3x-ui/internal/web/controller/api_auth_test.go
Sanaei 37c5e0bfd2
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feat(node): node hardening — mTLS, hashed+zstd reconcile transport, per-node net metrics (#5382)
* fix(api-docs): document clientIpsByGuid route

Restores a green `go test ./...` baseline: TestAPIRoutesDocumented
flagged POST /panel/api/clients/clientIpsByGuid (added in 9385b6c6)
as undocumented in endpoints.ts.

* test(node): characterize current node TLS + API auth behavior

Phase 0 regression net for the mTLS work. These pass on unchanged
production code and lock the pre-mTLS contracts so later phases can be
proven additive:

- tlsConfigForNode: skip -> InsecureSkipVerify (no VerifyConnection);
  pin -> VerifyConnection installed.
- checkAPIAuth: bearer match -> Next + api_authed; unauthenticated ->
  401 (XHR) / 404; valid session -> Next.
- panel HTTPS listener with no ClientAuth accepts a client that presents
  no client certificate (the browsers-keep-working invariant).

* feat(crypto): node-auth CA + client-cert minting (TDD)

Stdlib-only ECDSA P-256 helpers for the node mTLS work:
- GenerateNodeCA: self-signed CA (IsCA, CertSign, path len 0)
- IssueClientCert: client-auth leaf (ExtKeyUsageClientAuth) signed by CA
- LoadCAFromPEM: parse a CA cert+key for issuing / trust-pool building

Tests assert the contract (leaf verifies against the issuing CA with
ExtKeyUsageClientAuth), seen failing on the assertion before impl.

* feat(node): lazy node mTLS CA + client cert in settings (TDD)

SettingService gains opt-in mTLS material, all stored as Setting rows
with empty defaults and kept out of entity.AllSetting (so private keys
never reach the settings UI/export):
- EnsureNodeMtlsCA: mint+persist the node-auth CA once, reuse thereafter
- EnsureMasterClientCert: issue the master client cert from the CA, idempotent
- NodeMtlsClientCAPool: ClientCAs trust pool for the listener; nil when
  unconfigured so the no-mTLS path is unchanged

Tests assert idempotency and that the client cert verifies against the CA
for client auth; seen failing on the assertion before impl.

* feat(node): mtls client TLS config + master-cert provider (TDD)

tlsConfigForNode gains an 'mtls' branch that presents the master client
certificate and verifies the node server against system roots (no
InsecureSkipVerify, no custom RootCAs). The cert is supplied via an
injected MasterClientCertProvider so runtime need not import service;
it fails closed when unconfigured. skip/pin contracts unchanged.

* feat(node): allow tokenless mtls nodes in remote do() (TDD)

mtls nodes authenticate with a client certificate, so the bearer token
becomes optional for them: do() no longer rejects an empty ApiToken when
TlsVerifyMode is mtls, and the Authorization header is omitted when no
token is set. Every other mode still requires a token (regression kept).

* feat(node): authenticate verified client certs in checkAPIAuth (TDD)

A completed mTLS handshake (non-empty r.TLS.VerifiedChains) now
authenticates an API request, equivalent to a valid bearer token, and
sets api_authed so the CSRF middleware lets cert-authed mutations
through. Bearer/session/reject paths unchanged. The accept-path assert
was mutation-checked (guard flipped -> test red -> reverted).

* feat(node): opt-in mTLS on the panel listener (TDD; mutation-checked)

web.go now applies VerifyClientCertIfGiven + ClientCAs to the HTTPS
listener when a node trust CA is configured, and wires the master client
cert provider for outbound mtls calls. With no CA the listener is
byte-identical to before (browsers unaffected).

applyNodeMtls is covered end-to-end: no-cert client handshakes (browsers
keep working), a CA-signed client cert verifies, a foreign-CA cert is
rejected at the handshake. Mutation-checked:
- RequireAndVerifyClientCert -> no-cert client rejected (red) -> reverted
- drop ClientCAs -> master cert no longer trusted (red) -> reverted

* feat(node): accept mtls verify-mode + CA reveal endpoint (TDD)

- model.Node.TlsVerifyMode validator now accepts 'mtls'
- normalize() preserves mtls and requires the node scheme to be https
  (fail closed), instead of clamping mtls back to verify
- NodeService.NodeMtlsCaCert + POST /panel/api/nodes/mtls/ca return this
  panel's node-auth CA cert (public) to paste into a node, minting the CA
  + master client cert on first call
- endpoints.ts documents the new route (doc-sync test)

No model column added (enum is a string), so no migration/codegen.

