mirror of
https://github.com/danny-avila/LibreChat.git
synced 2026-11-16 13:00:55 +00:00
🔐 fix: Resolve Tool Grants Once Per Request and Pair Every Capability Gate
Four review rounds found thirteen issues, all one class: a boundary the permission check had not been copied into. Rounds 2 and 3 each found gaps created by the previous round's fix, and a manual sweep of tool constructors and upload routes still missed the `codeEnvAvailable` family entirely — because the thing worth enumerating is not "paths that reach a tool" but "reads of the capability". There are 28 such reads. This replaces per-site permission checks with one resolution per request, pairs every read that is a gate, and pins the list so a new one cannot be added silently. - `resolveToolRoleGrants` resolves `RUN_CODE` and `FILE_SEARCH` together and memoizes on the request. Both perf findings disappear by construction: gates share one role read instead of each issuing its own. - Newly paired gates: `codeEnvAvailable` in the OpenAI-compatible, Responses and memory-agent initializers (`initializeAgent` rebuilds `bash_tool`, `read_file` and the workspace file tools from it, and hands their handlers the code environment); the capability checks in agent upload processing and in agent-management upload purposes; and the library chat-completion service, behind an optional `getRoleByName` dependency so embedders are not broken. - The v1 Knowledge upload posts `assistant_id` with no `tool_resource`, so there is no resource to authorize. It now reads the assistant's own native tools and requires their grants, instead of treating a missing resource as unrestricted. - The startup role read moved off the critical path into the existing `Promise.all`, and the direct tool-call check passes `req` so the shared loader gate reuses its result rather than repeating the lookup. - `toolCapabilityGates.spec.js` pins every file that reads either capability with a count and a reason. A new read fails the suite until it is classified, so the next boundary announces itself instead of waiting for a reviewer.
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parent
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commit
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13 changed files with 337 additions and 27 deletions
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@ -174,6 +174,8 @@ jest.mock('@librechat/agents', () => ({
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jest.mock('@librechat/api', () => ({
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createAgentExecutionContext: (context) => context,
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/** Grants both by default; the capability set is what these specs vary. */
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resolveToolRoleGrants: jest.fn(async () => ({ runCode: true, fileSearch: true })),
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collectReachableAgents: (roots) => {
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const agents = [];
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const pending = [...roots];
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@ -197,6 +197,8 @@ jest.mock('@librechat/agents', () => ({
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jest.mock('@librechat/api', () => ({
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createAgentExecutionContext: (context) => context,
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/** Grants both by default; the capability set is what these specs vary. */
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resolveToolRoleGrants: jest.fn(async () => ({ runCode: true, fileSearch: true })),
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SAFE_CONVERSATION_TITLE: 'New Chat',
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resolveConversationTitle: (...args) => mockResolveConversationTitle(...args),
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/** Pass-through: the controller strips UI-only activity-label parts
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@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ const {
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resolveRunFadingTiers,
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createContextMetaPublisher,
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selectRunContextMetaToPublish,
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resolveToolRoleGrants,
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} = require('@librechat/api');
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const {
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Run,
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@ -2870,6 +2871,14 @@ class AgentClient extends BaseClient {
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* tool registered unconditionally; without this passthrough the
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* memory path would silently lose code-execution tooling). */
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const memoryCapabilities = new Set(appConfig?.endpoints?.[EModelEndpoint.agents]?.capabilities);
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/** Same pairing as the chat initializers: the capability is the deployment
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* switch, the grant is the role's. Request-memoized, so on the usual path
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* this joins the lookup the tool loader already made. */
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const memoryToolGrants = await resolveToolRoleGrants({
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req: this.options.req,
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getRoleByName: db.getRoleByName,
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context: 'memoryAgent',
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});
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const agent = await initializeAgent(
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{
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req: this.options.req,
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@ -2881,7 +2890,8 @@ class AgentClient extends BaseClient {
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? EModelEndpoint.agents
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: memoryConfig.agent?.provider,
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},
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codeEnvAvailable: memoryCapabilities.has(AgentCapabilities.execute_code),
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codeEnvAvailable:
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memoryCapabilities.has(AgentCapabilities.execute_code) && memoryToolGrants.runCode,
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statefulSessionsAvailable: memoryCapabilities.has(AgentCapabilities.stateful_code_sessions),
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},
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{
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@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ const {
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stripActivityLabelParts,
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executeAgentRun,
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waitForAgentExecutionWrites,
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resolveToolRoleGrants,
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} = require('@librechat/api');
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const {
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buildSummarizationHandlers,
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@ -489,12 +490,20 @@ const executeOpenAIChatCompletion = async (envelope, { req, res }) => {
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};
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const enabledCapabilities = new Set(agentsEConfig?.capabilities);
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/** Started before the memory read rather than awaited on its own line, so
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* the role lookup overlaps that query instead of preceding it. */
