mirror of
https://github.com/MHSanaei/3x-ui.git
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* refactor(session): store user ID in session instead of full struct
Replaces storing the full User object in the session cookie with just
the user ID. GetLoginUser now re-fetches the user from the database on
every request so credential/permission changes take effect immediately
without requiring a re-login. Includes a backward-compatible migration
path for existing sessions that still carry the old struct payload.
* feat(auth): block panel with default admin/admin credentials and guide credential change
checkLogin middleware now detects default admin/admin credentials and
redirects every panel route to /panel/settings until they are changed.
The settings page auto-opens the Authentication tab, shows a
non-dismissible error banner, and lists 'Default credentials' first in
the security checklist. Login response includes mustChangeCredentials
so the login page can redirect directly. Logout is now POST-only.
Password must be at least 10 characters and cannot be admin/admin.
* feat(settings): redact secrets in AllSettingView and add TrustedProxyCIDRs
Introduces AllSettingView which strips tgBotToken, twoFactorToken,
ldapPassword, apiToken and warp/nord secrets before sending them to
the browser, replacing them with boolean hasFoo presence flags. A new
/panel/setting/secret endpoint allows updating individual secrets by
key. Secrets that arrive blank on a save are preserved from the DB
rather than overwritten. Adds TrustedProxyCIDRs as a configurable
setting (defaults to localhost CIDRs). URL fields are validated before
save.
* fix(security): SSRF prevention, trusted-proxy header gating, CSP nonce, HTTP timeouts
Adds SanitizeHTTPURL / SanitizePublicHTTPURL to reject private-range
and loopback targets before any outbound HTTP request (node probe,
xray download, outbound test, external traffic inform, tgbot API
server, panel updater). Forwarded headers (X-Real-IP, X-Forwarded-For,
X-Forwarded-Host) are now only trusted when the direct connection
arrives from a CIDR in TrustedProxyCIDRs. CSP policy is tightened with
a per-request nonce. HTTP server gains read/write/idle timeouts. Panel
updater downloads the script to a temp file instead of piping curl into
shell. Xray archive download adds a size cap and response-code check.
backuptotgbot is changed from GET to POST.
* feat(nodes): add allow-private-address toggle per node
Adds AllowPrivateAddress to the Node model (DB default false). When
enabled it bypasses the SSRF private-range check for that node's probe
URL, allowing nodes hosted on RFC-1918 or loopback addresses (e.g.
a private VPN or LAN setup).
* chore: frontend UX improvements, CI pipeline, and dev tooling
- AppSidebar: logout via POST /logout instead of navigating to GET
- InboundList: persist filter state (search, protocol, node) to
localStorage across page reloads; add protocol and node filter dropdowns
- IndexPage: add health status strip (Xray, CPU, Memory, Update) with
quick-action buttons
- dependabot: weekly go mod and npm update schedule
- ci.yml: add GitHub Actions workflow for build and vet
- .nvmrc: pin Node 22 for local development
- frontend: bump package.json and package-lock.json
- SubPage, DnsPresetsModal, api-docs: minor fixes
* fix(ci): stub web/dist before go list to satisfy go:embed at compile time
* chore(ui): remove health-strip bar from dashboard top
* Revert "feat(auth): block panel with default admin/admin credentials and guide credential change"
This reverts commit 56ce6073ce.
* fix(auth): make logout POST+CSRF and propagate session loss to other tabs
- Switch /logout from GET to POST with CSRFMiddleware so it matches the
SPA's existing HttpUtil.post('/logout') call (previously 404'd silently)
and blocks GET-based logout via image tags or link prefetchers. Handler
now returns JSON; the SPA already navigates client-side.
- Return 401 (instead of 404) from /panel/api/* when the caller is a
browser XHR (X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest) so the axios interceptor
redirects to the login page on logout-in-another-tab, cookie expiry,
and server restart. Anonymous callers still get 404 to keep endpoints
hidden from casual scanners.
- One-shot the 401 redirect in axios-init.js and hang the rejected
promise so queued polls don't stack reloads or surface error toasts
while the browser is navigating away.
- Add the CSP nonce to the runtime-injected <script> in dist.go so the
panel loads under the existing script-src 'nonce-...' policy.
- Update api-docs endpoints.js: GET /logout doc entry was missing.
* fix(settings): POST /logout after credential change
* fix(auth): invalidate other sessions when credentials change
When the admin changes username/password from one machine, sessions
on every other machine kept working until they manually logged out
because session storage is a signed client-side cookie — there is
no server-side session list to revoke.
Add a per-user LoginEpoch counter stamped into the session at login
and re-verified on every authenticated request. UpdateUser and
UpdateFirstUser bump the epoch (UpdateUser via gorm.Expr so a single
update statement is atomic), so any cookie issued before the change
no longer matches the user's current epoch and GetLoginUser returns
nil — the SPA's 401 interceptor then redirects to the login page.
