mirror of
https://github.com/danny-avila/LibreChat.git
synced 2026-08-04 06:52:47 +00:00
🛡️ fix: Validate Avatar URL Before Fetch (#12928)
`resizeAvatar` previously called `node-fetch` on any string input with no validation. When OIDC providers surface a user-controllable `picture` claim, this could be used to make blind SSRF requests to internal services on every social login. Wrap the URL fetch with: - An allowlist on the URL protocol (http/https only). - The shared `createSSRFSafeAgents` utility, which blocks resolution to private, loopback, and link-local IPs at TCP connect time (TOCTOU-safe; works equally for hostname targets that DNS-resolve privately and for IP-literal targets, since Node's `net.Socket` always dispatches through the agent's `lookup` hook). - `redirect: 'error'` so a public-IP redirect target cannot be used to bypass the agent check on a subsequent hop. - A 5-second total request budget (node-fetch v2's `timeout` covers request initiation through full body receipt, bounding slow-loris exposure rather than just the TCP connect). - A 10 MB response cap (`size` option + `Content-Length` pre-check + post-read length assertion) so a hostile payload cannot exhaust memory before `sharp()` rejects it. Fetch the canonicalized `parsed.href` rather than the raw input string to eliminate any future parser-differential between `new URL()` and the underlying fetch implementation. Per-call agent construction is intentional: the avatar path runs once per social login per user, so pooling adds complexity without a measurable benefit. Documented inline. Comprehensive test coverage in `avatar.spec.js`: - Rejects malformed URLs, non-http(s) schemes (file://, data:, javascript:). - Asserts the happy-path canonicalization (`fetch` is called with `parsed.href`) and the SSRF-safe agent factory routing (https→httpsAgent, http→httpAgent). - Rejects non-2xx HTTP status. - Rejects an oversized Content-Length before reading the body, and asserts `.buffer()` is never invoked in that case. - Rejects an oversized body even when the server lies about / omits Content-Length. - Surfaces ESSRF, redirect, and `size` overflow errors thrown by the fetch layer. - Confirms Buffer inputs bypass the fetcher entirely.
This commit is contained in:
Danny Avila
GitHub
parent
4cce88be42
commit
c7f38d9621
2 changed files with 256 additions and 6 deletions
|
|
@ -3,8 +3,74 @@ const fs = require('fs').promises;
|
|||
const fetch = require('node-fetch');
|
||||
const { logger } = require('@librechat/data-schemas');
|
||||
const { EImageOutputType } = require('librechat-data-provider');
|
||||
const { createSSRFSafeAgents } = require('@librechat/api');
|
||||
const { resizeAndConvert } = require('./resize');
|
||||
|
||||
const ALLOWED_AVATAR_PROTOCOLS = new Set(['http:', 'https:']);
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Cap response size to bound memory exposure if a malicious or compromised
|
||||
* `picture` URL serves a multi-GB payload. Avatars are at most a few hundred
|
||||
* KB in practice; 10 MB is well past any legitimate use.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
const MAX_AVATAR_BYTES = 10 * 1024 * 1024;
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Fetches an image URL with SSRF protection: rejects non-http(s) schemes,
|
||||
* blocks resolution to private/loopback/link-local IPs at TCP connect time,
|
||||
* refuses to follow redirects to prevent post-validation rebinding, and caps
|
||||
* the response body so a hostile payload cannot exhaust memory before
|
||||
* `sharp()` rejects it.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Per-call agent construction is intentional: avatar fetches are infrequent
|
||||
* (once per social login per user) and pooling adds complexity without a
|
||||
* measurable benefit on this path. If this ever becomes a hot path, hoist
|
||||
* the agents to module scope.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
async function fetchAvatarBuffer(input) {
|
||||
let parsed;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
parsed = new URL(input);
|
||||
} catch {
|
||||
throw new Error('Invalid avatar URL');
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!ALLOWED_AVATAR_PROTOCOLS.has(parsed.protocol)) {
|
||||
throw new Error(`Refusing to fetch avatar over ${parsed.protocol}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const { httpAgent, httpsAgent } = createSSRFSafeAgents();
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* `node-fetch` v2's `timeout` is the total request budget (request initiation
|
||||
* through full body receipt), not a TCP-connect-only timeout. That is the
|
||||
* stronger of the two for this path — bounds total slow-loris exposure.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
const response = await fetch(parsed.href, {
|
||||
agent: (urlObj) => (urlObj.protocol === 'https:' ? httpsAgent : httpAgent),
|
||||
redirect: 'error',
|
||||
timeout: 5000,
|
||||
size: MAX_AVATAR_BYTES,
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
if (!response.ok) {
|
||||
throw new Error(`Failed to fetch image from URL. Status: ${response.status}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const contentLength = parseInt(response.headers.get('content-length') ?? '0', 10);
|
||||
if (contentLength > MAX_AVATAR_BYTES) {
|
||||
throw new Error(`Avatar response too large: ${contentLength} bytes`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Re-check after read in case the server lied about Content-Length or
|
||||
* omitted it. `node-fetch` v2 honors the `size` option above and throws on
|
||||
* overflow, but Defense-in-depth: assert on the actual buffer length.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
const buffer = await response.buffer();
|
||||
if (buffer.length > MAX_AVATAR_BYTES) {
|
||||
throw new Error(`Avatar response too large: ${buffer.length} bytes`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
return buffer;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Uploads an avatar image for a user. This function can handle various types of input (URL, Buffer, or File object),
|
||||
* processes the image to a square format, converts it to target format, and returns the resized buffer.