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const toolRoleGrants = resolveToolRoleGrants({ req, getRoleByName: db.getRoleByName });
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const memoryAvailable = await resolveMemoryAvailability({
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enabledCapabilities,
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memoryConfig: appConfig?.memory,
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user: req.user,
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getRoleByName: db.getRoleByName,
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});
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/** The deployment switch AND the role grant: `initializeAgent` rebuilds
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* `bash_tool`, `read_file` and the workspace file tools from this flag,
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* and forwards the code-environment context to their handlers. */
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const codeEnvAvailable =
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enabledCapabilities.has(AgentCapabilities.execute_code) && (await toolRoleGrants).runCode;
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const skillsCapabilityEnabled = enabledCapabilities.has(AgentCapabilities.skills);
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const ephemeralSkillsToggle = request.ephemeralAgent?.skills === true;
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const accessibleSkillIds = skillsCapabilityEnabled
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@ -559,7 +568,7 @@ const executeOpenAIChatCompletion = async (envelope, { req, res }) => {
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skillsCapabilityEnabled,
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ephemeralSkillsToggle,
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}),
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codeEnvAvailable: enabledCapabilities.has(AgentCapabilities.execute_code),
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codeEnvAvailable,
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backgroundToolsAvailable: enabledCapabilities.has(AgentCapabilities.run_in_background),
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toolIntentsAvailable: enabledCapabilities.has(AgentCapabilities.tool_intents),
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statefulSessionsAvailable: enabledCapabilities.has(
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@ -638,7 +647,7 @@ const executeOpenAIChatCompletion = async (envelope, { req, res }) => {
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}),
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skillStates,
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defaultActiveOnShare,
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codeEnvAvailable: enabledCapabilities.has(AgentCapabilities.execute_code),
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codeEnvAvailable,
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backgroundToolsAvailable: enabledCapabilities.has(AgentCapabilities.run_in_background),
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toolIntentsAvailable: enabledCapabilities.has(AgentCapabilities.tool_intents),
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statefulSessionsAvailable: enabledCapabilities.has(
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@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ const {
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CHILD_THREAD_READ_ONLY_ERROR,
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executeAgentRun,
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waitForAgentExecutionWrites,
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resolveToolRoleGrants,
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} = require('@librechat/api');
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const {
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createResponsesToolEndCallback,
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@ -736,12 +737,20 @@ const executeResponse = async (envelope, { req, res }) => {
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};
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const enabledCapabilities = new Set(agentsEConfig?.capabilities);
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/** Started before the memory read rather than awaited on its own line, so
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* the role lookup overlaps that query instead of preceding it. */
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const toolRoleGrants = resolveToolRoleGrants({ req, getRoleByName: db.getRoleByName });
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const memoryAvailable = await resolveMemoryAvailability({
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enabledCapabilities,
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memoryConfig: appConfig?.memory,
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user: req.user,
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getRoleByName: db.getRoleByName,
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});
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/** The deployment switch AND the role grant: `initializeAgent` rebuilds
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* `bash_tool`, `read_file` and the workspace file tools from this flag,
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* and forwards the code-environment context to their handlers. */
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const codeEnvAvailable =
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enabledCapabilities.has(AgentCapabilities.execute_code) && (await toolRoleGrants).runCode;
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const skillsCapabilityEnabled = enabledCapabilities.has(AgentCapabilities.skills);
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const ephemeralSkillsToggle = request.ephemeralAgent?.skills === true;
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const accessibleSkillIds = skillsCapabilityEnabled
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@ -806,7 +815,7 @@ const executeResponse = async (envelope, { req, res }) => {
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skillsCapabilityEnabled,
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ephemeralSkillsToggle,
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}),
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codeEnvAvailable: enabledCapabilities.has(AgentCapabilities.execute_code),
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codeEnvAvailable,
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backgroundToolsAvailable: enabledCapabilities.has(AgentCapabilities.run_in_background),
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toolIntentsAvailable: enabledCapabilities.has(AgentCapabilities.tool_intents),
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statefulSessionsAvailable: enabledCapabilities.has(
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@ -885,7 +894,7 @@ const executeResponse = async (envelope, { req, res }) => {
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}),
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skillStates,
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defaultActiveOnShare,
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codeEnvAvailable: enabledCapabilities.has(AgentCapabilities.execute_code),
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codeEnvAvailable,
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backgroundToolsAvailable: enabledCapabilities.has(AgentCapabilities.run_in_background),
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toolIntentsAvailable: enabledCapabilities.has(AgentCapabilities.tool_intents),
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statefulSessionsAvailable: enabledCapabilities.has(
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@ -131,7 +131,11 @@ const callTool = async (req, res) => {
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logger.debug(`[${toolId}/call] User: ${req.user.id}`);
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let hasAccess = true;
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if (toolAccessPermType[toolId]) {
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/** `req` is what puts this read in the request cache, so the shared
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* `loadTools` gate below resolves the same grant for free instead of
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* issuing a second serial role lookup before the sandbox call. */
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hasAccess = await checkAccess({
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req,
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user: req.user,
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permissionType: toolAccessPermType[toolId],
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permissions: [Permissions.USE],
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@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ const {
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ioredisClient,
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mapAgentManagementError,
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restoreTenantContextFromReq,
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resolveToolRoleGrants,
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} = require('@librechat/api');
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const { checkBan, configMiddleware, createFileLimiters } = require('~/server/middleware');
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const { hasCapability } = require('~/server/middleware/roles/capabilities');
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@ -96,10 +97,12 @@ const fileHandlers = createAgentManagementFileHandlers({
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return await checkCapability(req, AgentCapabilities.context);
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}
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if (purpose === EToolResources.execute_code) {
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return await checkCapability(req, AgentCapabilities.execute_code);
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const grants = await resolveToolRoleGrants({ req, getRoleByName: db.getRoleByName });
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return (await checkCapability(req, AgentCapabilities.execute_code)) && grants.runCode;
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}
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if (purpose === EToolResources.file_search) {
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return await checkCapability(req, AgentCapabilities.file_search);
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const grants = await resolveToolRoleGrants({ req, getRoleByName: db.getRoleByName });
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return (await checkCapability(req, AgentCapabilities.file_search)) && grants.fileSearch;
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}
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return true;
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},
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@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ const {
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buildSubagentThreadTaskConfig,
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backgroundCompletionWakeupsEnabled,
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createLazyAgentHistoryResolver,
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checkToolRolePermission,
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resolveToolRoleGrants,
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} = require('@librechat/api');
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const {
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ResourceType,
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@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ const {
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MAX_SUBAGENT_GRAPH_NODES,
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MAX_SUBAGENT_RUN_CONFIGS,
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isEphemeralAgentId,
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PermissionTypes,
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resolveAllowedStatefulCodeEnvironments,
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} = require('librechat-data-provider');
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const {
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@ -228,21 +227,15 @@ const initializeClient = async ({
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* allowlist with the toggle on = full accessible catalog. */
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const enabledCapabilities = new Set(appConfig?.endpoints?.[EModelEndpoint.agents]?.capabilities);
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const skillsCapabilityEnabled = enabledCapabilities.has(AgentCapabilities.skills);
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/** Capability alone is not enough: `initializeAgent` rebuilds `bash_tool`,
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* `read_file` and the workspace file tools from this flag, after the tool
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* loader has already dropped `execute_code` for a denied role. Those handlers
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* read and write the attached code environment, so the grant has to travel
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* with the flag. Short-circuits before the role read when the deployment has
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* the capability off. */
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const codeEnvAvailable =
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enabledCapabilities.has(AgentCapabilities.execute_code) &&
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(await checkToolRolePermission({
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req,
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user: req?.user,
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permissionType: PermissionTypes.RUN_CODE,
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getRoleByName: db.getRoleByName,
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context: 'initializeClient',
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}));
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const codeCapabilityEnabled = enabledCapabilities.has(AgentCapabilities.execute_code);
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/** Started here but joined into the startup `Promise.all` below rather than
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* awaited inline: `codeEnvAvailable` is not read until agent construction, so
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* the role lookup overlaps the memory, skill and conversation queries instead
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* of delaying them. Skipped entirely when the deployment has the capability
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* off, since the flag is false either way. */
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const toolRoleGrantsPromise = codeCapabilityEnabled
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? resolveToolRoleGrants({ req, getRoleByName: db.getRoleByName, context: 'initializeClient' })
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: null;
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const backgroundToolsAvailable = enabledCapabilities.has(AgentCapabilities.run_in_background);
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const toolIntentsAvailable = enabledCapabilities.has(AgentCapabilities.tool_intents);
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const deferredToolsAvailable = enabledCapabilities.has(AgentCapabilities.deferred_tools);
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@ -525,6 +518,7 @@ const initializeClient = async ({
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{ skillStates, defaultActiveOnShare },