* feat(node): node mTLS UI + trust-CA setter (TDD)

Backend:
- NodeService.SetNodeMtlsTrustCA + POST /panel/api/nodes/mtls/trustCA
  store the CA this panel trusts for incoming node-API client certs
  (validates PEM, empty clears); applied on next restart
- endpoints.ts + regenerated openapi.json document both mtls routes

Frontend:
- node form: 'mtls' TLS-verify option + setup hint (zod enum updated)
- Nodes page 'Node mTLS' card: copy this panel's CA, and paste/save the
  trusted parent CA
- en-US i18n keys (other locales fall back to en-US)

Gates green: go build (native+windows), vet, go test ./...; frontend
typecheck, lint, vitest (541).

* style(node): gofmt web_mtls_test doc comment

* feat(node): hashed+zstd reconcile transport (TDD, negotiated, mixed-version safe)

Adds an integrity + compression envelope to node config pushes:
- internal/util/wirecodec: shared zstd codec (bomb-capped decode) +
  SHA-256 hashing + the header/capability constants
- Remote.do(): always attaches X-Config-Sha256 of the uncompressed body;
  zstd-compresses only when the node advertised support (learned from its
  X-3x-Node-Caps response header) and the body is >=1KiB
- ConfigEnvelopeMiddleware on /panel/api: advertises the cap, decompresses
  and verifies the hash (handler not invoked on mismatch) before binding

Mixed-version safe: old nodes never advertise the cap -> plain bodies;
the hash header is verify-if-present so any panel/node mix interoperates
(existing reconcile tests stay green). klauspost/compress promoted to a
direct dep. Hash-mismatch reject was mutation-checked (compare defeated
-> test red -> reverted).

* feat(node): per-node network throughput metrics (TDD)

The node status response already carries gopsutil netIO.up/down (summed
non-virtual interfaces), so no node-side change is needed:
- probe() parses netIO.up/down into HeartbeatPatch.NetUp/NetDown
- Node gains net_up/net_down columns (AutoMigrate); UpdateHeartbeat
  persists them and appends netUp/netDown to the per-node metric history
- NodeMetricKeys whitelists netUp/netDown so the history endpoint serves them
- NodeHistoryPanel renders Net Up/Down sparklines (KB/s, no 0-100 clamp)
- regenerated frontend types + openapi.json for the new Node fields

* feat(node): move node mTLS controls into a toolbar button + modal

The Node mTLS panel was an always-visible card cluttering the nodes
page. Replace it with a 'Node mTLS' button beside 'Add node' that opens
a modal with the same copy-CA + trusted-parent-CA controls; the modal
closes on a successful save. No backend/i18n changes.

* i18n(node): translate mTLS + net-metrics keys for all locales

Adds the node mTLS strings (tlsMtls, mtlsFormHint, mtls.* dialog + the
saveMtls toast) and the netUp/netDown chart labels to all 12 non-English
catalogs (ar, es, fa, id, ja, pt, ru, tr, uk, vi, zh-CN, zh-TW), matching
each catalog's existing terminology. Technical tokens (mTLS/TLS/CA/API/
KB/s) kept verbatim.

* fix(node): address Copilot review on node-hardening PR

- setting_mtls: fail closed on a half-present CA/master-cert pair instead of
  silently regenerating (which would rotate the CA and break fleet trust).
- config_envelope: reject non-zstd Content-Encoding on the envelope path
  rather than hashing/forwarding a still-encoded body to the handler.
- node mTLS: support tokenless mTLS end-to-end — apiToken is now
  required_unless tlsVerifyMode=mtls (model) with matching conditional
  validation in NodeFormSchema, so the runtime allowance is actually reachable.
- NodesPage: add a catch block to onSaveTrustCa so save failures surface.
2026-06-16 12:19:33 +02:00

203 lines
6.4 KiB
Go

package controller
import (
"crypto/tls"
"crypto/x509"
"net/http"
"net/http/cookiejar"
"net/http/httptest"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"github.com/gin-contrib/sessions"
"github.com/gin-contrib/sessions/cookie"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/database"
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/database/model"
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/util/crypto"
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/web/session"
)
// newAPIAuthTestEngine builds a gin engine that mirrors the production auth
// wiring: the sessions middleware, then checkAPIAuth guarding a sentinel
// handler that reports whether c.Next() was reached and whether api_authed was
// set. The APIController is the zero value, exactly as NewAPIController leaves
// its service fields (they query the global DB), so this exercises the real
// auth path. A fresh temp DB is initialised per test.
func newAPIAuthTestEngine(t *testing.T) (*gin.Engine, *APIController) {
t.Helper()
gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
dbDir := t.TempDir()
t.Setenv("XUI_DB_FOLDER", dbDir)
if err := database.InitDB(filepath.Join(dbDir, "x-ui.db")); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("InitDB: %v", err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = database.CloseDB() })
engine := gin.New()
store := cookie.NewStore([]byte("api-auth-test-secret"))
engine.Use(sessions.Sessions("3x-ui", store))
a := &APIController{}
// Logs in as the first user so the session path can be exercised over a
// cookie round-trip without reaching into checkAPIAuth's internals.
engine.GET("/test-login", func(c *gin.Context) {
u, err := a.userService.GetFirstUser()
if err != nil {
c.Status(http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
if err := session.SetLoginUser(c, u); err != nil {
c.Status(http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
c.Status(http.StatusOK)
})
api := engine.Group("/panel/api")
api.Use(a.checkAPIAuth)
api.GET("/ping", func(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"api_authed": c.GetBool("api_authed")})
})
return engine, a
}
// TestCheckAPIAuth_BearerSuccess characterizes the bearer-token path: a valid
// token reaches the handler and sets api_authed (the contract the later
// client-cert branch must match).
func TestCheckAPIAuth_BearerSuccess(t *testing.T) {
engine, _ := newAPIAuthTestEngine(t)
const plaintext = "characterization-token-value"
if err := database.GetDB().Create(&model.ApiToken{
Name: "t1",
Token: crypto.HashTokenSHA256(plaintext),
Enabled: true,
}).Error; err != nil {
t.Fatalf("seed token: %v", err)
}
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/panel/api/ping", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+plaintext)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
engine.ServeHTTP(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 200; body=%s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
if got := w.Body.String(); got != `{"api_authed":true}` {
t.Fatalf("body = %s, want api_authed true", got)
}
}
// TestCheckAPIAuth_AcceptsVerifiedClientCert asserts that a completed mTLS
// handshake (a non-empty verified client chain) authenticates the request even
// with no bearer token and no session — the equivalent of a valid token — and
// sets api_authed so the CSRF middleware lets mutations through.
func TestCheckAPIAuth_AcceptsVerifiedClientCert(t *testing.T) {
engine, _ := newAPIAuthTestEngine(t)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/panel/api/ping", nil)
req.TLS = &tls.ConnectionState{
VerifiedChains: [][]*x509.Certificate{{&x509.Certificate{}}},
}
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
engine.ServeHTTP(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 200; body=%s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
if got := w.Body.String(); got != `{"api_authed":true}` {
t.Fatalf("body = %s, want api_authed true", got)
}
}
// TestCheckAPIAuth_EmptyVerifiedChainsFallsThrough asserts a TLS request with no
// verified client chain is NOT treated as authenticated (it falls through to the
// bearer/session paths) — so the cert branch can't accidentally authorize plain
// browser HTTPS.
func TestCheckAPIAuth_EmptyVerifiedChainsFallsThrough(t *testing.T) {
engine, _ := newAPIAuthTestEngine(t)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/panel/api/ping", nil)
req.TLS = &tls.ConnectionState{} // handshake done, but no client cert verified
req.Header.Set("X-Requested-With", "XMLHttpRequest")
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
engine.ServeHTTP(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 401 (unauthenticated, no verified chain)", w.Code)
}
}
// TestCheckAPIAuth_RejectsUnauthenticated characterizes the reject paths: no
// bearer token and no session yields 401 for XHR callers and 404 otherwise.
func TestCheckAPIAuth_RejectsUnauthenticated(t *testing.T) {
engine, _ := newAPIAuthTestEngine(t)
cases := []struct {
name string
xhr bool
want int
}{
{"xhr gets 401", true, http.StatusUnauthorized},
{"non-xhr gets 404", false, http.StatusNotFound},
}
for _, c := range cases {
t.Run(c.name, func(t *testing.T) {
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/panel/api/ping", nil)
if c.xhr {
req.Header.Set("X-Requested-With", "XMLHttpRequest")
}
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
engine.ServeHTTP(w, req)
if w.Code != c.want {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want %d", w.Code, c.want)
}
})
}
}
// TestCheckAPIAuth_SessionLoginPasses characterizes the session path: a
// logged-in browser session (no bearer token) reaches the handler.
func TestCheckAPIAuth_SessionLoginPasses(t *testing.T) {
engine, _ := newAPIAuthTestEngine(t)
db := database.GetDB()
var n int64
if err := db.Model(&model.User{}).Count(&n).Error; err != nil {
t.Fatalf("count users: %v", err)
}
if n == 0 {
if err := db.Create(&model.User{Username: "sess", Password: "x"}).Error; err != nil {
t.Fatalf("seed user: %v", err)
}
}
ts := httptest.NewServer(engine)
defer ts.Close()
jar, err := cookiejar.New(nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("cookiejar: %v", err)
}
client := &http.Client{Jar: jar}
loginResp, err := client.Get(ts.URL + "/test-login")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("login: %v", err)
}
loginResp.Body.Close()
if loginResp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("login status = %d, want 200", loginResp.StatusCode)
}
pingResp, err := client.Get(ts.URL + "/panel/api/ping")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ping: %v", err)
}
pingResp.Body.Close()
if pingResp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("session ping status = %d, want 200", pingResp.StatusCode)
}
}