|
||||
|
|
@ -29,12 +95,7 @@ async function resizeAvatar({ userId, input, desiredFormat = EImageOutputType.PN
|
|||
|
||||
let imageBuffer;
|
||||
if (typeof input === 'string') {
|
||||
const response = await fetch(input);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!response.ok) {
|
||||
throw new Error(`Failed to fetch image from URL. Status: ${response.status}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
imageBuffer = await response.buffer();
|
||||
imageBuffer = await fetchAvatarBuffer(input);
|
||||
} else if (input instanceof Buffer) {
|
||||
imageBuffer = input;
|
||||
} else if (typeof input === 'object' && input instanceof File) {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
189
api/server/services/Files/images/avatar.spec.js
Normal file
189
api/server/services/Files/images/avatar.spec.js
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
|
|||
/**
|
||||
* Tests for the SSRF-safe avatar fetcher in `avatar.js`.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The function is the sole line of defense against SSRF when a social
|
||||
* login surfaces a user-controllable `picture` URL. We assert each
|
||||
* rejection branch (protocol, status, redirect, size, agent) and the
|
||||
* happy path so that a future refactor of the fetch / agent / URL
|
||||
* handling cannot silently break the protection.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
jest.mock('node-fetch');
|
||||
jest.mock('@librechat/api', () => ({
|
||||
createSSRFSafeAgents: jest.fn(() => ({
|
||||
httpAgent: { __kind: 'http' },
|
||||
httpsAgent: { __kind: 'https' },
|
||||
})),
|
||||
}));
|
||||
jest.mock('@librechat/data-schemas', () => ({
|
||||
logger: { info: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(), debug: jest.fn() },
|
||||
}));
|
||||
jest.mock('librechat-data-provider', () => ({
|
||||
EImageOutputType: { PNG: 'png' },
|
||||
}));
|
||||
jest.mock('./resize', () => ({
|
||||
resizeAndConvert: jest.fn(async ({ inputBuffer }) => ({ buffer: inputBuffer })),
|
||||
}));
|
||||
jest.mock('sharp', () => {
|
||||
const sharpFn = jest.fn();
|
||||
return sharpFn;
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
const fetch = require('node-fetch');
|
||||
const { createSSRFSafeAgents } = require('@librechat/api');
|
||||
const sharp = require('sharp');
|
||||
const { resizeAvatar } = require('./avatar');
|
||||
|
||||
function makeResponse({ ok = true, status = 200, body = Buffer.from(''), contentLength } = {}) {
|
||||
return {
|
||||
ok,
|
||||
status,
|
||||
headers: {
|
||||
get: (name) => {
|
||||
if (name.toLowerCase() === 'content-length') {
|
||||
return contentLength != null ? String(contentLength) : null;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return null;
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
buffer: jest.fn(async () => body),
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function makeSharpStub(format = 'png', width = 100, height = 100) {
|
||||
const chain = {
|
||||
metadata: jest.fn(async () => ({ format, width, height })),
|
||||
extract: jest.fn(() => chain),
|
||||
resize: jest.fn(() => chain),
|
||||
gif: jest.fn(() => chain),
|
||||
toBuffer: jest.fn(async () => Buffer.from('squared')),
|
||||
};
|
||||
return chain;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const callResize = (input) => resizeAvatar({ userId: 'u1', input });
|
||||
|
||||
describe('resizeAvatar — fetchAvatarBuffer', () => {
|
||||
beforeEach(() => {
|
||||
jest.clearAllMocks();
|
||||
sharp.mockImplementation(() => makeSharpStub());
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe('rejects unsafe inputs before any network call', () => {
|
||||
it('rejects a malformed URL string', async () => {
|
||||
await expect(callResize('not-a-url')).rejects.toThrow('Invalid avatar URL');
|
||||
expect(fetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('rejects file:// URLs', async () => {
|
||||
await expect(callResize('file:///etc/passwd')).rejects.toThrow(/Refusing to fetch.*file:/);
|
||||
expect(fetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('rejects data: URLs', async () => {
|
||||
await expect(callResize('')).rejects.toThrow(
|
||||
/Refusing to fetch.*data:/,
|
||||
);
|
||||
expect(fetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('rejects javascript: URLs', async () => {
|
||||
await expect(callResize('javascript:void(0)')).rejects.toThrow(
|
||||
/Refusing to fetch.*javascript:/,
|
||||
);
|
||||
expect(fetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe('happy path', () => {
|
||||
it('returns a processed buffer for a valid https URL', async () => {
|
||||
fetch.mockResolvedValueOnce(makeResponse({ body: Buffer.from('rawimg') }));
|
||||
const result = await callResize('https://cdn.example.com/avatar.png');
|
||||
expect(fetch).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
|
||||
// `parsed.href` canonicalizes the input — assert we did not pass the raw string.