Backward compatible: the column defaults to 0 and missing cookie
values are treated as 0, so sessions issued before this change
remain valid until the first credential update.
---------
Co-authored-by: Sanaei <ho3ein.sanaei@gmail.com>
166 lines
3.8 KiB
Go
166 lines
3.8 KiB
Go
package controller
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import (
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"fmt"
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"net"
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"net/http"
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"net/netip"
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"strings"
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"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/logger"
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"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/web/entity"
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"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/web/service"
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"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
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)
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// getRemoteIp extracts the real IP address from the request headers or remote address.
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func getRemoteIp(c *gin.Context) string {
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remoteIP, ok := extractTrustedIP(c.Request.RemoteAddr)
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if !ok {
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return "unknown"
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}
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if isTrustedProxy(remoteIP) {
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if ip, ok := extractTrustedIP(c.GetHeader("X-Real-IP")); ok {
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return ip
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}
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if xff := c.GetHeader("X-Forwarded-For"); xff != "" {
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for _, part := range strings.Split(xff, ",") {
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if ip, ok := extractTrustedIP(part); ok {
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return ip
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}
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}
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}
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}
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return remoteIP
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}
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func isTrustedForwardedRequest(c *gin.Context) bool {
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remoteIP, ok := extractTrustedIP(c.Request.RemoteAddr)
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return ok && isTrustedProxy(remoteIP)
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}
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func isTrustedProxy(ip string) bool {
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addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(ip)
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if err != nil {
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return false
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}
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trusted := trustedProxyCIDRs()
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for _, value := range strings.Split(trusted, ",") {
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value = strings.TrimSpace(value)
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if value == "" {
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continue
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}
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if prefix, err := netip.ParsePrefix(value); err == nil {
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if prefix.Contains(addr) {
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return true
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}
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continue
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}
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if proxyIP, err := netip.ParseAddr(value); err == nil && proxyIP.Unmap() == addr.Unmap() {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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func trustedProxyCIDRs() (trusted string) {
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trusted = "127.0.0.1/32,::1/128"
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defer func() {
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_ = recover()
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}()
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settingService := service.SettingService{}
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if value, err := settingService.GetTrustedProxyCIDRs(); err == nil && strings.TrimSpace(value) != "" {
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trusted = value
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}
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return trusted
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}
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func extractTrustedIP(value string) (string, bool) {
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candidate := strings.TrimSpace(value)
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if candidate == "" {
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return "", false
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}
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if ip, ok := parseIPCandidate(candidate); ok {
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return ip.String(), true
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}
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if host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(candidate); err == nil {
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if ip, ok := parseIPCandidate(host); ok {
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return ip.String(), true
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}
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}
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if strings.Count(candidate, ":") == 1 {
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if host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(fmt.Sprintf("[%s]", candidate)); err == nil {
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if ip, ok := parseIPCandidate(host); ok {
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return ip.String(), true
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}
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}
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}
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return "", false
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}
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func parseIPCandidate(value string) (netip.Addr, bool) {
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ip, err := netip.ParseAddr(strings.TrimSpace(value))
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if err != nil {
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return netip.Addr{}, false
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}
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return ip.Unmap(), true
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}
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// jsonMsg sends a JSON response with a message and error status.
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func jsonMsg(c *gin.Context, msg string, err error) {
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jsonMsgObj(c, msg, nil, err)
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}
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// jsonObj sends a JSON response with an object and error status.
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func jsonObj(c *gin.Context, obj any, err error) {
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jsonMsgObj(c, "", obj, err)
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}
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// jsonMsgObj sends a JSON response with a message, object, and error status.
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func jsonMsgObj(c *gin.Context, msg string, obj any, err error) {
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m := entity.Msg{
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Obj: obj,
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}
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if err == nil {
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m.Success = true
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if msg != "" {
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m.Msg = msg
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}
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} else {
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m.Success = false
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errStr := err.Error()
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if errStr != "" {
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m.Msg = msg + " (" + errStr + ")"
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logger.Warning(msg+" "+I18nWeb(c, "fail")+": ", err)
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} else if msg != "" {
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m.Msg = msg
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logger.Warning(msg + " " + I18nWeb(c, "fail"))
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} else {
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m.Msg = I18nWeb(c, "somethingWentWrong")
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logger.Warning(I18nWeb(c, "somethingWentWrong") + " " + I18nWeb(c, "fail"))
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}
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}
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c.JSON(http.StatusOK, m)
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}
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// pureJsonMsg sends a pure JSON message response with custom status code.
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func pureJsonMsg(c *gin.Context, statusCode int, success bool, msg string) {
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c.JSON(statusCode, entity.Msg{
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Success: success,
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Msg: msg,
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})
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}
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// isAjax checks if the request is an AJAX request.
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func isAjax(c *gin.Context) bool {
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return c.GetHeader("X-Requested-With") == "XMLHttpRequest"
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}
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