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{ primaryAgent, modelsConfig },
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requestConversation,
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toolRoleGrants,
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] = await Promise.all([
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memoryAvailablePromise,
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accessibleSkillIdsPromise,
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@ -533,9 +527,17 @@ const initializeClient = async ({
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skillStatesPromise,
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validatedPrimaryAgentPromise,
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requestConversationPromise,
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toolRoleGrantsPromise,
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]);
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delete endpointOption.agent;
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/** The deployment switch AND the role grant. `initializeAgent` rebuilds
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* `bash_tool`, `read_file` and the workspace file tools from this flag after
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* the tool loader has already dropped `execute_code` for a denied role, and
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* forwards the code-environment context to their handlers — so the grant has
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* to travel with the flag, not just with the tool list. */
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const codeEnvAvailable = codeCapabilityEnabled && toolRoleGrants?.runCode === true;
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const agentConfigs = new Map();
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const allowedProviders = new Set(appConfig?.endpoints?.[EModelEndpoint.agents]?.allowedProviders);
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@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ const {
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contentFilterBlockResponse,
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sweepExpiredFiles: sweepExpiredFilesWithDeps,
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startExpiredFileSweep: startExpiredFileSweepWithDeps,
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resolveAssistantToolPermissions,
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resolveToolRoleGrants,
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} = require('@librechat/api');
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const {
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convertImage,
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@ -606,6 +608,22 @@ const processFileUpload = async ({ req, res, metadata, sseStream }) => {
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});
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if (isAssistantUpload && !metadata.message_file && !metadata.tool_resource) {
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/** A v1 Knowledge upload posts `assistant_id` with no `tool_resource`, so
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* there is no resource name to authorize against. The assistant's own
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* native tools are what the file will feed, so read those and require the
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* grant for each: otherwise a denied role attaches new inputs to an
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* assistant that still carries `retrieval` or `code_interpreter`, without
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* passing either writer's filter. */
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const assistant = await openai.beta.assistants.retrieve(metadata.assistant_id);
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const isNativeToolPermitted = await resolveAssistantToolPermissions({
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req,
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tools: assistant?.tools,
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getRoleByName: db.getRoleByName,
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});
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const deniedTool = (assistant?.tools ?? []).find((tool) => !isNativeToolPermitted(tool));
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if (deniedTool) {
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throw new Error(`Forbidden: Insufficient permissions for ${deniedTool.type}`);
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}
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await openai.beta.assistants.files.create(metadata.assistant_id, {
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file_id: id,
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});
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@ -702,7 +720,10 @@ const processAgentFileUpload = async ({ req, res, metadata, sseStream }) => {
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const entity_id = messageAttachment === true ? undefined : agent_id;
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const basePath = mime.getType(file.originalname)?.startsWith('image') ? 'images' : 'uploads';
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if (tool_resource === EToolResources.execute_code) {
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const isCodeEnabled = await checkCapability(req, AgentCapabilities.execute_code);
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const isCodeEnabled =
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(await checkCapability(req, AgentCapabilities.execute_code)) &&
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(await resolveToolRoleGrants({ req, getRoleByName: db.getRoleByName, context: 'fileUpload' }))
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.runCode;
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if (!isCodeEnabled) {
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throw new Error('Code execution is not enabled for Agents');
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}
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@ -746,7 +767,10 @@ const processAgentFileUpload = async ({ req, res, metadata, sseStream }) => {
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executionProfile: 'default',
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});
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} else if (tool_resource === EToolResources.file_search) {
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const isFileSearchEnabled = await checkCapability(req, AgentCapabilities.file_search);
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const isFileSearchEnabled =
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(await checkCapability(req, AgentCapabilities.file_search)) &&
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(await resolveToolRoleGrants({ req, getRoleByName: db.getRoleByName, context: 'fileUpload' }))
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.fileSearch;
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if (!isFileSearchEnabled) {
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throw new Error('File search is not enabled for Agents');
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}
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113
api/server/services/__tests__/toolCapabilityGates.spec.js
Normal file
113
api/server/services/__tests__/toolCapabilityGates.spec.js
Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
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const fs = require('fs');
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const path = require('path');
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/**
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* `FILE_SEARCH` and `RUN_CODE` are enforced by pairing each read of the matching
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* `AgentCapabilities` entry with the role grant from `resolveToolRoleGrants`.