|
||||
expect(fetch.mock.calls[0][0]).toBe('https://cdn.example.com/avatar.png');
|
||||
const opts = fetch.mock.calls[0][1];
|
||||
expect(opts.redirect).toBe('error');
|
||||
expect(opts.timeout).toBe(5000);
|
||||
expect(opts.size).toBe(10 * 1024 * 1024);
|
||||
expect(typeof opts.agent).toBe('function');
|
||||
expect(result).toEqual(Buffer.from('squared'));
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('passes an SSRF-safe agent factory routing https→httpsAgent and http→httpAgent', async () => {
|
||||
fetch.mockResolvedValueOnce(makeResponse({ body: Buffer.from('rawimg') }));
|
||||
await callResize('https://cdn.example.com/avatar.png');
|
||||
const agentFn = fetch.mock.calls[0][1].agent;
|
||||
expect(agentFn(new URL('https://anything'))).toEqual({ __kind: 'https' });
|
||||
expect(agentFn(new URL('http://anything'))).toEqual({ __kind: 'http' });
|
||||
expect(createSSRFSafeAgents).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe('rejects unsafe responses', () => {
|
||||
it('rejects non-2xx HTTP status', async () => {
|
||||
fetch.mockResolvedValueOnce(makeResponse({ ok: false, status: 500 }));
|
||||
await expect(callResize('https://cdn.example.com/avatar.png')).rejects.toThrow(
|
||||
/Status:\s*500/,
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('rejects an oversized Content-Length header before reading the body', async () => {
|
||||
const oversize = 11 * 1024 * 1024;
|
||||
const resp = makeResponse({ contentLength: oversize });
|
||||
fetch.mockResolvedValueOnce(resp);
|
||||
await expect(callResize('https://cdn.example.com/big.png')).rejects.toThrow(
|
||||
/Avatar response too large.*11534336/,
|
||||
);
|
||||
// We must not even read the body once the header has already disqualified it.
|
||||
expect(resp.buffer).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('rejects a body whose actual size exceeds the cap (lying / missing Content-Length)', async () => {
|
||||
const oversize = Buffer.alloc(11 * 1024 * 1024);
|
||||
// No content-length header — server lies or omits.
|
||||
fetch.mockResolvedValueOnce(makeResponse({ body: oversize }));
|
||||
await expect(callResize('https://cdn.example.com/lies.png')).rejects.toThrow(
|
||||
/Avatar response too large.*11534336/,
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe('propagates fetch-layer errors', () => {
|
||||
it('surfaces SSRF rejection thrown by the agent (ESSRF)', async () => {
|
||||
const ssrfError = Object.assign(new Error('SSRF protection: 127.0.0.1 blocked'), {
|
||||
code: 'ESSRF',
|
||||
});
|
||||
fetch.mockRejectedValueOnce(ssrfError);
|
||||
await expect(callResize('http://internal.attacker.example/img.png')).rejects.toThrow(
|
||||
/SSRF protection/,
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('surfaces redirect rejection from `redirect: error`', async () => {
|
||||
const redirectError = Object.assign(new Error('redirect mode is set to error'), {
|
||||
type: 'no-redirect',
|
||||
});
|
||||
fetch.mockRejectedValueOnce(redirectError);
|
||||
await expect(callResize('https://cdn.example.com/redirected.png')).rejects.toThrow(
|
||||
/redirect mode/,
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('surfaces a `size` overflow thrown by node-fetch', async () => {
|
||||
const sizeError = Object.assign(new Error('content size at 11534336 over limit: 10485760'), {
|
||||
type: 'max-size',
|
||||
});
|
||||
fetch.mockRejectedValueOnce(sizeError);
|
||||
await expect(callResize('https://cdn.example.com/large.png')).rejects.toThrow(/over limit/);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe('non-string inputs bypass the fetcher', () => {
|
||||
it('accepts a Buffer input directly without calling fetch', async () => {
|
||||
const buf = Buffer.from('inline');
|
||||
const result = await callResize(buf);
|
||||
expect(fetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
|
||||
expect(result).toEqual(Buffer.from('squared'));
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue