a protocol-specific variable before all_proxy and
lowercase before uppercase, so an ignored value became a trusted host:port that a
redirect onto a direct route could reach. It also normalizes a scheme-less value
such as proxy.internal:3128 to an http URL, where parsing the raw string yielded
an empty hostname and no exemption at all, breaking the proxy hop.

Resolve through getProxyForUrl, the entry point Axios itself calls, so precedence,
scheme normalization, and NO_PROXY match exactly and cannot drift. NO_PROXY
covering everything now yields no exemption, since nothing is proxied. Declared
locally rather than adding a types package, alongside the existing declaration in
the same directory.

Also revert the fec0::/10 site-local change. domain.spec asserts that boundary
deliberately to prove the fe80::/10 mask does not over-reach, and the shared
address schema still classifies fec0 as public, so a runtime block there would
leave operators unable to configure the exemption. It belongs with those two
together, not in this PR.

* 🛡️ fix: Resolve Proxy Exemptions Against the Real Destinations

Resolving against placeholder probe hosts applied destination-specific NO_PROXY
rules to a host nobody dials. With NO_PROXY matching the probe domain but not a
real provider, no exemption was derived even though Axios still proxied the actual
request, so the agent rejected the private proxy hop with ESSRF.

Resolve per configured destination instead, passing the values loadWebSearchAuth
already resolved. Only plaintext http destinations are considered, since for an
https destination Axios substitutes its own CONNECT tunnel and never uses the
injected agent for the proxy connection, which is also why provider defaults need
no exemption: every one of them is https.

* 🛡️ fix: Accept Embedded-IPv4 IPv6 Forms in the Address Exemption Schema

The runtime guard blocks 6to4, NAT64, and Teredo addresses whose embedded IPv4 is
private, but the schema's local copy recognized only ULA, link-local, and the
dotted IPv4-mapped form, so an entry such as [64:ff9b::a00:1]:8080 was dropped as
a public literal. An operator reaching a private endpoint that way could not
configure the exemption at all.

Mirror hasPrivateEmbeddedIPv4 in the schema helper, which the surrounding comment
already asks to keep in sync. Public embedded addresses stay rejected, since an
exemption there has no defensive purpose.
2026-08-10 10:33:54 -04:00