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* The capability is the deployment switch; the grant is the per-role half. A
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* read that gets one without the other is a hole — which is how every gap in
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* this area has been found: a boundary nobody knew existed.
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*
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* So the boundary list is pinned here. Adding a read of either capability fails
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* this test until it is classified below, which is the point: the classification
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* is the review, and it cannot be skipped by not knowing the site exists.
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*/
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const REPO_ROOT = path.resolve(__dirname, '../../../..');
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const SEARCH_ROOTS = ['api/app', 'api/server', 'packages/api/src', 'packages/data-provider/src'];
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const CAPABILITY_PATTERN =
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/AgentCapabilities\.(execute_code|file_search)\b|EToolResources\.code_interpreter\b/;
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/**
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* Every file holding at least one read, with the count and why each is sound.
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* Counts rather than line numbers so ordinary edits above a gate don't churn it.
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*/
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const CLASSIFIED = {
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// -- Gates: capability AND grant --------------------------------------------
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/** 7 gates + 2 map entries + 2 warning-list entries. */
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'api/server/services/ToolService.js': 11,
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/** `codeEnvAvailable`, paired after the startup batch. */
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'api/server/services/Endpoints/agents/initialize.js': 1,
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/** `codeEnvAvailable` for the OpenAI-compatible route. */
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'api/server/controllers/agents/openai.js': 1,
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/** `codeEnvAvailable` for the Responses route. */
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'api/server/controllers/agents/responses.js': 1,
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/** `codeEnvAvailable` for the memory-agent initializer. */
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'api/server/controllers/agents/client.js': 1,
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/** Upload processing: the code-environment and file-search branches. */
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'api/server/services/Files/process.js': 2,
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/** Agent-management upload purposes. */
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'api/server/routes/agents/management.js': 2,
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/** One gate, paired when the embedder wires `getRoleByName`; one in a comment. */
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||||
'packages/api/src/agents/openai/service.ts': 2,
|
||||
|
||||
// -- Not gates ---------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
/** The upload-resource map entry, and one mention in a doc comment. */
|
||||
'packages/api/src/tools/rolePermissions.ts': 2,
|
||||
/** `recordCapabilityToolNames` bookkeeping — describes what was built, does
|
||||
* not decide whether to build it. */
|
||||
'packages/api/src/agents/initialize.ts': 2,
|
||||
/** Default capability list shipped in config. */
|
||||
'packages/data-provider/src/config.ts': 2,
|
||||
/** Config normalization only: strips stale `tool_options` when the capability
|
||||
* is off. Execution is gated by the loaders, so this needs no grant. */
|
||||
'api/server/controllers/agents/v1.js': 1,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
/** @returns {string[]} repo-relative files under `dir`, excluding tests. */
|
||||
function walk(dir) {
|
||||
const entries = fs.readdirSync(dir, { withFileTypes: true });
|
||||
return entries.flatMap((entry) => {
|
||||
const full = path.join(dir, entry.name);
|
||||
if (entry.isDirectory()) {
|
||||
return entry.name === 'node_modules' || entry.name === 'dist' ? [] : walk(full);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!/\.(js|ts)$/.test(entry.name) || /\.(test|spec)\.[jt]s$/.test(entry.name)) {
