🔐 feat: Enforce Required Two-Factor Authentication (#14731)
Some checks are pending
Backend Unit Tests / Build packages (push) Waiting to run
Backend Unit Tests / Codegraph select (push) Waiting to run
Backend Unit Tests / TypeScript type checks (push) Blocked by required conditions
Backend Unit Tests / Circular dependency checks (push) Waiting to run
Backend Unit Tests / Tests: api (shard 1/3) (push) Blocked by required conditions
Backend Unit Tests / Tests: api (shard 2/3) (push) Blocked by required conditions
Backend Unit Tests / Tests: api (shard 3/3) (push) Blocked by required conditions
Backend Unit Tests / Tests: data-provider (push) Blocked by required conditions
Backend Unit Tests / Tests: data-schemas (push) Blocked by required conditions
Backend Unit Tests / Tests: @librechat/api (shard 1/4) (push) Blocked by required conditions
Backend Unit Tests / Tests: @librechat/api (shard 2/4) (push) Blocked by required conditions
Backend Unit Tests / Tests: @librechat/api (shard 3/4) (push) Blocked by required conditions
Backend Unit Tests / Tests: @librechat/api (shard 4/4) (push) Blocked by required conditions
Codegraph E2E Votes / vote (full suite) (push) Waiting to run
Docker Dev Branch Images Build / publish (push) Waiting to run
Frontend Unit Tests / Client build recovery regression (push) Waiting to run
Frontend Unit Tests / Codegraph select (push) Waiting to run
Frontend Unit Tests / Build packages (push) Waiting to run
Frontend Unit Tests / TypeScript type checks (client) (push) Blocked by required conditions
Frontend Unit Tests / Tests: @librechat/client (push) Blocked by required conditions
Frontend Unit Tests / Tests: Ubuntu (shard 1/2) (push) Blocked by required conditions
Frontend Unit Tests / Tests: Ubuntu (shard 2/2) (push) Blocked by required conditions
Frontend Unit Tests / Vite build verification (push) Blocked by required conditions
Sync Locize Translations & Create Translation PR / Sync Translation Keys with Locize (push) Waiting to run
Sync Locize Translations & Create Translation PR / Create Translation PR on Version Published (push) Blocked by required conditions

* feat: enforce required two-factor authentication

Require local and LDAP accounts to enroll in TOTP before they can use the
app when ENFORCE_TWO_FACTOR_AUTHENTICATION is set. Sign-in, refresh, bearer
verification, optional share auth and image authorization all route an
unenrolled account into a staged setup flow, and every bearer credential
minted before enrollment or a password reset is retired.

Password reset retirement uses the existing credentialsChangedAt stamp, and
commitPasswordReset clears any staged enrollment in the same write. Passkey
sign-in follows the same enrollment gate as password sign-in.

* test: cover passkey sign-in handing off to required enrollment

* refactor: keep Mongoose user types out of two-factor auth contracts

* fix: withdraw a minted session when its retirement recheck fails

* fix: hold Agent API keys and the reset CLI to the required two-factor policy

* fix: adopt a setup token handed off after the setup screen mounted

* fix: move every tab that receives an enrollment hand-off into setup

* fix: read the enrollment gate's retirement cutoff in system scope

* fix: clear minted session cookies before the fallible session deletion

* fix: adopt a setup token persisted before the setup screen subscribed
This commit is contained in:
Marco Beretta 2026-10-01 23:39:51 +02:00 • committed by GitHub
parent 557038bd6b
commit 92432e95d5
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG key ID: B5690EEEBB952194
119 changed files with 10630 additions and 826 deletions

View file

@ -1,88 +1,22 @@
const cookie = require('cookie');
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
const { isEnabled } = require('@librechat/api');
const { logger, runAsSystem } = require('@librechat/data-schemas');
const { SystemRoles } = require('librechat-data-provider');
const {
createOptionalShareFileAuth,
clearCloudFrontCookies,
isTwoFactorEnrollmentRequired,
isTokenRetired,
isEnabled,
} = require('@librechat/api');
const { getUserById, findSession } = require('~/models');
const verifySignedUserId = (token) => {
try {
const payload = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_REFRESH_SECRET);
return typeof payload?.id === 'string' ? payload.id : null;
} catch {
return null;
}
};
const getRefreshTokenUserId = async (token) => {
const userId = verifySignedUserId(token);
if (!userId) {
return null;
}
const session = await runAsSystem(() => findSession({ userId, refreshToken: token }));
return session ? userId : null;
};
const getOpenIdUserId = (parsed, req) => {
if (parsed.token_provider !== 'openid' || !isEnabled(process.env.OPENID_REUSE_TOKENS)) {
return null;
}
const sessionRefreshToken = req.session?.openidTokens?.refreshToken;
if (!parsed.refreshToken || parsed.refreshToken !== sessionRefreshToken) {
return null;
}
return verifySignedUserId(parsed.openid_user_id);
};
/**
* Fallback auth for share file routes that are hit by `<img>`/anchor requests,
* which can't carry the bearer access token. Resolves the viewer from the
* `refreshToken` cookie (or an active OpenID session plus signed `openid_user_id`
* cookie) so non-public shared links can authorize the viewer's ACL. Never
* blocks: on any failure it leaves `req.user` unset and lets
* `canAccessSharedLink` decide (public access, 401, or 403).
*/
const optionalShareFileAuth = async (req, res, next) => {
if (req.user) {
return next();
}
try {
const cookieHeader = req.headers.cookie;
if (!cookieHeader) {
return next();
}
const parsed = cookie.parse(cookieHeader);
const userId =
getOpenIdUserId(parsed, req) ||
(parsed.refreshToken ? await getRefreshTokenUserId(parsed.refreshToken) : null);
if (!userId) {
return next();
}
// Resolve in system context: this runs before canAccessSharedLink establishes
// the share tenant, so under strict tenant isolation a tenant-scoped User
// query would otherwise throw. The viewer's id comes from verified, active
// cookie auth; the share's tenant-scoped ACL check still gates access.
const user = await runAsSystem(() =>
getUserById(userId, '-password -__v -totpSecret -backupCodes'),
);
if (user) {
user.id = user._id.toString();
if (!user.role) {
user.role = SystemRoles.USER;
}
req.user = user;
}
} catch (error) {
logger.warn('[optionalShareFileAuth] cookie auth failed:', error?.message);
}
return next();
};
module.exports = optionalShareFileAuth;
module.exports = createOptionalShareFileAuth({
parseCookie: cookie.parse,
getUserById,
findSession,
runAsSystem,
clearCloudFrontCookies,
enrollmentRequired: isTwoFactorEnrollmentRequired,
tokenRetired: isTokenRetired,
enabled: isEnabled,
warn: (...args) => logger.warn(...args),
});