|
||||
return [];
|
||||
}
|
||||
return [full];
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function collectReads() {
|
||||
const found = {};
|
||||
for (const root of SEARCH_ROOTS) {
|
||||
for (const file of walk(path.join(REPO_ROOT, root))) {
|
||||
const matches = fs
|
||||
.readFileSync(file, 'utf8')
|
||||
.split('\n')
|
||||
.filter((line) => CAPABILITY_PATTERN.test(line));
|
||||
if (matches.length > 0) {
|
||||
found[path.relative(REPO_ROOT, file)] = matches.length;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return found;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
describe('FILE_SEARCH / RUN_CODE capability reads are all classified', () => {
|
||||
const found = collectReads();
|
||||
|
||||
it('has no unclassified file reading a role-gated capability', () => {
|
||||
const unclassified = Object.keys(found)
|
||||
.filter((file) => CLASSIFIED[file] == null)
|
||||
.sort();
|
||||
|
||||
expect({
|
||||
unclassified,
|
||||
hint: 'A new read of AgentCapabilities.execute_code / file_search or EToolResources.code_interpreter. Pair it with resolveToolRoleGrants, then record it in CLASSIFIED with why it is sound.',
|
||||
}).toEqual({ unclassified: [], hint: expect.any(String) });
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('has no classified file whose read count drifted', () => {
|
||||
const drifted = Object.entries(CLASSIFIED)
|
||||
.filter(([file, expected]) => (found[file] ?? 0) !== expected)
|
||||
.map(([file, expected]) => `${file}: expected ${expected}, found ${found[file] ?? 0}`)
|
||||
.sort();
|
||||
|
||||
expect({
|
||||
drifted,
|
||||
hint: 'A capability read was added or removed. If added, pair it with the grant before updating the count.',
|
||||
}).toEqual({ drifted: [], hint: expect.any(String) });
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
|
@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ import {
|
|||
} from '~/middleware/modelBoundContent';
|
||||
import { contentFilterBlockResponse, isContentFilterError } from '~/middleware/contentFilter';
|
||||
import { contentFilterUninspectableResponse } from '~/protection/files';
|
||||
import { resolveToolRoleGrants } from '../../tools/rolePermissions';
|
||||
import { createMCPRuntimeRequestBody } from '~/mcp/request';
|
||||
import { getUserFacingProviderError } from '../errors';
|
||||
import { collectReachableAgents } from '../traversal';
|
||||
|
|
@ -119,6 +120,12 @@ export interface ChatCompletionDependencies {
|
|||
* keep tenant tracing and code execution working.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
appConfig?: AppConfig;
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Supply to have `codeEnvAvailable` respect the caller's `RUN_CODE` grant as
|
||||
* well as the deployment capability. Optional so existing embedders keep
|
||||
* their current behavior; without it this route is gated by capability alone.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
getRoleByName?: Parameters<typeof resolveToolRoleGrants>[0]['getRoleByName'];
|
||||
/** Tool execute options for event-driven tool execution */
|
||||
toolExecuteOptions?: ToolExecuteOptions;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -668,7 +675,15 @@ export async function createAgentChatCompletion(
|
|||
agentsConfig != null && typeof agentsConfig === 'object'
|
||||
? ((agentsConfig as { capabilities?: string[] }).capabilities ?? []).includes(capability)
|
||||
: undefined;
|
||||
const codeEnvAvailable = capabilityEnabled(AgentCapabilities.execute_code);
|
||||
const capabilityAllowsCodeEnv = capabilityEnabled(AgentCapabilities.execute_code);
|
||||
/** Paired with the role grant when the embedder wires `getRoleByName`;
|
||||
* `initializeAgent` rebuilds `bash_tool`, `read_file` and the workspace
|
||||
* file tools from this flag, so a denied role would otherwise keep the
|
||||
* code environment's file handlers. */
|
||||
const codeEnvAvailable =
|
||||
capabilityAllowsCodeEnv === true && deps.getRoleByName != null
|
||||
? (await resolveToolRoleGrants({ req, getRoleByName: deps.getRoleByName })).runCode
|
||||
: capabilityAllowsCodeEnv;
|
||||
/** Mirror `codeEnvAvailable` for the stateful-session gate so this route
|
||||
* also carries each agent's trusted stateful endpoint/profile selection
|
||||
* into tool loading and prewarming. */
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import {
|
|||
resolveToolRolePermissions,
|
||||
toolResourceRolePermissions,
|
||||
assistantToolRolePermissions,
|
||||
resolveToolRoleGrants,
|
||||
resolveAssistantToolPermissions,
|
||||
checkToolResourceUploadPermission,
|
||||
} from './rolePermissions';
|
||||
|
|
@ -261,3 +262,51 @@ describe('resolveAssistantToolPermissions', () => {
|
|||
expect(permitted(undefined)).toBe(true);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe('resolveToolRoleGrants', () => {
|
||||
it('reports both grants from one role read', async () => {
|
||||
const getRoleByName = jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(buildRole());
|
||||
|
||||
await expect(resolveToolRoleGrants({ req: buildReq(), getRoleByName })).resolves.toEqual({
|
||||
runCode: true,
|
||||
fileSearch: true,
|
||||
});
|
||||
expect(getRoleByName).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('reports each grant independently', async () => {
|
||||
const getRoleByName = jest
|
||||
.fn()
|
||||
.mockResolvedValue(buildRole({ [PermissionTypes.RUN_CODE]: { [Permissions.USE]: false } }));
|
||||
|
||||
await expect(resolveToolRoleGrants({ req: buildReq(), getRoleByName })).resolves.toEqual({
|
||||
runCode: false,
|
||||
fileSearch: true,
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
/** The whole point of centralizing: several gates on one request must not
|
||||
* each pay their own role lookup. */
|
||||
it('memoizes on the request across repeat callers', async () => {
|
||||
const getRoleByName = jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(buildRole());
|
||||
const req = buildReq();
|
||||
|
||||
const [first, second] = await Promise.all([
|
||||
resolveToolRoleGrants({ req, getRoleByName }),
|
||||
resolveToolRoleGrants({ req, getRoleByName }),
|
||||
]);
|
||||
await resolveToolRoleGrants({ req, getRoleByName });
|
||||
|
||||
expect(first).toBe(second);
|
||||
expect(getRoleByName).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('fails both grants closed when the role lookup throws', async () => {
|
||||
const getRoleByName = jest.fn().mockRejectedValue(new Error('unreachable'));
|
||||
|
||||
await expect(resolveToolRoleGrants({ req: buildReq(), getRoleByName })).resolves.toEqual({
|
||||
runCode: false,
|
||||
fileSearch: false,
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -224,3 +224,71 @@ export async function resolveAssistantToolPermissions({
|
|||
return type == null || !denied.has(type);
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Memoizes the resolved grants for the lifetime of one request. */
|
||||
const toolRoleGrantsKey = Symbol.for('librechat.toolRoleGrants');
|
||||
|
||||
export interface ToolRoleGrants {
|
||||
/** `RUN_CODE.USE` — the sandbox, its file tools, and PTC. */
|
||||
runCode: boolean;
|
||||
/** `FILE_SEARCH.USE` — the search tool and its uploads. */
|
||||
fileSearch: boolean;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export interface ResolveToolRoleGrantsParams {
|
||||
req?: ServerRequest;
|
||||
getRoleByName: CheckAccessParams['getRoleByName'];
|
||||
context?: string;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Resolves both tool grants for a request, once.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Every gate on `AgentCapabilities.execute_code` / `file_search` reads its role
|
||||
* half from here, so a boundary is authorized by pairing the capability with a
|
||||
* field of this object rather than by repeating a permission check. The two
|
||||
* lookups run together and the result is memoized on the request, so a startup
|
||||
* that consults several gates — the tool loader, the agent initializer, an
|
||||
* upload handler — pays one role read between them.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Callers that want the read off their critical path can start it early without
|
||||
* awaiting; the memoized promise is what later callers join.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Fails closed: a missing user or a check that throws denies both.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export function resolveToolRoleGrants({
|
||||
req,
|
||||
getRoleByName,
|
||||
context = 'toolRoleGrants',
|
||||
}: ResolveToolRoleGrantsParams): Promise<ToolRoleGrants> {
|
||||
const cache = req as
|
||||
| (ServerRequest & { [toolRoleGrantsKey]?: Promise<ToolRoleGrants> })
|
||||
| undefined;
|
||||
const memoized = cache?.[toolRoleGrantsKey];
|
||||
if (memoized) {
|
||||
return memoized;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const pending = Promise.all([
|
||||
checkToolRolePermission({
|
||||
req,
|
||||
user: req?.user as CheckAccessParams['user'],
|
||||
permissionType: PermissionTypes.RUN_CODE,
|
||||
getRoleByName,
|
||||
context,
|
||||
}),
|
||||
checkToolRolePermission({
|
||||
req,
|
||||
user: req?.user as CheckAccessParams['user'],
|
||||
permissionType: PermissionTypes.FILE_SEARCH,
|
||||
getRoleByName,
|
||||
context,
|
||||
}),
|
||||
]).then(([runCode, fileSearch]) => ({ runCode, fileSearch }));
|
||||
|
||||
if (cache) {
|
||||
Object.defineProperty(cache, toolRoleGrantsKey, { value: pending, enumerable: false });
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return pending;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue